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This dissertation examines the transformation of the United States Navy as a 
fighting organization that took place on the North Atlantic Station between 1874 and 
1897.  At the beginning of this period, the warships assigned to this station were 
collectively administered by a rear-admiral, but were operationally deployed as 
individual units, each of whose actions were directed by their captains.  By 1897 the 
North Atlantic, or “Home” Squadron as it was known, was a group of warships 
constituting a protean battle fleet – that is, an organized body moving and fighting in 
close-order, which meant that the actions of the captains were directed by a commanding 
admiral.     
The development of an American battle fleet resulted in the construction of a new 
organizational identity for the North Atlantic Squadron.  This process was as critical as 
the eventual outcome.  It was not linear, but one in which progress in critical areas was 
modulated by conflicting demands that caused distraction.  From 1874-1888, exercises in 
fleet tactics under steam were carried out sporadically utilizing existing wooden cruising 
 
 
vessels.   From 1889-1894, the last wooden cruisers were decommissioned and the 
Squadron consisted entirely of new steel warships.  Ad-hoc concentrations of vessels for 
purposes besides exercise and training retarded the continued development of doctrine 
and tactics necessary for a multi-ship fighting capability during this time.  However, 
much work was done to develop a concept of multi-ship operations.  From 1895-1897, 
the identity of the North Atlantic Squadron as a combat unit solidified.  Tactical exercises 
were held that had specific offensive and defensive wartime applications.  These 
exercises were necessary to develop a combat capability.   
The results of this study demonstrate that the United States government had an 
interest in developing an offensive naval combat capability as early as the 1870’s.  Based 
on the record of the North Atlantic Squadron, it is argued that imperial aspirations, in the 
sense of possessing a capability to restrict the actions of other great powers in the 
Caribbean region, existed prior to the War of 1898.  However, the process of change 
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“It has to do with the fact that the Navy is not only an armed 
force: it is a society.  In the forty years following the Civil War, this 
society had been forced to accommodate itself to a series of 
technological changes---the steam turbine, the electric motor, the rifled 
shell of great explosive power, case-hardened steel armor, and all the 
rest of it. These changes wrought extraordinary change in ship design, 
and therefore in the concepts of how ships were to be used: that is, in 
fleet tactics, and even in naval strategy. The Navy of this period is a 
paradise for the historian or sociologist in search of evidence of a 



























                                                 
1 Elting E. Morison, "A Case Study of Innovation," Engineering and Science Magazine 13, no. 7 (April 
1950) (1950): 9. 
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This dissertation examines the transformation of the United States Navy as a 
fighting organization that took place on the North Atlantic Station between 1874 and 
1897.  At the beginning of this period, the warships assigned to this station were 
collectively administered by a rear-admiral, but were operationally deployed as 
individual units, each of whose actions were directed by their captains.  By 1897 the 
North Atlantic, or “Home” Squadron as it was known, was a group of warships 
constituting a protean battle fleet – that is, an organized body moving and fighting in 
close-order, which meant that the actions of the captains were directed by a commanding 
admiral.  Its officers and sailors trained and conducted tactical exercises together, cruised 
to overseas ports together, socialized on liberty, and fought together at Santiago de Cuba 
in July of 1898.  The reason for this change in form was a change in function.  The 
objective of American naval power in the event of war shifted from commerce-raiding to 
being able to engage and defeat hostile battle fleets.1
  That the Squadron underwent important changes in the period 1874-1897 is 
unquestioned.  The modern battleships that confronted the Spanish Navy in 1898 are 
  At the same time, moreover, the 
basic materiel of navies was undergoing radical changes.  In 1874 most of the U.S. 
Navy’s inventory consisted of wooden cruising vessels.  The first steel warships were 
authorized in 1883 and entered service between 1885 and 1889.  These unarmored 
cruisers were followed rapidly by armored cruisers, then battleships.  By 1897 the entire 
North Atlantic Squadron was comprised of modern warships. 
                                                 
1 Geroge W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power:  The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 11. 
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proof that significant changes in strategic purpose and materiel took place.  Historians 
have studied both of these aspects extensively.  However, the process the Squadron went 
through to effect these changes has received little attention.  The development of a multi-
ship fighting capability was more than simply a materiel problem.  It involved the 
development of doctrine, tactics, and a hierarchy of command suited to the control of a 
complex fighting organization.  Structurally, official change did not come until the 
designation of a North Atlantic Fleet in 1902, followed quickly by the consolidation of 
the North Atlantic Fleet and the South Atlantic Squadron into the Atlantic Fleet in 1906.  
The North Atlantic Squadron’s identity as a warfighting unit had changed long before 
this, however, having become a combat unit with the cohesion necessary to carry out 
combat operations at the squadron and fleet level in the late 19th century.  This critical 
process of change was accomplished by rigorous exercise at sea.  An inquiry into the 
nature of this process gives insight into the combat effectiveness of the United States 
Navy prior to the War of 1898, as well as the Navy’s role in U.S. imperial aspirations. 
Historiography 
 
The core histories of this period follow two basic lines of argument.2
                                                 
2 Core naval history: “Standard narrative histories of naval policy and operations…which establish the 
master plot.”  See Jon T. Sumida and David A. Rosenberg, “Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, 
and Money: the Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century 
Naval History,” in John B.   Hattendorf, ed. Doing Naval History: Essays Towards Improvement, ed. John 
B. Hattendorf, Naval War College Historical Monograph Series (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 
1995). 
  The first is 
theoretical and strategic in nature, and covers the development of a new strategic purpose 
for the U.S. Navy.  The standard narrative begins with Stephen B. Luce successfully 
agitating for the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884.  Luce then enticed 
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Alfred Thayer Mahan to join the faculty of the new school.  Luce and Mahan became the 
uniformed face of the so-called “navalism” movement.  Together with politicians like 
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, they “called for a navy to fulfill the 
nation’s destiny, and by 1890 agreed that it should be a “blue-water navy” – a battle-
oriented fleet of fighting ships.”3  This narrative typically culminates in the 1890 
publication of Mahan’s opus, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783.  In 
that work, Mahan argued decisively for the abandonment of the traditional U.S. naval 
strategy of coastal defense and commerce raiding and advocated a battle fleet which 
could protect American commerce and sea lines of communication.  The second line of 
argument emphasizes the political and legislative battles which led to the purchase and 
construction of the modern warships which made up the “New Steel Navy.”  This 
narrative typically begins with the Naval Advisory Boards of 1881 and 1882 and the 
authorization of the first four steel warships in 1883.  It then traces the construction of 
various classes of ships, beginning with unarmored cruisers, then armored cruisers, and 
culminating with the introduction of battleships in the mid-1890’s.  The congressional 
battles to secure approval and appropriations for the various building programs are 
detailed.  While some monographs treat only one of the main narratives,4
                                                 
3 Mark R. Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893 (Annapolis, MD: 
U.S. Naval Institute, 1995), 2. 
 most of the 
core histories address them both.  The two lines of argument are deployed in arcs that 
intersect at the War of 1898, where the Navy’s new strategic purpose and newly-
 
4 An example is Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the 
Naval Profession, ed. B.M. III Simpson, U.S. Naval War College Historical Monograph Series (Newport, 




constructed warships are tested in combat.5  Ancillary histories6 explore structural and 
ideological aspects of the changes undergone by the naval officer corps,7 the enlisted 
force8, or the changes wrought by new technologies.9
The traditional narratives are fundamentally incomplete.  None address the crucial 
questions of the process of developing a multi-ship fighting capability.
   
10  With few 
exceptions, very little is said in any of these histories about the day-to-day operations of 
the Navy while engaged in this generation of transition from cruising to the battle line.11
                                                 
5 Kenneth J. Hagen, This People's Navy (New York, NY: MacMillan, Inc., 1991), 180-192; Walter R. 
Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 30-
85; Robert W. Jr. Love, History of the U.S. Navy, Volume 1, 1775-1941, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Harrisburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 1992), 345-382; Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Twelfth ed. 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1918; reprint, 1918); Donald W. Mitchell, History of the 
Modern American Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 22-
23; Harold and Sprout Sprout, Margaret, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, ed. Jack 
Sweetman, Classics of Naval Literature (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1990), 214-257. 
  
If operations are addressed, they are largely dismissed as a rag-tag collection of ships 
 
6 “Ancillary naval history consists of those studies that deal primarily with naval machines, men (including 
biography), manufacturing, and management.”  Sumida and Rosenberg, “Machines, Men, Manufacturing, 
Management, and Money: the Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of 
Twentieth Century Naval History” 
 
7 Donald Chisholm, Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer 
Personnel System, 1793-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Peter Karsten, The Naval 
Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (Annapolis, 
MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2008). 
 
8 Frederick S. Harrod, Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-
1940, ed. Jon L. Wakelyn, Contributions in American History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
 
9 William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945, ed. Merritt Roe 
Smith, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000). 
 
10 George Baer comes the closest.  In a single sentence concerning the designation of the Atlantic Fleet in 
1907, he notes that “fleet formation was necessary.  Maneuvers were conducted accordingly.”  What those 
maneuvers consisted of is left to the reader’s imagination.  See Baer, 24. 
 
11 Exceptions to this rule are Kenneth J. Hagen, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-
1889, Contributions in Military History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973); Stephen S. Roberts, "An 
Indicator of Informal Empire: Patterns of U.S. Navy Cruising on Overseas Stations, 1869-1897," in Fourth 
Naval History Symposium, ed. Craig L. Symonds (United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute, 1979). 
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haphazardly cruising around to various ports, for the purpose of protecting American 
businessmen and their property.12  Mahan and his battleships then arrive on the scene, sui 
generis, just in time to fight the Battles of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba.  This 
approach to U.S. naval history creates a “black box”,13
Organizational Change 
 in which the wooden navy of the 
cruising era is entered in one end, and the New Steel Navy magically appears from the 
other end in time for the War of 1898.  The generation-long struggle of the operational 
Navy to re-create itself is entirely missing.  This ignores the crucial development of the 
doctrine, tactics, and hierarchy of command necessary for a navy to possess a true multi-
ship fighting capability.  The organization that fought the War of 1898 was not an 
inevitable outcome.  The process of organizational change that produced a trained combat 
squadron of armored ships, and that squadron’s combat effectiveness throughout the 
transformation, is the subject of this study. 
 
The introduction of a new technology, in this case armored ships, into an 
organization causes changes in the routines and roles of the organization undergoing the 
change.14
                                                 
12 C.f. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
Twelfth ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1995; reprint, 1985), 228. 
  The North Atlantic Squadron underwent significant changes in both its 
operational routines and its role as a combat unit.  Organizational change is defined in the 
sociological literature as a transformation of an organization between two points in time.  
It can be analyzed either in terms of structural changes – what is actually different at the 
 
13Jon T. Sumida and David A. Rosenberg, “Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, and Money: The 
Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Naval History” in 
Hattendorf, ed., 31. 
 
14 Olga Volkoff, Diane M. Strong, and Michael B. Elmes, "Technological Embeddedness and 
Organizational Change," Organization Science 18, no. 5 (2007). 
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second point in time, or by studying the process undergone by the organization as the 
transformation occurs.  This study takes the latter approach.  Core structural changes for 
an organization take place in the areas of mission, authority structure, technology, and 
marketing strategy (public relations).  I argue that by focusing on the changes in day-to-
day processes, much can be done to unpack the black box of America’s naval 
revolution.15
As the process of change occurred, the organizational identity of the squadron 
changed fundamentally.  Organizational identity is the way in which members perceive 
their organization.  It encompasses all that is central, distinctive, and enduring about the 




                                                 
15 The term “The American Naval Revolution” belongs to Herrick, see Herrick.  For more on organizational 
change, see William P. Barnett, and Carroll, Glenn R., "Modeling Internal Organizational Change," Annual 
Review of Sociology 21, no. (1995). 
  The North Atlantic Squadron ceased to be an administrative unit, which 
largely provided a structure for a flag officer to oversee the individual movements of 
cruising vessels.  It became a combat unit that had to train constantly in order to be ready 
to do battle with an enemy fleet.  Although it was still referred to regularly by its formal 
title: “U.S. Naval Forces on the North Atlantic Station,” by the 1890’s it was much more 
common to see it referred to as the “North Atlantic Squadron”, or simply the “Home 
Squadron”, an indication of its growing identity as a fighting unit.  While engaged in a 
process of organizational change, the squadron took on an identity different than its 
 
16 Jane E. and Dukerich Dutton, Janet M., "Keeping an Eye on the Mirror: Image and Identity in 
Organizational Adaptation," The Academy of Management Journal 34, no. 3 (1991); Dennis A. and 
Thomas Gioia, James B., "Identity, Image, and Issue Interpretation: Sensemaking During Strategic Change 




previous one: that of an organization devoted to learning and readiness.17
The organizational changes and the new identity assumed by the squadron 
required new and different leadership skills from the commanders-in-chief.  Morris 
Janowitz has identified a shift in military leadership during this era, from the 
authoritarian, or “heroic” officer, who led by force of personality and threat of 
punishment, to the “managerial”.  In Janowitz’ words: 
  Its new 
primary mission required time to be spent annually on training for combat as a unit, in 
addition to the previous routine of carrying out drills in individual ships.  Reports to the 
Navy Department on drills and training held for their ships by commanding officers 
become secondary to more frequent reports by the squadron commander-in-chief, 
outlining training and drills undergone by the entire unit. 
“The technology of warfare is so complex that coordination of a complex group of 
specialists cannot be guaranteed simply by authoritarian discipline.  Members of a 
military group recognize their greater mutual dependence on the technical proficiency of 
their team members, rather than the formal authority structure.”18
 
 
Timothy Wolters has argued that naval commanders’ cognitive experience of 
command changed in the early twentieth century.  Traditionally, commanders had been 
trained to take pragmatic action – that is, cognitive action carried out in order to bring 
one immediately closer to a desired end state.  Examples of pragmatic action would 
include such things as directing one’s ship to close with the enemy, ordering the crew to 
general quarters, or ordering the gunners to “open fire.”   Increasingly, commanders had 
to learn to take epistemic action, performed to enable one to direct large-scale fleet 
                                                 
17 On organizational learning as part of the process of organizational change, see Andrew D. and Starkey 
Brown, Ken, "Organizational Identity and Learning: A Psychodynamic Perspective," The Academy of 
Management Review 25, no. 1 (2000). 
 
18 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York, NY: The Free 
Press, 1971; reprint, 1971), 41. 
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maneuvers, by making clearer information that is obscure or difficult to process.  
Examples of this could include receiving reports from subordinate vessels or plotting 
locations of enemy warships.19  Wolters attributes much of this shift to epistemic 
cognition to the introduction of wireless communications.  I argue that a shift in the 
cognitive experience of command for squadron commanders-in-chief was well underway 
before this.  The commander-in-chief of the 1870’s was used to providing administrative 
oversight to ships spread throughout the area of operations.  His function did not include 
leading his organization in combat.  By 1897, the commander-in-chief had to have the 
force of personality to build unit identity and cohesion in a concentrated squadron of 
warships, and lead them in tactical formation under combat conditions.20
Whenever there were enough ships otherwise unassigned and available to sail 
together under a squadron commander-in-chief’s tactical command, there were logistical 
problems.  The major ports which had the facilities and supply lines to handle 
concentrations of multiple ships were New York and Norfolk, Virginia, yet these two 
ports were far from the Squadron’s operational responsibilities in the Caribbean.  Key 
West, Florida, was closer but yellow fever often racked the port, and squadron 
commanders were therefore uneasy about concentrating their ships at that location for 
  Throughout the 
narrative, it will become apparent that the commanders-in-chief who were best able to 
embrace the change to an epistemic cognition, and a managerial leadership style had the 
most success bringing their squadron together as a unit.  Those who had trouble with this 
transition ended up in trouble with the Navy Department and their fellow flag officers. 
                                                 
19 Timothy Scott Wolters, “Managing a Sea of Information: Shipboard Command and Control in the United 
States Navy, 1899-1945” (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), 21-23. 
 
20 For more on the “cognitive experience of command”, see Ibid. 
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long periods of time.  Regardless of where the ships were concentrated, the delivery of 
sufficient amounts of coal to power more than one of the new steel warships was a 
constant concern, and occupied much of a deployed commander-in-chief’s time.  
Signaling was primitive and constantly being changed or experimented with.  Despite 
these obstacles, commanders-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron throughout the late 
1870’s and 1880’s drilled their warships in fleet tactics under steam whenever possible.  
These exercises have not received the attention they deserve from naval historians.   
Although the entire Navy was undergoing organizational change, as a unit of 
analysis it is difficult to focus on the operations of all Navy warships around the world.  
For this reason, it was considered appropriate to select one of the squadrons as most 
representative of the change in the Navy as a whole.  The North Atlantic, or “Home” 
Squadron, therefore is the subject of this study.  Among the cruising stations, only the 
North Atlantic Squadron was expected to carry out two distinct missions: the traditional 
cruising mission of protection of business and commercial interests abroad, as well as the 
protection of the vital cities of the U.S. east coast.21
                                                 
21 It could be argued that the Pacific Squadron had a national defense role with respect to California and the 
Puget Sound region, but that hardly compared with the expectation that the North Atlantic Squadron would 
have the ability to protect cities vital to the national economy, such as New York.   
  Its missions, therefore, most closely 
resembled European squadrons such as the Royal Navy’s Channel Squadron, which were 
equipped with the most modern materiel.  Throughout the period studied, the North 
Atlantic Squadron received the latest equipment first, was close enough to the capital for 
the commander-in-chief to consult often in person with the Navy Department, and it 
worked closely with the Naval War College to implement the latest thinking in tactics.  
The North Atlantic Station was considered to be a “plum” flag officer assignment.  Often, 
a perspective commander-in-chief would have already completed a C-in-C tour in one of 
10 
 
the lesser squadrons before being rewarded with command of the coveted North Atlantic 
Squadron.  A study of the process of change from a cruising navy to one that expected to 
fight in a battle line would rightfully start here. 
At the close of the Civil War, the Navy Department moved to reestablish the 
overseas cruising stations that had been abandoned at the war’s outbreak.  Established by 
order of the Navy Department on the first of November, 1865, the North Atlantic 
Squadron was formed by joining together the Atlantic Coast and West India Squadrons.  
At the time of its formation, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles noted that:  
“These squadrons…have, by one or more of their vessels, during the year visited nearly 
every principal port of the world.  The views of the department enjoining activity, and the 
exhibition of the flag of our navy wherever our commerce penetrated, have been 
faithfully observed, and the reappearance of our men-of-war has been welcomed, not 
only by our countrymen, but by the people of every nation which they have visited.”22
 
 
The post-war national naval strategy is clear in the Secretary’s remarks.  The navy was, 
in the words of one junior officer, “absorbed in police duty for the State Department.”23
Perhaps, then, tactical operations during this period have been rightfully de-
emphasized by naval historians who have grappled with larger questions of strategy and 
policy?  History is an attempt to understand the thought processes of those who have 




                                                 
22 Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy on the Operations of the 
Department, with Accompanying Documents for the Year 18661866. 
  This is important.  Even though the ships they commanded were 
unarmored and had been designed for a naval strategy of commerce raiding, the fact that 
the Navy Department desired the capability to engage an enemy in line-of-battle 
 
23 A. P. Niblack, "Discussion of Prize Essay, 1895," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 21, no. 2 (1895). 
 




formation, and repeatedly ordered this capability practiced whenever an opportunity 
presented itself, suggests imperial and expansionist tendencies in the United States prior 
to the 1890’s.  This critical decade in U.S. history can only be understood in the context 
of the preceding half-century.25
Evidence exists for America’s “outward thrust”
  To the extent that the North Atlantic Squadron was 
becoming less an administrative collection of ships and more an integrated combat unit, it 
can be argued that expansion and possible conflict with European powers was being 
conceived as early as 1874.  In this way, an inquiry into the construction of the North 
Atlantic Squadron’s identity provides evidence in the debate on the nature of imperialism 
and the United States.   
26
                                                 
25On this, see for example, Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 
1860-1898, Fourth ed. (Itaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963; reprint, Fourth), 61. 
 in the day-to-day operations of 
the North Atlantic Squadron.  The twenty-three year span studied saw growing numbers 
of squadron exercises and attempts to solve the problems of maneuvering, short and long 
range signaling, basing strategies, coaling, and leadership.  These problems had not been 
completely solved by 1898 but at least “ten years before Mahan”, to borrow a phrase 
from Robert Seager, naval commanders were actively working to perfect fleet tactical 
maneuvering.  It is easy to say that the construction of cruisers, commerce raiders, 
monitors, and other craft associated with an offensive defense in the 1880’s are proof that 
those who were responsible for naval policy had no desire, prior to the authorization of 
the first battleships in 1889, for an overseas combat capability.  It remains to address the 
operational record, however, and ask the question: why were these protected cruisers and 
commerce raiders performing fleet tactics under steam and signaling exercises?  Studying 
 
26 Milton Plesur, America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890 (DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1971). 
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the operational record can uncover the middle ground between cruising responsibilities to 
protect American commerce, lives, and property and the uneasy relationship those 
responsibilities shared with professional naval officers’ attempts to develop a military 
unit with fighting capabilities that would be useful against a peer European competitor.   
The North Atlantic Squadron’s Area of Responsibility 
 
The North Atlantic Squadron was responsible for two regions of intense U.S. 
foreign policy interest: the Caribbean and the Canadian fisheries.  The Squadron spent 
less time and devoted fewer warships to patrolling the fishing grounds off the coast of 
Canada than the Caribbean.  However, the touchy diplomatic situation surrounding 
fishing rights in the waters off Great Britain’s Canadian colonies consistently threatened 
the otherwise-improving U.S. – British relations during this era.  The rights of U.S. 
fishermen had been recognized as early as the Treaty of Paris, which ended the 
Revolutionary War in 1783.  Although U.S. fishermen were no longer part of the British 
Empire, their livelihood rested in the cod fisheries off the coast of Newfoundland, and 
U.S. negotiators made recognition of this fact by the British a requirement for peace. 
This recognition came in the form of Article III of the Treaty of Paris, which 
granted two things to American fishermen: the right to fish in the waters off 
Newfoundland and in all other international waters, and the liberty to come ashore at 
uninhabited points along the Canadian coast to dry and preserve their catch.  This last 
provision was just as important as the right to fish in the days before refrigeration and 
modern methods of getting a catch to market.  Thirty years later, the War of 1812 caused 
confusion over the agreed-upon fishing rights, as the British government maintained that 
the Treaty of Paris had been nullified by the outbreak of hostilities in 1812.  This 
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necessitated a new agreement, The Fisheries Convention of 1818, which stipulated more 
precisely the exact geographic boundaries within which U.S. fishermen could both fish 
and approach the sure to dry and preserve their catch.  It also forbade U.S. vessels from 
approaching any other harbors or settled areas not specifically authorized for any purpose 
other than to seek emergency shelter, repair damage, or purchase wood or water.  The 
purpose was to prevent black market trading between U.S. fishing vessels and the 
Canadian mainland.  The final treaty between the two nations which addressed fishing 
was the Treaty of Washington, signed in 1871 to settle the Civil War-era Alabama 
claims.  The Treaty of Washington reaffirmed rights for both American and Canadian 
fishermen, with an additional $5.5 million payment from the United States to Great 
Britain to compensate for what was judged to be greater concessions by the British.27
While the controversies over U.S. fishing rights in the northeast occasionally kept 
North Atlantic Squadron warships busy patrolling the fishing grounds, it will be seen that 
the majority of the commander-in-chief’s time tended to be focused to the south.  In the 
Caribbean region, three hotspots kept the Squadron continuously busy.  The island of 
Cuba, less than ninety miles away from mainland United States, had been on the mind of 
Americans since the Revolution.  Generations of antebellum slave owners had coveted 
the island’s land as a site for the expansion of slavery and the southern social and 
economic system.  Postwar expansion enthusiasts were eager to reap the rewards of 
investment in the island’s growing economy.  At least two nineteenth century 
administrations had attempted to buy the island outright from Spain, but had been 
   
                                                 
27 James Phinney III Baxter, "June Meeting: The British High Commissioners at Washington 1871," 
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 65 (October 1832 - May 1936), no. 3 (1936); J. Jay, 
The Fisheries Dispute: A Suggestion for Its Adjustment by Abrogating the Convention of 1818, and Resting 
on the Rights and Liberties Defined in the Treaty of 1783; a Letter to the Honourable William M. Evarts, of 
the United States Senate (Dodd, Mead & company, 1887). 
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rebuffed.  If the U.S. was unable to own Cuba, the next best alternative was a Cuba under 
the control of a weakened Spanish Empire, with a tacit understanding under the Monroe 
Doctrine that the island was not to be transferred to any other colonial power.  As the 
“Cuba Libre” movement grew over the second half of the nineteenth century, the disorder 
caused by Spain’s inept colonial governance threatened U.S. security and economic 
aspirations.28
Another island, Haiti, was a constant source of unrest.  After its independence 
from France in 1804, the nation’s mostly unstable government underwent a series of 
coups, as the military, elites, and commercial classes fought for control.  Stability in Haiti 
was important to the United States for two reasons.  By the 1870’s, the search for 
overseas markets had led U.S. businessmen to Haiti, where U.S. property and 
investments were often in need of protection.  More importantly, the island of Hispaniola 
contained excellent, and highly-coveted, possible locations for naval stations.  The U.S. 
government was acutely aware that whoever controlled these locations controlled the 
access to the Isthmus of Panama, with all its attendant commercial and national security 
implications.  Haiti’s Mole St. Nicholas, site of Columbus’ landing in the New World, 
was one such location.  Repeated attempts by a succession of U.S. administrations to 
purchase or lease Mole St. Nicholas were unsuccessful, but the continual unrest in the 




                                                 
28 L.A. Pérez, The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998), 1-7. 
 
 
29 Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1941); Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States 1714-
1938 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1940). 
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Finally, but perhaps most importantly, was the Isthmus itself.  With the expansion 
westward of the United States, the acquisition of California, and especially the discovery 
of gold in 1849, transit across the isthmus became critical to U.S. interests.  Eventually a 
New York railroad company built a railroad across the isthmus, turning a 4-day passage 
into a 3-hour train ride and making the railroad and everyone financially associated with 
it exceptionally wealthy.  Unfortunately for business investors, this was an area of great 
unrest.  The citizens of Panama had attempted to secede from Gran Colombia several 
times since independence from Spain.  The constant armed uprisings threatened not only 
the peaceful transit across the isthmus, but the property of the U.S.-controlled railroad 
company.  Meanwhile, the attempt by the French builder of the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, to build a canal across the isthmus in the 1880’s raised questions of European 
influence in the Western Hemisphere.  The formal diplomatic relationship between the 
United States and Colombia was governed by an 1846 treaty which guaranteed the right 
of passage across the isthmus in exchange for U.S. guarantees of Colombian sovereignty.  
During the period of this study, U.S. troops would land at Panama twice, and North 
Atlantic Squadron warships would be tasked to call at the port of Aspinwall almost 
continuously, under the terms of the 1846 treaty.30
The U.S. and Empire 
 
 
Historians have pondered the extent to which U.S. actions in the late nineteenth 
century constituted the construction of an “empire.”  The question is problematic, 
                                                 
30 Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1989); John Lindsay-Poland, Emperors in the Jungle: The Hidden History of the U.S. In 
Panama, ed. Glibert M. and Rosenberg Joseph, Emily S., American Encounters / Global Interactions 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Alfred Charles Richard, Jr., The Panama Canal in American 
National Consciousness, 1870-1990 (New York, NY: Garland Publishing Inc., 1990). 
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beginning with the definition of “empire.”  Suggestions range from the imposition of a 
system of government on a subjected people, to dominating the subordinate country’s 
economy.  In any event, Charles Maier argues that an empire requires both sufficient 
military force and the ability to project that force over distance.31  If this is the case, then 
evidence for the argument that the U.S. project had imperial aspirations earlier than the 
1890’s could be found in the operational attempts of the Navy to develop the ability to 
project decisive, concentrated combat power.  By definition, the United States possessed 
an empire when it took possession of the Philippines and Puerto Rico following the War 
of 1898.  However, historians such as William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber 
have claimed imperial aspirations for the United States from much earlier.  Williams 
argued that the agricultural businessmen of the 1870’s and 1880’s, and their desire for 
expanded markets, paved the way for the naval buildup of the 1890’s and the subsequent 
articulation of the “frontier” thesis by historians such as Turner and Adams.32   After the 
U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 historians filled the bookshelves 
with analysis of the United States as an imperial power.  Many of these works were 
polemical in nature, aimed at the Bush Administration and its wars, but all were 
convinced that the roots of “empire” ran deep in the United States.33
                                                 
31 Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: 2006), 
61. 
  For the Navy’s part, 
 
32 LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898; Walter Nugent, Habits 
of Empire: A History of American Expansionism (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008); William 
Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of 
Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York, NY: Random House, 1969); William 
Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present 
Predicament Along with a Few Thoughts About an Alternative (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1980). 
 
33 Sidney Lens, The Forging of the American Empire: From the Revolution to Vietnam - a History of U.S. 
Imperialism (London, UK: 2003); Maier; Gretchen Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe 
Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire (Durham, NC: 2005); Nugent. 
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Stephen Roberts asserts that the deployment patterns of the U.S. Navy and the ports 
visited from 1869 to 1897 indicate a pattern of “informal empire”, using the definition 
provided by British historians Gallagher and Robinson, as well as William Appleman 
Williams.34
Dissertation Overview 
  One of the arguments of this dissertation is that an analysis of the daily 
operations of the North Atlantic Squadron, with an inquiry into the extent to which it 
developed an identity as a coherent combat unit, can be used as evidence of presence or 
absence of U.S. imperial aspirations.  Such study of the operational record suggests a 
recognition by the U.S. government in the 1870’s that the challenges to U.S. policy in the 
Caribbean region were about to increase in magnitude.  The increasing competition 
between the great powers meant that the U.S. Navy would have to possess the capability 
to do more than simply police the status quo with the tacit approval and assistance of the 
Royal Navy.  To the extent that there was a desire to restrict the actions of other great 
powers in the region, it can be argued that U.S. imperial aspirations existed well prior to 
the War of 1898. 
 
What follows, then, is a narrative of the operations of the U.S. Navy’s North 
Atlantic Squadron during the years 1874 to 1897.  The selection of the timeframe is 
deliberate.  This is a study of operations amidst changes in structure and organizational 
identity during an interwar period.  The Civil War Union Navy was a massive 
undertaking purchased and hastily built for the express purpose of combating the 
Confederacy and was largely dismantled within months of Appomattox.  Other than 
understanding the very specific naval strategy that Abraham Lincoln employed to win the 





Civil War, the experience has very little to say about the strategic capabilities of the Navy 
beyond the lengthy southern coastline of the North American continent, or its desire to 
participate in overseas expansion.  By the same token, this is not a battle piece about 
Manila Bay or Santiago de Cuba.  Both engagements, and the Spanish-American-Cuban 
War of 1898, have no shortage of historians eager to write about them in great detail.   
Chapter One, “The North Atlantic Squadron, the Virginius Affair and the Birth of 
Squadron Exercises, 1874-1881” first examines developments in naval tactics in the mid-
nineteenth century, introducing Commodore Foxhall A. Parker as the recognized U.S. 
expert in this area.  It discusses the post-Civil War sea and shore organization of the U.S. 
Navy, describing in particular the North Atlantic Squadron and comparing its warships 
with Royal Navy units that shared similar missions.  It then turns to the 1873-1874 
concentration of the warships of the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and European 
stations at Key West, Florida, during a war scare with Spain.  When threatened with war, 
the Navy Department reacted in a manner that was exactly opposite the naval strategy 
they had embraced for public consumption.  Rather than reinforce vital ports and prepare 
to sweep Spain’s commerce from the seas through a robust program of commerce 
raiding, the Navy Department concentrated its wooden cruising warships and monitors, 
attempting to prepare for a multi-ship action against Spain’s fleet.  This series of 
exercises was so noteworthy that Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, assigned to the 
Lighthouse Board at the time, kept a copy of the handwritten journal of the fleet’s 
movements with his personal papers.35
                                                 
35 Stephen B. Luce, RADM, "Journal of the Movements of the U.S.N.A. Fleet, Commencing February 3, 
1874, 1874," Ship's Log, Stephen B. Luce Papers, Washington, D.C. . 
  This naval visionary recognized, as this study 
argues, that the maneuvers of the inefficient and obsolescent wooden warships marked 
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the beginning of a process of significant change for the Navy.  The future change in 
squadron identity is personified by Commander William Cushing, the commanding 
officer of the Wyoming.  The month prior to the exercises, he and his ship had been one 
of the first responders to the capture of Virginius.  While in Cuba, he had acted alone, on 
his own initiative, to protect U.S. citizens and property overseas.  A month later, during 
the Key West exercises, Wyoming steamed second in a column of ships, with Cushing 
taking orders from the flag officer in command.  It is a vivid illustration of the coming 
change in the cognitive experience of command, both for the commanding officers of the 
warships as well as the commander-in-chief.  The 1877 deployment of North Atlantic 
Squadron sailors to the Washington D.C. area during domestic labor unrest provides an 
example of the continued identification of the Navy with the protection of commercial 
interests – in this case at home, as well as abroad. 
In Chapter Two, “Towards a New Identity: 1882-1888,” the growth in the practice 
of holding squadron maneuvers is analyzed, providing evidence for the beginning of a 
change in identity for the squadron from an administrative organization to a combat unit.  
The early efforts of Rear Admiral Cooper to drill his wooden steam vessels are detailed, 
as are Rear Admiral Jouett’s intervention in Panama and Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce’s 
handling of unrest in Haiti and in the Canadian fishing waters.  The latter part of the 
chapter centers on Luce’s innovative vision for a theoretical and operational partnership 
between the Naval War College and the North Atlantic Squadron.  He had hoped to use 
his position as commander-in-chief of the squadron to complement his work at the Naval 
War College and develop the U.S. Navy’s ability to fight fleet actions.  The time had not 
yet come, however, for the primary mission of the squadron to be recognized as training 
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and preparation for combat.  The State Department still mandated the presence of U.S. 
warships throughout the North Atlantic Squadron’s area of operations, and to his great 
disappointment, Luce was repeatedly unable to concentrate enough of his ships in one 
place to conduct tactical exercises. 
Chapter Three, “The North Atlantic Squadron and the Squadron of Evolution, 
1889-1891” discusses the acquisition and operational employment of the Navy’s first 
four warships of the “New Steel Navy”, the so-called “ABCD ships.”  Although they 
were cruisers, the decision was made to operate them as a squadron – the “Squadron of 
Evolution.”  It was led by Rear Admiral John G. Walker, who had spent the previous 
eight years as the powerful chief of the Bureau of Navigation and Detail.  Walker was a 
leader who displayed at once the understanding of what it meant to lead a squadron as a 
military unit, and the limitations that flag officers raised in the “old navy” faced when 
trying to adapt the old “heroic” style of leadership to the “managerial” skills required in a 
new world shaped by steam propulsion and telegraph communications.  Walker’s role 
leading the Squadron of Evolution is contrasted with Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi’s 
experience in command of the North Atlantic Squadron during the same time.  While 
Walker led his squadron as a coherent unit, Gherardi was largely forced by various crises 
to manage his warships in the old-fashioned mode, detailing them throughout the 
Caribbean to carry out Navy Department tasking.  Epitomizing the “warrior-diplomat” of 
bygone years, Gherardi became personally involved in diplomatic negotiations with the 
Haitian government.  The limitations of the incompletely-developed hierarchy of 




In Chapter Four: “The Limits of Ad-hoc Crisis Response, 1892-1894”, Rear 
Admirals John G. Walker and Bancroft Gherardi changed roles.  Rear Admiral Walker’s 
Squadron of Evolution was broken up in late 1891, and he eventually became the 
commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron.  He immediately had to cope with 
the Navy Department ordering his warships to various Caribbean ports as crises arose.  
Meanwhile, Gherardi was given command of the Squadron for Special Service, and then 
the Naval Review Fleet, and his leadership style had to become more like Walker’s as he 
struggled to develop the cohesion and unit identity necessary for those forces to carry out 
their missions successfully.  Gherardi’s commands provided more opportunity for the 
development of a concept of multi-ship operations, but were limited in their ability to 
develop the doctrine and tactics necessary for a multi-ship fighting capability.  Formation 
steaming for appearance’s sake did not equate to formation steaming in combat.  The 
chapter culminates with the 1893 International Naval Review in New York.  Here, in an 
example of the effect naval pageantry could have on national identity and public opinion, 
the United States proudly displayed to the world – not to mention its own population – its 
new warships and administrative and operational prowess in handling large fleet 
operations.36
In Chapter 5, “Luce’s Vision Realized: The North Atlantic Squadron Solidifies a 
New Identity, 1895-1897,” the Squadron took the monumental step of a peacetime, non-
crisis, deployment as a squadron.  Rather than splitting up for the customary winter 
  The urbanization trend which led more and more Americans to live in or 
near the nation’s large cities made it easier for large segments of the population to view 
the steel warships of the “new navy.”   
                                                 
36 Jan Ruger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire, ed. Jay Winter, Studies 
in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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cruises throughout the Caribbean in 1895, Rear Admiral R.W. Meade led the North 
Atlantic Squadron in visiting strategic ports throughout the region as a unit.  While 
transiting from port to port, the Squadron exercised regularly at fleet tactics and 
signaling.  When in port, the officers mingled and the crews indulged in boat races.  In 
their homeport of New York, squadron personnel organized a bicycle club and baseball 
teams.  The extensive time spent steaming in company, as well as the socialization of the 
crews of the Squadron, provide evidence that just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-
American-Cuban War of 1898, the North Atlantic Squadron had taken on a new identity 
as a combat unit.  The Squadron’s function was not only to send single units to respond to 
State Department contingencies, but to be prepared to operate as a squadron in combat.  
Rear Admiral Meade’s success as a squadron commander-in-chief was short-lived, 
however.  Unable to adapt his confrontational leadership to the consensus-building 
managerial style required by the new command functions, he was forced to resign his 
position after publicly insulting the President and Secretary of the Navy. 
The Epilogue narrates briefly the actions of the squadron during the Battle of 
Santiago de Cuba.  While recognizing that the action at Santiago was not a true fleet 
engagement, it nonetheless provides a venue to reflect on the North Atlantic Squadron 
with respect to the development of a strategic purpose for a battle fleet, the development 
of a concept of multi-ship operations, and the test in combat action of a multi-ship 
fighting capability, as well as challenges yet to be overcome in the area of strong 
personalities and unified fleet command.  While the North Atlantic Squadron had 
developed and demonstrated a protean combat capability, the process of becoming a 
battle fleet was incomplete.  It awaited structural developments in the early twentieth 
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century, such as the establishment of a fleet hierarchy of command.  A battle fleet also 
required a concept of multi-ship operations that exercised a fighting capability, rather 
than formation discipline geared towards appearances.  Nonetheless, extensive and 
significant progress had been made towards the realization of this goal prior to the War of 





Chapter 1:  The North Atlantic Squadron, the Virginius Affair, 
and the Birth of Squadron Exercises, 1874-1881 
 
Early on the morning of February 4th, 1874, the U.S. Naval Forces on the North 
Atlantic Station1 got underway from their anchorage off of Key West, Florida.   Their 
mission was to execute fleet maneuvers under steam power.2  As the assembled ships 
formed columns and steered to the southwest behind the lead ship, they represented the 
combined available combat power of the U.S. European, South Atlantic, and North 
Atlantic Squadrons.  This was the largest concentration of U.S. naval forces since the 
Civil War, which had ended nine years before.  The series of exercises which took place 
over the next month has received relatively little attention from historians.3
                                                 
1 The terms “Naval Forces on the North Atlantic Station” and “North Atlantic Squadron” are 
interchangeable, and were used interchangeably by contemporaries.  I will argue that the use of the term 
“squadron” increases in both popular print and official correspondence throughout the period under study, 
as the organization’s identity evolves. 
  They 
represented, nonetheless, something more than a mere collection of ships playing war 
games.  The Key West exercises of February-March 1874 signal the beginning of the 
transformation of a cruising force into a battle fleet.  Over the next twenty-three years, 
the Squadron would undergo a series of core organizational changes, not only in materiel, 
but in terms of unit identity and the command technique necessary to direct a group of 
ships in battle.  In the years 1874-1881, the increasing desire on the part of the U.S. 
government and the Navy Department to possess a battle fleet created a conflict between 
 
2 Foxhill A. Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in the Bay of Florida, and the Navy of the Future," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 1, no. 8 (1874).  I use the term “fleet” here, and throughout the study, as Commodore 
Parker did – as a way of describing tactical evolutions involving multiple warships.  I do not mean to imply 
that, simply by practicing these maneuvers, the U.S. possessed a “battle fleet” at this time. 
 
3 An exception to this is Love, 334-338.  Professor Love argues that this episode (in 1874) highlights the 
fact that U.S. policy in the Caribbean could not move forward without a battle fleet. 
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the requirements of cruising missions undertaken by single warships and the need to 
concentrate and exercise warships in groups.  Constant tasking in support of the State 
Department, “showing the flag” and protecting U.S. commercial interests, both abroad 
and domestically, regularly interfered with the North Atlantic Squadron’s ability to train 
for combat against a peer naval power.  Far from being a reactionary backwater period, 
the 1870’s and 1880’s were a time of considerable development, laying the essential 
foundation for the more-visible naval buildup of the 1890’s.  During this time, naval 
authorities struggled to find the correct balance between traditional missions and the 
many changes in technology, materiel, and mission facing the North Atlantic Squadron. 
Naval Tactics, 1874 
 
Although European navies, as well as many progressive-minded U.S. naval 
officers, knew that the ability to maneuver warships in formation was critical to future 
naval combat, the exact nature of sound practice during a fleet engagement remained 
unclear.  The gun, which had been the featured weapon in the line-ahead battles of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, had been augmented by the ram and torpedo.4
                                                 
4 “Line ahead”:  A group of ships following a guide in a straight line, one behind another.  Contemporary 
U.S. tacticians referred to this formation in tactical guides as a “column”, the term I will use throughout the 
study. 
  
Torpedoes could be attached to a spar, or like the new British Whitehead torpedo, they 
could be self-propelled.  All of these represented options for a squadron commander in 
attack and defense.  Experts at the time were unsure how a large-scale battle would be 
fought.  The U.S. Civil War offered little guidance because no action between fleets 
occurred.  One major naval action that took place not long after the Civil War gave naval 
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tacticians a rough idea of what combat between opposing groups of steam-powered 
ironclads would look like.  
At the battle of Lissa in 1866, an Austrian squadron made up of seven ironclads 
and 14 unprotected vessels met an Italian squadron of 10 ironclads and 22 unarmored 
units.5
The Italians broke off their shelling of the Austrian positions and deployed for 
battle in a column formation.  Tegettoff, although outnumbered by the Italians, deployed 
his ships in a wedge formation and pressed home his attack, driving for the center of the 
Italian line.  His intention, which he had expressed to his captains prior to the action, was 
to utilize the ram bows of his ironclads in a close action.  He soon got his chance.  On the 
Italian side, Persano had taken this inopportune moment to attempt to shift his flag, which 
threw his line into disarray and confused his commanding officers.  The Austrian wedge 
broke through the line and a general melee ensued.  What happened next influenced naval 
tactical thinking for the next thirty years.  The lead ship of the Italian second division was 
Re d’Italia, an armored frigate displacing 5700 tons and armed with 6 72-pounder 
  The Italian squadron, under the command of Count Carlo Pellion di Persano, was 
supporting a landing attempt on the island of Lissa, which was held by the Austrians.  
While shelling the island, they were attacked by the Austrian squadron, led by Wilhelm 
von Tegetthoff.  The capital ships on both sides were of wooden construction, had full 
sail rigs, iron armor belts, and broadside-mounted armament.  The Austrians employed a 
larger number of breech-loading guns than the Italians, although it was not to be the guns 
that would play the most dramatic role. 
                                                 
5The following account is taken from Richard Hill, War at Sea in the Ironclad Age, ed. John Keegan, 
Cassell's History of Warfare (London, UK: Cassell, 2000).  See also Spencer C. Tucker, Handbook of 19th 
Century Naval Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 131-133.  Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet 
Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2000), 63-67. 
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smoothbore shell guns and 32 6-inch breechloading rifles mounted in broadside.6
From a strategic standpoint, the battle meant little.  Italy and her ally, Prussia, 
prevailed in the conflict.  The battle’s impact on naval tactics had a wider effect.  
Attention focused on the ram as an offensive weapon of importance.  The position of 
primacy of the gun was usurped, albeit briefly, by a return to tactics that seemed more 
suited to the age of galleys than the nineteenth century.
  She 
had a 4.5 inch armor belt.  She was attacked by the Austrian flagship Ferdinand Max.  
Also an armored cruiser, she was slightly smaller than Re d’Italia, with 16 48-pounder, 
four 8-pounder and two 3-pounder smoothbore guns.  Her battery was protected by a 4 
inch iron belt.  Disregarding the rapid gunfire from the Italian breechloading batteries, 
Tegettoff executed ramming attacks on both Re d’Italia and another, smaller, armored 
corvette, Palestro.  Both Italian ships sank in minutes, at a cost of over 800 sailors, 
including both captains.  The Italians eventually withdrew.  Tegetoff returned home to a 
hero’s welcome, while Persano faced a court-martial and dismissal from the Italian Navy. 
7
                                                 
6 The nomenclature designating different types of naval guns during this period can be confusing.  In 
general, a gun primarily designed to fire shot (solid projectiles) was designated by the weight of its shot, 
i.e. a “72-pounder”.  A gun primarily designed to fire shells (explosive projectiles) was designated in the 
U.S. Navy by the diameter of its bore, i.e. “6-inch”.  These generalizations break down quickly, as many 
shell guns were capable of firing solid shot, and vice versa.  For more, see Tucker, Chapter 4. 
  In one respect, bringing an 
enemy to action was now easier than it had been in the age of sail.  Sailing ships relied on 
combinations of current and wind for propulsion, and were only capable of sailing within 
six points (36 degrees) of wind direction.  Station-keeping in formation, not to mention 
closing with and engaging an enemy, were difficult propositions even for squadrons that 
 
7 It is interesting to note that Commodore Foxhall Parker, in addition to his more famous works on 
contemporary naval tactics, wrote a book on warfare in the age of galleys.  
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exercised together regularly.8  With the advent of steam propulsion, an admiral could 
command his formation regardless of wind speed or direction.  Theoretically, ship’s 
speed and turning radius were known quantities, as they could be measured and 
controlled by engineers.  But as captains tried to position their ships to ram an opponent, 
or launch a torpedo – both weapons that seemed capable of doing more lethal damage 
faster than guns – the neat line of battle was usually disrupted.  Lissa cast doubt on the 
single column as a method of concentrating firepower.9
The development of the torpedo led to the adoption of small craft carrying 
torpedoes which created new hazards for a line of battleships.  In theory, it was possible 
that a small craft, cheaply built and lightly manned, could sink a capital warship.  This 
created a dangerous paradox for the battle line.  Concentrated by necessity to maximize 
the impact of its guns, the battle line was vulnerable to torpedo attack.  To evade such 
attacks required the ability to shift course as a unit on demand – that is, the entire line of 
ships had to be able to move in a designated direction by carrying out a designated turn – 
making a naval officer’s ability to handle his ship in close order and high speed 
imperative for fleet action.  Steam propulsion allowed fleet commanders to deal with 
these new threats to the battle line without being constrained by the direction of the wind, 
but that freedom came at a cost.  Formations moved faster, and both commanders and 
subordinates had more decisions to make about direction and the disposition of 
formations, and less time to make them.  Successful accomplishment of these tasks 
required constant rehearsal at sea.  While Naval Academy cadets received instruction in 
 
                                                 
8 Sam Willis, "Fleet Performance and Capability in the Eighteenth-Century Royal Navy," War In History 
11, no. 4 (2004). 
 
9 Hughes, 64. 
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the theory of fleet tactics, the 1870’s U.S. Navy did not possess the materiel resources 
necessary to both carry out its cruising mission and rehearse fleet tactics under steam.10
The U.S. Navy’s foremost expert on the evolution of naval tactics under steam 
power was Commodore Foxhall A. Parker.
  
The fleet concentration off Key West in late 1873 – early 1874 gave the Navy 
Department a rare opportunity to address this issue operationally. 
11  He is also one of the most under-
recognized figures behind the Navy’s shift from cruising to line-of-battle tactics.  Much 
of this may have to do with the fact that he died unexpectedly at a relatively young age.12
                                                 
10 United States Naval Academy, "Annual Register of the U.S. Naval Academy, 1870," book, Special 
Collections and Archives Department, Annapolis, MD. 
  
Parker entered the navy as a midshipman in 1837.  His development as a junior officer 
followed a standard antebellum path, with duty aboard the Constitution, serving under his 
father – a prominent naval officer in his own right – who was the commanding officer.  
During the Civil War, he held several commands, one of which was the Potomac Flotilla, 
where he was responsible for protecting the Potomac River approaches to the capital and 
Alexandria, Virginia (held by the Union for most of the war).  It was here that he gained 
experience participating in joint operations, as he had to work closely with the Army 
commander in the area.  It was also here that he used his time in command of a number of 
small gunboats to work out the tactical evolutions which would eventually be published 
 
11 The following drawn from Clark G. Reynolds, Famous American Admirals, First Naval Institute Press 
Edition ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002). 
 
12 Parker died in 1879 while assigned as the Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy.  He is buried in the 
Naval Academy cemetery on Hospital Point – ironically, only feet from Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi’s 
grave and a few yards from Captain William Cushing’s grave.  One can only speculate the heights Parker 
would have achieved in the New Steel Navy had he lived. 
30 
 
as the book “Squadron Tactics Under Steam” in 1864.13  The end of the Civil War did not 
slow the output of his prolific pen.  “The Naval Howitzer Afloat”, a short work on the use 
of artillery by naval battalions, was published in 1866.  “Fleet Tactics Under Steam,” the 
sequel to “Squadron Tactics Under Steam,” came out in 1869.  The Bureau of Navigation 
immediately provided four copies of this work for each ship fitting out for deployment.14
A “fleet” was defined as an assembly of twelve or more warships, arranged in 
three “divisions” that consisted of at least one “squadron” of not less than four vessels.  
Three basic formations covered all the options available to a fleet commander: line, 
column, and echelon, depicted here in Figure 1: 
 
                                                 
13 Foxhill A. Parker, Squadron Tactics under Steam (New York, NY: D. Van Nostrand, 1864).  In the 
special collection of Nimitz Library at the U.S. Naval Academy. 
 
14 Bureau of Navigation, "Circular Order, 10 December 1869, 1869," Circular Order, RG 24, Records of the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. .  Foxhill A. Parker, Fleet Tactics under Steam (New York, 
NY: D. Van Nostrand, 1870). 
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Figure 1: Line Abreast, Column, Echelon15
 
 
The influence of the 1866 Battle of Lissa can be seen in Parker’s diagrams.  The line 
(Parker’s “Fig. 1”) is identified as useful only for ironclads, rams, and torpedo vessels.  
The column (Parker’s “Fig. 2”) is to be used only for vessels which mount broadside 
batteries.  These were, as discussed above, the deployments used by Tegettoff and 
Persano, respectively.  As a result of Tegettoff’s success, the column fell briefly into 
disfavor as a formation for modern armored vessels.  Improvements in gun technology 
                                                 
15 Parker, Fleet Tactics under Steam, 10. 
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and range would soon restore the column to primacy as a tactical formation, but Parker’s 
diagrams represented the state of the art in 1869.16
 In any of the formations, the vessels could take station at “open order,” defined as 
two cable lengths, or “close order,” a single cable length.  A “cable” was 120 fathoms, or 
720 feet, thus two cable lengths would be 1440 feet, or just under a quarter mile.  One 
cable length would be 720 feet, and “half distance” was 60 fathoms, or 360 feet.  The 
ordered speed for a formation was at all times to be no greater than ½ knot less than the 
maximum speed of the slowest vessel in the formation.  This allowed the slowest vessel a 
reserve of speed available in order to gain and maintain station.
 
17
The U.S. Navy, 1874 
 
 
The Union Navy during the Civil War boasted over 700 vessels of all types; 
steam-powered ironclads such as the famous Monitor, paddlewheel gunboats designed to 
operate in shallow rivers, and wooden cruising vessels designed for service on overseas 
stations.  The large number of commissioned warships notwithstanding, there were no 
battles during the Civil War that required coordinated fleet maneuvers under steam 
power.  This was mostly because of the small size of the Confederate Navy, but it also 
had to do with the missions the Union Navy was called upon to carry out during the 
war.18
                                                 
16 On the debate over these various formations, see Hughes, 70-75. 
  The few engagements that involved large numbers of ships were not fleet actions 
as such, but actually combined military operations that pitted Union ships against 
Confederate land fortifications, and vessels that acted as extensions of those land 
 
17 Parker, Fleet Tactics under Steam, 12-13, 217-218. 
 
18 Namely blockade of Southern ports and riverine operations in support of Union ground troops.   
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defenses.19  After the close of hostilities, the U.S. Navy returned to its antebellum 
deployment patterns.  The majority of the vessels constructed or purchased for wartime 
service were paid off and sold.  Six stations were established: the North and South 
Atlantic, North and South Pacific, Asiatic, and European.  By 1874 the entire U.S. Navy 
consisted of 163 warships.  That number is misleading, as both Secretary of the Navy 
Robeson and Admiral of the Navy David Dixon Porter pointed out in their annual report 
to Congress that year.  It included tugboats and obsolete sail-only craft that were bound 
for sale and breaking up.   The actual tally of effective warships was closer to 73, which 
represented the number of fighting steam vessels suitable for overseas cruising.  Even 
that figure, though, has a certain amount of ambiguity.  Included in the count of 73 were 
several units that were on the stocks, or in various stages of repair or construction.  A 
review of the warships actually assigned to the six cruising stations for the calendar year 
1874 yields the following:  The European Station had 4 vessels, the South Atlantic 
Station had 1 vessel, the South Pacific Station had 3 vessels, the North Pacific Station 
had 6 vessels, the Asiatic Station had 8 vessels, and the North Atlantic, or “home” Station 
counted 10 cruising vessels and 2 monitors.20  From the preceding, can be seen that the 
U.S. Navy had available the combat power of approximately 34 warships.  To man and 
support these 34 warships, the Navy could draw upon an authorized strength of 10,000 
officers and men and an annual budget of just over $23 million.21
                                                 
19 Farragut at Mobile Bay (1864) being the prime example of this.  For a discussion of important naval 




20 All figures taken from Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy on the 





The ships on these stations rarely worked together.  Alfred Thayer Mahan noted 
in his memoirs that: “The rule was that the vessels were scattered, one to this port, 
another to that… to the several officers their own ship was everything, the squadron little 
or nothing.”22
The Navy’s infrastructure to service its warships on the East Coast was provided 
by six navy yards: Portsmouth, Massachusetts; Charlestown (Boston), Massachusetts; 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Brooklyn, New York; Washington, D.C.; and Norfolk, 
Virginia.  Significantly, there were no other naval facilities between Norfolk and the navy 
yard at Pensacola, Florida, on the Gulf of Mexico.  This vexed station commanders, as 
  The organization of the Navy Department was also fragmented.  Under the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Department was organized into eight bureaus by legislation in 
1862: the Bureau of Navy-Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the 
Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of 
Provisions and Clothing, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Navigation.  This 
last was considered the first among equals, as it had cognizance over the Office of Detail, 
which controlled the movements of officers and ships.  The eight bureaus oversaw a 
budget of just over $19 million dollars.  Cooperation among the bureaus was poor.  Until 
the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations after the turn of the 
twentieth century, there was no single operational commander between the bureau chiefs 
and the appointed civilian Secretary of the Navy.  The Admiral of the Fleet – Admiral 
David Dixon Porter in 1874 – was the principal uniformed advisor to the Secretary of the 
Navy, but his role was advisory.  The exercise of executive authority was reserved for the 
Secretary of the Navy. 
                                                 




they had to send their warships north, at least as far as Norfolk, if not further, if they 
needed extended repairs or had yellow fever cases on board.23  Navy dockyards, as major 
bases where ships were constructed and repaired, have received attention from 
historians.24
 Operationally, the problem with utilizing the existing navy yards as homeports 
lay within the navy’s bureau organization and structure.  Under the regulations then in 
force, whenever a vessel was required to report to a navy yard, it came under the 
command of the commandant of that navy yard.  Thus the vessel was no longer under the 
  Less written about are the smaller naval stations, which simply existed to re-
supply and re-coal the navy’s vessels on the east coast, but their role in enabling the 
vessels of the North Atlantic Squadron to concentrate would become increasingly 
important in the age of steam.  Unlike sailing vessels, which, once commissioned, needed 
very little in the way of regular supply beyond fresh vegetables and meat, steam vessels 
required regular transfusions of coal and greater maintenance to the variety of engines 
and equipment carried on board.  In the early days of the steam navy, the way this was 
dealt with was to have single ships pull into ports at their convenience and procure their 
own coal or supplies.  This approach tied the number of vessels that could be serviced at 
any one time to the ability of the surrounding civilian workforce and infrastructure to 
provide coal and supplies.  For the fleet to spend more time concentrated, it would be 
necessary to have a location which could coal and supply multiple ships; this was a 
subject of some concern to the Navy Department in the latter part of the decade. 
                                                 
23 Ships with multiple cases of yellow fever on board were typically ordered to the Naval Hospital at 
Portsmouth, NH.  See, for example, George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Robeson to 
Mullany, 18 July 1874, 1874," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters to Flag Officers Commanding 
Squadrons, Vessels, and Stations, Sent by the Secretary of the Navy, 1867-1886, Washington, D.C. 
 
24 Peltier, Eugene, The Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy and the Civil Engineer Corps, New York, 
Newcomen Society in America, 1961; R.J. Winklareth, Naval Shipbuilders of the World: From the Age of 
Sail to the Present Day (Chatham, 2000), 125-209. 
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operational control of the squadron commander-in-chief.  This protocol often caused 
misunderstandings about who correspondence should be addressed to, reviewed by, or 
which organization (squadron or navy yard) was responsible for carrying out tasks 
associated with a particular warship.25
The fact that U.S. warships were not concentrated or regularly rehearsing tactical 
maneuvers is not to say that there was no innovation happening within the Navy 
Department in the 1870’s.   As ships became more heavily armored neither the accuracy 
nor the explosive power of the guns of the 1870’s were capable of penetrating the 
heaviest armor.  The military problem to be solved at sea became one of penetrating the 
non-armored skin of an opposing warship below the waterline.  One way to achieve this, 
as the Battle of Lissa demonstrated, was to ram the opposing ship, driving the attacker’s 
prow into its hull.  The concept of a torpedo built on this concept.  A “torpedo” in the 
mid-nineteenth century was simply an explosive device.  Extended in front of the 
  This structural organization is evidence that the 
squadron commander-in-chief was not intended to concentrate his warships in one 
location as a routine practice.  Instead, it was expected that ships that were in commission 
would spend the majority of their time deployed as single units, resupplying either off of 
the local economy wherever they were showing the flag, or from one of the small navy 
depots in the gulf region.  The most-often used of these for the North Atlantic Station was 
Key West, Florida, where the 1874 exercises would be held.  But even at the depots, there 
were problems.  The supplies of fresh vegetables and beef that could be had locally often 
could not supply more than one or two ships at a time.   
                                                 
25 J.C. Howell, CinC, Bureau of Ordnance, "Letter, Howell to Mullany, 18 October 1875, 1875," Letter, 
RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters to Flag Officers Commanding Squadrons, Vessels, and Stations, Sent 
by the Secretary of the Navy, 1867-1886, Washington, D.C. This letter is one example of the tensions 
between operational and yard commanders.  There are many like it in this era. 
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attacking ship on a spar, the torpedo constituted a ram with extended reach.  The 
explosive charge seemed to provide a much more accurate and controllable way of doing 
major damage to an ironclad vessel.26
All major navies were experimenting with the torpedo during this decade, as 
previously discussed.  U.S. Secretary of the Navy Adolph E. Borie recognized the 
importance and possible utility of this new weapon system.  During his brief three-month 
tenure as Navy Secretary, he authorized the foundation of a torpedo school at Newport, 
Rhode Island.
   
27  While the Royal Navy was successful in fielding a self-propelled variant 
in the 1860’s, U.S. naval officers were originally drawn to their use as stationary 
explosives, or what would be referred to as “mines” today.  The thought was that 
strategically important U.S. harbors could be protected by a combination of monitors and 
a field of electronically-detonated torpedoes.28  Tactical, non-stationary versions were 
attached to the attacking ship either by a spar or towed alongside, physical forces holding 
the towed torpedo away from the offensive ship at a 45 degree angle until it could be 
positioned to make contact with an opponent.29
                                                 
26 Hughes., pg. 67. 
  Surprisingly, one of the biggest 
advocates of the torpedo ram was the arch-conservative Admiral of the Navy, David 
Dixon Porter.  History has left Porter with a reputation for resistance to change, 
especially for his infamous stinginess with coal and insistence on the use of sails for 
deployed warships, but in actuality Porter enthusiastically embraced certain innovations.  
 
27 Adolph Borie, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Borie to Dahlgren, 2 June 1869, 1869," Letter, RG45, U.S. 
Navy Department Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to the Chiefs of Navy Bureaus, 1842-1886, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
28 David Dixon Porter, ADM, "Letter, Porter to Robeson, 4 December 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 74, Records 
of the Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D.C. 
 
29 Tucker, 168. 
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The torpedo boat was one of them.30
Alarm was one such enterprise.  She was 176 feet long and displaced 800 tons.  
Her main armament consisted of a 32 foot reinforced iron prow, and a torpedo spar which 
extended from a watertight gland at the tip of the ram.
  The files of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance 
are filled with letters from Porter – sometimes daily – excitedly talking about one of his 
pet torpedo projects.   
31  She was assigned to the New 
York Navy Yard to perform experimental work with torpedoes.  She would eventually be 
assigned to the Torpedo School at Newport, Rhode Island.  Alarm’s weakness was the 
inability of her steam powerplant to attain the high speeds necessary to mount a torpedo 
attack against a warship.  At full steam, Alarm’s maximum speed was only ten knots.32  
Only slightly faster was the Intrepid, another torpedo ram of similar characteristics 
launched in Boston at about the same time.  With a top speed of 11 knots, Intrepid was 
still considered to be too slow to carry out her designed mission of closing a large 
warship, and maneuvering her spar torpedo into a position where it could be exploded 
under her waterline.  Still, Alarm and Intrepid provided platforms from which the tactics 
and technology of the torpedo could be worked out for future generations of warfighters.  
These tactics had not yet progressed to the point where joint operations involving the 
torpedo ram and cruising vessels were contemplated.33
                                                 
30 David Dixon Porter, ADM, "Letter, Porter to Case, 12 June 1872, 1872," Letter, RG 74, Records of the 
Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D.C. 
  Instead, most naval officers 
assumed that torpedo craft would be used in conjunction with moored torpedoes (mines) 
 





33 European navies had not yet integrated torpedo boats into “grand fleet” tactics, either. 
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to guard harbors.34  U.S. naval officers, particularly those on the European Station, 
watched developments in Europe carefully.  Cruising warships were outfitted with 
Harvey (spar) torpedoes, which they practiced deploying regularly and reported the 
results to the Bureau of Ordnance.35
Regardless of the capacity in which torpedo boats would be utilized, it was 
apparent that flagships and/or larger fleet units would have to communicate with them.  
This, perhaps, is why the publication of new tactical codebooks in early 1869 was 
overseen by the Torpedo School, prior to the assignment of a Chief Signal Officer for the 
Navy.
 
36  This development took place in the summer of 1869.37
                                                 
34 E.W. Very, Lieutenant, U.S.N, Report on Torpedo-Boats for Coast Defense1884. 
  The establishment of the 
office of the Chief Signal Officer, within the Bureau of Navigation, was a tacit admission 
by the Navy of the fact that ships of the upcoming era would be required to work in 
company and communicate with each other far more often than occasional meetings in 
overseas ports.  The future Navy was going to require tools and skills substantially more 
developed than exchanging numbers and requests to “send a boat on board” with the 
flagship every few weeks.  Officers with specialized training in the art of signaling would 
be required, as would new and improved equipment.  Several different systems of 
 
35 James Alden, RADM, "Letter, Alden to Case, 27 April 1872, 1872," Letter, RG 74, Records of the 
Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D.C; "Torpedoes and Sunken Mines," Colburn's United Service 
Magazine 1, no. 551 (1874). 
 
36 E.O. Matthews, "Letter, Matthews to Alden, 15 April 1870, 1870," letter, RG 24, Records of the Bureau 
of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
 
37 Bureau of Navigation, "General Order, Bureau of Navigation, 19 July 1869, 1869," Order, Records of the 




sending signals, both day and night, were experimented with during this time.38
Once the signal office was up and operating, Commodore S.P. Lee, the first Chief 
Signals Officer, began to work on how best to get this important training to the fleet.  The 
problem was attacked on two fronts.  First, naval cadets at the Naval Academy in 
Annapolis were to be instructed in signals.  By 1872 they were being trained in the naval 
system of signaling before graduation.
  The 
amount of correspondence in the Chief Signal Officer’s records dealing with methods of 
signaling between warships at night leads one to believe that the Navy Department 
assumed that future operations would require their ships to spend more time in formation. 
39  It worked, because later that year, commanding 
officers in the fleet were reporting to the Navy Department that the midshipmen received 
from the Academy had been “thoroughly instructed at the U.S. Naval Academy.”40  At 
the same time, it was important to get training out to the fleet.  This was accomplished by 
detailing an officer or two from each ship in commission to receive signals training at 
Washington, D.C.  An agreement was made with the Army Signal Office to provide this 
training, as the Navy had decided to use the Army Code of Signals to transmit non-
tactical messages.41
                                                 
38 Daniel Ammen, Rear Admiral, "Letter, Ammen to Parker, 5 May 1874, 1874," letter, RG24, Records of 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C; Rear Admiral Ammen, "Letter, Ammen to Parker, 15 
October 1873, 1873," letter, RG24, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
  Once these core officers were trained, they were to return to their 
 
39 Commodore Worden, Superintendant of the Naval Academy, asked for copies of the new signal manual 
for the purpose of teaching it to the students at the Academy.  See John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, 
Almy to Worden, John L., Commodore, 1872," letter, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
40 John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, Almy to Ammen, April 1872, 1872," letter, RG 24, Records of the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
 
41The office of the Chief Signal Officer arranged the rental of an ambulance, mules, and drivers to ferry 
naval officers receiving the training to Ft. Whipple, where the Army signal school was located.  See Rear 
Admiral Ammen, "Letter, Ammen to Almy, 26 April 1872, 1872," letter, RG24, Records of the Bureau of 
Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
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ships and provide training to the rest of the crew.  A “Quarterly Report of Signals 
Training” was instituted by the office of the Chief Signal Officer to monitor each ship’s 
progress.42  Commanding officers were apparently annoyed at yet another piece of 
paperwork required by the Navy Department; the files of the CSO’s office are stuffed 
with copies of complaints sent to the chief of the Bureau of Navigation about CO’s and 
their missing, incomplete, or sloppy quarterly reports.43  One commanding officer, 
however, was never late with his report, and always made certain that his signal officers 
conducted their required training.  Commander Stephen B. Luce, CO of the Juniata on 
the European Station, consistently filed the most comprehensive reports.  140 years after 
the fact, it is easy to spot the many reports that were filled out at the last minute, with 
very little attention to the veracity of the report being made.  Many commanding officers 
failed to grasp the importance of the coming changes in naval warfare, but Luce was not 
one of them.44
Even with the amount of training being conducted, both at Washington, D.C. and 
afloat, the combination of naval tactical signals with the Army’s signal book was 
unsatisfying to the Navy Department.  In light of the changing face of naval warfare, it 
soon became evident that what was needed was a signal book that more closely 
  It is evidence that, as early as 1871, the future Commander-in-Chief of 
the North Atlantic Squadron and founder of the Naval War College was concerned about 
the details involved with training and fighting as a fleet, rather than a single ship.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
42 Rear Admiral  Alden, "Letter, Alden to Almy, 3 Feb 1871, 1871," letter, RG24, Records of the Bureau of 
Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
 
43There are multiple reports like this.  See, for example,  John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, Almy to 
Alden, 26 June 1871, 1871," letter, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. . 
 
44 John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, Almy to Luce, 4 May 1871, 1871," Letter, Records of the Bureau of 
Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
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complemented Commodore Parker’s new book on steam tactics.  In October of 1872, a 
board was appointed by the Bureau of Navigation, charged with “modify[ing] the 
Tactical Signal Book so as to conform to what is necessary for the execution of 
maneuvers…for Parker’s Steam Tactics.”45  Captain Parker put in his own suggestions 
for the signal book as well.46  By early 1873, the new Tactical Signal Book was ready for 
the fleet.47
The Royal Navy, 1874 
  It was this new signal book that Commodore Parker – by then the new Chief 
Signal Officer – brought with him to exercise with the assembled vessels at Key West in 
early 1874. 
 
The gold standard of what constituted a “fleet” in the Victorian Era, against which 
the North Atlantic Squadron can be measured, was deployed by Great Britain’s Royal 
Navy.  The Royal Navy of the nineteenth century had two separate and competing 
missions.  On one hand, the protection of the lines of communication connecting Great 
Britain with her Colónies was crucial to the economic well-being of the Empire.  To carry 
out this function, the Royal Navy employed squadrons of masted wooden cruisers, not 
unlike those of the U.S. Navy.  More importantly, the Royal Navy was seen as the 
island’s most important line of defense against invasion.48
                                                 
45 John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, Almy to Ammen, 31 October 1872, 1872," letter, Records of the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. . 
   For this task, the Channel 
 
46 Foxhall Parker, Commodore, "Omissions, Corrections, Additions to the U.S. Naval Signal Book (Steam 
Tactics) Proposed and Submitted by Capt. F.A. Parker, 1872," letter, Washington, D.C. 
 
47 John J. Almy, Commodore, "Letter, Almy to Ammen, 10 January 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 24, Records of 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
 
48 N.A.M. Rodger, “Naval Strategy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries”, in Geoffrey Till, ed. The 
Development of British Naval Thinking: Essays in Memory of Bryan Mclaren Ranft, ed. Geoffrey Till, Cass 
Series: Naval Policy and History (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 19-33.  See also Paul Kennedy, The 
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Fleet relied upon the most modern armored warships.  The British “battlefleet” – in other 
words, the first rate warships which would be expected to take their place in a line of 
battle –  of the 1870’s was, in fact, a homeguard.49
In 1874, the Royal Navy consisted of 102 warships, manned by 60,000 personnel 
with an annual budget of over $54 million.
   
50  The cruising stations of the Royal Navy 
consisted of China, the East Indies, Australia, the Pacific, the South East Coast of 
America, the Cape of Good Hope, the West Coast of Africa, North America and the West 
Indies, the Mediterranean, and the “Home Waters” station.51
 
  This latter was also referred 
to as the Channel Squadron.  While it did not have a cruising or overseas presence 
mission, the Channel Squadron was responsible for the defense of the home island – in 
that respect, her mission was much different than that of the North Atlantic Squadron, 
which had a cruising function in addition to being expected to defend the East Coast of 
the United States in the event of attack by a foreign navy.  In 1874, the Channel Squadron 
consisted of 10 ships: Devastation, Black Prince, Hector, Agincourt, Northumberland, 
Monarch, Hercules, Sultan, Audacious, and Glatton.  The following tables compare the 
eight vessels of the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Squadron with the ten warships of the 
Royal Navy’s Channel Squadron. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1982; 
reprint, 1982). 
 
49 G.A. Ballard, The Black Battlefleet (Naval Institute Press, 1980), 16-17. 
 
50 Barry M. Gough, The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1914: A Study of 
British Maritime Ascendancy (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1971; reprint, 1974), 
248. 
 
51  Ibid. 
44 
 
THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON - 187452 
SHIP DISP 
(TONS) 
















WORCESTER 3000  WOODEN 
SCREW SLOOP 
NO 1X60LB PARROTT 
14X9” DAHLGRENS 
13.0 POST-WAR (1871) 
CANANDAIGUA 2030 WOODEN 
SCREW SLOOP 
NO 1X150LB PARROT RIFLE 
2X11” DAHLGRENS 
1X30LB PARROT RIFLE 
10.0 CIVIL WAR (1862) 
WYOMING 1457 WOODEN 
SCREW SLOOP 
NO 2X11”DAHLGRENS 




SHAWMUT 579 WOODEN 
SCREW 
GUNBOAT 
NO 1X150LB PARROT RIFLE 
3X9” DAHLGRENS 
11.0 CIVIL WAR (1864) 
NIPSIC 579 WOODEN 
SCREW 
GUNBOAT 
NO  1X150LB PARROT RIFLE 
3X9”DAHLGRENS 
11.0 CIVIL WAR (1863) 
TERROR 3295 MONITOR YES 4X15” SB GUNS 8.5 CIVIL WAR (1864) 
SAUGUS 2100 MONITOR  YES 2X15” SB GUNS 8.0 CIVIL WAR (1864) 
Table 1: The North Atlantic Squadron - 187456
 
 
                                                 
52 A list of specific ships on station at any given time is necessarily a moving target.  Vessels were 
transferred on and off station constantly due to repairs, reassignment to a different cruising station, or 
decommissioning.  The names of vessels in this table, and all others throughout the study, come from the 
Secretary of the Navy’s Annual Report for that calendar year.  See Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy on the Operations of the Department, with Accompanying Documents for the Year 1874. 
 
53Timothy Wolters, in his work on U.S. Navy recapitalization in the nineteenth century, identifies four 
classifications of U.S. vessels: Antebellum Navy, Civil War Navy, Post-Civil War Navy, and New Steel 
Navy.  All tables in this study follow his convention.  See Timothy S. Wolters, "Recapitalizing the Fleet: A 
Material Analysis of Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Naval Power," Technology and Culture 52, no. 1 
(2011): 117. 
 
54 A “Dahlgren” was a heavy, smooth-bore, muzzle-loading shell gun invented by Rear Admiral John 
Dahlgren, U.S. Navy.  See Tucker, 82-85. 
 
55 A “Parrott Rifle” was a muzzle-loading cast iron rifle with a wrought iron band shrunk over the breech to 
strengthen it.  It was invented by Robert P. Parrott.  See Ibid., 91-92. 
56 Donald L. Canney, The Old Steam Navy: Frigates, Sloops, and Gunboats, 1815-1885, 2 vols., vol. 1 




THE CHANNEL SQUADRON - 1874 
SHIP DISP 
(TONS) 
TPYE/CONST ARMOR SPEED ARMAMENT DATE 
DEVESTATION 9180 IRONCLAD TURRET SHIP YES 13.8KTS 4X12” MLR57 1871 
BLACK PRINCE 9284 BROADSIDE IRONCLAD YES 13.6KTS 24X7” MLR 
 
1861 
HECTOR 7100 BROADSIDE IRONCLAD YES 12.7KTS 16X7” MLR 
2X8” MLR 
1864 













HERCULES 8816 CENTRAL BATTERY 
IRONCLAD 




SULTAN 9439 CENTRAL BATTERY 
IRONCLAD  
YES 14.1KTS 8X10” MLR 
4X9” MLR 
1871 
AUDACIOUS 6131 CENTRAL BATTERY 
IRONCLAD 
YES 14.1KTS 10X9” MLR 
4X64LB MLR 
1870 
GLATTAN 4491 MONITOR YES 12.1KTS 2X12” MLR 1872 
Table 2: The Channel Squadron - 187459
 
 
Studying these two tables shows at once two different naval forces, designed to 
perform different missions.  The Channel Squadron’s mission was to confront the naval 
forces of a European power and defeat them in fleet combat.  The ships’ armored 
construction makes that clear.  More than just materiel sets the Channel Squadron apart, 
however.  Organizationally, the Channel Squadron spent the majority of its time in 
company, in a way almost unheard of in the U.S. Navy at that time. They possessed an 
identity as a unit devoted to training and preparation for combat.  The warships of the 
                                                 
57 “MLR” denotes “Muzzle-loading Rifle” 
 
58 “SB” denotes “Smoothbore” 
 
59 Roger; Kolesnik Chesneau, Eugene M., ed. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905, ed. 




Channel Squadron attended commemorations and celebrations and visited ports 
throughout Great Britain together.  The First Lord was often requested by members of 
Parliament to have the Squadron (not individual ships, but the Squadron) visit their 
constituencies.60  The Channel Squadron also possessed a homeport that it could call its 
own, something which enabled them to carry out squadron-wide exercises on a regular 
basis.  Located opposite the Isle of Wight on the southeastern coast of England, the 
generous anchorage available at Spithead gave the Channel Squadron the opportunity to 
concentrate in a strategically important location opposite the French coast.  Keeping the 
warships concentrated allowed them regular opportunities for exercise as a unit.  It also 
allowed the officers opportunities to socialize, contributing to their ability to think of 
themselves as a coherent fighting unit.  The officer corps of the Channel Squadron spent 
a great deal of time together, both at sea and ashore.  At their homeport of Portsmouth, 
the officers of the Squadron had been instrumental in founding a popular officers’ club in 
1868.61
Because they were not a cruising squadron, the warships of the Channel Squadron 
did not have a mission to support the Foreign Ministry, or use their warships to “show the 
flag” abroad.  It is more instructive to compare the North Atlantic Squadron with a 
British one that did perform cruising duties.  In the waters of the Pacific Northwest, for 
   Without a suitable homeport close to their area of operations, the North Atlantic 
Squadron did not have these same opportunities.  The Squadron’s focus on cruising 
operations meant that deployment patterns, rather than socialization, shaped the 
professional perspective of the U.S. naval officer corps.   
                                                 
60 The Parliamentary Debates (Authorized Edition), 1872. pt. v. 212. 
61 "The Service Clubs: The Royal Naval Club, Portsmouth," Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine: A 




example, the Royal Navy had 9 warships on station in 1874.  They were the Boxer, Fawn, 
Fisgard, Myrmidon, Peterel, Reindeer, Repulse, Tenedos, and Thetis II.62
ROYAL NAVY – PACIFIC NORTHWEST SQUADRON, 1874 
   
SHIP DISP 
(TONS) 
TYPE/CONST ARMOR SPEED ARMAMENT DATE 
FISGARD 1068 WOODEN FRIGATE NO N/A 46 GUNS.  STATION 
SHIP.  NOT ON 
EFFECTIVE LIST IN 1874 
1819 
REPULSE 6190 CENTRAL BATTERY IRONCLAD YES 12.5KTS 12X8” MLR 1870 
FAWN 1108 WOODEN SCREW SLOOP NO  17 GUNS 1856 
REINDEER 1365 WOODEN SCREW SLOOP NO 9.1KTS  5X40PDR ML SB 
12X32PDR ML SB 
1866 




TENEDOS 1755 WOODEN SCREW CORVETTE NO 13.0KTS 2X7” MLR 
4X64PDR MLR 
1872 
THETIS II  1854 WOODEN SCREW CORVETTE NO 13.4KTS 14X64PDR MLR 1873 








Table 3: Royal Navy – Pacific Northwest Squadron, 187463
 
 
With the exception of the central-battery ironclad Repulse, the forces at the Royal 
Navy station at Esquimalt, British Columbia closely resembled those possessed by the 
commander in chief of the North Atlantic Station.  The point of this comparison is that 
the oft-maligned warships of the 1870’s U.S. Navy compare favorably with those of the 
most advanced fleet in the world when analyzed by mission type.  This is important 
because it begs the question why, when equipped with materiel and a mission resembling 
the cruising squadrons of a first-rate navy, was the North Atlantic Squadron asked, in 
1874, to practice the mission of a first-rate navy’s battle fleet?   
                                                 
62 Names of ships on station in 1874 come from Gough, Appendix F, pp. 256-258. 
63 Chesneau, ed. 
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The Virginius Affair 
 
The U.S. Navy had mustered all its available ships in Key West, Florida, in late 
1873 in response to the threat of war with Spain.  Long a declining imperial power, 
Spain’s increasing inability to maintain order in her overseas possessions had caused 
uneasiness around the world.64
The events that nearly led to war with Spain began in 1870, at the pier of the 
Washington Navy Yard, where a surplus ex-Confederate blockade runner named Virgin 
was moored.  Virgin had been in and out of government hands since being captured by 
the Union Navy during the war.  She was a side-paddlewheel steamer, 225 feet long, with 
a powerful engine.  Offered for sale by the government, she was bought by an American 
businessman who was acting as a proxy for Cuban insurrectionists.  They intended to use 
the ship to run troops and supplies to their positions in Cuba.  Over the next three years 
Virginius, as she had been renamed, made several successful runs with weapons, 
supplies, and fresh troops.  Along the way, Virginius became well-known to just about 
everyone in the Caribbean.  It was no secret that she was supplying the Cuban rebels.  
U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean were familiar with the nature of work that Virginius 
  In no location was this truer than Cuba, one of the focal 
points of the North Atlantic Squadron’s operations in the Caribbean Sea.   
                                                 
64 On Spain as a declining world power during this era, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America 
and the Crisis of Global Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012), 16.  As an example of the enormous 
financial toll which prolonged wars exacted from Spain, see Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and 
the Spanish Road, 1567-1659, ed. J. H. and Koenigsberger Elliott, H. G., paperback ed., Cambridge Studies 
in Early Modern History (New York,  NY: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
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was engaged in.65  She was, however, flying an American flag, which for a time stopped 
Spanish officials from seizing her.66
   In October of 1873, her luck ran out.  After a chase of several hours, the 
Virginius was captured by a Spanish gunboat as she attempted to bring a load of war 
materiel and volunteers to the rebel forces in Cuba.  Virginius was brought into port at 
Santiago de Cuba, where the Spanish military authorities rushed through a perfunctory 
court-martial and sentenced the captain, Joseph Fry (who was an American citizen, 
Annapolis graduate, and ex-Confederate naval officer), as well as another 53 passengers 
and crew, to death.  These executions were carried out, over the strenuous objections of 
the U.S. vice counsel on the scene, between the 4th and 13th of November, 1873.  
Fortunately for the rest of the imprisoned crew of the Virginius a Royal Navy ship, HMS 
Niobe (4), Captain Sir Lambton Loraine commanding, arrived on the scene, having been 
dispatched by the admiral commanding the British West Indian Naval Forces.  The 
British were at first reluctant to become involved in the filibustering imbroglio, but the 
U.S. counsel at Jamaica managed to convince the Admiral that there were British citizens 
aboard the Virginius.  Loraine intervened with the Spanish authorities to prevent any 
further executions.  With British Imperial disfavor now plainly displayed by a black-
hulled warship at anchor in the harbor, Captain-General Burriel relented.  The executions 
stopped.
   
67
                                                 
65 Willaim Ronckendorff, CAPT, "Letter, Ronckendorff to Scott, Radm, 3 July 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 
313, Records of the Operating Forces, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
66 On the events leading up to the confrontation over the Virginius, see Richard H. Bradford, The Virginius 
Affair (Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1980); French Ensor Chadwick, RADM, The 






Meanwhile, the closest U.S. ship to Santiago de Cuba was the Wyoming (6), 
Captain William Cushing commanding.  She had arrived at Aspinwall, on the isthmus of 
Panama, in September 1873.68  Operating independently, as was standard for U.S. ships 
on the North Atlantic Station, her mission was to protect U.S. interests in this always-
important geographic nexus for travel and commerce.  A recent revolution in Panama had 
made the U.S. merchants and railroad agents uneasy, and they welcomed the visit of a 
U.S. warship to their harbor.69
Cushing epitomized the independent-operating naval officer.  A member of the 
Annapolis class of 1862, Cushing proved his stubbornness and determination before he 
even received a commission.  When he was forced to leave the Naval Academy in his 
senior year due to academic difficulties, Cushing pushed for and received a wartime 
commission as a master.
   
70
Cushing’s exploits while on blockading duty off the coast of North Carolina 
represented a kind of leadership that the industrial revolution was rapidly making 
obsolete.  Cushing acted independently, carrying out what he perceived to be his duty 
with minimal input from superiors and the freedom, as a relatively junior officer, to 
  Master Cushing excelled at his early wartime assignments, 
and eventually won reinstatement to the rank of Passed Midshipman.  Thanks to the 
exigencies of the Civil War, he was promoted quickly, and soon was a lieutenant.   
                                                 
68 “Aspinwall” was the name used by Europeans to refer to the city founded by Panama Railroad president 
William Henry Aspinwall at the eastern terminus of the Panama Railroad.  Indigenous Panamanians called 
the city “Colón,” to honor Christopher Columbus.  Eventually the city was universally referred to as 
“Colón.”  Throughout this study, I will conform to the contemporary usage of U.S. naval officers in their 
official reports. 
 
69 William Cushing, CDR, "Letter, Cushing to Scott, 7 October 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 313, Records of 
the Operating Forces, Washington, D.C; G. H. Rear Admiral Scott, "Letter, Scott to Robeson, 30 October 
1873, 1873," Letter, RG 45, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, 
North Atlantic Squadron (1866-1885), Washington, D.C. 
 
70 An officer rank no longer in use that was roughly the equivalent of today’s lieutenant, junior grade.   
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determine his own best course of action given whatever circumstances he was in.  Often, 
this required him to act decisively first, and seek approval from higher up after the fact.  
Cushing relished this role.  “A ship at sea is a complete system in itself”, he wrote his 
cousin, “The captain is king, and as absolute a monarch as ever lived.  The officers are 
his house of lords, and some five hundred men are his subjects…I had rather be an officer 
on board a man o’ war than the President of les Etats-Unis.”71
Cushing is best known for his daring raid on the Confederate ram Albermarle 
during the Civil War.  Albermarle was constructed in a shipyard in North Carolina in 
1863-1864.  She was 158 feet long, carrying on her superstructure a casemate 60 feet 
long covered with 4 inches of iron plating.  Her armament consisted of broadside guns, 
but more importantly an armored bow that was to be used as a ram.  She got underway on 
17 April and made her way down the Roanoke River.  She ran a gauntlet of Union fire at 
Warren’s Neck, the shot from the Union fort bouncing off her casemate, and then 
happened upon two Union Navy gunboats.  Like most of the hurriedly purchased and 
armed vessels that the Union Navy used for river patrol, Miami and Southfield were 
heavily armed, but unarmored, and no match for the Confederate ironclad.  Albermarle 
attacked the two boats aggressively, plunging her armored bow deep into Southfield’s 
side and causing the gunboat to sink almost immediately.  Miami, meanwhile, fired 
furiously into Albermarle at almost point-blank range, but the shots simply bounced off 
the Confederate ram’s armored sides.  Frustrated, and with her commanding officer 
disabled, Miami withdrew.  Thusly, in the space of a few minutes, Albermarle had 
established Confederate naval supremacy on the Roanoke River.  After recovering a few 
 
                                                 
71 Cushing to Mary Edwards, May 20, 1860, quoted in Robert J. Jr. Schneller, Cushing: Civil War Seal, ed. 
Dennis E. Showalter, Military Profiles (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2004). 
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survivors from Southfield, she returned to port.  Another, larger, engagement took place 
on 5 May.  While Albermarle and another Confederate steamer, Bombshell, were 
escorting a troop transport, they were engaged by four Union warships: Miami, 
Mattabesett, Sassacus, and Wyalusing.  Bombshell was forced to surrender, but 
Albermarle successfully traded fire with all four Union ships before retiring, unharmed.  
The situation for the Union was now critical.  The Union Navy’s ability to conduct naval 
warfare on the Roanoke River was completely negated by one armored ship, about which 
their gunboats could do nothing.  The ram would have to be cut out and destroyed.   
Unfortunately for the Confederate Navy, Commander Fusser, the commanding 
officer of the Southfield, had been a close friend of Lieutenant Cushing.  “I shall never 
rest until I have avenged his death”, Cushing swore.72
                                                 
72 Ralph J. and Van Doren Roske, Charles, Lincoln's Commando: The Biography of Cdr. William B. 
Cushing, Usn, Bluejacket Books ed., Bluejacket Books (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957; 
reprint, 1995). 
  Without hesitation, he volunteered 
to take two small boats upriver to destroy the Confederate ironclad.  The mission was 
carried out on the night of 27 October 1864.  Leading two small boats and 20 men, he 
crept up the river, past a detachment of sentries standing watch on the sunken hulk of the 
Southfield, and drove a spar torpedo underneath the hull of the Albermarle, personally 
detonating it when it was placed correctly.  He and his crew then dove overboard amidst 
heavy small arms fire and swam away.  For his actions, Lieutenant Cushing was voted 
the thanks of Congress (which resulted in his being advanced in rank) and a large share of 
the prize money awarded by a court of admiralty when the hulk eventually fell into Union 
hands.  Northern newspapers made much of the brilliant naval exploit, at a time when 
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civilian morale and zeal for prosecuting the war was at a low point in the Northern 
states.73
This, then was the officer who received a telegram in November 1874 while at 
Aspinwall, Colombia, stating that American citizens were in danger in Cuba.  Any naval 
officer of that era would be expected to act exactly as Cushing now did – taking 
immediate, decisive action.  Although, in this case, Cushing’s actions were not as 
immediate as the vice-counsel in Santiago de Cuba would have liked them to be.  As 
much of a reputation as Cushing might have had for celerity, he does not seem to have 
been in much of a hurry to leave Aspinwall.  This may have had something to do with the 
fact that everyone in the U.S. Navy knew exactly what Virginius was doing, and it was 
not exactly surprising that she had been caught in flagrant violation of the law.  The 
assumption was that the American flag flying from Virginius’ mast would protect her 
passengers and crew.  After receiving the initial telegram, Cushing telegraphed back to 
the vice counsul at Santiago de Cuba, asking for “more information”, then waited over 
the weekend (the telegraph office was closed) for his reply.  Satisfied that American lives 
and property were, in fact, in danger, Cushing took on coal and departed from Aspinwall 
on 11 November.
 
74  After leaving Aspinwall, Cushing touched at Kingston, Jamaica, 
where he satisfied himself that the Virginius’ papers were in order, then proceeded 
immediately to anchor at Santiago de Cuba.75
                                                 
73 "Further Particulars," New York Times (1857-1922), 3 November 1864. 
  Here Cushing met with Captain Loraine 
and the US counsel.  He then wrote a scathing letter to the Spanish military officer in 
 
74 Bradford, 49. 
 
75 U.S. Attorney General George Henry Williams subsequently ruled that the Virginius was, in fact, the 
legal property of the Cuban rebels and, as such, had no right to be flying the U.S. flag.  See Bradford, pg.  
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charge, demanding both an immediate halt to the executions and a personal meeting, and 
threatened to fire on the town.76
Cushing met with General Burriel the next day.  Hagiographic accounts depict 
Cushing standing with his “hand on the hilt of his revolver” making demands of the 
general while telling him to evacuate the women and children from Santiago before he 
shelled the city.
 
77  Other authors do not present such a heroic picture.  Depending upon 
which account one reads, Cushing was either the single-handed savior of the Virginius 
crew, who took charge of events from an ineffectual British officer, or he arrived after the 
heavy lifting had been done by Captain Loraine and took the credit.78  As is often the 
case in history, the truth probably lies somewhere in between.  In any event, the 
combination of British and U.S. naval presence convinced the Spaniards that there was 
little to be gained by continuing to execute prisoners.  The Spanish military officers had 
almost certainly heard of Cushing’s Civil War exploits, and perhaps took his threat to 
shell the city of Santiago de Cuba seriously.79
                                                 
76Reprints of the letters between Cushing and the Spanish military officials in Bradford 
  The USS Juniata, Captain Braine 
commanding, soon arrived on the scene.  Kansas and Canandaigua followed as quickly 
as they could.  As the senior officer present, Captain Braine took charge of things in 
Santiago and sent Cushing north with Wyoming to report on the situation in person.  
There is some evidence that the Navy Department was concerned that the hotheaded 
 
77 E.M.H. Edwards, Commander William Barker Cushing of the United States Navy (New York, NY: F. 
Tennyson Neely, 1898). 
 
78 Bradford tends more towards the latter, Edwards and Roske/VanDoren definitely present the former.   
 
79 The authors of the best Cushing biography make this claim, without providing documentation.  Without 
going through Spanish archival sources it is hard to substantiate whether the Spanish were familiar with 
Cushing or not.  Cushing’s attack on the Albermarle was sensationally covered in U.S. newspapers, and 
Cushing did receive a vote of thanks from Congress.  It is not too much of a stretch to say that Spanish 
naval officers would have been aware of the mission.  We have much better proof that U.S. officials were 
afraid of Cushing and his hot-headedness.  See Roske and VanDoren, pg. 293. 
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Cushing would start a war, and had hurried Braine down to Cuba to relieve him as 
quickly as possible.80
During a meeting of President Grant’s cabinet on 14 November, Secretary of the 
Navy Robeson was told to gather all available naval forces at Key West, in anticipation 
of trouble with Spain.
   
81  Telegrams began to fly, as the cruising forces of the North 
Atlantic, South Atlantic, and European squadrons began to move towards Key West, 
Florida.  It was decided that Rear Admiral A. Ludlow Case, the commander-in-chief of 
the European Station and senior to the North Atlantic Squadron’s commander-in-chief, 
Rear Admiral Scott, would take command of the combined forces.82  Case’s chief of staff 
would be the Navy Department’s current Chief Signal Officer, Commodore Foxhall 
Parker.  Parker’s involvement was important, because he had authored the Navy 
Department’s newly-published manual for steam tactics and brought copies of the new 
signal manual with him to Key West.  In Case’s words: “Some of the drills and exercises, 
directed by the Department, which had commenced before his arrival, will now be carried 
on more efficiently, as he brings books for details to be followed by all vessels – a great 
desideration.”83
                                                 
80 D.L. Braine, CDR, "Letter, Braine to Scott, 11 December 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 313, Records of the 
Operating Forces, Washington, D.C. 
  Parker’s work up until now had been largely theoretical, and based on 
 
81 Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, "Hamilton Fish Diary, 14 November 1873, 1873," Diary, The Papers 
of Hamilton Fish, Washington, D.C. . 
 
82 G. H. Rear Admiral Scott, "Letter, Scott to Robeson, 20 December 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 45, Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, North Atlantic Squadron (1866-1885), 
Washington, D.C. 
 
83 A. Ludlow Case, RADM, "Letter, Case to Robeson, 22 January 1874, 1874," Letter, RG45, Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 




the publications of foreign authors.  This would be the Navy’s first opportunity to have 
enough ships in one location to test the tactical formations that Parker had written about. 
The crisis, however, ended before the fleet could be gathered.  After hurried 
negotiations both in Madrid and Washington, D.C., the release of the prisoners was 
eventually agreed upon.  Juniata took custody of one hundred two prisoners and departed 
Santiago de Cuba on the 18th of December, 1873.84  In this case, the mutual desire of both 
Spain and the United States to avoid war had prevailed.  The limitations of the U.S. 
warships have already been discussed.  The Spanish fleet of 1873 was superior both in 
numbers and technology to the U.S. Navy.  It boasted seven heavy armored vessels, ten 
screw frigates, three armored turret vessels, and five screw corvettes, as well as several 
advice vessels and gunboats.85  European powers, propelled by defense requirements 
more pressing than those of the United States, invested early in such things as armor and 
improved armament.  The Spanish ironclad Arapiles86, which was in dry dock at the 
Brooklyn Navy yard at the time the Virginius Affair took place, was an example of this.    
Spain was one of the few second-rate naval powers to invest in broadside ironclads like 
Arapiles.87
                                                 
84 G. H. Rear Admiral Scott, "Telegram from Rear Admiral G.H. Scott to Secretary of the Navy Robeson, 
1873," Telegram, U.S. Navy Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding 
Officers, North Atlantic Squadron (1866-1885).  Roll 10 (August 1872-December 1873), Washington, D.C. 
. 
  Launched in 1864, Arapiles was 280 feet long and displaced 5500 tons.  Her 
main armament consisted of 22 10-inch muzzle-loading rifles (MLR), 5 8-inch MLR and 
10 7.9-inch breechloaders (BL), mounted in broadside.  These were protected by a by a 
4.25-4.75-inch armor belt of iron amidships.  With a top speed of 12 knots, Arapiles was 
85 "Foreign Miscellany," New York Times (1857-1922), 25 August 1874. 
 
86 A village near Salamanca, in Spain.  The ship’s name commemorates a victory over French forces there 
in 1812, during the Peninsular War. 
 
87 Chesneau, ed., 381-381. 
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more than a match for any warship the North Atlantic Squadron could send against her.  
But, she had suffered major damage off the coast of Venezuela while on deployment.  As 
Spain had no dock facilities in her overseas possessions capable of repairing Arapiles, she 
was forced to put in at New York to have the work done and, ironically, was docked there 
during the 1873 diplomatic standoff with Spain.  Although there were no problems during 
her detainment at the height of the Virginius crisis, her officers and crew wasted few 
opportunities to remind their hosts at the Brooklyn Navy Yard that she could outgun 
anything they owned.88
However, Spanish circumstances were also difficult.  The Spanish Empire was 
mired in a costly civil war.  Followers of Carlos VII controlled the city of Cartagena, 
where many of Spain’s naval assets were located, and it was doubtful that the Spanish 
government would have access to them in the event of war.
  The fact that a nearly-obsolescent warship was widely viewed in 
the press as being superior to anything that the U.S. Navy could mount against it certainly 
gave U.S. policy-makers reason for pause. 
89
The account of the Virginius incident to this point highlights the performance 
standards that informed the professional prospective of a mid-nineteenth century U.S. 
naval officer.  When the first telegrams from the panicked vice counsel at Santiago 
reached him at Aspinwall, Commander Cushing took immediate action.  He had no 
opportunity to consult with Rear Admiral Scott, the Commander-in-Chief of the North 
Atlantic Station.  He did not receive orders from any superior.  The commanding officer 
  On the whole, it was 
mutually beneficial to come to an agreement regarding the Virginius.   
                                                 
88 "The Spanish War Vessel Arapiles," New York Times (1857-1922), 25 November 1873. 
 
89 "The Spanish Navy in War. Its Uselessness against Our Ports Attacks on Our Commerce," New York 
Times (1857-1922), 25 November 1873. 
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of the Wyoming took it upon himself to get underway and steam for Jamaica, knowing 
that he was expected to deal with the situation.  For Cushing, command involved making 
decisions that amounted to the execution of national policy, at an operational, and even 
strategic, level.  Cushing’s performance in this episode epitomizes the warrior/diplomat 
naval officer of the first half of the nineteenth century.  However, two months after the 
Virginius incident, the same USS Wyoming that had taken a city under her guns and 
risked war with the Spanish Empire was steaming in close order formation with eleven 
other warships. The skills that Commander Cushing would be called upon to display over 
the next two weeks had nothing to do with diplomacy or making decisions that would 
affect national policy.  Instead, the Wyoming would be expected to respond to signals 
quickly and accurately, keep her station in close order with the ships in front and behind 
of her, and execute complicated maneuvers in concert with the other ships of the fleet 
while an admiral made strategic and operational decisions. 
The 1874 Squadron Exercises 
 
Rear Admiral A. Ludlow Case arrived in Key West on 3 January, 1874.90   
Tapping Case to command the combined European, North Atlantic, and South Atlantic 
squadrons was an excellent choice.  Case entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1828.91
                                                 
90 A. Ludlow Case, RADM, "Letter, Case to Robeson, 3 January 1874, 1874," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, North Atlantic Squadron, 
1866-1885, Washington, D.C. 
  
After distinguished service in both the Mexican-American War and the Civil War, he 
spent the four years from 1869-1873 as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.  Perhaps no 
 





other officer on active duty at the time was more familiar with the new weapons systems 
being deployed by European navies, and certainly no officer was more eager to 
experiment with new weapons and tactics, unless it was his chief of staff, Commodore 
Foxhall A. Parker.92
Commodore Parker arrived in Key West on 22 January.
  The selection of a command team that featured an ordnance expert 
assisted by a tactical and signaling expert was one of the keys to success of the exercise. 
93  One of his first duties 
was to act as the commander of a naval brigade which carried out landing exercises on 23 
January 1874.94  Parker was the perfect man for this duty as well, having published works 
on the landing and employment of naval howitzers using small boats.95
Mostly, they were just waiting for all the ships that had been ordered to Key West 
to show up.  It was a point of some embarrassment to the Navy Department that the alarm 
had gone out on 14 November, the crisis had ended in December, and it was not really 
  It is noteworthy 
that, in the midst of this unprecedented effort to exercise U.S. Navy warships tactically as 
a coherent combat unit capable of engaging an enemy squadron, Admiral Case’s first 
thoughts, before the exercises even got underway, were to practice landing troops.  He 
understood that the primary mission of the U.S. Navy still involved protection of 
American interests on overseas soil. 
                                                 
92 A. Ludlow Case, RADM, "Letter, Case to Jeffers, 23 November 1873, 1873," Letter, RG 74, Records of 
the Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D.C.  Case tells his successor at BuOrd that he needs various 
weapons delivered to Key West immediately, including “torpedoes, wires, fuses, and the newest and best 
working Electric apparatus.” 
 








until the end of January 1874 that anything approaching a “fleet” had been assembled.96  
By 4 February 1874, the twelve wooden cruisers and five ironclad monitors were in place 
and the exercises were ready to commence.  The steaming characteristics of the monitors 
and the wooden screw vessels were so dissimilar as to make it almost impossible for the 
two ship types to operate together, so one of Case’s first decisions was to exercise the 
two types of vessels separately.97
  The North Atlantic Fleet’s tactical drills evolved in a logical progression, 
designed by Case to ease the unfamiliar officers and crews into the highly dynamic 
business of operating their ships together in close order..
  The cruising vessels went first. 
98  The first two days were 
devoted to moving the fleet to the exercise area in the Bay of Florida.  On 3 and 4 
February the ships simply got underway together, steamed in columns of vessels abreast 
by division at double cable length – about 1500 yards – between ships, and anchored 
together in the afternoon.  On board Wyoming, Lieutenants Todd and Costen, Ensign 
Peck, and Master Day rotated through watches as officer of the deck, keeping station on 
Congress ahead of them.99
                                                 
96This would come back to haunt Rear Admiral J.R.M. Mullany when he asked the Navy Department to 
allow him to move his ships north for the sickly season later in 1874.  The Department refused permission, 
not wanting their warships too far from the Caribbean.  See Robeson, "". 
  This same work was going on throughout the fleet.  140 years 
later, with global positioning navigation, computers, and massive arrays of precision 
instrumentation, formation work is still one of the most nerve-wracking evolutions 
 
97 Case, "Letter, Case to Robeson, 22 January 1874. " 
 
98 The following discussion is based on the Journal of the Movements of the U.S.N.A. Fleet, Commencing 
February 3, 1874, "1874," Ship's Log, Stephen B. Luce Papers, Washington, D.C. . 
 
99 USS Wyoming, "Logbook, 22 December 1873 - 30 April 1874," Ship's Log, Records of the Bureau of 




practiced by modern warships.100
By 5 February, the formation of columns was executing simultaneous direction 
changes on signal, as well as the more complicated shift from column formation to line 
abreast.  This was an important fundamental maneuver for steam fleets.  Cruising in 
column abreast by divisions allowed all the vessels in the formation to be within visual 
range of the flagship, and made passing signals easier.  The formation for combat, 
however, was the time-tested line ahead, or “column.”  Transitioning from one to the 
other would be a vital technique  in fleet combat, and thus would have been one of the 
first maneuvers practiced.   
  In 1874, without a pilothouse, or any remote 
instrumentation, it must have been excruciating.  One can picture the twelve commanding 
officers pacing nervously next to their junior officers of the deck, watching as more or 
fewer revolutions per minute were called down to the engine room to keep the correct 
distance from the ship immediately in front of them.  The rudder was used to follow in 
the preceding ship’s wake.  This would have been difficult due to the lack of visibility 
from the quarterdeck – sailing ships not constructed with a raised pilothouse.  Modern 
sailors order changes in the rudder in ½ degree increments, but the smallest rudder order 
available to these officers was a “point”, or six degrees on the compass.  The 
instrumentation necessary to closely monitor the position of the rudder had not yet been 
developed.  This made formation work that much more difficult. 
                                                 
100 The author has personally been involved in a near-collision between a guided-missile cruiser and an 








Figure 2: Warships move from column to columns abreast by division102
                                                 
101 The warships move from a line abreast to a column formation.  Journal of the Movements of the 
U.S.N.A. Fleet, Commencing February 3, 1874, ""; Luce, "". 
 
102 The warships move from a column to columns abreast by division.  Note the position of Case’s flagship 




On 6 February, Admiral Case ordered the interval between ships closed to a half 
cable length (about 350 feet).  Their confidence in their ability not to run into each other 
was growing.  The fleet executed the reverse of the evolution practiced on 5 February, 
moving from a simple column to a column abreast by divisions.  The recorder noted that 
the evolution was carried out at a speed of three knots.  (The fleet was limited by the best 
speed of their slowest ship, and more than one of the ships had worn out boilers that 
could only get up enough steam to make good three knots.)  This was a remarkably slow 
speed for a time when most navies were operating their formations at speeds of up to 
twelve knots.  The U.S. fleet would neither be able to bring a faster enemy to action if 
they wanted to, or run from them if they desired to refuse action.  The recorder goes on to 
note that the movement to column abreast by divisions took one and a half hours to 
perform.     
After closing out 6 February with some flanking movements, the fleet spent the 
next four days at anchor.  On 11 February, Admiral Case and Commodore Parker began 
to step up the pressure on the officers of the fleet.  At 11:20AM, signal number 63 was 
ordered: “Divisions from the right of, form columns of vessels, fleet right oblique, right 
vessels forward.”  This fairly complicated maneuver was carried out in fifteen minutes.  
The skill and confidence of the officers of the deck was climbing rapidly.    The new 
tactics had not entirely replaced the old ways, however, as Wyoming went to general 
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quarters at 9:45, then (while still responding to signals from Congress) exercised at 
stations for “repel boarders”.103
After this introduction to fleet operations, the fourteen ships sat at anchor for the 
next four days.  Commander Cushing and the rest of the commanding officers were 
summoned to the flagship on Saturday to debrief the last three days of steaming in 
column order.  While the commanding officers were gone, there was no rest for the 
engineers.  Wyoming’s boilers had been a constant source of headache since her 
commission began, and the constant usage of steam tactical evolutions was beginning to 
tell on them.  Sunday was spent attempting repairs to the port boiler.   
   
The attempted repairs only barely got Wyoming through the evolutions on 11 
February.  On 12 February, Admiral Case decided that he had enough, and that outside 
help would be needed to repair Wyoming’s boilers.  Accordingly, the signal “WYOMING 
EXCEPTED” was made at 6:45 that morning.  Soon, the fleet weighed anchor without 
the Wyoming, and got underway for that day’s operations.  In the old days of cruising or 
showing the flag, the order simply would have been given to make sail, and the Wyoming 
would have continued with her business as usual.  But there was no room in a steam navy 
battle formation for a ship that could not get up enough steam to keep station with the rest 
of the fleet.  Despatch, a mail steamer, was detailed to take Wyoming’s place.  Two boiler 
makers from Key West boarded Wyoming that afternoon.104
Minus the Wyoming, the fleet got underway at 10:00 AM.  Settling into the now-
familiar column of vessels, the signal was given for “close order”, which was one cable 
   
                                                 
103 Logbook, USS Wyoming, 22 December 1873-30 April 1874, Entry for 6 February 1874.   RG 24: 
Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Logs of Ships and Stations, 1801-1946, E-118, Vol. 19 of 41, 
NARA I, Washington, D.C.  
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length, or 720 feet, apart.  With the interval set, the column began to maneuver; simple 
commands first, followed by increasingly difficult deployments of the battle line.  By the 
end of the day’s exercises, the official recorder was able to note that “marked 
improvement in the execution of evolutions is noticeable throughout the fleet.” 
Wyoming, the emergency repairs to her boilers complete, was back in the action 
on Friday.  That evening, Admiral Case ordered a boat sent on board the flagship with 
Wyoming’s signal and order books.  Apparently, he and Commodore Parker were 
interested in seeing how well the various ships of their fleet were receiving their signals.  
The weekend was spent at anchor. Once again, the commanding officers were summoned 
to the Wabash for a meeting to discuss the weeks’ work.  Other visiting was going on as 
well.  During the afternoon watch, Wyoming sent visiting parties to the Alaska, Franklin, 
Colorado, and Lancaster.105
The evolutions began anew on Monday, 16 February.  This was a week of 
increasingly difficult maneuvers.  Apparently, Wyoming had some issues with her speed 
on Monday, because prior to Tuesday’s evolutions, the Admiral signaled “Are you in 
condition to take position in the fleet.” Commander Cushing, who no doubt was 
frustrated with the performance of his boilers, simply replied “Yes”.
  Officers from the various ships were mingling, exchanging 
both professional notes and camaraderie in a way that would have been impossible in a 
cruising navy.   
106
                                                 
105 Logbook, USS Wyoming, entry for 15 February 1874 
  The week’s work 
culminated in firing exercises on Friday, the twentieth of February.  Admiral Case was 
disappointed in the results of the gunnery.  According to his report, hits were made only 
by the Wabash, Colorado, and Kansas.  One again has to imagine Cushing’s frustration 
 
106 Logbook, USS Wyoming, entry for 17 February 1874 
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as Wyoming fired her 11-inch gun four times and her 20 pound rifle twice without 
registering any hits on the target.107
At the beginning of the third week of exercises Wyoming was detached to coal.  
She returned Monday afternoon and anchored, while the rest of the fleet conducted 
another gunnery exercise.  Torpedo exercises were carried out on Wednesday.  Admiral 
Case took a personal interest in this evolution, having been the previous chief of the 
Bureau of Ordnance.  Here was an opportunity to see, in practice, many of the 
innovations his office had worked on and advocated over the past three years.  In spite of 
Admiral Case’s efforts, the technology of the spar torpedo had not progressed much 
beyond the weapon that Lieutenant Cushing had employed against the Albermarle a 
decade earlier.  Much depended upon being able to use the ship to place the spar in just 
the right position against the target and then activate the torpedo by means of wires 
running along the spar.  In nineteen attempts, eight failed on the first try, mostly due 
either to carrying away the spar or damaging the wires in the course of the attack.  
Eventually, all the participating ships, with the exception of Alaska, were able to explode 
their torpedoes after one or two attempts.
   
108  Although Admiral Case generally referred to 
these exercises as a success, he could not have felt that the chances of a U.S. Navy ship 
being able to carry out a torpedo attack in combat conditions were likely.  He made it 
obvious in his reports that much work was needed by the Torpedo School in Newport, 
R.I. if this weapon was to have any significance as an effective weapon.109
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108 Luce, "".  Entry for Wednesday, 24 February.  Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in the Bay of Florida, and 
the Navy of the Future," 169. 
 
109 “I desire to call the attention of the officers…especially to that relating to the torpedo, which, in my 
judgment is to act so great a part in all future offensive and defensive operations.  Although the Torpedo 
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That Friday, the fleet steamed in double echelon formation at night, as they 
returned to the Dry Tortugas.  It was a fitting display of the tactical prowess gained by the 
officers and crews of the North Atlantic Fleet in their short three weeks of exercises.  On 
6 March, it was the turn of the monitors.  Under the direction of Commodore Parker, the 
Manhattan, Ajax, Mahopac, and Saugus were taken out for a single day of formation 
maneuvering.  The exercise showed the complete inability of the monitor-type vessels to 
fight a fleet action.  Restricted to a speed of four knots to accommodate the slowest 
vessel, Manhattan, the four ships tried a series of flanking and echelon movements.  
Commodore Parker noted that Mahopac, in particular, took nine minutes to turn eight 
points to port.110
Admiral Case’s farewell order to the fleet sounded a note of pleasure at the 
outcome of the exercises, praising Commodore Parker and the efficient execution of 
tactics under steam by the vessels of the fleet.
  It was apparent that the idea of engaging an enemy fleet with these 
vessels, especially when it was probable that an enemy would attempt to ram them, was 
far-fetched. 
111
                                                                                                                                                 
School at Newport has done much to bring the system to its present advanced condition, it is yet in its 
infancy, and I wish to invite a closer attention to it by all…”, Army and Navy Journal, 11 April 1874 1874. 
  However, in reality Admiral Case’s 
words can only be described as putting the best face on the occasion for the benefit of his 
subordinates.  Given the disappointing results of the gunnery exercises, the torpedo 
exercises, and the pathetic, four-knot attempt to maneuver the monitor vessels, the best 
that can be said is that the assembled vessels proved the ability of their officers and crews 
to execute complicated formations with some degree of precision.  Their ability to inflict 
 
110 i.e. a 90-degree turn.  See Foxhall Parker, Commodore, "Letter, Parker to Case, 7 March 1874, 1874," 
Letter, RG45, Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanders, North Atlantic Squadron 
(1866-1885), Washington, D.C. . 
 
111 Army and Navy Journal, 11 April 1974, pg. 549. 
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any damage on an enemy formation was doubtful.  Case went on to note that: “…as the 
practice and effect of exercises in naval tactics, gunnery, and torpedoes is of more 
importance to the officers who are to command our future fleets (my italics) than those 
who are just passing out, I desire to call the attention of the officers to them.”112
Commodore Parker, in not quite as delicate a position as the flag officer 
commanding the exercises, had somewhat less generous remarks.  “The Commodore said 
that it certainly demonstrated the lamentable condition of the American Navy,” reported 
the Army and Navy Journal on 7 March 1874, “…The evolutions had thoroughly 
demonstrated the necessity of an immediate and radical change in the character of the 
vessels composing the navy.”
  Case’s 
reference to “fleets” shows that he felt that the exercises he had just overseen represented 
the future employment pattern of the North Atlantic Squadron.   
113  The fleet of the future, according to Commodore Parker, 
would consist of “rams, artillery vessels, and torpedo boats”; an argument he made again 
in a subsequent Proceedings article later in the year.114
Return to Station Cruising, 1874-1876 
 
 
In the short term, it was back to business as usual.  The maneuvers 
notwithstanding, the U.S. Navy of 1874 was still devoted to carrying out detached, 
single-ship operations.  After the fleet broke up, the North Atlantic Station returned to its 
practice of supplying ships singly or in pairs to represent the interests of the United Sates 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.  Wyoming returned to the Washington Navy Yard, 
                                                 
112Army and Navy Journal, 11 April 1874 1874., Ibid. 
 
113 "The Naval Review," Army and Navy Journal, 7 March 1874 1874. 
 
114 Ibid.  See also Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in the Bay of Florida, and the Navy of the Future." 
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where she was put out of service on 30 April.  The ship’s commission was over, and 
tragically, her captain’s life would be over within the year as well.  William Cushing was 
probably suffering from prostate cancer as the exercises were underway, and his 
condition worsened through the summer of 1874.  Taken off sea duty and assigned to the 
Washington Naval Yard, he died in December.  Cushing’s final year symbolized the 
massive institutional change underway in the Navy, as he shifted from operating 
independently to spending three weeks executing difficult maneuvers in company with 
eleven other ships, following orders transmitted by a rear admiral.  Over the next decade, 
the Navy Department and the North Atlantic Squadron struggled to find the right balance 
between showing the flag in foreign ports and maintaining the capability to operate as a 
combat unit.   
After issuing his farewell, Rear Admiral Case took Franklin, Congress, Alaska, 
and Juniata and returned across the Atlantic to reestablish the European Station.115  This 
left the North Atlantic Squadron with a total of 12 warships, which remained under the 
command of Rear Admiral Scott for another two and a half months, until he was relieved 
by Rear Admiral J.R.M Mullany in June 1874.116
                                                 
115 George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Robeson to Case, March 1874, 1874," Letter, 
RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters to Flag Officers Commanding Squadrons, Vessels, and Stations, Sent 
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Washington, D.C. 
  A Civil War veteran who had been at 
Mobile Bay with Farragut, Mullany had had previous duty as a flag officer commanding 
the European Squadron as well as the Navy Yard at Philadelphia, PA.  After assuming 
command of the station, Rear Admiral Mullany was ordered to place his monitors in 
 
116 George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Robeson to Mullany, 19 June 1874, 1874," Letter, 
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Powhatan, as one of the older ships on the station, remained in home waters 
throughout 1874.  After spending some time off the coast of New Orleans, she proceeded 
to Norfolk, where she was fitted out for special duty – carrying the next commander-in-
chief of the European Station to Portugal in 1875.  Canidaigua cruised in the Greater 
Antilles and Virgin Islands throughout the summer of 1874.  Ossipee left Key West in 
April, cruising up and down the east coast of Central America.  Wachusett cruised to 
various ports throughout the Caribbean in the spring and summer of 1874, before 
receiving orders to proceed to Norfolk for decommissioning in November.  Kansas and 
  The cruising vessels quickly deployed throughout the North 
Atlantic Squadron’s area of operations.  Colorado visited Havana, Cuba briefly in the 
summer before returning to Key West to act as Rear Admiral Mullany’s temporary 
flagship.  Brooklyn departed in April for a cruise throughout the Windward Islands.  She 
touched at various ports in the Caribbean before returning to Key West in June.  
Worcester had been Rear Admiral Scott’s flagship, which put her in an interesting 
position.  After the decision by the Navy Department to turn the combined forces of the 
North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and European Squadrons over to the European Squadron 
commander, Rear Admiral Case, Worcester was tasked with what essentially amounted 
to a “special mission” to get Rear Admiral Scott out of Key West.  After Scott turned 
over command to Case on 3 January, he and Worcester departed on an extended 
deployment to visit Cuba and the Windward Islands, reporting on conditions there in the 
aftermath of the Virginius Affair.  Discretely returning to Key West on 1 April (after 
Case departed), she continued as the flagship of the station after Scott, who had already 
asked to retire, turned over command to Rear Admiral Mullany in June.  




Shawmut both spent the summer carrying out coastal surveys around various parts of the 
Caribbean. 
The monitors remained in port – Cannonicus in New Orleans, and Dictator at 
Pensacola.  Unlike the cruising vessels, these were not designed for long-distance work, 
but to provide local defense against hostile warships.  They were armored, with very little 
freeboard, and carried their main armament in revolving turrets.  Their restricted hull 
volume offered very little living room for her crew, and it was assumed that the officers, 
at least, would spend a great deal of the time ashore, rather than on board.118
All of this is to show that, after the fleet exercises in January and February 1874, 
the forces of the North Atlantic Squadron ceased to be an operating fighting unit.  They 
dispersed, not to operate as a tactical unit for another three years.
  While their 
nominal fighting power was much greater than than the wooden cruisers, the monitors did 
have a number of significant weaknesses.  They were unwieldy and very difficult to 
maneuver.  Their top speed was such that any adversary would be free to pick the terms 
of the engagement.  As far as endurance on the open ocean, the monitors were considered 
so unseaworthy and their engines so unreliable and inefficient that they usually had to be 
towed, or at least escorted, by a cruising ship whenever it was necessary for them to 
move from one port to another.  The monitors (or “ironclads” as they were almost 
universally referred to in the correspondence of the time) were kept partially manned in 
ports such as New Orleans, Pensacola, and Norfolk, with the understanding that they 
could be quickly provided with crews in the event of a national emergency.   
119
                                                 
118 The files of the Bureau of Steam Engineering are full of letters from engineering officers requesting 
transfer to one of the larger, more comfortable, cruising ships.   
  Partly, the reason for 




this was the desire of the Navy Department to go about the normal missions of the Navy 
– namely to look after commercial interests.  Another reason, however, was the fact that 
the US Navy did not possess an infrastructure that allowed its ships to spend more than a 
few weeks concentrated in one location.  Until that changed, it was not possible for the 
forces of the North Atlantic Station to train together as a combat fleet on a regular basis.  
Part of the homeport problem had to do with yellow fever.  In the 1870’s, yellow fever 
was on the mind of any military officer who had to operate in southern latitudes.  Without 
a vaccination or a known cure, it could sweep through a collection of ships very rapidly.  
This was one of the reasons that it was not a good idea to keep ships close together during 
the “sickly season”, but rather send them out on independent voyages.  Yellow fever was 
very poorly understood in the nineteenth century, as Navy Department orders that urge 
commanders to keep the men from too much sun exposure or heat from the ships’ boilers 
attest.120  For his part, in 1874 Admiral Mullany wanted to bring his forces north.  He 
requested permission to relocate his base of operations to Norfolk, but was denied 
because of the Department’s concern that his warships would not be close enough to the 
action if they were needed for another crisis in Cuba.121
When Rear Admiral William E. LeRoy took command in January of 1876, the 
Navy Department seemed determined to build on the “success” of the 1874 exercises 
with another round of squadron drills.  Moreover, it appears that Admiral Mullany’s 
  Despite Admiral Mullany’s best 
intentions, the North Atlantic Squadron did not perform any maneuvers in 1875. 
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concerns about keeping a large concentration of ships in the deep south had registered at 
the Department.  Upon assuming command, Admiral LeRoy was ordered to concentrate 
his forces at Port Royal, South Carolina.122  The importance of Port Royal to operations 
on the eastern seaboard of the United States had been clear since the Civil War.  One of 
the earliest decisions of the northern Blockade Strategy Board was to seize a likely port 
on the Carolina coast to facilitate resupply and coaling of warships on blockade duty.  By 
1866, a large supply operation, complete with a dock constructed by the Navy, was in 
place at Port Royal, South Carolina.123  After the war the facilities at Port Royal were 
ordered closed, but the Navy Department elected to retain ownership of the property.124  
When the threat of yellow fever rendered the Navy Yard at Pensacola inhospitable, the 
idea of using Port Royal as a rendezvous was resurrected.  Here, the ships could be 
serviced without incurring the expense of travelling north to the next-closest shipyard at 
Norfolk, 460 miles away.  An additional benefit was that the warships would remain 
under the operational control of the commander-in-chief of the station, not the 
commandant of a navy yard.  Port Royal had the additional advantage of being relatively 
close to the action in the Caribbean, especially when compared with Hampton Roads.125
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of the Navy, "Letter, Welles to Bureau Chiefs, 2 February 1867, 1867," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
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In 1876 the monitors which had previously been in ordinary at Pensacola, FL were also 
moved to Port Royal, where they could be anchored in fresh water, which was preferable 
for the preservation of the monitors’ metal hulls.126  The USS New Hampshire, an 
outdated ship-of-the-line, was ordered to Port Royal as a permanent depot-ship.  The 
entire operation was placed under the command of Captain J.B. Clitz, who was given the 
title of commodore and the responsibility for all the warships at the Port Royal 
rendezvous when the Commander-in-Chief was not present.127  This last stipulation is 
crucial to understanding how this was a move by the Navy Department towards an 
operational cycle for the Squadron that would involve the vessels spending more time in 
close proximity.  One way to facilitate this was to create a “rendezvous” where the ships 
could gather that did not create chain-of-command difficulties with the commandant of a 
navy yard.   This seems to indicate that the Navy Department in 1877 was moving away 
from a cruising mindset to one that involved a concentration of its forces.  Port Royal 
continued to grow in importance in the eyes of the Navy Department and the North 
Atlantic Squadron.  Opening as a “naval depot” in 1876, by 1877 it was classified as a 
“naval station”, with its own commanding officer.128
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The Department was eager to try out their new homeport in 1876, and sent a 
lengthy order to Rear Admiral LeRoy upon his assumption of command of the North 
Atlantic station.  After a preliminary period in which the squadron would practice drills 
and gunnery exercises while at anchor or in the vicinity of Port Royal, Admiral LeRoy 
was expected to get underway and lead his squadron on a deployment to the Caribbean, 
exercising them along the way in “squadron evolutions and tactics.”  “The Department 
hopes,” wrote Secretary Robeson, “that with the class and conditions of vessels in this 
command, and with the preliminary drill, the squadron will be able to make a creditable 
exhibition of our Naval power, wherever it may go and whatever work it may be directed 
to perform.”129  Soon after taking command, LeRoy issued General Order No. 6, which 
organized the “vessels attached to the North Atlantic Station.”  They were divided into 
three divisions, with a reserve division comprised of support ships and monitors.130
Unfortunately, real-world contingencies intruded upon the plans Admiral LeRoy 
and the Department had for the vessels of the North Atlantic Station, and as will be seen, 
the prevailing model of sending individual ships abroad to “put out fires” continued.  
Things began to unravel in March, when unrest in Haiti threatened U.S. interests.  On 14 
March, a terse telegram from the Department of the Navy ordered Admiral LeRoy to 
  In 
the beginning, at least, Admrial LeRoy was thinking in terms of commanding his forces 
as a single combat unit, and there was an expressed desire both on his part, and that of the 
Department, to project a squadron into the Caribbean in support of U.S. foreign policy 
objectives. 
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130 William E. LeRoy, RADM, "General Order No. 6, 1876," General Order, Papers of Stephen Bleeker 
Luce, Washington, D.C. . 
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dispatch two vessels to Port-au-Prince without delay.131  Unrest in Mexico was on the 
Administration’s mind as well, and two days later, on 16 March, Admiral LeRoy was 
ordered to take four ships, Hartford, Swatara, Shawmut, and Marion to Tampico, 
Mexico.132  While these orders, and subsequent ones concerning these four ships refer to 
this as a “squadron”, the plan for them upon arrival in Mexican waters was to “distribute” 
them as most advisable, making sure that at least one ship was stationed at the mouth of 
the Rio Grande del Norte.  On 1 April the U.S. government ordered LeRoy to have one of 
his other ships visit ports along Mexico’s east coast.133  With no chance remaining for the 
ships to conduct exercises, Marion was ordered to the Mediterranean on 17 May, and 
Admiral LeRoy was ordered to bring Hartford north to Philadelphia on 24 June.134
While the contingent events intruded upon the Department’s extensive plans to 
hold squadron maneuvers in the summer, the North Atlantic Squadron was eventually 
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  Rear Admiral Trenchard assumed command of the station in 
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September of 1876.  He was immediately orderd to assemble whatever ships he had 
available in Port Royal in October of that year for an inspection and exercises in naval 
drill prior to departing to their cruising stations for the winter .136  After all the attention 
paid to squadron exercises in steam tactics, drills with torpedoes, and the like in Admiral 
LeRoy’s original orders of 28 January, the centerpiece of the October maneuvers, or 
rather the only aspect the Secretary of the Navy felt was worthy of his including in his 
Annual Report to Congress for 1876, was the landing of a naval brigade – a fighting unit 
consisting of the officers and men of the assembled ships.137  Although we can see early 
evidence that the Department was becoming more interested in the ships of the North 
Atlantic Squadron spending meaningful time together as a combat unit, the Secretary’s 
attention is still drawn to the Navy’s ability to project combat power ashore, providing 
security for U.S. business interests on land.  In an era when the U.S. Marine Corps still 
mainly consisted of small detachments to keep order aboard ships, it was expected that a 
commanding officer could deploy a fighting unit from the men of the entire ships’ 
company.138
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The twelve vessels under the command of Rear Admiral William E. LeRoy were 
never referred to as a “squadron”.  Indeed, Rear Admiral LeRoy did not identify himself 
as a “squadron commander”, nor is there any evidence that, other than issuing General 
Order No. 6 assigning his ships to divisions, he had any intention of commanding the 
assembled vessels as a squadron or fleet.  Admiral LeRoy’s job as commander-in-chief 
consisted largely of managing the logistics involved with the individual movements of his 
ships.   
 1877 and 1878 were lean years for the North Atlantic Station.  Many of the 
wooden cruising vessels which had carried out the large exercises of 1874 and the smaller 
reprise of 1876 had been placed out of commission.  In 1877, Admiral Trenchard had five 
cruising vessels to work with.  These five were sent on deployments that touched down 
the eastern seaboard and into the Caribbean.  This was still the overarching mission of the 
U.S. Navy, as the Secretary of the Navy made clear in his remarks in his Annual Report 
to Congress.139
                                                 
139 Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy on the Operations of the 
Department, with Accompanying Documents for the Year 18771877. 
  Protecting commerce and commercial opportunities was, however, not 
just a mission for overseas.  1877 brought an opportunity to exercise the naval brigade 
concept in a way that the Navy Department had probably not conceived of using it.  
Using sailors to influence events ashore had always been a secondary mission of all 
navies, and the North Atlantic Squadron was no exception.  Ships’ logbooks give 
testimony to the amount of time spent practicing to call out “all boats, armed and 
equipped.”  The 1870’s, however, seem to give an added urgency to this capability, as the 
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two landings carried out during the Key West exercises of 1874 show.140
The 1877 Labor Riots 
  In 1877, sailors 
of the North Atlantic Squadron would be called upon to protect U.S. business interests – 
not in some faraway port, but on U.S. soil. 
 
An economic depression which lingered throughout most of the 1870’s lowered 
prices and wages – particularly in the transportation sector – to a point that culminated in 
the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, as railroad workers who had seen an almost 70% cut in 
their pay walked off the job and then threatened violence when railroad managers 
attempted to keep the trains running.   The B&O Railroad’s operation in Cumberland, 
Maryland – worryingly close to Washington, D.C. – was targeted by strike activity, 
which threatened to freeze most of the freight and passenger service from the Old 
Northwest into the Baltimore/Washington DC region.  When the strikes turned violent, 
state governors called out their militias.  Unfortunately, in many of the areas where the 
strikes were the most violent, the local militia consisted almost entirely of strikers.  
Railroad officials, especially John W. Garrett, the president of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, pressured governors to call for federal aid.  Public opinion was in favor of 
federal intervention, not to mention the fact that many senior government officials, 
including Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson, had close ties to railroad 
                                                 
140 Commodore Foxhall Parker, who had published on the subject and by virtue of his work with the 
Potomac Flotilla during the Civil War was considered to be an expert, personally oversaw the larger of the 
two landing exercises in 1874, putting ashore some 2700 sailors with artillery. 
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money.141  President Hayes eventually sent federal troops to break up the striking railroad 
workers.  Sailors and Marines played an important part in these military operations.142
When the governors relented and asked the President for federal troops, controlled 
chaos ensued.  The Army, once numbering millions only a decade earlier, was now little 
more than a frontier police force.  With company-sized units spread around the country, 
no plan existed for mobilizing and concentrating them within the territorial boundaries of 
the United States.  As the Army attempted to collect itself to respond, the federal 
government looked to another source of ready manpower: sailors.  On 21 July, a message 
reached Hampton Roads that all available seamen and Marines from any ships currently 
at the navy yard, as well as anyone who could be spared from the navy yard itself, were 
to be sent to Washington, D.C.   The initial response was 130 Marines, who were 
organized from the ships present at the Norfolk Navy Yard.  They departed that evening 
for Washington, D.C. in Swatara.  The following afternoon, Plymouth left with about 250 
Sailors in addition to her own crew.  The tug Pinta sailed with her.  Upon arrival at 
Washington, D.C., the sailors and marines were detailed to protect government buildings, 
railroad bridges, tunnels, and other government property.  Personnel from the New York 
Navy Yard performed the same duties around New York City.
  
143
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  Admiral Trenchard had 
been on leave when the call went out to the North Atlantic Squadron for resources.  He 
hurried to Washington, D.C. and established himself at the Ebbitt Hotel, where he 
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143 Jerry M. Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder: Federal Military Intervention in Labor Disputes, 1877-
1900, ed. Thomas E. and Luvaas Griess, Jay, Contributions in Military History (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1980). Pg. 51. 
81 
 
directed the operations of the naval forces ashore.144  Eventually, the panic subsided and 
the sailors and marines returned to Norfolk, their efforts much appreciated by the federal 
government.145
By 1878, the five vessels Admiral Trenchard had commanded in 1877 had been 
whittled to two:  Powhatan and Plymouth.  There is no evidence that either of these ships 
either spent any sort of significant time together in port or cruised together.
 
146  Squadron 
tactics under steam were, for the moment, no more than a memory.  Admiral Trenchard 
gave up his command in September of 1878, relieved by Rear Admiral J.C. Howell.147
 Howell had been appointed a midshipman from Pennsylvania in 1836.  After 
distinguished service during the Civil War, he served as chief of the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks from 1875-1878, before being assigned as the commander-in-chief, North Atlantic 
Squadron.  Howell’s two-ship squadron became a one-ship squadron after an insurrection 
broke out on the island of Santa Cruz, in the Caribbean.  The Navy Department cabled 
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  The Department was less than satisfied with the North Atlantic Squadron’s 
response.  Of Howell’s two ships, Powhatan was too far away to have any effect on the 
 
145The Secretary of the Navy asked that the men involved be given special liberty.  See Thompson, "Letter, 
Thompson to Trenchard, 9 August 1877. " 
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situation, and Plymouth, who was closer, but in port, had not provisioned, and was unable 
to get underway.  In the event, a French ship got to Santa Cruz first and landed troops, 
but not before the American consulate had been burned.   
It is likely that this event solidified the Navy Department’s resistance to keeping 
ships in northern ports and redoubled their determination to have a facility, such as the 
one at Port Royal, where a concentration of North Atlantic Station assets could be ready 
to sail from on a moment’s notice.149  After reprimanding Admiral Howell for not having 
a warship ready to respond, the Department  had the nerve to tell him that “The 
Department will leave to your discretion any further movements of  your squadron…” as 
if he had control of more than two ships.150
 By 1879, five ships were assigned to the Station, as the Essex-class wooden screw 
sloops began to report for service.  There is no evidence, however, that any of these ships 
carried out either squadron-level tactical exercise or cruising deployment during the year.  
In January, Rear Admiral Howell was appointed to command the European Squadron, 
and Rear Admiral R. H. Wyman took command of the North Atlantic Station.
 
151
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  In 
keeping with tradition, Admiral Wyman had performed a previous tour as the Chief of a 
Bureau – in his case the Navy Hydrographic Office.  During the eight years that he held 
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and surveying that decreased U.S. Navy reliance on foreign (often British) sources for 
their charts.152
 Admiral Wyman was immediately greeted in his new command by a telegram 
from the Navy Department informing him that there was a disturbance underway at 
Puerto Caballo, Venezuela, and directing him to prepare his flagship to get underway to 
proceed there at once.
 
153  At this point, the flagship represented the only vessel Wyman 
had under his control, so that essentially, upon receipt of that telegram, the entire North 
Atlantic Squadron set out for the Caribbean.  Touching at Cuba, Powhatan was greeted 
with another telegram that instructed her to proceed at once to Puerto Caballo and “look 
after American interests in that quarter…”154  Things cooled down, however, and 
Admiral Wyman was back in Norfolk by April.155  There was trouble in Panama in June, 
but the Navy Department decided that sending a vessel was not warrented.156
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 The importance of the Central American region was growing as more and more 
thought began to be given to the project of putting a canal through the isthmus.157  One of 
the ironic results of the Riots of 1877 was that the personal involvement of naval officers, 
who already felt that their mission largely involved protecting American commercial 
interests overseas, in the maintenance of civil order convinced them that the way to 
prevent future unrest was to have more and more commercial opportunities overseas, 
providing necessary outlets for production surplus and, by extension, jobs and money for 
the working class.158
 Just as the question of a canal through the isthmus began to capture the 
imagination of the American people, the attention of the Navy Department began to turn 
to the north, as the fisheries questions which had been thought settled by the 1871 Treaty 
of Washington began to be raised again.  In late July 1879, Kearsarge was sent to 
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada, where she was met by a special agent of 
the Department of State who had been sent to gather information about possible treaty 
violations in the fishing waters off Canada.
 
159
While the United States was free from conflict in the 1870’s and 1880’s, other 
nations in the hemisphere were not, and the lessons learned from these conflicts were 
important in putting before the U.S. population the specter of Latin American countries 
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with larger and better-equipped navies.  One such example was the War of the Pacific, 
fought between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia from 1879-1884.  This little-studied conflict 
featured some of the first naval battles between ironclad ships.  Any of the ships in these 
engagements would have been more than a match for even the strongest warship on the 
North Atlantic Station in the 1870’s.  Of particular interest to naval officers was the 
engagement of the Peruvian ironclad, Huascar, with Chilean ironclads in 1879.  Huascar 
was essentially a “monitor”, mounting a main battery consisting of a single turret with 
two muzzle-loading rifles.  In other words, she represented exactly what the U.S. Navy 
was banking on to protect important harbors along the eastern seaboard, with the 
exception that she was more technologically advanced and carried a crew of Peruvian 
regulars, as opposed to hurriedly-mobilized naval militia. In the event, Huascar absorbed 
an impressive amount of punishment from modern, armor-piercing shells, before being 
forced to strike her colors and being captured as a prize by the Chilean forces.  The rear 
admiral commanding U.S. forces on the Pacific Station, C.R. P. Rodgers, was a 
progressive-minded naval officer who had been heavily involved in the work of the 
Naval Institute during his previous tour as superintendant of the Naval Academy.  
Admiral Rodgers immediately recognized the importance of the engagement, and 
dispatched a team of experienced line officers and engineers to examine the Huascar and 
report on their findings.  The Chilean Navy was only too happy to show the “gringos” 
around their prize of war, and the commission appointed by Admiral Rodgers was able to 
conduct a thorough investigation.  The report remarks, in several pages of very technical 
detail, on the effects of each of the 24 shell hits absorbed by Huascar.  Left unsaid in the 
report was the fact that Huascar, while outdated already by the most modern European 
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standards, clearly outclassed any vessel of the U.S. Navy.160  U.S. naval officers, and not 
a few politicians and citizens, realized that some basic improvements were going to have 
to be made to the navy if it was to retain any effectiveness in world affairs.161
Naval authorities of the time noted that during the action itself, Huascar was 
separated from her companion and defeated as a single ship.  This fact directly 
challenged the comfortable notion that a small number of monitors spread up and down 
the eastern seaboard would be able to protect American coastal cities.  Admittedly, the 
analogy only goes so far.  Huascar was on the offensive and was in Chilean waters 
seeking action, not defending a harbor in coordination with coastal artillery, but the 




 The Key West exercises of 1874 signified recognition by the Navy Department 
that conducting fleet tactics under steam would be a skill required of its officers in the 
future.  The continued development of U.S. strategic interest in the Caribbean meant that 
it was no longer enough to simply train naval cadets in tactical theory at the Academy.  
The process of developing a fleet capable of fighting in formation could only be 
accomplished by rigorous exercise at sea.  Although managing the individual movements 
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of his ships was still the best description of what the commander-in-chief did on a daily 
basis, it was now clear that he would be spending an increasing amount of time leading 
his vessels in formation.  The conflict faced by the North Atlantic Squadron between 
these two distinct mission types would become evident over the next two decades.  While 
the Royal Navy possessed enough warships, armored and unarmored, to field different 
squadrons for cruising and fleet operations, the U.S. Navy did not.  The North Atlantic 
Squadron would be forced to attempt to maintain proficiency in both missions with the 
assets available.   
The Squadron did not yet have a permanent homeport, although the Navy 
Department had been considering various options for one.  Nor did they yet have 
different classes of vessels which would utilize different weapons systems to fight in 
coordination with one another against an enemy force, although experiments were being 
carried out in Newport with the torpedo vessel Alarm.  Methods of rapidly transmitting 
tactical signals throughout a formation were a subject of intense focus for the Chief 
Signal Officer of the Navy.  In short, the vessels on the North Atlantic Station could not 
yet be referred to as constituting a fleet, although the elements of a fleet were beginning 
to take shape.  The 1880’s would see two major developments.  The authorization of the 
U.S. Navy’s first four steel warships in 1883 would herald the arrival of a “naval 
renaissance.”162
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  Two years later, an officer who would almost single-handedly be 
responsible for the development of fleet tactical doctrine was setting up shop across 
Newport Harbor from the Torpedo School.  Commodore Stephen B. Luce would not only 
become the first president of the Naval War College, he would follow that 
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accomplishment with a tour as the Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, 




Chapter 2:  Towards a New Identity, 1882 - 1888 
 
 The decade of the 1880’s witnessed a number of centennial celebrations across 
the United States, as various anniversaries associated with the founding of the nation 
were observed.  This was particularly true for cities along the East Coast such as 
Philadelphia and New York, where celebratory showings by the Navy were popular.  It 
was a time when the legacy of the Revolution was being reconciled with the horrific 
experience of the Civil War to forge a new identity for the nation.  Into this heady 
atmosphere of celebration and new possibilities came something that had been missing in 
the 1870’s: a revived post-war economy.  With the federal government enjoying a budget 
surplus for the first time since the war, it was a favorable time for a discussion about the 
nation’s future naval policy.  These discussions provided the foundation for the naval 
renaissance that was to come, but as they were being carried out, identity confusion and 
conflict of missions continued for the North Atlantic Squadron.   
Organizational change in the North Atlantic Squadron took place slowly.  In the 
squadron’s operations during the 1880’s, the impetus for a shift in identity can clearly be 
identified.  Concern about European encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, the rise 
of South American nations, and a war scare with Chile created the context within which a 
debate about the Navy’s mission and materiel took place.  The first ships of the “New 
Steel Navy” were authorized in 1883, but would not enter active service until almost six 
years later.  Although materiel and structure did not change significantly in the early to 
mid 1880’s, the mission did.  The Squadron became concerned not solely with cruising 
operations, but with training exercises to prepare for combat as a unit.  Naval strategists, 
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through the work of two separate Naval Advisory Boards and numerous articles in the 
Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, officially insisted that the U.S. Navy’s proper 
mission was to guard the coastline and raid enemy commerce.  However, during this 
time, the North Atlantic Squadron regularly engaged in fleet maneuvers.  By 1888, 
something such as the Key West exercises of 1874 was, if not routine, at least 
commonplace.   
The theoretical justification for tactical exercises was provided by Rear Admiral 
Stephen B. Luce.  In the years before his groundbreaking work in establishing the Naval 
War College, he advocated a synthesis of operational exercises and classroom theoretical 
work, and attempted to implement such a program during his tour as commander-in-chief 
of the North Atlantic Squadron.  But regardless of the desire, either on the part of the 
Navy Department or the commander-in-chief, to carry out fleet tactical training, both 
Rear Admiral Luce and his predecessor, Rear Admiral Jouett, spent most of their time 
carrying out diplomatic tasking and protecting U.S. commercial interests rather than 
training their forces for fleet combat.  However, exercises did occur.  While the 
establishment was still publicly promoting a cruising navy, the North Atlantic Squadron 
was repeatedly practicing as if the intended primary mission was to meet an enemy in a 
fleet engagement at sea.   
Policy and Materiel Debates:  “Proceedings” and the Naval Advisory 
Boards 
 
 The election of James A. Garfield of Ohio to the presidency in 1880 placed the 
moderate, or “Half-Breed” wing of the Republican Party in power.1
                                                 
1 So-called because their detractors surmised that they couldn’t possibly be “full-blooded” Republicans. 
  The leader of this 
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faction was Maine Senator James G. Blaine.  As a reward for his efforts on Garfield’s 
behalf, Blaine was appointed Secretary of State in the new administration.  Blaine was an 
energetic and outgoing politician who desperately wanted to be president.  His vision for 
U.S. foreign policy included dominance of the Western Hemisphere and increased trade 
both there and throughout the Pacific.  His particular interest in Latin American affairs 
indirectly encouraged the nascent naval reform movement.  In an attempt to head off 
possible British involvement, he injected the United States into the still-raging War of the 
Pacific (1879-1884), backing Peru against Chile.2  It was a politically risky move, as 
Chile had largely established military superiority by this point in the war.  Chilean naval 
power at the time was centered on two central-battery ironclads, Cochrane and Blanco 
Encalada.  The U.S. Navy of 1881 had nothing to deploy in the Pacific that could 
contend with either British or Chilean naval assets, a fact of which U.S. officials were 
uncomfortably aware.  As in the 1874 Virginius affair, a conflict existed between the 
foreign policy objectives of the U.S. government in the Western Hemisphere and the 
naval means of obtaining those objectives.  Naval officers in the early 1880’s worked to 
address this conflict.  Far from being the mindless advocates of offensive naval power as 
they are sometimes characterized, the published record shows that officers who led the 
push for naval reform did their best to reconcile national strategic requirements and 
operational naval capabilities.3
                                                 
2 David Healy, James G. Blaine and Latin America (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 
54-99. 
  The professional forum provided by the U.S. Naval 
Institute offered an opportunity for these officers to voice their policy recommendations. 
 
3 On naval officers as uncompromising advocates of increased naval power, see: Karsten, 385-389. 
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For its 1880 prize essay contest, the Naval Institute asked members to write on the 
subject “Naval Strategy for the United States.”  The submissions were evaluated by a 
panel of three distinguished judges:  William M. Evarts, the Secretary of State; Richard 
W. Thompson, the Secretary of the Navy; and Senator John R. McPherson, the chairman 
of the Naval Affairs Committee.  The winning entry, submitted under the motto sat cito, 
si sat bene,4 was written by a lieutenant who was a member of the Naval Academy 
faculty and the Institute’s secretary: Charles Belknap.  Belknap reviewed the reasons for 
maintaining a strong navy: “the unsettled condition of society in the less civilized parts of 
the world; the depressed state of our maritime interests; the enforcement of the principles 
of the Monroe Doctrine and of our neutral rights.”5 He then translated those reasons into 
four operational requirements: “the naval defense of our coasts and sea ports…the 
protection of our commerce and the destruction of an enemy’s…the destruction or 
capture of the men-of-war of an enemy [and]…carrying the war into an enemy’s 
country.”6  Although the stated order of the operational requirements seemed to privilege 
the historic priorities of coastal defense and commerce raiding, it is clear the Belknap was 
calling for the development of an offensive capability.  Belknap reminded readers of the 
diplomatic “draw” between Spain and the United States that ended the Virginius affair, 
and warned against “our again being placed in such a false position before the eyes of the 
world.”7
                                                 
4 “Quick enough, if well enough” 
  Belknap’s essay may be taken to represent the thinking of junior officers in the 
1879-1880 period.  The fact that the essay was judged ahead of seven others by the three 
 
5 Charles Belknap, "The Naval Policy of the United States," US Naval Institute Proceedings 6, no. 13 
(April 1880) (1880): 380. 
 
6 Ibid.: 386. 
 
7 Ibid.: 372. 
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men most influential in naval matters in the Hayes Administration is suggestive that there 
was some consensus as early as 1879 that the United States Navy should possess the 
capability in certain circumstances to conduct fleet operations against an enemy. 
The specifics, however, of the materiel necessary to carry out this function were 
not so easily agreed upon.  The 1881 prize essay attempted to address this problem, by 
posing the question of “The type of (I) armored vessel, (II) cruiser, best suited to the 
present needs of the United States”.  The winning essay was submitted by Lieutenant 
Edward W. Very, from the Navy Signal Office.  If any junior officer in the Navy was 
intimately involved with the real operational questions of close order formation, it was 
Lieutenant Very, whose work in perfecting a night signaling system for warships in 
formation will be discussed below.  Yet his prize essay gave a very conservative answer 
to the issue raised.  In it, Very recommended a two-pronged construction plan.  Improved 
monitors for coastal defense would be aided by cruising vessels with full sail rigs to 
attack enemy shipping and protect U.S. overseas commercial interests.  Nowhere in his 
essay is the requirement to operate in close order with other warships mentioned.  The 
honorable mention essay, written by Lieutenant Seaton Schroeder of the Hydrographic 
Office, differed only slightly from Very’s in the recommendation for the type of armored 
vessel to be used for coastal defense.  Schroeder favored a version of what the Europeans 
were calling a “central-battery ironclad”, rather than a monitor.8
 This inconsistency, then, between policy ambition and materiel reality was the 
major challenge facing the Navy in the 1880’s.  Lieutenant Belknap claimed that the 
capability to engage enemy combatants on the high seas was necessary.  However, the 
 
                                                 
8 Seaton Schroeder, LT, "The Type of (I) Armored Vessel, (Ii) Cruiser, Best Suited to the Present Needs of 
the United States," US Naval Institute Proceedings 7, no. 1 (1881). 
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next year, neither Lieutenant Very nor Lieutenant Schroeder spent much time on this 
dimension of naval warfare in their essays, discussing instead the relative merits of 
monitors and sail-rigged cruisers.  None of the three essays discussed fleet maneuvers, 
fleet combat, or the ability of the recommended types of armored or cruising vessels to be 
built to be able to operate together in close order.  Historian Peter Karsten accuses naval 
writers who published essays during this time of artificially keeping their work 
conservative, thereby making it easier for Congress to vote them money.  However, a 
close reading of Lieutenant Very’s other correspondence throughout his active duty 
career renders it unlikely that he, as a lieutenant, cared what the establishment thought.9
With the Republican ascent to power in the 1880 election, President Garfield’s 
new Secretary of the Navy intended to do something about this identified inconsistency 
between stated mission and anticipated wartime operational employment of the Navy.  
William H. Hunt was a former Confederate officer and attorney general of the state of 
Louisiana.  Although his tenure as Secretary of the Navy lasted only a little over a year, 
Hunt understood that a major reason for the Congressional reluctance to spend more for 
the Navy was that, as the prize essays for 1880 and 1881 showed, there was no clear 
consensus on either what the national naval strategy should be or what kind of warships 
should be built.  To remedy this, Hunt appointed a Naval Advisory Board, under the 
leadership of Rear Admiral John Rodgers (of the well-connected Rodgers naval family) 
to prepare a single, coordinated recommendation to Congress about the future of the 
Navy and its warships.  The board was instructed to meet on 11 July 1881 and to transmit 
   
                                                 
9 Very eventually left the Navy and went to work for an arms manufacturer in France.  For an example of 
his non-politically correct correspondence, see Lieutenant Very, U.S.N, "Letter, Very to Wells, 5 January 
1880, 1880," letter, RG 24, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C.  On the idea that 
naval officers wrote conservatively to curry congressional favor, see Karsten, 312. 
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a report by 10 November.10
The introduction to the majority report stated that: “At present the unarmored 
vessels of the service are the only ones required to carry on the work of the navy.”
  The Naval Advisory Board consisted of fourteen officers, 
representing the line as well as engineers and naval constructors.  After meeting for the 
four months the Secretary had allowed them, they found that they were unable to reach a 
consensus.  Two reports were submitted: a majority report, signed by 11 members and 
largely representing the views of the line officers, and a minority report, signed by Chief 
Engineer Isherwood and three other engineers and naval constructors.   
11  The 
line officers were willing to leave it at that.  They acknowledged that armored warships 
would be required in time of war, but expressed confidence that the national production 
capabilities would be enough to produce these ships on demand.12
                                                 
10 Paolo Coletta, ed. American Secretaries of the Navy, Volume I, 1775-1913 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval 
Institute Press, 1980), 389-393. 
  The report went on to 
review the vessels available to cruise on foreign stations against the number they felt was 
sufficient, including a reserve.  The result was a recommendation for the construction of 
38 new unarmored cruising vessels.  Two would be capable of sustaining a speed of 15 
knots, six would be designed to maintain 14 knots, ten 13 knots, and twenty would have a 
maximum speed of 10 knots.  The 10 knot vessels would be of wooden construction, the 
rest were to be built of steel.  All of the vessels would have full sail power, as well as 
steam engines.  The majority supplemented their building plan with a call for smaller ram 
 
11 Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 29. 
 
12 “Such vessels [ironclads] are absolutely needed for the defense of the country in time of war; and if 
Congress be willing to at once appropriate the large sum necessary for their construction, thoroughly 
efficient vessels can be designed and built in this country.”  Ibid., 36. 
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vessels as well as torpedo vessels – to be used in conjunction with the existing monitors 
for harbor defense.13
The minority report, representing the views of Chief Engineer Isherwood and the 
Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair, agreed with the majority 
that the current needs of the Navy did not include the ability to engage armored warships 
in combat.  They were, however, more forceful about pointing out that such a capability 
was necessary to be considered a first-rate navy.
 
14  The minority report pointed out that 
unarmored cruising vessels “enable[d] a naval organization to be maintained by serving 
as training vessels for crews and officers during peace...”15
                                                 
13 Ibid., 27-81.  See also Coletta, ed., 391-392. 
  The minority report went on 
to reject entirely the construction of new wooden vessels, and instead insisted that all 
vessels should be of iron.  This represented the pragmatic view of the engineers and naval 
constructors that the U.S. steel industry was not capable of producing the amount and 
quality of steel necessary to build a ship.  Overall, the minority recommended the 
construction of two spar-deck ships (frigates), six first-rate single-deck sloops, ten 
second-rate sloops, twenty gunboats and fifteen steam torpedo boats.  All were to be 
constructed of iron.  After reviewing the documents, the full House Naval Committee 
eventually recommended the construction of a total of fifteen ships and reported the bill 
to the floor of Congress for a vote.  After the bill went to conference, only two ships were 
finally authorized, but no funding was appropriated for their construction.  Congress 
 
14 “In making this statement, we do not wish to be understood that an efficient navy can be composed of 
unarmored vessels…” House of Representatives, Condition of the Navy: Letter from the Secretary of the 
Navy, in Response to a Resolution from the House of Representatives, Requesting the Views of the Minority 






expected the Navy Department to build the new warships with construction and repair 
funds which had already been appropriated.  A small beginning, but it was 
acknowledgement nonetheless that new, non-wooden warships were considered 
necessary by Congress.  The assassination of President Garfield in 1881 and the 
subsequent elevation of Chester Arthur to the presidency led to a change in the Secretary 
of the Navy’s office.  William H. Hunt, who was ill and having difficulty carrying out his 
duties as Secretary of the Navy anyway, was posted to St. Petersburg as the U.S. minister 
to Russia.16
President Arthur’s appointee to head the Navy Department was William E. 
Chandler.
 This cleared the way for now-President Chester Arthur to repay some 
political favors.   
17
                                                 
16 He eventually died in St. Petersburg.  See Coletta, ed., 393. 
  The New Hampshire state assemblyman and newspaper editor Chandler 
turned out to be a surprisingly effective advocate of increased naval spending and a new 
construction program.  He appointed a second Naval Advisory Board on 5 August 1882 
to make recommendations concerning the construction of the two cruisers authorized by 
Congress earlier that year.  This board was chaired by Rear Admiral Robert W. Shufeldt, 
and consisted of six other members, including a civilian naval architect and a civilian 
marine engineer.  Shufeldt’s Advisory Board submitted its recommendations on 21 
November 1882.  Having been witness to the reception on Capitol Hill of the first 
Advisory Board’s report, they were somewhat more pragmatic.  In addition to the two 
warships already authorized by Congress, the board recommended two more second-rate 
single-deck unarmored cruisers for a total of four ships, all to be constructed of steel.  
 
17 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Luce, 3 May 1884, 1884," Official Orders, Naval Historical 




The “New Steel Navy” was born on 3 March 1883, when Congress appropriated 1.3 
million dollars for the construction of the four ships, to be named Atlanta, Boston, 
Chicago, and Dolphin – the so-called “ABCD Ships”.18
The significance of the reports of the two Naval Advisory Boards and the 
eventual congressional construction approval is to point out the continued conflict 
between materiel and the professional expectations placed on the North Atlantic 
Squadron.  The “ABCD” ships were cruising vessels.  They were unarmored and had full 
sail rigs.  However, as the decade progressed, the North Atlantic Squadron was 
increasingly expected to maintain proficiency at fleet tactical drills and close order 
steaming.   As Secretary Chandler put it in his 1883 remarks: “It is not now, and it never 
has been, a part of that policy to maintain a fleet able at any time to cope on equal terms 
with the foremost European armaments…we unquestionably need vessels in such 
numbers as fully ‘to keep alive the knowledge of war’, and of such a kind that it shall be 





  While Congress was debating the missions and composition of the New 
Navy, the North Atlantic Squadron rendezvoused in Port Royal in April 1882 and 
steamed north to Hampton Roads for a change-of-command and exercises in fleet tactics 
off Fort Monroe. 
 
                                                 
18 Miller, 149.  See also Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy1882. Vol. 1. 
154-155. 
 
19 Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy1883. Vol. 1. 8-9. 
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Squadron Exercises, 1882 
 
On 1 May 1882, Rear Admiral Wyman was relieved by Rear Admiral George H. 
Cooper as Commander-in-Chief.20  Cooper was a native of New York, and was the last 
nineteenth century commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron not to have 
attended the Naval Academy at Annapolis.  He joined the Navy in 1837 as a 16 year-old 
midshipman and spent four years on the Constitution before being sent to the naval 
school at Philadelphia to prepare for his exams.21  Service in the Mexican and Civil Wars 
followed.  He had been the commanding officer of Rear Admiral John Rodgers’ flagship, 
Colorado, in the Asiatic Fleet during the Korean Expedition of 1871, where he gained 
experience conducting squadron-level operations.  Subsequently, he had commanded the 
navy yard at Pensacola, FL, before his assignment as commandant of the New York Navy 
Yard.22  The change-of-command took place in Hampton Roads, Virginia, where the 
squadron had been ordered to assemble.23
 Launched in 1865, the flagship Tennessee represented the culmination of the 
technology marrying wooden sailing ships with steam auxiliary power.  At a 
displacement of 3200 tons, she was large and roomy, and was a coveted assignment for 
  All six warships of the North Atlatnic 
Squadron were in attendance: Tennessee, Kearsarge, Vandalia, Alliance, Enterprise, and 
Yantic.   
                                                 
20 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 1 May 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
21 The naval school at Philadelphia was the direct predecessor of the U.S. Naval Academy. 
 
22 Cogar, 33-34; "Obituary," New - York Tribune (1866-1899), 18 November 1891. 
 






  Kearsarge was the most famous and decorated of the Navy’s Civil War-era 
steam sloops, being the celebrated veteran of the epic battle with the Confederate raider 
Alabama. The less famous screw sloops Vandalia, and Enterprise and the gunboats 
Alliance and Yantic rounded out the squadron.   
THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, 1882 




3281 WOODEN SCREW 
FRIGATE 
NO 13.9KTS 2X8” DAHLGREN RIFLES 
2X100LB PARROT RIFLE 
1X60LB PARROT RIFLE 
8X9” SMOOTH BORE 
CIVIL WAR 
(1865) 
KEARSARGE 1550 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 11KTS 2X11” DAHLGRENS 
1X30LB PARROTT RIFLE 
4X32LB SMOOTH BORE 
CIVIL WAR 
(1861) 
VANDALIA 2033 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 10.2KTS 1X60LB PARROT RIFLE 




ALLIANCE 1375 WOODEN SCREW 
GUNBOAT 
NO 11KTS 1X11”DAHLGREN 
4X9” DAHLGRENS 
1X60LB PARROT RIFLE 
POST-WAR 
(1875) 
ENTERPRISE 1375 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 11KTS 1X11” DAHLGREN 
4X9” DAHLGRENS 
1X60LB PARROT RIFLE 
POST-WAR 
(1874) 
YANTIC 836 WOODEN SCREW 
GUNBOAT 
NO 9.5KTS 1X100LB PARROT RIFLE 






Table 4: The North Atlantic Squadron, 188225
 
 
The Navy Department was anxious to take advantage of this rare opportunity of 
having the ships concentrated to conduct fleet tactical exercises.  Much of the 
Department’s new-found drive to carry out these exercises probably had to do with the 
energetic new chief of the Bureau of Navigation and Detail, Commodore John G. 
                                                 





Walker.26  Within two days of assuming command, the Department (probably Walker) 
had cabled Cooper with instructions to take his squadron to sea for exercise at steam 
tactics.  Cooper promised to get to sea by 10 May.27  There is some evidence that the 
order to conduct exercises initially caught Cooper off guard.  His correspondence during 
the eventual 20-day at-sea period makes several oblique references to the speed at which 
his commanding officers had prepared their ships for sea and commends them for being 
able to stay at sea for so long on such short notice.28  The printing press on Tennessee 
was kept busy as a flurry of general orders and circular instructions to commanding 
officers were quickly produced, outlining Admiral Cooper’s organization of his 
squadron.29
On 10 May 1882 Cooper’s six ships got underway and stood out from Hampton 
Roads.  They spent the next two days scattered in heavy fog, but eventually were able to 
commence steam maneuvers on 13 May.  With a slight northwest breeze, smooth seas, 
and his ships making an average speed of 4.5 knots under steam, Cooper ordered the 
Squadron to form in simple echelon at “open order.”  This allowed commanding officers 
 
                                                 
26 Walker had been ordered to the Bureau in late 1881.  See Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Porter, 
31 August 1881, 1881," Letter, David D. Porter Family Papers, Washington, D.C.  We know that Porter 
was happy to have him there, and felt that he would be a positive influence on the Secretary of the Navy.  
See David Dixon Porter, ADM, "Letter, Porter to Luce, 15 August 1881, 1881," letter, Naval Historical 
Foundation Collection, Washington, D.C. . 
 
27 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 4 May 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
28 See for instance, Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 30 May 1882, 1882," letter, 
RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, 
North Atlantic Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
29 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Circular Order, Cooper to Commanding Officers, 8 May 1882, 1882," 
letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding 
Officers, North Atlantic Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. ; Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Circular 
Order, Cooper to Commanding Officers, 9 May 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic Squadron, 1866-1885, 
Washington, D.C. . 
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to maintain position with a greater interval between ships than that called for in the 
tactical manual.  Cooper explained in his after-action report that “close order” forced the 
expenditure of larger amounts of coal, as commanding officers had to constantly use 
higher engine settings to achieve and maintain their positions.  The supply of coal was on 
Rear Admiral Cooper’s mind throughout these exercises.30
Cooper began with the same basics Rear Admiral Case had practiced eight years 
before.  For any squadron commander, the fundamental formation skill was the ability to 
move his ships from line to column and back.  A line abreast formation enabled a 
commander to spread his ships out in such a manner that they could maximize the 
amount of ocean searched for opposing forces, yet remain in visual contact with the 
flagship.  The column allowed him to concentrate his firepower at the onset of battle.  
The ability to rapidly shift from line to column could mean the difference between 
victory and defeat in a fleet engagement.
 
31
                                                 
30 Earl English, CAPT, "Letter, English to Cooper, 25 May 1882, 1882," Letter, RG 313, Records of the 
Naval Operating forces, Washington, D.C. 
  Once established in echelon formation, 
Cooper’s first order was to move into line abreast.  This took nine minutes.  The line of 
ships than made a simultaneous turn to the right, a “right flank”, which turned the 
formation into a column.  It took the ships fifteen minutes to establish their correct 
positions in the column, before Cooper ordered a column turn to the right.  After the 
column was established on its new heading, Cooper ordered another flanking movement 
(changing column into line) and then ordered the ships in line to reform as a column.  
 
31 On this see Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London, UK: 




This was the most difficult maneuver yet attempted, taking eighteen minutes to execute 
correctly at an ordered speed of seven knots.32
The exercise was not problem-free.  At 8:20, Yantic signaled the flag: “My 
engines are disabled.”  Yantic’s captain, Commander Frank Wildes, initially estimated 
two hours required for repair, but by 9:20 he was able to send signal 4271 to the flagship: 
“Engine repairs completed.”  That allowed about two hours of tactical work before an 
unknown vessel strayed into the exercise area.  Cooper suspended the maneuvers and 
signaled Vandalia to “Ascertain character of strange vessel.”  As Vandalia departed the 
formation at 11:45, the rest of the ships paused for about an hour.  At 12:30, Vandalia 
was able to report that the interloper was the schooner Race, out of Joinville Island, on 
her way to Philadelphia with a load of lumber.  Satisfied, Rear Admiral Cooper resumed 
tactical signaling.  As the afternoon progressed, the maneuvers became more difficult.  
Cooper formed the squadron in double echelon on Yantic, then ordered them into “close 
order” at a speed of five knots.  Another series of shifts from line to column and back 
ensued until about 2:30PM, when Cooper placed his ships in an easy echelon formation 
at open order, asked for a report on coal expended, and terminated the exercises.
 
33
The weather was not as promising on the morning of 14 May, overcast and hazy 
with drizzle, but the Squadron pressed on with its formation work.  From a line, the ships 
formed a column on a northeast heading in eighteen minutes, an improvement over the 
previous day of 4.5 minutes.   From the column formation, the six ships split into three 
 
                                                 
32 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 1 June 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
33 Ibid.""; USS Tennessee, "Logbook, Uss Tennessee, 29 December 1881 - 10 June 1882," Ship's Log, p. 
Entry for 13 May, 1882, RG24: Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Logs of US Naval Ships, 1801-




columns of two ships each, forming a mini “fleet” of three “squadrons,” and moved into 
close order.34
The tactical exercises were completed on 15 May.  The Squadron spent that 
afternoon conducting a number of turning trials to, in Cooper’s words, “ascertain the 
relative handiness of the different vessels in turning.”
  Cooper than maneuvered his “fleet” as in the previous day, moving the 
two-ship “squadrons” into and out of a battle line.  The third and final day of steam 
tactics was “clear and pleasant.”  The entire day’s work took place at close order, and 
consisted mainly of column work.  The Squadron formed a column, then practiced 
shifting the order of ships in the column from natural to reverse order while the entire 
column changed course repeatedly. 
35  His written orders to each of his 
commanding officers stipulated that measurements would be taken at full speed and 2/3rds 
speed, with the helm half over and hard over.  The idea of spending extensive amounts of 
time in formation was still new enough that accurate data on the turning abilities of U.S. 
ships did not exist.  In giving his instructions for measuring tactical diameter, Admiral 
Cooper referenced a work by Chief Constructor W.O. White of the Royal Navy entitled 
“Turning Powers of Ships.”36
The remainder of the time at sea was spent under sail.  The Secretary of the 
Navy’s report for 1882 makes special mention of the twenty days the ships of the North 
Atlantic Station spent cruising “in squadron,” but in reality, steam maneuvers only took 
 
                                                 
34 Cooper had assigned the order of ships in the column of twos in his pre-exercise orders.  See Geroge H. 
Cooper, RADM, "North Atlantic Station General Order No. 19, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
35 Cooper, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 1 June 1882. " 
 




place from 13-15 May. The remainder of the squadron’s time underway was spent under 
sail.  Rear Admiral Cooper was adamant about keeping the ships’ crews busy with sail 
and spar drills and other training aboard the individual ships.  These drills were much 
more in line with the daily operations of a navy whose chief mission was cruising and 
“showing the flag.”  Target practice with the ships’ guns was carried out on 20 May, and 
torpedo practice took place on 24 May.  The Squadron returned to Hampton Roads on 30 
May 1882.37  In twenty days, Rear Admiral Cooper had already spent more time in direct 
tactical control of his warships than the previous five commanders-in-chief combined.38
Rear Admiral Cooper and the Limits of Wooden Cruising Vessels 
   
 
Upon his return to Hampton Roads, Rear Admiral Cooper was pleased to learn 
that the Navy Department intended to keep the Squadron together during the summer.  
This would afford many more opportunities for training in fleet tactics under steam.39  An 
indication that Cooper intended to spend the summer working was his 2 June circular 
letter to commanding officers in which he actively discouraged officers from applying to 
take leave for periods longer than 24 hours, and required that the papers be submitted to 
him for approval if any did.40
                                                 
37 Cooper, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 1 June 1882. "; Tennessee, "", p. Entry for 30 May, 1882. 
  After routinely dealing with yellow fever year after year, 
the Navy Department suspended the practice of sending warships to the Caribbean during 
 
38 This observation is based on a review of the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy for 1875-1881, 
as well as an analysis of the movements of the squadron flagship, Tennessee, as recorded in her logbooks. 
 
39 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 2 June 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
40 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Circular Letter to Commanding Officers, 2 June 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, 
U.S. Navy Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North 




the hot fever season and replaced it with the practice of moving north in the summer for 
exercises, then dispersing throughout the Caribbean as the weather cooled and the threat 
of yellow fever decreased.41  Admiral Porter endorsed this new convention, noting in his 
annual report to the Secretary of the Navy that “cruising together the past summer has 
been of great advantage to the squadron in many respects, and I recommend that the 
practice be kept up.”42
After a couple of weeks to perform minor repairs and resupply the ships, 
Tennessee, Vandalia, Alliance, and Yantic got underway on 17 June.  Kearsarge and 
Enterprise needed more substantive repairs, and so stayed behind at the Norfolk Navy 
Yard.
 
43  Once underway, the squadron immediately began to do formation work, as 
ordered by the Navy Department.44  On Sunday 18 June, after divine services, the officer 
of the deck noted that “The Chief of Staff exercised the fleet in naval tactics under 
steam.”45
                                                 
41 It is during this period that newspapers begin to regularly refer to the “annual winter cruise” and “annual 
summer exercises.” 
  He went on to note in his entry that he had to “revolve the engines by the bell 
during the maneuvers.”  The methods of rapidly sending engine orders from the deck to 
the engine room were still being worked out.  This set of exercises began more 
aggressively than the previous one, no doubt owing to the experience that the ships and 
 
42 Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 230. 
 
43 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 17 June 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
44 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 30 June 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
 
45 USS Tennessee, "Logbook, Uss Tennessee, 11 June 1882 - 9 December 1882," Ship's Log, p. Entry for 





their crews had received the previous month.  In close order at seven knots, the four ships 
shifted first into echelon, then line abreast, then formed two columns of two in a 
respectable 8.5 minutes.  The evolutions continued over the next two hours, the Squadron 
working through line abreast, column, and echelon formations before maneuvering 
ceased for the day.46  The four ships followed the same routine for the next four days, 19 
through 21 June, spending at least two hours each day maneuvering in response to 
tactical signals from the flagship.  On 21 June, each ship performed more maneuvers to 
test and chart their tactical diameter.47  Once the fleet exercises were complete, Vandalia 
was detached and sent to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, while Alliance was sent to 
Boston.  In his after-action report, Rear Admiral Cooper noted that, in accordance with 
his instructions from the Navy Department, “All the evolutions laid down in Parker’s 
Steam Fleet Tactics were made that were possible with a Squadron of four vessels...the 
vessels were maneuvered in closer order than during the previous cruise, and more care 
was observed in preserving proper positions.”  He went on to offer his recommendation 
that “in future, the time to be devoted to these exercises be shortened.”48
                                                 
46 Ibid."". 
  Cooper’s 
correspondence throughout 1882 gives the impression that he found tactical exercises 
useful to a point, but he was not as excited about them as Rear Admirals Stephen B. Luce 
or John G. Walker would be in a few years.  Cooper carried out tactical exercises with his 
wooden cruising vessels not because he was preparing to fight a fleet action, but because 
he thought formation work in appropriate doses was good professional development for 
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his officers, and because the Navy Department repeatedly directed him to throughout the 
summer. 
Tennessee and Yantic arrived in New York City on 22 June.  It was a 
homecoming of sorts for Rear Admiral Cooper, as he had been the commandant of the 
New York Navy Yard prior to his assignment as the North Atlantic Squadron 
commander-in-chief.  They stayed at anchor there for the next twenty days, taking on 
coal and supplies from the New York Navy Yard.   On 12 July, Tennessee and Enterprise 
set out for Boston by way of Provincetown, Massachusetts, where they were to meet up 
with Yantic and the other vessels of the squadron.49  The Navy Department continued to 
press Cooper to conduct squadron exercises at every opportunity.50
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  On the way to 
Boston, Tennessee, Enterprise, Alliance, and Yantic carried out exercises in steam fleet 
tactics on 31 July.  The after-action report is unremarkable.  All the usual combinations 
of column, line abreast, and echelon formations were practiced.  This time the base speed 
was eight knots and everything was done at close order.  At the conclusion of the fleet 
drills, fires were banked and the remainder of the underway period was spent under 
canvas.  The crews were worked at spar and sail drills, as well as general quarters, both 
day and night.  On the fourth day underway, steam was raised in order to hold target 
practice.  The four ships moved in a circle around the targets at ranges from 1000 to 2500 
yards.  Cooper was pleased with the results, noting that Seaman N. P. Peterson of 
 
50 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Letter, Cooper to Chandler, 22 July 1882, 1882," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. ; Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "North Atlantic Station General 
Order No. 11, 1882," order, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy 
from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. . 
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Tennessee’s No. 12 gun (an 8inch rifle) had struck the target at 800 yards.51
Overall, Cooper was pleased with his ships’ performance on the trip to Boston.  
He reported that the enthusiasm shown by the officers and men “goes to prove the utility 
of squadron exercises, as long as circumstances will admit.”
  It speaks to 
the low state of efficiency of naval artillery in the 1880’s, prior to range-finding and 
sighting equipment, that the attainment of a single hit was cause for the commander-in-
chief to mention the gun captain by name in his report.   
52  He goes on to say that “In 
carrying out the views of the Department in this matter, I make it an object to keep every 
one on the alert…At the same time I am very careful not to worry or harass the command 
with anything like overwork.”53
The Squadron anchored in Boston on 2 August 1882.
  Cooper represents the epitome of the commander-in-
chief in transition.  He recognized the utility of squadron exercises and carried them out 
professionally (when directed to by the Navy Department).  However, without fail, he 
ordered his cruising vessels to bank fires and spread canvas at the first available 
opportunity.  With the materiel in place on the North Atlantic Station in 1882, sail was 
still the primary method of propulsion. 
54  After three days in 
Boston, the four ships headed to Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Portland, Maine.55
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Cooper held brief tactical exercises as the Squadron departed the harbor under steam 
power, but once out to sea, fires were banked and the Squadron continued under sail 
alone.  Exercises in wearing and tacking, making and shortening sail, reefing and shifting 
topsails were carried out.56  At night the Squadron exercised with Very signals, a new 
method of night communication using flares that would eventually replace the not-very-
reliable Costen lights.57  The signal office had been hard at work on perfecting a system 
to maneuver large numbers of ships at night, and after testing several systems had settled 
on the rockets designed by Naval Institute Prize Essay-winning Lieutenant E.W. Very.  
Testing would continue over the next few years, but little was found that enabled quicker 
or easier understood night signaling than the Very system.58
At Portsmouth the Squadron was reviewed by President Chester A. Arthur and 
Secretary of the Navy William Chandler.  The two dignitaries arrived at Portsmouth in 
Despatch on 9 September.  Over a period of three days, official visits were exchanged.  
The President and Secretary Chandler visited Tennessee on 11 September, and were able 
to witness tactical drills as well as target practice.  President Arthur, who had just 
  The interest and amount of 
effort expended by the signal office to tackle the night signaling problem is yet another 
indicator of the operational navy’s interest in being able to sail and fight in tactical 
formations. 
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assumed his office following the death of President Garfield, would prove to be a great 
friend of the Navy.  He and Secretary Chandler were appropriately pleased with the state 
of training of their naval forces.  Rear Admiral Cooper was as well, noting that “in 
performing evolutions under steam in close order, the commanding officers showed much 
skill and confidence in handling their vessels.”  Cooper was genuinely concerned with 
training for his junior officers.  He went out of his way to ensure that each of them was 
given ample opportunity to act as the officer of the deck during tactical maneuvers, 
responsible for directing their ship’s movements with proper rudder and engine orders.  
North Atlantic Squadron General Order No. 14, published on 8 September, mandated that 
after-action reports from fleet tactical exercises would list each line officer and give the 
times they had stood watch as officer of the deck during maneuvers.  Cooper insisted that 
ensigns and midshipmen get more time as the officer of the deck, to enhance their 
professional development.59  The Presidential review signaled the end of tactical training 
for the Squadron in 1882.  One afternoon was devoted to fleet tactics on the way to 
Protland, Maine from Portsmouth – a training period insignificant enough that it did not 
warrant an after-action report from Cooper.  It was time for the Squadron to break up and 
send the individual ships on their way with their cruising assignments in the West Indies.  
After a squadron visit to Philadelphia in October, the warships moved south to Hampton 
Roads, Virginia, where they departed for the winter cruise on 12 December, 1882.60
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The flagship operated alone on the winter cruise.  Tennessee traveled first to 
Maritinique, then St. Christopher’s Island, St. Thomas, Santa Cruz, and finally 
Aspinwall, on the Panama isthmus.  This was a traditional mission.  At each stop, Rear 
Admiral Cooper reported carefully to the Department economic information such as the 
port’s main imports and exports and the main crops grown.  He noted the number of ships 
in each port and how many of them were American.  At each stop, he was wined and 
dined by the local dignitaries, whom he invited in turn to be entertained on board 
Tennessee.  Such socialization served to promote U.S. business interests, assuring local 
leaders and ex-patriot businessmen alike of the stability and security following the Stars 
and Stripes.  The detail that Cooper went into in his official reports concerning 
commercial opportunities suggests that he considered such business dealings to be an 
integral part of his job as commander-in-chief.61
Tennessee arrived back in New Orleans on 13 March 1883.
 
62
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  Cooper had ordered 
the Squadron to assemble there after their individual cruises.  After two weeks in New 
Orleans, Tennessee departed in company with Vandalia, Kearsarge, and Yantic.  The 
Squadron carried out brief fleet tactical drills on their way from the mouth of the 
Mississippi River to Tortugas Islands, off of Key West, Florida.  Again, fires were 
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banked and sails set after the Squadron stood out to sea.63  The four ships then proceeded 
north independently and rendezvoused at Hampton Roads in May.  After replenishing 
stores and making minor repairs, Cooper intended to conduct a week or ten days of 
exercises, but the Department ordered him back to New York.  Tennessee, Vandalia, 
Kearsarge, and Yantic were to take part in the celebration of the opening of the Brooklyn 
Bridge on 24 May, with Rear Admiral Cooper as the senior Navy representative.64
The request to have the Squadron present for the Brooklyn Bridge festivities was 
an example of the nature of Navy Department tasking that prevented the North Atlantic 
Squadron from conducting any tactical exercises for the remainder of 1883.  Not only 
were there several public relations events to be attended, but unrest in Haiti called ships 
away as well.  “At the request of the State Department,” read Cooper’s orders to 
Vandalia’s commanding officer, Captain Wallace, “the U.S.S. Vandalia under your 
command has been detailed to proceed to Port-au-Prince…to care for the interests of 
Americans during the present troubles in that island.”  Wallace’s orders went on to 
require him to “afford such protection and security to the Americans residing in the 
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Island as they may require of you.”65  Later in the year, Vandalia would be relieved by 
Swatara.66
  The remainder of the Squadron stayed busy with a variety of tasks.  Alliance was 
ordered to the north, to visit the various fishing ports and show the U.S. flag in the 
always-contested Canadian fishing grounds.
  
67  She would later be joined by Vandalia and 
Swatara.68  In July, Rear Admiral Cooper was ordered to take the flagship to LaGuyara, 
Venezuela, to represent the United States at the unveiling of a stature of George 
Washington in Caracas.69  Other engagements included the Newburgh, New York 
centennial celebration in October and the celebration of the evacuation of New York by 
the British, held on November 26th, 1883.70
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  The majority of the Squadron was able to 
reunite at that time, with Tennessee, as well as Colorado, Saratoga, Jamestown and 
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Yantic, in attendance.  Soon, it was cruising season.  In December, Rear Admiral Cooper 
gathered the Squadron in Hampton Roads and issued his orders for the various warships’ 
West Indies deployments.71  Although they spent some time together at various events, 
there is no evidence that the North Atlantic Squadron units carried out any tactical 
exercises in the summer or fall of 1883.  The dual nature of the functions expected of the 
Squadron was evident.  While there was initiative within the Navy Department, certainly 
from the Bureau of Navigation, to concentrate the Squadron’s warships and exercise 
them frequently, there was no set plan for executing this.  Although there was a general 
idea that the Squadron should cruise to the south in the winter and concentrate in the 
north during the summer, this convention was easy to ignore if exigencies arose.  Senior 
officers also believed that they had, at that point, simply gotten everything they could out 
of having the wooden cruising vessels practice formations at the extremely slow speeds 
of 4-6 knots.  As Admiral Cooper put it while at Hampton Roads in May: “I do not think 
it will be of any advantage to devote a longer period to these exercises as all the vessels 
have already had much practice in them.”72
Stephen B. Luce and the Naval War College 
  Cooper’s actions and his after-action reports 
clearly demonstrate that he felt that the North Atlantic Squadron had reached the outer 
limits of what productive good could be accomplished with wooden cruising ships. 
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One officer who was determined to push for a more systematic approach to fleet 
training and readiness for combat was Commodore Stephen B. Luce.  Luce was the 
epitome of that rare breed of officer who was both exceptionally successful at sea, and a 
path-breaking leader ashore.73  He, perhaps more than any naval officer of the nineteenth 
century, understood that a “fleet” was more than just a collection of ships.  He both 
articulated, and then put into action, a comprehensive system of education.  In 1841, as a 
fourteen year-old, he signed on aboard the USS Congress as a midshipman, and moved 
through the ranks over the next twenty years.  After distinguished service during the Civil 
War, Luce’s association with the North Atlantic Squadron began with his tour of duty as 
the commanding officer of Rear Admiral LeRoy’s flagship, Hartford, from 1 November 
1875 to 21 August 1877.  Although he was not present during the Key West exercises of 
1874, we know that he understood the importance of that initial set of maneuvers, since 
his personal papers contain a full set of copies of all the reports submitted by Rear 
Admiral Case.74  Luce would, however, have been present for the landing exercises held 
in 1876.75
                                                 
73 For example, Luce’s more famous subordinate, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was widely considered to be a 
sub-par shiphandler and operational naval officer. 
  As the commanding officer of the flagship, he would have been privy to Rear 
Admiral LeRoy’s frustration that year as planned fleet tactical exercises off Port Royal 
were rendered impossible to carry out by Navy Department tasking which scattered his 
warships throughout the North Atlantic Squadron’s operating area.  It was a pattern that 
 
74 Luce was on duty at the Boston Navy Yard at the time, although he had briefly been detailed to 
command the Minnesota when it was thought that she would be put in commission during the Virginius 
crisis. 
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would repeat itself during Luce’s career with the North Atlantic Squadron: high hopes of 
executing fleet training undermined by other duties.  After leaving command of Hartford, 
Luce turned to naval education and training.  He successfully established the New York 
State Maritime School, than spent the years 1877-1883 in various positions associated 
with training naval apprentices, including command of the U.S. Training Ship Minnesota 
and command of the Apprentice Training Squadron. 
His interests extended to education for officers as well, which led to his most 
lasting contribution as the founder and first president of the Naval War College at 
Newport, Rhode Island.  In Professors of War, Professor Ronald Spector argues that the 
foundation of the War College was an important step in the professionalization of the 
naval officer corps.76
                                                 
76 Spector. 
  The opportunity for post-graduate professional interaction, when 
added to the initial bonding experience at the Naval Academy, the work of the Naval 
Institute at Annapolis, and the networking influence of various military-themed 
periodicals discussed in the previous chapter, was a major move for the profession.  As 
such, the foundation of the War College is a subject which has received its share of 
attention from naval historians.  Typically, the narrative focuses on the study of strategy 
and the cast of characters usually features Alfred Thayer Mahan and his ideas about the 
political-economic role of a navy in the shaping of national destiny.  While correct, this 
interpretation does not give enough attention to Luce’s belief in the importance of 
development of operational naval tactics in his fight to establish the War College.  Luce’s 
had a passion for putting naval theory into practice.  He was fundamentally interested in 
the daily work associated with operating large ships together.  One of the reasons that 
Luce felt that something like a war college was necessary was that the new naval 
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professional of the 1880’s would have to learn to fight entire squadrons of ships together 
as a unit.77
After much lobbying, on 3 May 1884, Luce was ordered, along with Commander 
William T. Sampson and Commander Goodrich, to “consider and report upon the whole 
subject of a post graduate school or school of application, to be established by the Navy 
Department for officers of the Navy.”
   
78
"The North Atlantic Squadron affords the nearest approach to be found to a proper course 
in naval tactics.  It should be assembled once a year, and during a stated period, go 
through a series of fleet evolutions, gunnery practice with the latest types of ordnance, the 
landing of seamen for military operations, boat operations, torpedo attack and defense, 
etc, having the class on board for instruction."
  The report that these three officers submitted the 




 It is evident that from the beginning, the Naval War College was not intended by Luce to 
be simply a classroom-based institution.  Before it had even been officially chartered, the 
NWC concept included the study and development of formation steaming tactics, with 
the North Atlantic Squadron acting as the laboratory.   
On 26 July 1884, Commodore Luce was ordered to take command of the North 
Atlantic Squadron.80
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  It was to be a temporary position, as Luce had already been tapped 
to open the new Naval War College later that year, but he was determined to make the 
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most of his brief opportunity to command ships at sea.  On 10 July 1884, Tennessee, 
Vandalia, Alliance, and Yantic got underway from the squadron anchorage off Staten 
Island, headed for Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where the change-of-command was to 
take place.  Rear Admiral Cooper took advantage of having four ships steaming together 
to carry out one final set of fleet exercises under his flag.  Moving out of New York 
Harbor in column, the ships commenced exercises at 9:10AM.  At first glance, the 
Squadron would seem to have been doing fairly well, showing the gains made by having 
had increased opportunities over the past two years to work together.  An order to form 
columns of twos from a single column in natural order was carried out in seven minutes.  
They then returned to a single column in eight minutes.  Rear Admiral Cooper, though, 
was not impressed.  “Fleet not performing well,” he wrote in his remarks, “Alliance 
frequently out of position.  The commanding officers rather nervous as regards 
approaching each other in close order.”81
On 11 July, more exercises commenced at 8AM.  The Squadron moved from 
echelon into line and back several times, changing course along the way.  At 4PM, a light 
fog required Rear Admiral Cooper to give tactical signals for a while using the ship’s 
steam whistle.  Cooper reported that this was done successfully, and went on comment, 
begrudgingly, “Alliance improving slowly.”
  He did go on to say that they improved as the 
afternoon progressed.   
82
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After conducting the change-of-command, the five ships of the North Atlantic Squadron, 
together with the ships of the Training Squadron, participated in the reception for the 
Greely Relief Expedition.83
From Portsmouth, Tennessee, Vandalia, Swatara, Yantic, and Alliance got 
underway on 6 August and conducted 10 days of tactical exercises, including a landing of 
the naval brigade on Gardiner’s Island on 11-13 August.  660 men from the ships of the 
Squadron were landed under the command of Tennessee’s commanding officer, Captain 
J. N. Miller.  Luce proudly noted that it had been a surprise exercise, with the landing 
orders given after the Squadron had left Portsmouth for Newport, and that it was the 
largest exercise of its kind ever conducted on as little notice.
  
84The Squadron arrived in 
Newport on 16 August.85  Once in Narragansett Bay, Luce had the ships of his squadron 
conduct measured mile speed and tactical diameter tests.86
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Scott Schley, rescued them on 20 June 1884, and returned them to the Naval Hospital at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.  Of an original party of 25 men, 6 were rescued and 5 survived. 
  Knowing exactly how many 
revolutions needed to be ordered for each ship to make a given speed, as well as knowing 
the arc each ship would scribe through the water at a given rudder angle was crucial to 
the ability of a squadron to operate together, and was information that was typically 
lacking at this formative stage.  Officers of the deck were previously expected to carry 
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out tactical maneuvers by “seaman’s eye”, rather than rely on data.87  In the days before 
instrumentation, maneuvers were made much more difficult without a reliable way to 
know how fast each ship was going.  By immediately ordering speed trials for his new 
command, Luce showed both that he recognized this fact, and that he intended his 
squadron to spend a lot of time operating together.  Even before the official opening of 
the Naval War College, Luce was doing his best to fulfill his vision of the North Atlantic 
Squadron as a squadron of evolution, working out tactical problems studied at the Naval 
War College through actual exercises at sea.  In fact, the board’s selection of Newport, 
Rhode Island as the permanent location for the Naval War College had a lot to do with 
the fact that the proximity of the deep water of the Narragansett Bay made it easy for the 
entire North Atlantic Squadron to call at Newport, and coordinate fleet exercises with the 
War College.  However, Luce’s first tour as Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic 
Squadron was short-lived, as Congress approved the Secretary of the Navy’s 
recommendation to open a Naval War College, based on the report of Luce’s board.  
Naturally, he was tapped to be the first president of the College, which cut short – for the 
moment – his squadron command tour.  In fact, much of Luce’s’ correspondence during 
this period was focused more on his work to get the War College up and operating than it 
was on his position as a squadron commander-in-chief.88
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  On 20 September, 1884, 
onboard Tennesse anchored in Newport Harbor, Luce turned over command of the North 
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Atlantic Squadron to Rear Admiral James E. Jouett.89
Rear Admiral Jouett and Intervention in Panama, 1885 
  He then went ashore to take 
possession of the abandoned poorhouse on Coasters Harbor Island, and begin the work of 
establishing the Naval War College. 
 
James E. “Fighting Jim” Jouett entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1841, 
graduating from the Naval Academy six years later, in 1847.  The highlight of his 
distinguished service during the Civil War was fighting alongside Rear Admiral Farragut 
at the Battle of Mobile Bay, as commanding officer of the Union steamship Metacoma.90  
Unlike the previous two changes-of-command of the North Atlantic Squadron, there was 
no grand review nor series of tactical exercises.  Jouett returned to New York with his 
new flagship Tennessee, where he remained until after New Years’ Day.  As 1885 
dawned, the most important item on the Squadron’s calendar was representing the Navy 
at the World Exposition in New Orleans, during the festive Mardi Gras season.  On 10 
January 1885, Tennessee arrived at Fort Monroe, Virginia, enroute to New Orleans.  
Jouett’s correspondence during this time is light-hearted and not concerned with 
warfighting.  Among other letters commenting on the “delightful” sailing conditions, he 
sent the Navy Department a request for an entertainment budget of $4000 (something on 
the order of $80,000 today)91   He was soon joined in New Orleans by Yantic, Alliance, 
and Swatara.92
                                                 
89 "Army and Navy News," New York Times (1857-1922), 21 September 1884. 
 
 
90 Cogar, 86-87; "Rear Admiral Jouett Dead," New York Times (1857-1922), 2 October 1902; Reynolds, 
Famous American Admirals, 170-171. 
 
91 James E. Jouett, RADM, "Letter, Jouett to Chandler, 28 January 1885, 1885," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Letters Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic 
123 
 
But entertaining guests soon became one of Rear Admiral Jouett’s least concerns.  
On 4 March, he received word that a revolution in Colombia threatened the transit of 
people and goods across the Panamanian isthmus.  In addition to endangering U.S. 
citizens and property, the closure of this vital communication route would be disastrous 
to business interests and the flow of goods between the east and west coasts of the United 
States.  Keeping it open was considered to be a vital U.S. interest.  Contingency took 
precedence over squadron training opportunities from that point on.  Jouett would be 
forced to spend most of 1885 on what would become the most noteworthy event of his 
career as a flag officer - responding to the crisis in Panama.  Galena, with Commander T. 
F. Kane in command, was immediately ordered to proceed to Aspinwall – the Atlantic 
terminus of the Panamanian isthmus – with “all possible dispatch.”93
                                                                                                                                                 
Squadron, 1866-1885, Washington, D.C. ; "King Carnival's Plans," New York Times (1857-1922), 16 
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  When Kane arrived 
on 13 March, he found an insurrection underway and the city of Aspinwall in danger. 
After communicating by telegraph with the Navy Department on 14 March, Galena was 
ordered to stay until further notice.  Jouett did not leave New Orleans at first, but carried 
on with his entertaining duties.  The situation did not appear to be overly serious, and his 
actions were in keeping with the usual role of a squadron commander-in-chief as a 
manager of scattered assets.  Jouett even had time to request and receive permission to 
leave the flagship and travel to Washington D.C. on personal business.  The trip was no 
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doubt timed to coincide with the assumption of office of a new Secretary of the Navy.  
On 4 March 1885, Democrat Grover Cleveland was sworn in as President.  His new Navy 
Secretary was New York financier and political reformer William C. Whitney.  
Apparently some questions had been raised with the new secretary about Jouett’s 
seniority and why he had been appointed to the North Atlantic Squadron.  Jouett wanted 
to set the record straight immediately.94
The situation in Panama, however, was getting out of hand.  Rebels fired the city 
on 30-31 March, destroying and damaging millions of dollars worth of U.S. property.  
When the insurgents began burning the city, Commander Kane allowed American 
citizens to seek refuge in Galena, while sending his naval battalion ashore to protect U.S. 
property.  When insurrectionists captured a mail steamer belonging to the Pacific Mail 
Line, Kane immediately recovered her.
   
95  He also arrested two of the more prominent 
insurrectionists, and held them on board Galena.  He let it be known that he was 
unwilling to turn them over to Colombian authorities, as their corruption or incompetence 
would allow the criminals to escape.96
Jouett was ordered to coal and proceed to Pensacola with Tennessee.  There, a 
detachment of 60 Marines boarded the flagship, which departed on 4 April headed 
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directly to Aspinwall.97  Alliance was sent to the vicinity of Cartagena, where her 
commanding officer, Commander Lewis Clark, was to make contact with U.S. consular 
officials and protect U.S. property and business interests.98  Swatara was sent directly to 
Aspinwall to reinforce Galena as quickly as possible.99  When Jouett arrived he took 
personal charge of the situation.  His initial letter to the Colombian government 
representative at Aspinwall demonstrated the fine balance of military muscle and 
diplomatic tact that was required of a nineteenth century flag officer.  After announcing 
his arrival (“with four vessels of the United States Squadron under my command”), he 
went on to assure the authorities that he had no intention of interfering with the 
constitutionally-recognized government of Colombia, and requested permission to land 
additional U.S. troops if he deemed it necessary.  It is doubtful that anyone reading the 
letter, least of all the Colombians, was under any illusion that Jouett cared about their 
permission, but the diplomatic niceties were observed to the letter.100  Under Jouett’s 
supervision, transit across the isthmus reopened on 11 April.   By 14 April, Jouett was 
able to report to Secretary Whitney that the situation was stabilized.101
On 15 April, a naval brigade consisting of sailors and Marines under the 
command of Commander B.H. McCalla, arrived from New York to assist Rear Admiral 
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Jouett in restoring order and “maintaining treaty obligations” (i.e. keeping transit across 
the isthmus open for U.S. commerce).102   Jouett gave McCalla careful instructions to as 
much as possible not interfere with internal Colombian politics.   He then sent McCalla’s 
force on the railroad across the isthmus to prevent Panama City from being burned as 
Aspinwall had.  In light of the orders he had given, Jouett was taken aback when McCalla 
formally occupied the entire city.  He quickly instructed McCalla to remove his troops to 
the train station and worked to smooth relations with Colombian officials.103  In any 
event, Panama City was spared the fate Aspinwall had suffered two weeks earlier.  By 24 
April, Jouett was able to report that all was quiet, and that a contingent of 700 Colombian 
troops was expected to arrive soon, in which case Jouett planned to withdraw McCalla’s 
troops and turn Aspinwall and Panama City over to the proper Colombian authorities.104  
Once the Colombian troops arrived, Jouett, with two officers of his staff, rode the railroad 
across the isthmus to Panama City to meet with them and personally express his support 
for the constitutional government.  Jouett was well-received by the Colombian officers in 
charge of the detachment, who were grateful for his assistance and assurances about 
Colombian sovereignty.105
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Commander Kane had taken on board Galena after the burning of Aspinwall.106 Jouett 
assented to the prisoner transfer.  On 7 May, after a quick court-martial, the two were 
publicly hanged in Aspinwall.  Jouett pronounced the outcome “beneficial.”107  On 8 
May, the first contingent of U.S. Marines boarded a transport for home, as more 
Colombian troops arrived to secure the city.108
With the military situation secure, at least in regard to U.S. interests in the 
isthmus, Rear Admiral Jouett turned his attention to diplomacy.  On 11 May, he 
proceeded in Tennessee to Cartegena, the capital of Colombia, for the purpose of 
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  There, Tennessee happened upon two steamers loaded with 
insurrectionists who were planning to retreat after having been repulsed during a battle 
for the capital city.  Jouett refused to let the rebels leave, and informed them that he 
would prevent the departure of their vessels from Cartegena’s harbor by force, if 
necessary.  He then invited the rebel leaders to join him in Tennessee, where he 
convinced them to allow him to attempt to mediate a settlement.  On 3 June, Jouett wrote 
Secretary Whitney that the President of Colombia had granted him permission to mediate 
between the government and the rebels.  Additionally, the president had offered terms 
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which Jouett thought were reasonable.  He was hopeful that “a successful mediation is 
probable, which will end the revolution.”110  Jouett’s optimism, however, was misplaced.  
The departure of U.S. ground forces emboldened the rebels who immediately refused to 
disarm completely.  The Colombian government refused to negotiate with them unless 
they disarmed, so that by 25 June, Jouett was writing the Navy Department that “a 
peaceable settlement” would be impossible.”111
Although they did not have an opportunity to conduct fleet maneuvers, at one 
time or another the entire North Atlantic Squadron was involved in the Panama operation.  
Swatara remained in Colombian waters until July, at which time she proceed back to the 
U.S.  Alliance remained for two months, departing in June.  Yantic arrived in May, sailing 
from Guatemala, where she had been ordered to protect U.S. interests at Livingston.  She 
relieved the other ships and stayed until 1 August.
 
112  Rear Admiral Jouett and Tennessee 
remained until 11 July when, with a yellow fever outbreak threatening the health of his 
sailors, he was ordered north by the Navy Department.113  Tennessee arrived at Fort 
Monroe, Virginia, on 23 July 1885.114
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The Navy Department was sensitive to public opinion surrounding the 
Panamanian operation.  Democrat Grover Cleveland became president in March 1885, 
replacing Republican Chester Arthur.  Cleveland had run on a platform of non-
intervention and disapproval of the aggressive foreign policy and expansionist tendencies 
of Arthur and his Secretary of State, Fredrick Freylinghuysen.  It would not do to have 
the first foreign crisis to confront his administration be a naval intervention that got out of 
hand.  Prior to his departure with the troop reinforcements, Commodore Walker, the chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation, reminded Commander McCalla that: “It is of considerable 
importance…that we keep the country with us in this matter.”  He went on to instruct 
McCalla to be sure to take every opportunity to send information back to the Department, 
“that it may be given out to the press, and the people kept in accord with the 
Department.”115  This was apparently news to Rear Admiral Jouett who, when he opened 
the stateside newspapers that arrived in Aspinwall on 1 June, was incensed to see that 
correspondence between Walker and McCalla to which he was not privy had been 
published for the general public.  Furthermore, some of McCalla’s information and 
opinions directly contradicted information given by Jouett in his own official dispatches.  
Jouett demanded, and received, from McCalla copies of every communication he had had 
with the Navy Department, and requested clarification of McCalla’s subordinate role 
from the Secretary of the Navy.116
In the meanwhile, a letter arrived from the commanding officer of the USS 
Wachusett, who was none other than Alfred Thayer Mahan.  Mahan, whose world fame 
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was years in the future, had been sent to Panama City by the commander-in-chief of the 
Pacific Squadron.  His predecessor on station, Captain Norton of the Shenandoah, had 
carried out some tasks “suggested” by Rear Admiral Jouett’s in support of his mission to 
keep the isthmus transit open.  Mahan now asked Jouett directly if he had the authority to 
order these tasks, or if they were simply advisory in nature, in which case he did not 
intend to carry them out.  Jouett wrote Mahan a curt reply (“I do not care to discuss the 
matter with you”), and referred the whole matter to the Secretary of the Navy.117
Taken together, these two incidents demonstrate the structural difficulty of 
determining the operational chain-of-command in the era before the establishment of the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1913.  With each bureau its own entity, 
answering only to the Secretary of the Navy, Commodore Walker had no problem 
corresponding directly with Commander McCalla, even though it violated the chain-of-
command at the scene in Panama.  For his part, Mahan’s letter was technically correct but 
short on political savvy.  The Secretary of the Navy later agreed that the senior officer 
present, regardless of squadron, should be in charge of all matters at the isthmus.  
Mahan’s predecessor on station had been much more politically astute, even if not as by-
the-book, which shows why Mahan was considered by his contemporaries to be, at best, a 
mediocre line officer.  He would go on to have a much more successful career as an 
academic.
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The operations of the North Atlantic Squadron in the spring and summer of 1885 
show the simple effectiveness of the old way of dealing with traditional U.S. foreign 
relations problems – threats to property and the transit of goods and services.  These 
threats were adequately addressed with the presence of one or more wooden ships in the 
port of Aspinwall, and sailors and Marines deployed ashore.  It would seem that the 
opinions of the majority report of the first Naval Advisory Board were justified, as 
Jouett’s wooden cruisers carried out their mission in a timely manner with great 
effectiveness.    Naval officers such as Lieutenant Belknap feared, however, that these 
capabilities would not be enough for a future encounter with a peer naval competitor.   
This seemed more likely as U.S. assertion of claims to exclusive leadership in the 
Western Hemisphere grew stronger throughout the 1880’s.119
The arrival of the flagship Tennessee back at Fort Monroe on 23 July 1885 
coincided to the day with the death of former president General Ulysses S. Grant.
  The North Atlantic 
Squadron had to be able to keep the Panamanian isthmus open for business not only in 
the face of poorly-armed insurrectionists, but in the event of hostilities with a European 
naval power.  It did not help matters that a French national (Ferdinand de Lesseps) was 
then engaged in an attempt to build a canal across the isthmus.  To meet future threats, 
either from South American nations or from European incursions into the Western 
Hemisphere, the North Atlantic Squadron would have to be capable of engaging an 
armored fleet at sea as a tactical combat unit. 
120
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Jouett had been trying to arrange some liberty for the crew of his flagship and the 
Department had been anxious to have the Squadron conduct some fleet tactical drills, but 
all was put on hold pending Grant’s funeral.121  Naturally, it was expected that warships 
from the North Atlantic Squadron would be present at the ceremonies in New York.  Rear 
Admiral Jouett returned to New York in Tennessee and immediately became involved in 
the planning for the massive funeral procession.122  On 8 August, a naval brigade 
consisting of sailors and Marines from every ship in the Squadron marched in the funeral 
procession, while Jouett and his staff rode in carriages with the official mourners.  Five 
warships of the Squadron, Despatch, Powhatan, Omaha, Alliance, and Swatara, anchored 
just off the tomb and fired salutes as the procession made its way past.123
The remainder of the year proved frustrating for Rear Admiral Jouett.  Plans for 
squadron tactical exercises, desired by both Jouett and the Navy Department, were 
consistently hampered by the poor material condition of the Squadron’s wooden ships.  
After working through various mechanical conditions, Jouett had managed to collect 
three of his ships, Tennessee, Alliance, and Galena at Bar Harbor, Maine, in August.  Just 
as they were about to get underway, however, the Navy Department ordered Tennessee 
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back to New York to have her seams re-caulked.124  Later in the fall, a series of exercises 
Jouett had planned to hold in Florida Bay were placed on indefinite hold by the Navy 
Department, and Tennessee was instead sent, with Galena, on a cruise in the West 
Indies.125  Meanwhile, Jouett spent most of the fall of 1885 fighting not to have his pay 
docked for the expenses he incurred at New Orleans, while hosting various dignitaries 
aboard Tennessee.126
Having thus been twice denied the opportunity to conduct fleet exercises in 1885, 
Jouett was determined to do better in 1886.  He ordered his forces to rendezvous in Key 
West at the end of March 1886, for a week of fleet tactical exercises.
   
127  These were 
carried out between Key West and Pensacola during the month of April.  While in the 
south, Jouett corresponded with Commodore Walker of the Bureau of Navigation, about 
ways to keep his force intact.  Walker’s answer was instructive:  “If you come north in 
the usual way, your ships are sure to be scattered to the different yards, and you will lost 
control of them just as you did last summer.”128
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  This was exactly what happened.  
Against Walker’s advice, Jouett took the squadron, consisting of Tennessee, Brooklyn, 
Swatara, Galena, and Yantic to New York, where they were promptly split up.  Brooklyn 
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went into the Navy Yard for work; the rest were sent to visit ports in the northeast and 
Canada.   
Stephen B. Luce and the North Atlantic Squadron 
 
Meanwhile, between October of 1884 and June of 1886, Stephen B. Luce had 
been busy at work at the Naval War College, honing his ideas about tactical theory and 
operational practice.  Along the way he gathered associates, such as Admiral of the Navy 
David Dixon Porter and Commodore John G. Walker, who agreed with and supported his 
vision of post-graduate centralized education for naval officers.129  He also provoked 
opposition, which included the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, who viewed the 
Naval War College as an infringement on the Academy’s mandate as the home of officer 
education.130  Superintendent Ramsey failed to understand the operational aspects of 
Luce’s project.  At the Naval War College, it was always Luce’s intention to marry 
intellectual efforts at the shore establishment with practical work at sea.131
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 He, perhaps 
more than any other officer of the time, understood that the complicated multi-ship 
formations which would characterize naval warfare of the future would require a different 
kind of naval officer.  It would not be enough for these officers of the future to have a 
common entry-level education at Annapolis.  They would require a new, more 
specialized body of professional knowledge, and this body of knowledge would have to 
be the same across the fleet, because these officers would be required to operate their 
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ships in close formation and fight as multi-ship units.  In short, modern naval warfare 
required the U.S. Navy to develop fleet doctrine. 
 To operationalize this, Luce brought to the War College faculty retired Lieutenant 
William McCarty Little, a member of the Annapolis Class of 1866.  While Alfred Thayer 
Mahan is the most famous of Luce’s appointments to the Naval War College, McCarty 
Little would have to be a close second.132  He had become acquainted with Luce while 
serving as the navigator aboard the USS New Hampshire, one of the vessels in Luce’s 
Training Squadron.  McCarty Little’s promising career had been cut short by a chronic 
eye condition which had cost him the sight of one eye and periodically threatened the 
sight in the other.  Profoundly disappointed over his medical retirement, he 
enthusiastically joined the War College staff, often on a volunteer basis without pay.  
While Mahan and Luce got much of the press for their publications and their sweeping 
ideas about national maritime strategy, McCarty Little quietly went about developing the 
methods for War College students to try out steam tactics.  When it proved impractical to 
gather enough actual ships in Narragansett Bay to conduct exercises, it was McCarty 
Little who suggested that the War College use steam launches instead.133
Whatever else fighting in the Age of Sail had been, it had not been a science.  
“Captains and commanders knew that nothing was certain other than uncertainty, nothing 
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of the elements fundamentally changed this condition.  It would enable naval tactics to be 
studied with much greater precision, and he intended to do exactly that.135
After seeing the Naval War College safely established, Luce was sent back to sea 
in June 1886, this time as the permanent commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic 
Squadron.
  Luce planned 
from the beginning to use his new shore-based post-graduate platform at the United 
States Naval War College to apply scientific principles to the questions of naval tactics 
and strategy, while marrying that effort with fleet maneuvers that would extend the 
theoretical knowledge with exercises of practical naval tactics.   
136   As has been previously shown, Luce felt that the squadron which operated 
regularly on the east coast should regularly work in conjunction with the Naval War 
College to try out tactics which had been developed by the War College students.  
Leaving Captain A. T. Mahan – by now detached from Wachusett and established in 
Newport – in charge of things ashore, he had successfully maneuvered to place himself in 
a position to be the important practical partner of the War College’s theoretical effort.  He 
set to work immediately, corresponding with the Bureau of Navigation about what 
warships he would have assigned to him in the summer of 1887 and what he would be 
able to do with them.137
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  As one of the junior officers in his squadron later recalled: “We 
immediately ceased to spend the summers at the principle New England watering places 
and the winters at the New Orleans Mardi Gras, and went into the most intensive and, as 
135 William Bainbridge-Hoff, CDR, "Letter, Bainbridge-Hoff to Luce, 7 January 1886, 1886," Lette, Naval 
Historical Foundation Collection, Washington, D.C. . 
 
136 Secretary of the Navy Whitney, "Letter, Whitney to Luce, 18 June 1886, 1886," Official Orders, Naval 
Historical Foundation Collection, Washington, D. C. . 
 
137 Bowman Hendry McCalla, "Letter, Mccalla to Luce, 7 December 1886, 1886," letter, Naval Historical 




many learned to think, irritating and unnecessary tactical maneuvers.”138  Luce had 
another innovation that rankled his officers, but gave a clue to the direction that the 
professionalization of the officer corps was taking: he liked to score his subordinates on 
their proficiency in carrying out tactical maneuvers, and he ranked them accordingly with 
these scores.139
Despite the support of the Navy Department, tactical exercises soon took a back 
seat to international politics.  In November 1886, Luce was directed to send a warship 
back to Aspinwall, once again protecting U.S. citizens, business interests, and free transit 
of the isthmus during the continued political unrest there.
  Promotion in the late 1880’s was not yet done on the basis of merit, but 
officers such as Luce understood that if ships were going to fight together, their officers 
would have to be held to a common standard across the squadron.   
140  1887 would bring more 
tasking from the State Department, this time on the other side of the Squadron’s area of 
responsibility.  Much of Luce’s attention in 1887 was directed to the Canadian fisheries 
question.  In July 1887, the Secretary of the Navy ordered that the North Atlantic 
Squadron proceed into the Gulf of St. Lawrence to enforce the fishing rights of American 
fishermen, in accordance with the 1818 treaty establishing those rights and the Treaty of 
Washington in 1871.  Unrest had been brewing over what was seen as unlawful British 
prosecution of U.S. fishing captains in Canadian waters.141
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140 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Luce, 6 November 1886, 1886," Letter, Naval Historical 
Foundation Collection, Washington, D.C. 
 
141 In fact, the Navy Department was beginning to be concerned about hostilities with Great Britain, as 
evidenced by a curious exchange between Commodore Walker and another naval officer about doing 
reconnaissance on locks and canals to obstruct in Canada in the event of war.  See Admiral J.G. Walker, 
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proceed to Portland and Halifax, while the Galina and Swatara were sent one at a time 
into the Gulf.142
Luce was determined to settle the fisheries problem as soon as possible.  Arriving 
on station in the Richmond,
  Luce’s handling of this situation shows his matter-of-fact approach to 
such political questions, and his desire to concentrate on preparing for what he felt was 
the true calling of the Navy.  Although he does not directly say so in his correspondence, 
one gets the feeling that Luce viewed these deployments of his ships as a distraction at 
best, and an outright misuse of resources at worst.  Rather than honing tactics to be used 
in naval warfare on the high seas, he was forced to spend much of the prime exercise 
season looking after the business interests of American fishermen.  Contrasting Luce’s 
correspondence with that of Rear Admiral Cooper (C-in-C 1882-1884), whose dispatches 
were always newsy and full of commercial information, throws the two distinct, and 
often conflicting, missions required of commanders-in-chief during this era into stark 
relief. 
143
                                                                                                                                                 
“Letter, Walker to Gridley, 25 July 1887,” in Naval Historical Foundation Collection (Washington, D.C.: 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 1887). 
 Luce interviewed various representatives of the U.S. 
fishing industry in Portland, Maine, as well as sent a questionnaire to the British 
commandant at Halifax, Nova Scotia, to ascertain what ports American fishermen were 
allowed to call in, where they were allowed to fish, and how they would clear customs, in 
the opinion of the British government.  Having received replies to his questionnaire, Luce 
had copies printed and distributed throughout the waterfront for the information of 
 
142 Secretary of the Navy Whitney, "Letter, Whitney to Luce, 20 June 1887, 1887," letter, Naval Historical 
Foundation Collection, Washington, D.C. . 
 
143 Tennessee was decommissioned in January of 1887. 
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American fishing captains.  Problem solved.  Back to the business of preparing his fleet 
for naval warfare; or so he thought. 
The State Department did not see it that way.  When the correspondence between 
the British officer and Rear Admiral Luce made its way into the northern newspapers, 
Washington D.C. exploded in partisan finger-pointing.  Republicans accused President 
Cleveland of being soft on the fisheries question.  An exchange of letters between Luce 
and Secretary of the Navy Whitney followed, culminating in Luce’s request to be 
relieved of his command.  This was the last thing the Secretary wanted.  The political ins 
and outs of the fisheries question do not require discussion for present purposes, but it is 
evident in the letter sent by Secretary of the Navy Whitney to Luce, turning down his 
offer to resign, that the secretary recognized the important work that Luce was doing with 
the War College/North Atlantic Squadron tandem and wanted it to continue.  “I have the 
honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 9th,” wrote Whitney, “and 
am satisfied that you should retain your present command.  Your handling of the 
Squadron at sea and the practice in tactics and in fleet movements which you have given 
your officers during the last year, are especially to be commended.”  (Italics added.)144
  With the political issues left behind for the moment,
 
145
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 the North Atlantic 
Squadron returned to Narragansett Bay where, in conjunction with the Army, they carried 
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out a very successful series of landings and maneuvers in the fall of 1887.146
Although Luce had a vision of a complete system of training and exercise for his 
command, and although he had colleagues such as Commodore John G. Walker (about 
whom more in the next chapter) in positions of importance such as the Chief of the 
Bureau of Navigation, the North Atlantic Squadron was still captive to the need to 
perform political missions as requested by the Department of State.  On board Richmond, 
which was spending the winter in New York, Luce began working on his plans for the 
next year.  He corresponded with General Sheridan of the Army, suggesting that the 
Marines participate in joint Army-Navy exercises in 1888.
  Back at 
New York for the winter, Luce worked on fleet training plans for the following summer.  
This is a significant indicator of progress in the development of a multi-ship fighting 
capability.  In contrast to ad hoc deployments of single ships based on requirements to 
“show the flag” and protect commercial interests, Luce’s actions during the winter of 
1887-1888 show a commander-in-chief actively planning combat training for his 
squadron and working to incorporate that training into his unit’s deployment plans.  Even 
the previously unprecedented tactical training under Rear Admiral George Cooper in 
1882 does not really appear to have been more than taking advantage of the squadron’s 
orders to be present together at the various celebrations they participated in that summer.   
147
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ships and their possible ports-of-call for the next summer.148
The first indication that Luce was not going to be able to carry out his planned 
exercises in the summer was a request for support from the U.S. minister at San 
Domingo.
  The initial plan was for 
Luce to take his warships, in company, on a tour of the southern ports, namely New 
Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, and Charleston, then proceeding north.  It made 
sense, the squadron having spent the last two summers visiting northern ports.  It 
appeared that Luce would have Richmond (his flagship), Atlanta (the first of the “New 
Steel Navy” cruisers), Yantic, Dolphin, and Galena.  This was not a large squadron, but 
there were enough ships to work through some tactical problems and train the officers of 
the squadron in handling their ships in formation. 
149  On 11 January 1888, only 10 days after Walker had expressed the approval 
of the Navy Department for Luce’s training plan, Walker wrote Luce a somewhat 
apologetic letter in which he instructed him to detach a ship to serve the needs of the 
State Department.150  In July, Luce’s flagship Richmond was summoned for service on 
the Asiatic station.  He was given Pensacola as a replacement, but she was unseaworthy, 
so he would be forced to transfer his flag to another, smaller, ship if he wanted to lead at 
sea.151  Meanwhile, political conditions in Haiti152
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 were deteriorating throughout the 
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summer, culminating in an order from the Navy Department in August to sent a ship to 
Port-au-Prince. 
 About this time, a letter arrived from the Navy Department asking Luce’s opinion 
on summer training plans for his squadron.  It should have been obvious at this point to 
anyone bothering to pay attention in the Navy Department that Luce had at his command 
only two ships.  Training of any sort, other than perhaps to send signals to one another, 
was completely out of the question.  The letter was the last straw.  On 28 July 1888, Luce 
fired off a 7-page reply from New York, in which he described his attempt to put together 
a coherent training plan for that summer.  He detailed the detachment of his ships, one by 
one, for tasking to support the State Department.  He questioned, with astonishment, the 
attempt by the Navy Department to charge the War Department for any coal expended 
carrying soldiers in Navy ships during combined exercises.  He lamented his inability to 
carry out his vision of making the North Atlantic Squadron a “school of practical 
instruction” which would exercise the theoretical concepts developed by the Naval War 
College.153
The fundamental idea (italics added) is to make theoretical instruction and 
practical exercise go hand in hand; or, in other words, to correlate the work of the 
Squadron and that of the College.  In the lecture room certain tactical propositions 
are laid down, or war problems given out, to the officers under instruction.  Their 
merit is then tested in the School of Application, the Squadron, and the result 
afterwards discussed in the lecture room.  This system raises our Squadron 
exercises to a higher plane than those of any other known to me, and places our 
Navy, comparatively insignificant in all else, in advance of the Navies of the 
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The 28 July 1888 letter from Luce to the Secretary of the Navy is a pivotal piece 
of Luce’s correspondence, second only perhaps to the letter inviting Alfred Thayer 
Mahan to join the faculty of the Naval War College.  Here, encapsulated in one 
document, is the basic difference between the modern fleet concept and the historical 
utilization of the U.S. Navy.  Under Luce, the identity of the North Atlantic Squadron 
was that of a single combat unit, which sailed together, trained together, and expected to 
fight together.  In short, the North Atlantic Squadron was an embryonic fleet, in the 
modern use of the word.  To the State Department, however, and to a lesser extent the 
Navy Department, the North Atlantic Squadron was simply a collection of ships, from 
which the Executive Branch could draw upon as necessary to fulfill commitments to U.S. 
citizens, property, and business interests throughout their area of responsibility.  While 
squadron exercises became commonplace, and even expected, throughout the decade of 
the 1880’s, it was clear in 1888 that the new concepts had not yet been accepted as the 
basis of peacetime naval operations. 
In any event, Luce did not have long to stew about his failure to convince the 
Navy Department of the validity of his views.  Down in Haiti, the political unrest which 
had already deprived him of one of his ships earlier in the year had taken a turn for the 
worse.  The Haytian Republic, a steamer flying the U.S. flag, was seized by the Haitian 
government.  This was a clear violation of the international rights of U.S. citizens, and 
one that struck especially at the sensibilities of a United States always keenly interested 
in the protection of U.S. property abroad.  On 8 December 1888, Luce was given back 
Richmond (temporarily), and told to take her and his remaining two ships Galena and 
Yantic, and depart for Port-au-Prince at once.  Ossipee would meet them on the way 
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down, as they passed Norfolk.  In the event, Luce accomplished the job with only Galena 
and Yantic, the other two vessels not being ready for sea fast enough.  There is little 
doubt that Luce thought that there was a good possibility that hostilities would result, as 
he drilled his little command and made out battle instructions while in transit.155  The two 
ships would prove to be enough, however.  They entered the harbor at Port-au-Prince at 
quarters, cleared for action with guns loaded.  The Provisional Government, sensing that 
this was a fight that would be unprofitable for them, quickly released the Haytian 
Republic.  In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of State Bayard praised the 
“high and intelligent discretion which has characterized the action of Admiral Luce in the 
execution of this National duty to American citizens…”156
Conclusions 
  This recognition of the 
Secretary of State was a small satisfaction, at the end of Luce’s tour as commander-in-
chief, for the way in which the State Department had questioned his judgment two years 
earlier during the 1887 Canadian fisheries question.   
 
Luce applied for, and received, his detachment from the North Atlantic Squadron 
in January of 1889.  The decade of the 1880’s had seen a change in the North Atlantic 
Squadron, not in structure or materiel, but in its sense of itself as an organization.  As in 
any organization undergoing a fundamental change in image and identity, the Squadron 
inhabited a middle ground between the old identity and the new.  Although this 
characterization of the Squadron’s dual identity would be accurate until the middle of the 
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1890’s, it was at no time truer than during the 1880’s.  The command tours of Rear 
Admirals Cooper and Jouett bring this characterization into relief.  Under Admiral 
Cooper’s somewhat reluctant leadership, the Squadron carried out at least four major sets 
of exercises, operating as a unit for a total of 44 days.  But the tactical exercises under 
Cooper were not part of an overall plan readying the squadron for combat as a tactical 
unit.  They were products of opportunity that were dropped as events occurred that were 
determined to be more important to the Squadron’s critical function of showing the flag 
and protecting and promoting U.S. commerce.  This is seen clearly in the command tour 
of Rear Admiral Jouett, who was only able to conduct a single week of tactical exercises, 
in April 1886.  The highlight of his tenure as commander-in-chief was the revolution in 
Colombia, an experience very much in keeping with the old-navy image of the naval 
officer as a warrior-diplomat. 
After Rear Admiral Luce took command of the squadron in 1886 he brought a 
vision for an integrated training plan.  Under his leadership, the North Atlantic Squadron 
warships not only trained together more often, but they did so as part of an overall 
scheme linking the theoretical work of the Naval War College with practical preparation.  
A routine developed that sent the warships of the Squadron north in the summer so that 
their officers could participate in the Naval War College’s summer session, then return to 
their ships to put into action theoretical concepts worked out in the classroom.  After 
these summer exercises, the Squadron could send warships north to the Canadian fishing 
waters or south to the Caribbean.  Its identity was becoming more that of a fighting unit 
and training organization and less as an administrative body that facilitated assignment of 
ships to individual missions by the Navy Department.  Years before Mahan popularized 
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the theory of seapower, the operational patterns of the North Atlantic Squadron were 
laying the foundations for the development of a national battlefleet.157
This vision was only partially realized in the 1880’s.
  
158
                                                 
157 This is the title of an article by Robert Seager II.  See: “Ten Years Before Mahan: The Unofficial Case 
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491-512. 
  The decade to come 
would bring not only materiel changes with the arrival the first of the steel ships of the 
“new steel navy”, but changes in the way those ships were employed.  It would also bring 
to the forefront a powerful, politically-connected officer who shared Luce’s vision for a 
well-trained fighting squadron.  Under Rear Admiral John Grimes Walker, the Squadron 
of Evolution, consisting of the Atlantic, Boston, Chicago, and Dolphin would tour 
Europe, showing the nations of the old world that the naval power of the United States 
was in the process of rebirth.   
 
158 Hattendorf, ed. The Writings of Stephen B. Luce, 13. 
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Chapter 3:  The North Atlantic Squadron and the Squadron of 
Evolution, 1889-1891 
 
This chapter traces the ground-breaking deployment of the Squadron of Evolution 
from November of 1889 to the fall of 1891, in the context of the day-to-day operations of 
the North Atlantic Squadron.  Comparing the leadership styles as well as the operational 
employment of the two squadrons gives examples of the slow development of the 
organizational identity of the North Atlantic Squadron as the nation’s foreign policy 
became more coherent and the U.S. Navy shifted from a focus on cruising and commerce 
raiding to one of engaging enemy fleets in open ocean combat.  The Squadron of 
Evolution will be shown to be the operational expression of the new identity that had 
been slowly coalescing in the North Atlantic Squadron over the previous fifteen years. 
In both identity and image, the North Atlantic Squadron was an organization in 
the midst of change, and sociologists have demonstrated the impact that identity and 
image have on organizational adaptation to change.1
                                                 
1 Gioia. 
   In the process of this change, the 
organizational identity was evolving.  A unit that previously thought of itself, and was 
viewed by outsiders, as an administrative collection of ships, to be sent to various ports as 
political conditions required, was beginning to identify itself as a combat unit, composed 
of subunits (ships), but increasingly focused on the necessity to train and the ability to 
fight together as a squadron.   In the decision to create a squadron out of the “ABCD” 
ships, and deploy them as a squadron, the Navy Department revealed its belief that future 
naval operations would involve combat on the squadron or fleet level, and that the proper 
mission of a squadron should involve constant training and combat preparation.  As the 
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Navy Department experimented with the employment of the Squadron of Evolution, the 
North Atlantic Squadron under the leadership of Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi clung 
to what appeared to be the traditional pattern of cruising assignments. 
Bancroft Gherardi and the North Atlantic Squadron – 1889 
 
With the successful outcome of the Haytian Republic affair barely behind him, 
Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce was detached from command of the North Atlantic 
Squadron on 28 January 1889.2  He was relieved at Key West by Rear Admiral Bancroft 
Gherardi, whose previous assignment had been as Commandant of the New York Navy 
Yard.3  It is significant that, in commenting on this, both the New York Times and the 
Secretary of the Navy report for 1889 noted that “the squadron on this [North Atlantic] 
station is now under the command of Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi.”4  The image of 
the North Atlantic Squadron was slowly transforming, as outsiders (in this case, 
newspapers as well as the Secretary of the Navy) began to use language consistent with 
viewing the Squadron as a fighting unit.  This can be contrasted to reports from as late as 
four years previously that referred to the “force on this station.”5
 The commander-in-chief’s flag was still flying from Galena when Rear Admiral 
Gherardi took charge.  Galena remained at Key West for another two months, getting 
underway again in February for the Caribbean.  Unrest in Haiti continued to occupy the 
attention of the North Atlantic Squadron throughout much of 1889.  At issue was the 
 
                                                 
2 Secretary of the Navy Whitney, "Letter, Whitney to Luce, 28 January 1889, 1889," Official Orders, Naval 
Historical Foundation Collection, Washington, D.C. . 
 
3 "Admiral Gherardi Transferred," New York Times (1857-1922), Feb 10 1889. 
 
4 U.S. Navy Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy1889. Vol. I. 78. 
 
5 Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy1885. Vol. 1. 207. 
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long-standing desire of the United States to have a naval presence on the island of 
Hispaniola.6  The dueling forces of Francois Legitime (president from October of 1888 to 
August of 1889) and Florvil Hyppolite (president from October 1889 to March 1896) 
were attempting to disrupt the flow of arms and supplies to each others’ supporters.  On 
his previous visit to the area in 1888, Rear Admiral Luce had determined that then-
President Legitime’s gunboat navy did not have the resources necessary to establish a 
legal blockade.  Their declaration of a blockade was therefore illegitimate.  Yantic had 
then remained behind after the Haytian Republic affair had concluded and Rear Admiral 
Luce departed.  She maintained a presence on station until a case of yellow fever forced 
her return north in January 1889.  The Haitian attempts at blockade were a disruption of 
business in an area considered to be strategically important, and thus a matter of 
continuing concern for the Navy.7
In New York, Rear Admiral Gherardi was ordered to transfer his flag to the 
venerable Kearsarge and then return to the Caribbean for another cruise in Haitian 
waters.  Kearsarge was added to the North Atlantic Squadron to replace Ossipee, which 
was scheduled for decommissioning at the end of the year.  Gherardi had been offered 
Boston as his flagship, but he demurred, preferring the older but much more spacious 
Kearsarge.  Much of the available interior room in the new steel warships was taken up 
by machinery; their living conditions were considered cramped, even without the added 
personnel of an admiral’s staff.  The older wooden cruising vessels, even a sloop like 
  After a cruise through the area, Galena returned to 
New York in May 1889.   
                                                 
6 President U.S. Grant’s various attempts to secure a naval base in Santo Domingo are discussed in Chapter 
1.  
 
7 For strategic interest in Haiti, see Love, 363-365.  On Galena’s cruise, see "Back from Hayti," New York 
Times (1857-1922), May 30 1889. 
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Kearsarge, offered plenty of room for a flag staff’s operations in addition to the ship’s 
company.8
It did not escape the attention of the New York Times that the North Atlantic 
Squadron had not exercised in fleet tactics since the departure of Rear Admiral Luce, the 
newspaper going so far as to note that: “It is true that not a few commanding officers of 
vessels dislike squadron operations.  This became eminently conspicuous during the 
rumored fitting out of a “flying squadron” designed to cruise round the world.  To have 
their vessels assigned to such a squadron would completely handicap the independence of 
the Captains, for henceforth their every movement would be regulated by the will of the 
Admiral in command of the fleet.”
  The relatively minor issue of the selection of a flagship seems a small point, 
but it is not.  It provides evidence that Rear Admiral Gherardi did not view his command 
the same way that Luce had.  The idea of Stephen B. Luce turning down the opportunity 
to fly his flag on one of the first ships of the “New Steel Navy” would have been 
unthinkable.  Gherardi’s selection of a obsolescent wood sloop as his flagship shows that 
he was more focused on having the room necessary for his staff to administer the 
Squadron’s presence duties than he was leading the Squadron in multi-ship tactical drills. 
9
 
  This is exactly what, for the moment, was precluded 
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THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON - 1889 




1550 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 11KTS 2X11” DAHLGRENS 
1X30LB PARROTT RIFLE 
4X32LB SMOOTH BORE 
CIVIL WAR (1862) 
OSSIPEE 1240 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 10KTS 1X11” DAHLGREN 
1X100LB PARROTT RIFLE 
3X30LB PARROTT RIFLE 
6X32LB SMOOTH BORE 
CIVIL WAR (1862) 
PENSACOLA 3000 WOODEN SCREW 
STEAMER 
NO 9.5KTS 1X11”DAHLGREN 
16X9” DAHLGRENS 
 
CIVIL WAR (1861) 
GALENA 1900 WOODEN SCREW 
STEAMER 
NO 9.5KTS 1X8” DAHLGREN RIFEL 
1X60LB PARROT RIFLE 
POST-WAR (1880) 
YANTIC 836 WOODEN SCREW 
GUNBOAT 
NO  9.5KTS 1X100LB PARROT RIFLE 




CIVIL WAR (1864) 
Table 5: The North Atlantic Squadron, 188910
 
 
The only other opportunity for the North Atlantic Squadron to sail in company in 
1889 was the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the bombardment of 
Fort McHenry and the Battle of North Point at Baltimore, Maryland.  For the festivities, 
Yantic, Ossipee, and Pensacola were present in the harbor from 9 to 15 September 1889.  
Among the events planned for the week-long celebration was a reenactment of the British 
naval bombardment of Ft. McHenry.  This was carried out by the three North Atlantic 
Squadron representatives.  The citizens of Baltimore had hoped that the ships of the New 
Steel Navy would make an appearance, but they were occupied with the formation of the 
new Squadron of Evolution, and did not make the trip to Baltimore.11
                                                 
10 Canney. 
  There is no 
11 "The Guest of the City," The Sun (1837-1985)1889; "Key's Spangled Banner," The Sun (1837-1985), 
Aug 29 1889. 
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evidence that the three warships steamed in formation or carried out any other tactical 
training during this time, but they did feature a new song to be played at morning and 
evening colors.  On 24 July 1889, Secretary of the Navy Tracy signed General Order 
#374, making “The Star Spangled Banner” the Navy’s official song to be used when 
raising and lowering the flag.  The song eventually became the national anthem in 1931.   
Kearsarge’s next assignment caused some controversy, and showed the identity 
changes underway in the nation, as well as the Navy.  In September, she was detailed to 
carry the newly-appointed U.S. minister to Haiti - Frederick Douglass.  Ossipee had 
originally been given the assignment, but the Norfolk Navy Yard reported that her boilers 
were in need of two weeks’ worth of repairs before she would be sea-worthy, so 
Kearsarge was given the assignment instead.  Newspapers in New York and Washington 
picked up the story and reported that Ossipee’s captain and executive officer were uneasy 
about the social status of the African-American dignitary they were ordered to carry on 
board, and had fabricated the mechanical problems to avoid the duty.  This was denied 
vehemently by everyone involved, including Ossipee’s XO, Admiral Evans, in his 
memoirs.12
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  Appearances were not helped when the commanding officer of the 
Kearsarge, Commander Shepard, was quickly relieved by Commander Whiting the next 
day.  The official explanation was that Commander Shepard had previously asked to be 
relieved from sea duty, but the timing of the change-of-command pointed to the 
possibility of his sharing the same racial sensitivities allegedly attributed to the Ossipee’s 
12 Robley RADM Evans, A Sailor's Log: Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life (New York, NY: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1901), 241.  See also "Douglass's Trip to Hayti," New York Times (1857-1922), 
Sep 30 1889. 
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commanders.13  Eventually Minister Douglass, his wife, daughter, and private secretary 
were housed as comfortably as possible in Commander Whiting’s cabin onboard 
Kearsarge, and delivered to Haiti without further incident, arriving on 8 October 1889.14
John Grimes Walker and the Squadron of Evolution 
   
 
Meanwhile, the first steel ships of the “New Steel Navy” were making their 
operational appearance.  It had been a long time coming.  The results of the two Naval 
Advisory Boards ordered by Secretaries of the Navy The construction contract for all 
four of the “ABCD” ships was subsequently awarded to John Roach’s shipyard in 
Chester, Pennsylvania.  Roach was a friend of Secretary of the Navy Chandler, a fact that 
caused no small amount of public furor, but in fact he had the only facilities capable of 
handling steel of the amount and size necessary to construct steel warships.   
The Navy’s first steel warship, Atlanta, was commissioned in 1886.  She, and her 
identical sister ship Boston, were both 270 feet long, carried a crew of 265 enlisted 
personnel and 19 officers, and boasted two 8-inch rifles, six 6-inch rifles and a battery of 
various smaller weapons.  The flagship of the Squadron of Evolution, Chicago, at 325 
feet long was the largest of the four, and generally considered the best-looking.15
                                                 
13 "Ready for Mr. Douglass," New York Times (1857-1922), Oct 1 1889. 
  She 
drew 4500 tons and had a crew of 376 enlisted and 33 officers.  Her armament consisted 
of four 8-inch guns, eight 6-inch guns, two 5-inch guns, and various other quick-firing 
smaller weapons.  Rounding out the squadron was the Yorktown, a 230 foot-long 
 
14 "The Kearsarge Sails," New York Times (1857-1922), Oct 2 1889. 
15 John D. Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction 
of the Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval 




gunboat with six 6-inch guns and the ability to mount launchers for the new Whitehead 
torpedoes. 
THE SQUADRON OF EVOLUTION, 1891 







NO 14.0KTS 4X8” BLR 
8X6” BLR 
2X5” BLR 
VARIETY OF SMALLER 
WEAPONS 
NEW (1889) 
ATLANTA 3189 STEEL 
PROTECTED 
CRUISER 
NO 16.3KTS 2X8” BLR 
6X6” BLR 
VARIETY OF SMALLER 
WEAPONS 
NEW (1886) 
BOSTON 3189 STEEL 
PROTECTED 
CRUISER 
NO 15.6KTS 2X8” BLR 
6X6” BLR 
VARIETY OF SMALLER 
WEAPONS 
NEW (1887) 
YORKTOWN 1710 STEEL 
GUNBOAT 
NO 16.1KTS 6X6” BLR 
VARIETY OF SMALLER 
WEAPONS 
NEW (1889) 
Table 6: The Squadron of Evolution, 189116
 
 
These four ships represented halfway points between the wooden steamers of the 
1870’s and the modern ships which were to come in the next twenty years.  While 
designed with double steel hulls, watertight compartments, and fully-electric lighting 
systems, they retained masts, canvas, and the ability to make way under sail power with 
partial sail rigs.17
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
  As “protected cruisers”, these were essentially unarmored ships.  They 
had a thin layer of steel plating which covered the top of the vital engineering spaces, but 
no armor belt along the sides.  With the exception of Chicago, they had single screws, 
underscoring the fact that they had not been designed for extensive formation work.  The 
 




axial forces generated by the rotation of a single screw on the centerline require constant 
rudder corrections to prevent the vessel from constantly falling off course.  This makes a 
single-screw ship significantly more difficult to maneuver precisely than one provided 
with two screws, one on either side of the keel.  The construction of these four ships 
gives an insight into the expectations of Congress and the Department of the Navy when 
they approved the designs of these ships.  Although modern in many respects, these were 
still cruising vessels, not designed for the line-of-battle.  “A solitary American steel 
cruiser with its delusive prefix of ‘protected,’” wrote Stephen B. Luce in 1889, 
“represents the latent possibilities of a great country placidly awaiting some national 
disaster to generate its mighty forces.”18
By the spring of 1889, the first three cruisers of the New Steel Navy were almost 
ready for squadron assignment.  How the new ships were to be assigned and utilized was 
the subject of much speculation, both among naval officers and the general public.
 
19
                                                 
18 Stephen B. Luce, RADM, "Our Future Navy," The North American Review 149, no. 392 (1889). Pg. 65.  
See also the remarks by Sampson about coastal defense for a different viewpoint. "Capt. Sampson's 
Scheme," New York Times (1857-1922), Aug 2 1889. 
  The 
assumption was that the new ships would be spread out among the established stations 
around the world.  In other words: exactly as the wooden steamships they were replacing 
were used.  However, in May 1889, stories began to be whispered about other plans that 
the Department of the Navy might have.  While the major newspapers argued over who 
had the inside “scoop” on the story, a naval officer entered the scene who would continue 
Stephen B. Luce’s movement to change the way the ships of the navy were employed.  
As the chief of the Bureau of Navigation and Detail, Commodore John G. Walker 
 
19"Editorial Article 4 -- No Title," New York Times (1857-1922), Oct 25 1889. Pg. 4.  See also “Work at the 
Navy Yard: A Decidedly Mythical Cruise”, New York Tribune, May 12 1889, pg. 3 for early gossip about 
possible utilization of the new ships. 
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enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary of the Navy.  He also had an inordinate amount 
of power over the movement of ships and the detailing of officers to man them.  After 
two consecutive tours in the Bureau, Commodore Walker was in line to be detailed to 
sea.  The command he desired was the North Atlantic Squadron”.  However, that 
command had been promised to Rear Admiral Gerhardi, who was senior to Walker.  
Unable to get himself placed in the “twilight tour” he desired, Commodore Walker went 
about quietly setting up the next best thing: command of the navy’s newest vessels.  
Walker was known within the Department as someone interested in concentration of 
naval assets whenever possible, and we have seen him encourage Jouett and Luce to keep 
their ships together and conduct exercises.20  In July 1889, he convinced the Secretary of 
the Navy to appoint him the head of a board which would conduct trials on the new 
cruisers Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago.  The so-called “Walker Board” would be 
responsible for determining and documenting the maximum speed and horsepower 
generated, as well as the turning radii of the three ships.21
                                                 
20 See Chapter 2 
  This information was of 
particular importance for two reasons: the first was to establish exactly what top speed 
could be expected from the ship operationally.  The structure of the contracts to build the 
ships promised bonuses for the shipbuilder for excess horsepower developed and knots of 
top speed.  In pursuit of these bonuses, the shipbuilders conducted acceptance trials with 
the ship crewed with the best stokers and firemen that money could buy, using the 
highest-grade coal.  Naval officers had good reason to be suspicious of these results, and 
wanted to try it for themselves using ordinary sailors as the crew, and standard-grade coal 
 
21 "Editorial Article 5 -- No Title," New York Times (1857-1922), Jul 20 1889. Pg. 4.  Also,  "Naval Speed 
Premiums," New York Times (1857-1922), Aug 8 1889.  Pg. 4. 
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for the boilers.  Secondly, although the new steel ships had been designed as cruisers – 
optimized for single-ship operations – it was becoming evident that the navy intended to 
conduct multi-ship squadron operations with them.  In the absence of modern 
instrumentation which gave accurate readings of ship speed and rudder angle, it would be 
necessary to take careful note of their speed and turning radius through experimentation.  
Accordingly, as they were completed, the three cruisers made their way to the 
Narragansett Bay and the waters off of Newport, Rhode Island for the trials. 
        Within the decentralized bureau system of the Department of the Navy, the unusual 
appointment of a board to collect this information caused annoyance if not offense.  The 
Board of Inspection and Survey, headed by Rear Admiral Jouett, a previous North 
Atlantic Squadron CinC, was supposed to conduct all trials for new warships.  RADM 
Jouett, although on friendly terms with Walker, resented that well-connected officer’s 
intrusion onto what he considered to be his turf.  Jouett’s entreaties to the Admiral of the 
Navy were dismissed, however, and the new ships continued with their trials under the 
supervision of the Walker Board throughout the fall of 1889.22
Meanwhile, Walker was looking ahead to the work he planned to do while 
underway.  In preparing for his deployment, he had to confront a Navy structure that was 
unprepared to support the innovative work he was trying to accomplish.  Methods of 
signaling provide an example of this.  In the deployments analyzed in the previous 
chapter, signals exchanged between ships were few, and routine in nature.  When ships 
were together in port, the senior officer present would coordinate the raising and lowering 
   
                                                 
22 Commodore John G. Walker, by C. F. Goodrich, CDR, 21 September 1889, Telegram, Telegram, 
Goodrich to Walker, 21 Sept 1889. Washington, D.C. And C. F. Goodrich, CDR, "Telegram, Goodrich to 
Walker, 24 September 1889, 1889," Telegram, RG 45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval 
Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
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of topgallant yards, and occasionally request that junior ships “send a boat” to receive 
instructions.  None of this required dedicated signals personnel.  The officer of the deck 
and whatever Sailors on watch were assisting him could handle the duties of decoding 
these flags and reporting their meaning to their captain for action.  Walker, however, had 
different things in mind, and he knew that constant and rapid communications between 
ships would be a vital requirement.  To that end, he instructed each of his captains to 
select six especially capable sailors and train them to handle signal flags.23
Being prepared for daytime signaling was not enough in Walker’s mind.  In a 
letter to the Secretary of the Navy, written just prior to departing New York, he 
complained that the ships’ allocation of rockets and Very signals was not adequate for the 
"amount of night signaling which I propose to do in this Squadron."
   
24  For all the 
formation work that previous commanders-in-chief had been successful in carrying out, 
only a small fraction had been done at night, mostly to evaluate new night signaling 
devices.25
By and large, the media approved of these plans.  “It is now patent”, crowed the 
New York Times, “that Admiral Luce’s ideas were proper ones in the matter of handling 
  Walker, who contemplated his four ships spending the vast majority of their 
deployment in company, found that the Navy Department bureaucracy that supplied the 
Navy’s warships had not caught up with the plans for a Squadron of Evolution. 
                                                 
23 Daniel Howard Wicks, “New Navy and New Empire: The Life and Times of John Grimes Walker” 
(University of California, Berkeley, 1979). 
 
24 Letter, Walker to SECNAV, 17 September 1889, in Department of the Navy, "Situation Reports, 
Squadron of Evolution, Dec 7 1889 - May 25, 1892, 1889-1892," Letterbook, RG 45, Records Collection of 
the Office of Naval Records and Library, Washington, D.C. 
 
25 Geroge H. Cooper, RADM, "Signal Instructions, 1882," order, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Letters 
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Commanding Officers, North Atlantic Squadron, 1866-1885, 




squadrons, and were furthermore the only right ones for the securing of efficiency on the 
part of naval forces when called upon for duty ashore.”26  The old days of single ships 
under sail were giving way to concentrated multi-ship operations under steam.  It 
required a different set of competencies, and naval officers – especially young ones – 
applied to the Bureau of Navigation and Detail for a chance to be a part of this cutting-
edge experience.27  It was as if naval officers of the era knew that the future had arrived, 
and that future was not duty on a single ship showing the flag by itself in a faraway port.  
Not surprisingly, Admiral Walker took many of the officers who had staffed the Bureau 
of Navigation with him when he left, offering them first pick of the “plum” 
assignments.28
From August through October, the Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago moved from 
New York to Newport and back, completing their trials.  The timetable for departure of 
the squadron was pushed back a few weeks when the Boston ran aground off of Newport 
on 3 August 1889.
 
29
                                                 
26 "Practical Naval Work," New York Times (1857-1922), Oct 6 1889. 
  Fortunately, the new double-bottomed construction minimized the 
damage, and Boston was able to make her way slowly back to the New York Navy Yard, 
where she entered drydock immediately.  The setback with Boston notwithstanding, 
eventually the trials were complete and the ships returned to the Navy Yard, where they 
were fully manned and supplied.  On 18 November 1889, the Squadron got underway 
 
27 "Army and Navy News," New York Times (1857-1922), Apr 2 1889.  Pg. 2.  "That Flying Squadron," 
New York Times (1857-1922), May 9 1889. Pg. 1 
 
28 “Admiral Walker’s Departure”, Washington Post, (1877-1922), Nov 1 1889, pg. 5. 
 




from New York.  Secretary of the Navy Tracy and Admiral of the Navy Porter were 
among the notables who descended on the Navy Yard to see them off.30
Their first order of business had nothing to do with experimentations in fleet 
tactics.  The four ships headed to Boston where they joined in a maritime celebration 
taking place there.
   
31  Besides being deeply interested in the development of fleet tactics, 
Walker understood the important public relations aspect of the “White Squadron”, and 
took specific pains to make the ships accessible to the American public prior to taking 
them on their overseas cruise.  He was pleased with the results of the time spent in 
Boston, where thousands of citizens had the opportunity to climb around on “their” new 
steel ships.  According to Walker, “Probably not less than twenty thousand people…have 
been received on the Chicago.”  He went on to note that “From all sources are heard 
expressions of satisfaction that the United States is again taking position as a naval 
power, and I have been deeply impressed with the strength and sincerity of this feeling 
and the advantage which future naval legislation will probably derive from it.”32
From Boston, the Squadron set sail for Lisbon, Portugal.
 
33
                                                 
30 "The Squadron Sails," New York Times (1857-1922), Dec 8 1889. 
  Daniel Wicks points 
out that fleet tactical exercises could have taken place anywhere, if they had been the 
only mission of the Squadron of Evolution.  There was more at stake here.  A newly-
powerful American navy wanted the nations of Old Europe to be aware not only of the 
 
31 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Secnav, 18 November 1889, 1889," Telegram, RG 45, U.S. 
Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
32 Navy, "Situation Reports, Squadron of Evolution, Dec 7 1889 - May 25, 1892. " 
 
33 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Secnav, 7 December 1889, 1889," Telegram, RG 45, U.S. 




new ships it was fielding, but of the ability to deploy them across long distances.34  It’s 
worth pointing out, though, that a large segment of the public felt this way as well, not 
just the “navalists”.  Witness the words of the New York Times correspondent who 
wrote: “The presence of such a fleet for two years abroad will do more to secure respect 
to American travelers than a host of State Department documents well-worded but not 
backed up by a show of military force.”35
After a two-week journey across the Atlantic, the Squadron arrived at Lisbon, 
Portugal.
 
36  Using his newly-printed letterhead that proudly proclaimed the “Flagship 
CHICAGO of the United States Squadron of Evolution”, Admiral Walker reported that 
the three cruisers had weathered the crossing well, in spite of some heavy weather, but 
that the smaller Yorktown had become separated.  He assumed that she had been forced 
to heave to by the weather and would rejoin the squadron in port in a couple of days, as 
indeed happened.37
The captain of the Yorktown, French Endsor Chadwick, was uniquely qualified 
for duty with the new Squadron of Evolution.  As one of the earliest proponents of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence, Chadwick had been posted to London, England, as the first 
U.S. naval attaché.  While there, he had corresponded regularly with then-Commodore 
Walker, who was the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and Detail about technological 
 
                                                 
34 Wicks., pg. 218. 
 
35 "War Ships to Be Proud Of," New York Times, 13 October 1889 1889. 
 
36 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Secnav, 1889," Telegram, RG 45, U.S. Navy Department 
Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
37 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Secnav, 21 December 1889, 1889," Letter, RG 45, U.S. Navy 




advancements in the various European navies.38  He had also been instructed to produce a 
report for the Department of the Navy on the training systems of the British and French 
navies, which was forwarded to Congress in 1880.39
In any event, Chadwick’s Yorktown had indeed been forced to lie to in the bad 
weather, the seaworthiness of the little gunboat being further compromised by the parting 
of the ship’s steering gear.  After touching at Fusal for repairs, Yorktown rejoined the 
squadron on 23 December 1889.
  Although he did not say much about 
ships operating in close order, Chadwick would have been more knowledgeable than any 
other officer in the U.S. Navy about the methods foreign navies used to conduct naval 
warfare. 
40  In Portugal, Admiral Walker received the records of 
the U.S. Naval Force on the European Station from Commander McCalla of the 
Enterprise, who had been in temporary command of the station.41  The Squadron then 
proceeded to enjoy the hospitality of the Portuguese for the next ten days, putting to sea 
on 31 December with the expressed intention of “exercise[ing]…in squadron tactics 
under steam.”42
                                                 
38 Doris D. Maguire, ed. French Ensor Chadwick: Selected Letters and Papers (Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1981).  See especially pp. 16-143.   
 
 
39 French Ensor Chadwick, Report on the Training Systems for the Navy and Mercantile Marine of England 
and on the Naval Training System of France Made to the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, U.S. Navy 
Department, September 1879, 46th Cong., 2nd sess., 1880. 
 
40 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Secnav, 23 December 1889, 1889," Letter, RG 45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
41 The same Commander McCalla who had been Jouett’s ground forces commander in Panama in 1885.  
Apparently his disagreements with Jouett, covered in Chapter 2, did not affect his ability to gain command 
of a ship.  See Bowman Hendry McCalla, "Letter, Mccalla to Secnav, 29 December 1889, 1889," Letter, 
RG 45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
42 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Secnav, 31 December 1889, 1889," RG 45, U.S. Navy 




This was Admiral Walker’s first real opportunity to put the Squadron through its 
paces…and he was not impressed.  “The manner in which the Squadron got underway 
and took positions in column of ships”, he wrote the Secretary of the Navy, “was 
unsatisfactory, showing that much practice in Squadron tactics is required to arrive at the 
necessary promptness and accuracy in handling the individual ships…”43   By 1 January 
1890, the ships having traveled in company for the past 24 hours, he had somewhat nicer 
things to say about the day’s tactical work.44
Gherardi and the North Atlantic Squadron, 1890 
 
 
 January 1890 found Rear Admiral Gherardi still preoccupied with affairs in Haiti 
and, in the manner of a traditional warrior-diplomat, spending much more time on 
diplomatic duties than training a squadron for fleet combat.  After arriving in Port-au-
Prince on 20 December 1889, his dispatch of 29 December made it clear that he was 
predicating his personal movements and those of his squadron on the arrival of the 
French minister to Haiti, with whom he hoped to have an opportunity to meet.45
                                                 
43 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Secnav, 2 January 1890, 1890," Letter, RG 45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  This 
was curious behavior, considering the fact that President Harrison had appointed a 
minister to Haiti, Fredrick Douglass.  The resident minister should have taken care of 
meeting foreign dignitaries.  The U.S. government, it seems, had little faith in the ability 




45 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Tracy, 29 December 1889, 1889," letter, RG45, U.S. 
Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
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Admiral Gherardi to make sure events played out in such a way to favor the interests of 
the United States. 
Admiral Gherardi’s flag was now flying from the little Dolphin, fresh from her 
58,000 mile   cruise around the world on steam power alone.  Dolphin was the first of the 
ships of the “New Steel Navy” to be commissioned and, fittingly, she was assigned to the 
“Home Squadron”.  At just over 1400 tons, Dolphin was not designed for combat, but to 
do utility work and deliver messages for station commanders.  One of her secondary 
planned uses was as a flagship for a squadron commander and his staff, so Rear Admiral 
Gherardi’s relocation from Galena represented the first opportunity to put that capability 
to the test.  Her gunboat armament consisted of a single 6-inch breechloading rifle and a 
pair of 6-pounder rapid fire guns.46  Small as she was, she represented the newest 
achievement of American shipbuilding, and the very fact that an admiral’s flag was flying 
from Dolphin’s mast was a vindication of sorts for her builder, John Roach, by now dead 
for almost three years.47
Rear Admiral Gherardi did not stay on board Dolphin for long.  As the newest and 
best of his ships, he detailed her to transport Minister Douglass to Santo Domingo to 
present his credentials to the government there.  Not wanting to go himself – he was still 
anxiously monitoring the Haitian elections and the arrival of a new French minister – he 
shifted his flag to Galena on 9 January.  It is evident that none of the uneasiness about 
hosting an African-American which had marred Douglass’ original transport to Haiti 
 
                                                 
46 Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the 
Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909, 14. 
 
47 For all the trouble associated with building Dolphin and getting the Navy Department to accept her, see 
Leonard Alexander Jr. Swann, John Roach Maratime Entrepreneur:  The Years as Naval Contractor, 1862-




reared its ugly head during this mission.  Douglass’ after-action report to the Secretary of 
State was filled with praise for both the Dolphin and her crew.48
Gherardi returned to Dolphin when she arrived back in Haitian waters with 
Minister Douglass.
 
49  He then sent Kearsarge and Galena north under the command of 
the CO of the Galena, Commander Sumner, while the admiral and his flagship visited 
Havana, Cuba.  Sumner and his charges were ordered to proceed to Matanzas, then 
Havana, Cuba, then to Key West, where they were to reprovision, re-coal, and meet up 
with Yantic.  While underway, the two ships were to exercise regularly in the “School of 
the Section”, found in the Fleet Drill Book.50
Galena and Kearsarge arrived in Key West on March 5th, where they were met by 
Yantic two days later.
  Gherardi kept his ships well-drilled, but he 
was less interested in personally leading them than he was attending to political business 
on his station – namely the ongoing negotiations for a U.S. naval base at the Mole St. 
Nicholas, a desirable harbor on the north coast of Haiti.  The Mole would provide an 
excellent vantage point for the U.S. Navy to keep an eye on the Caribbean and the 
approaches to any canal that might be built across the central American isthmus.   
51
                                                 
48 Fredrick Douglass, "Letter, Douglass to Blaine, 11 February 1890, 1890," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  Yantic had been on special duty for the Bureau of Navigation.  
She pulled into Key West on March 7th with the longitude party on board.  This 
 
49 G.W. Sumner, CDR, "Letter, Sumner to Tracy, 17 February 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
50 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Sumner, 13 February 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. 
Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
51 G.W. Sumner, CDR, "Telegram, Sumner to Bureau of Navigation and Detail, 5  March 1890, 1890," 
telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, 
Washington, D.C.  G.W. Sumner, CDR, "Telegram, Sumner to Bureau of Navigation and Detail, 7  March 
1890, 1890," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-
1910, Washington, D.C. 
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expedition, under the command of Lieutenant J. A. Norris, had left the United States in 
November 1889, charged with the telegraphic determination of longitudes in the West 
Indies and on the north coast of South America.  In this day and age of GPS, it can be 
hard to remember that in the late nineteenth century there were still major portions of the 
earth that were not charted accurately.  As a rising world power, the United States 
became more and more interested in correcting these deficiencies.  The geographic points 
surveyed say something about the United States’ interests.  Their first stop was Santiago 
de Cuba, followed by St. Nicholas Mole in Haiti.  Upon arrival in Key West, the 
expedition unloaded their equipment and departed for Washington, D.C., arriving on 11 
March 1990.52  The continued presence of U.S. warships in Haitian waters caused 
problems for Minister Douglass.  Within a month of his trip on Dolphin, Douglass was 
writing his boss to complain about “speculation as to alleged designs of the United States 
upon the integrity of Haiti; speculation supported in part by the frequent appearance of 
United States  vessels of war in Haitian waters.”53
Meanwhile, the northern portion of the North Atlantic Squadron’s area of 
operations was covered by Petrel, which was assigned to the squadron in June and 
cruised through the waters off the northeast coast.  Rear Admiral Gherardi thought he 
would finally be able to gather his squadron together, without being distracted by Haitian 
politics, when he returned to Key West in March 1890.  However, within a week he was 
  This entreaty, and others like it, had 
little if any effect. 
                                                 
52 Department. 1890.  165-167.  See also G. H. Rockwell, CDR, "Letter, Rockwell to Tracy, 8 March 1890, 
1890," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, 
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summoned to Washington, D.C. to discuss the situation in Haiti.  He delayed his 
departure from Key West long enough to observe his squadron take target practice, but 
eventually was forced to leave the ships in the care of the Senior Officer Present, 
Commander Sumner, and head north.54  From there, he was forced to resort to ordering 
his squadron around by telegram.55  Per Gherardi’s orders, the squadron went to sea on 
April 10th and drilled for five days.  Noticeably absent was Yantic, whose boilers were in 
such need of repair that she could not make the speed necessary to participate in squadron 
maneuvers.  Upon Rear Admiral Gherardi’s return to Key West in April, Yantic was 
detailed to return to New York with a load of naval cadets and men whose enlistment 
terms were up.  She was eventually transferred from the North Atlantic Squadron and put 
out of commission.56
Rear Admiral Gherardi did not have to wait long for a replacement ship to arrive.  
In May Baltimore arrived in Key West and Gherardi, acting in accordance with orders 
from the Department, shifted his flag to the new steel cruiser.
   
57
                                                 
54 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Tracy, 24 March 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  She was part of the 
second generation of protected cruisers, built from plans originally drawn for the Spanish 
government that the Navy Department purchased from Cramp’s shipyards.  At 4600 tons 
and mounting a main battery of 6-inch and 8-inch breechloading rifles, she was the first 
 
55 G.W. Sumner, CDR, "Letter, Sumner to Tracy, 6 April 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 
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warship of the “New Steel Navy” to join the North Atlantic Squadron.58  With the new 
flagship in place, the training program for the summer could begin.  In keeping with the 
tradition which had been established over the last fifteen years, the squadron prepared to 
move north to conduct training during the hot and sickly summer months.  Before 
departing Key West, a naval brigade of 350 men was put ashore, commanded by the 
executive officer of the Kearsarge, for practice in landings and naval infantry operations 
ashore.59
While the squadron trained, Rear Admiral Gherardi continued to be more 
concerned about conditions in Haiti.  On 3 May 1890, he dispatched Kearsarge to run 
down to Port-au-Prince and “inquire about the condition of affairs in Haiti.”
 
60  Political 
affairs by all rights should have been left to the representative of the State Department, 
while Gherardi concerned himself with the training of his combat unit.  However, in 
keeping with the traditional role of naval officers as warrior-diplomats, Gherardi clearly 
felt that it was within his rights to inject his squadron’s warships into Haitian politics.  
This slight did not go unnoticed by Minister Douglass, who complained in a letter to 
Secretary of State Blaine that “the presence of one of our national vessels in these waters 
is apt to attract general attention and to awaken curiosity and speculation.”61
                                                 
58 Excluding Dolphin, which was not designed to be a “warship” in the best sense of the word. 
  Left unsaid 
(but clearly intended) was the observation that the captain of the Kearsarge was 
encroaching on his area of responsibility.   
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Fortunately, Kearsarge returned to Key West on 15 May with news that all was 
quiet in Haiti.  Thus assured, Rear Admiral Gherardi was able to at last continue with his 
summer training program.  The squadron sailed from Key West, proceeding to 
Charleston, South Carolina, where they paused off the coast of Jacksonville, Florida for 
target practice on 28 May.62  The target practice session featured the use of the new Fiske 
rangefinder, which had just been installed in Baltimore.  Baltimore fired her guns on both 
sides, steaming in large circles around a stationary target at ranges between 800 and 2000 
yards.  The rangefinder’s inventor, as well as Baltimore’s officers, were very pleased 
with the results.  A 75% hit rate with the main battery was reported in the press; 
unprecedented if not entirely believable numbers.63
After stopping in at Port Royal, the squadron visited the port of Charleston from 
5-8 June 1890.  The four ships traveled in company, practicing tactical maneuvers along 
the way.  From all evidence, this was the only practice of steam tactics undertaken by the 
squadron in 1890.  After the Charleston port visit, the squadron proceeded to Portland 
Maine for a reunion of the Society of the Army of the Republic in July.  In August 
President Harrison embarked on Baltimore for a trip to Boston, where the Grand Army of 
the Republic held a reunion.  In company with Baltimore was her sister ship 
Philadelphia, recently put in commission from the Cramp shipyards in her namesake city, 
   The quality of U.S. gunnery seemed 
to be improving. 
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Philadelphia.  Officially designated Cruiser No. 4, she was a sister ship to Baltimore, 
sharing nearly the same hull and machinery but having a slightly different armament 
arrangement.64  When the two ships returned to New York, Rear Admiral Gherardi 
shifted his flag to Philadelphia, and Baltimore was assigned special duty from the Bureau 
of Navigation.  She was tasked with returning the remains of Captain John Ericsson from 
New York to Stockholm, Sweden.65  Of the remaining ships of the squadron: 
Philadelphia, Petrel, Enterprise, Dolphin, and the newly-commissioned Vesuvius were 
together in New York, while Kearsarge was away on special assignment.66
In September, Rear Admiral Gherardi detailed Kearsarge to proceed to Colón
  Without a 
doubt, much of the participation of the squadron in various commemorations throughout 
1890 was done with an eye to showing the new Baltimore to a public supportive of 
continued expenditures on new ships. 
67, 
on the Isthmus of Panama, to “see that American interests [were] properly protected.”68
                                                 
64 Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the 
Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909, 26. 
  
Her captain was Commander Horace Elmer.  Once a young lieutenant onboard Colorado 
during the Key West exercises of 1874, he was now a commander with his own ship – 
but still sailing alone to carry out national policy abroad.  Upon arrival in Colón, Elmer 
found the situation quiet.  In accordance with his orders from Rear Admiral Gherardi, he 
got underway on 22 September for Greytown, promising to return by 1 October.  The 
65 Department. 1890. 
 
66 "Of Naval Interest," New York Times (1857-1922), Oct 17 1890. 
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U.S. consul and the superintendent of the Panama Rail Road had asked for Kearsarge’s 
presence on that date which, presumably, was a payday which might result in drunken 
unrest among the laborers in Colón.69  Trouble came sooner than that.  No sooner had 
Kearsarge got underway than a massive fire broke out downtown, burning most of the 
business district to the ground.  The U.S. consul cabled frantically to Washington, D.C., 
begging for the return of the U.S. warship.  Upon his arrival in Greytown, Elmer received 
a cable from the Secretary of the Navy directing him to return to Colón, which he did at 
once.  It turned out that the fire was accidental, and not the result of labor unrest, but that 
did little to stop Elmer from offering his less-than-complementary observations about the 
citizens of the city.  “With a city built of such material [wood frame buildings], 
warehouses full of such inflammable stores [liquor], a lazy idle and careless population, 
no efficient fire department, the first accidental fire was almost sure to result in its 
destruction.”  He proceeded in another report to blame the unrest of unemployed laborers 
in the city on “Jamaica negroes, ignorant, vicious, and troublesome.”70
Across the Caribbean, Minister Douglass was still under fire.  In October, the 
State and Navy Departments received a flurry of letters from William P. Clyde, owner of 
a steamship line that stood to profit greatly from concessions if the United States 
successfully gained access to the Mole St. Nicholas.  Apparently, the French were 
moving in on his business interests and Clyde felt that Minister Douglass was not doing 
enough about it.  He was none too subtle in essentially calling Douglass incompetent.  
   
                                                 
69 Horace Elmer, CDR, "Letter, Elmer to Tracy, 22 September 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
70 Horace Elmer, CDR, "Letter, Elmer to Tracy, 4 October 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Horace Elmer, CDR, 
"Letter, Elmer to Tracy, 24 October 1890, 1890," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
172 
 
“…after Admiral Gherardi left Haiti”, according to Clyde’s missive, “these people took 
advantage of Mr. Douglas’s (sic) sympathy for the African Race and his lack of 
familiarity with the language and perhaps of diplomatic affairs to delay the carrying out 
of their pledges made to Admiral Gherardi as representing the United States 
government.”71
Enterprise joined the squadron in New York in November, and was promptly sent 
to Colón to relieve Kearsarge, which returned to Key West.  Commander Converse 
reported things in Colón quiet, to the extent that, by December, his presence there was no 
longer deemed necessary, and Enterprise left Colón.
  Despite his pleadings, Gherardi remained in New York and continued to 
plan for the squadron’s winter activities.   
72  Later that month, Rear Admiral 
Gherardi released his winter plans for the squadron, which were eagerly reported on by 
the New York papers.  The North Atlantic Squadron was to carry out independent 
cruising throughout the West Indies before rendezvousing at Key West in March 1891 for 
tactical exercises.73  This was very much in keeping with the operation cycle of winter 
cruises in the Caribbean followed by work in company in northern latitudes in the 
summer, that had been established for the squadron over the past decade.  The New York 
Times congratulated Rear Admiral Gherardi on his extensive plans for training in 1891, 
calling him “one of the most progressive officers in the navy.”74
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  It was curious praise, 
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since the same paper in January had compared him unfavorably with the recently-retired 
Stephen B. Luce, calling him a partisan of the “old school” and noting that fewer 
exercises and naval battalion landings had taken place under his leadership.75
Walker and the Squadron of Evolution, 1890 
  In fairness 
to Gherardi, the operations of the North Atlantic Squadron in 1890 show evidence of an 
organization in transition, exhibiting two different identities.  The Squadron now 
consisted of two steel ships, Baltimore and Dolphin, and two old wooden cruisers, 
Kearsarge and Galena.  On the whole, it spent very little time conducting tactical 
exercises in 1890, yet the Squadron steamed in formation regularly and made portcalls 
together.   
  
From 17-20 January, the Squadron of Evolution called at Cartagena, Spain, 
having first stopped at Gibraltar.  Diplomatically, this was an important visit, as the 
situation in Cuba and the events of the 1870’s were not far from anyone’s mind.  The 
Spanish authorities took great pains to show the American officers their facilities and 
warships under construction.  The American delegation also toured the torpedo factory 
and school.  In turn, Admiral Walker hosted a delegation of Spanish officers aboard the 
four ships of the Squadron of Evolution, where they expressed, in the words of the vice 
consul, “their favorable opinions regarding the handsome construction, clean state, and 
the latest sea and war improvements and perfect order of the four ships.”76
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 From Cartagena, the squadron moved on to Port Mahon, Menorca, then Toulon 
and Villefranche, France, and finally to Spezia, Italy, arriving there on 3 March 1890.  
Here, Walker sent off a long letter to the Secretary of the Navy, outlining an altercation 
he had had with Captain Howell of the Atlanta.  Captain Howell had allegedly not paid 
enough attention to the position of his ship in the squadron’s formation, and eventually 
Walker – after repeated signals to Atlanta to improve her station-keeping – relieved 
Howell.  This action provoked a long letter of protest from Howell to the Secretary of the 
Navy, which Walker endorsed and forwarded with his explanation of the circumstances.  
In his words: "The Atlanta has repeatedly been very badly handled, not apparently 
through lack of seamanlike skill and judgment on the part of her commanding officer, but 
rather from an indifference to the tactical precision and appearance of the squadron and to 
the necessity for prompt and literal obedience to signals."  Here we can see the clash of 
the old navy and the new.  An officer of the old guard, brought up under the old standards 
of professionalism, simply did not attach any importance to station keeping.  They were 
used to being the master of their own vessel, reporting to the commodore for 
administrative matters, and occasionally sailing about somewhere in the vicinity of the 
commodore’s ship, but not keeping a tight station at high speed.  Walker noted that 
Howell “does not seem to appreciate the military requirement of his duty as the 
commanding officer of a cruiser in a tactical squadron, and for the present service this 
appreciation is an officer's highest quality (my italics).”77
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Secretary of the Navy that, “The ships were much better handled, and the maneuvers 
were more satisfactory than ever before, showing that experience only is required to 
make the exercises all that is to be wished.”78
 Admiral Walker was looking for good weather, which the Adriatic had not 
provided, so he next took the Squadron further down the Mediterranean, calling at Corfu, 
Greece.  The cruise of these four ships represented a sharp change from previous 
deployments.  Dispatches from squadron commodores in previous years had mostly 
centered on the diplomatic and business functions of the U.S. naval mission.  
Commodores talked about the individual movement of ships, the ports they had spent 
time in, and how they had exchanged courtesies with the local authorities.  Walker’s 
dispatches contain those elements as well, but they also have a new focus: his perceived 
mission to train his squadron.  Walker chose to take the Squadron to Corfu not because 
the consul had requested it or because American business interests were at risk, but 
because Corfu presented the best opportunities for the Squadron to hold target practice 
and conduct landing exercises.
 
79  In fact, although the consul to Greece desperately tried 
to get the Squadron to call at Piraeus (near Athens) so that the King of Greece could 
inspect the ships and host the officers, Walker declined the invitation, giving the excuse 
that duty required him to concentrate on taking advantage of Corfu’s facilities for training 
the squadron.80
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Upon leaving Corfu, the Squadron was split up briefly.  Boston and Atlanta 
proceeded to Messina where they were docked and their bottoms were carefully inspected 
and cleaned.  Chicago and Yorktown went straight to Malta, arriving on 17 April.  The 
other two ships rejoined them a few days later.  In Malta there came another sign of the 
modernization of naval organization, and another change in the conception of the use of 
concentrated naval forces as national instrument of power.  A telegram arrived for 
Admiral Walker on 28 April instructing him to keep his squadron in the Mediterranean 
until further notice.  Walker had no way of knowing that the desire of the Secretary of the 
Navy to keep the squadron together and ready to respond as a unit had to do with the 
political situation in Brazil at the time.  What he did know was that he had over a hundred 
men whose term of enlistment was drawing to a close.  An extension on deployment of 
unknown duration would raise difficulties with these sailors.  Additionally, the 
Squadron’s stores had been purchased with the intent of returning to the United States in 
June.  Additional time at sea would require the purchase of additional supplies, and 
Admiral Walker wrote to the Secretary of the Navy requesting information on the nature 
of their orders to remain in the Mediterranean.81
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showing the flag and protecting business interests to being a display of national ability to 
project combat power.82
 Walker departed Malta two days after the telegram arrived and headed to Algiers.  
There, another telegram was waiting for him informing him that the Squadron was to 
prepare for deployment to the coast of Brazil.  He left Algiers and proceeded to Gibraltar, 
where he procured the supplies he felt necessary to carry out the orders.  In his 
acknowledgement of his orders, Walker could not help pointing out that, had he been 
privy to the Department’s intentions, he could have focused more on the material 
condition of his ships, making sure that they were ready for a cruise of uncertain duration 
to South America.  As it was, Walker wanted to make sure that the Secretary of the Navy 
understood that “I have placed before all other considerations not absolutely imperative, 
the training and tactical work of the Squadron of Evolution.”
 
83
 Once provisioned, the Squadron left Gibraltar and touched at Tangier for one day, 
a quick reversion to the old navy practice of “showing the flag” in support of the new 
U.S. consul.  They then proceeded to Madeira, arriving on 30 May 1890.  Admiral 
Walker took advantage of the stop at Madeira to send another report to the Secretary of 
the Navy, bemoaning at length the fact that  he had not been informed about the 
  Perhaps Walker was 
simply hedging his bets in case there was a mechanical problem with one of his ships 
later, but his remarks still show a change in the conception of what the deployment of 
U.S. naval assets overseas should accomplish.  Walker felt that it was his job to produce a 
combat-trained unit.  Conducting diplomacy was secondary. 
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Department’s intentions for his squadron.  Walker went so far as to intimate that the 
Department did not trust him with sensitive information, in spite of his over forty years of 
faithful service.84  After touching at Porto Grande, St. Vincent, Cape de Verde to 
communicate again with the Department, Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago headed for 
Brazil, while French Chadwick and the little Yorktown were sent to New York with the 




The Two Squadrons Collide, 1891 
 
By 3 January 1891, Philadelphia was ready to put to sea to lead the squadron in 
Rear Admiral Gherardi’s 1891 plans, but unfortunately the admiral was not ready.  His 
wife’s serious illness required him to ask for a delay in getting underway, which was 
granted.86  Dolphin was at New York with Philadelphia, and would get underway with 
her in January.  The “dynamite cruiser” Vesuvius was at New York as well, although she 
was still conducting tests on her pneumatic guns and was not expected to be employed as 
a cruising vessel with the squadron.87
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  Kearsarge was at Norfolk; Gherardi ordered her to 
get underway and meet him in Port-au-Prince.  Commander Elmer pointed out to the 
admiral that the amount of work necessary for Kearsarge would prevent her from getting 
 
85 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Secnav, 6 June 1890, 1890," Letter, RG 45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
86 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Telegram, Gherardi to Ramsey, 3  January 1891, 1891," telegram, RG45, 
U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 




underway as quickly as the admiral would have liked, but promised to meet him in Port-
au-Prince as soon as possible.88  Petrel was already in the West Indies, under orders to 
arrive at Port-au-Prince not later than 25 January.89
Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi embarked in his new flagship was finally able to 
leave New York on 17 January.
  Enterprise was at Colón, Columbia.  
It was a pivotal year in the evolving identity of the North Atlantic Squadron.  In 1891, old 
ships worked alongside ships of the “New Steel Navy.”  Old deployment patterns and 
assumptions about responsibilities operated, at times spectacularly unsuccessfully, 
alongside new paradigms of squadron deployment and unit identity.  At the center of that 
transition was an incident which took place in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, which drove to the 
heart of the question of the organizational identity of the two naval units simultaneously 
occupying the same geographical space.   
90  He headed straight to Haiti to continue negotiating his 
government’s earnest desire to have a naval base there.  Upon his arrival on 25 January, 
he found Petrel waiting for him.91
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warship.  The venerable Kearsarge joined the squadron on 5 February.92
The negotiations soon ran into a snag, as it was discovered that Rear Admiral 
Gherardi’s commission had been signed by the Secretary of the Navy, and not the 
President.  For the Haitian officials, this would not do.  They refused to talk further until 
a commission was delivered bearing the signature of President Harrison.
  Rear Admiral 
Gherardi was under orders to treat with President Hyppolite of Haiti for the cession of the 
Mole St. Nicholas.  
93
Gherardi had asked for his special commission to be delivered by the Clyde 
steamer due in Port-au-Prince later that month, but the powers that be decided that it 
would be useful to have some more U.S. warships to provide a backdrop for the 
negotiations, and dispatched Acting Rear Admiral John G. Walker’s Squadron of 
Evolution to personally deliver the commission.
  Gherardi had 
assumed that his position as an admiral in the United States Navy would provide enough 
diplomatic power to negotiate for a naval base, but finding that it did not, he took it upon 
himself to write home for a presidential commission.  Rather than training his squadron 
for combat, Rear Admiral Gherardi was acting the part of a warrior-diplomat of the “old” 
navy.   
94
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From the start, the mission got off on the wrong foot with Acting Rear Admiral 
Walker.  As usual, he was not given enough information far enough in advance about the 
Department’s wishes.  When his orders (and presumably, Rear Admiral Gherardi’s 
special commission) arrived at Key West by registered mail on 13 April, the complaints 
started immediately.  “If sent by open mail, I should have received them on the 10th, and 
if I had had any intimation of the duty required of me…the Squadron could have gone to 
sea on the morning of the 11th.  I shall now have considerable difficulty (my italics) in 
getting to sea on the 15th.95  For someone who was probably the most modern-thinking 
flag officer in terms of viewing his squadron as a single combat entity, Walker had a 
surprising amount of difficulty with urgent orders sent to him by telegram.  As promised, 
he got underway on 15 April with Chicago, Boston, and Yorktown – Atlanta remaining 
behind in Key West to have work done on her bottom.   He arrived with his squadron in 
Port-au-Prince on 18 April 1891.96
The three white-painted steel ships steamed into the harbor and dropped anchor a 
mere three hundred yards from Rear Admiral Gherardi’s flagship, without asking 
permission – a striking breach of both regulations and naval etiquette.
  
97
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other hand, first-person accounts in print tend to have been cleaned up for publication.  In 
any case, Rear Admiral Walker was summoned aboard Philadelphia, where Rear 
Admiral Gherardi pointed out to him in no uncertain terms that he was the senior officer 
present afloat (SOPA), that Acting Rear Admiral Walker was junior to him, and that it 
was expected that Walker’s squadron would obey all signals from the North Atlantic 
Squadron flagship.98
It was a clash of the old school and the new.  Walker felt that his squadron owed 
allegiance to no one but its commander, and that its commander owed allegiance to no 
one but the Secretary of the Navy.  It was not the first time Walker had run into trouble 
on this point.  He had had several arguments with various navy yard commandants prior 
to leaving for his European cruise, as well as with the Navy Department over making 
personnel decisions for ships in his squadron without consulting him.
   
99
Captain Beach Sr.’s memoirs relate that the two officers ended up having a drink 
in Gherardi’s cabin and came out all smiles, the incident behind them.
  It is unlikely that 
an officer as aware of his prerogatives as squadron commander as Walker was would not 
have been completely aware of the way in which he was snubbing Rear Admiral 
Gherardi. 
100
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for a week – for reasons Gherardi did not care to share with Walker.  “I was detained 
there by Rear Admiral Gherardi,” fulminated Walker in his report, “acting under the 
authority of the Navy Department, until 2:30 PM of the 24th instant, at which time I sailed 
for this port [Norfolk].”101
Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Gherardi and his squadron remained indefinitely in the 
Caribbean.  This caused some concern about the possibility of an outbreak of yellow 
fever, which was one of the major reasons the Navy Department preferred to schedule 
cruises to the Caribbean in the winter months and exercises in the north in the summer.  
Unfortunately for Department planners, political situations did not keep as healthy a 
calendar.  Gherardi was preoccupied now not only with the situation in Haiti but another 
tasking as well, this time directly from the President of the United States.
  Over the course of the next year, the two squadrons would ply 
the waters off the east coast of the United States, carefully staying away from each other, 
to avoid any more questions of seniority.   
102
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  President 
Harrison had received a letter from an African-American laborer from Washington, D.C. 
who was working for the Navassa Island Phosphate Company.  Fred Carter felt that he 
was being treated unjustly and had been held on the island past the expiration of his 
contract.  From the tiny island off the coast of Haiti, Carter took it upon himself to write 
the President of the United States to plead his case.  President Harrison, in turn, wrote the 
Secretary of the Navy saying, with a hint of understatement, “I do not intend that any 
 




system of slavery shall be maintained upon that island.”  He went on to ask that the 
Secretary have Rear Admiral Gherardi look into the matter.103
While the literature on military involvement in labor unrest mostly centers on the 
mainland use of the Army and National Guard
 
104, as we have seen in previous chapters it 
was not unusual for the Navy to become involved as well.  Here, the Navy was involved 
in a labor dispute overseas, and once again, Rear Admiral Gherardi was occupied doing 
something other than training his squadron for war.  Commander Elmer was ordered to 
take Kearsarge and proceed to Navassa Island.  In his written orders to Elmer, Gherardi 
instructed him to “Be pleased to make your report direct to the Secretary of the Navy, 
sending a copy to the Commander-in-Chief.”105
                                                 
103 Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, "Letter, Harrison to Tracy, 10 April 1891, 1891," 
RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C.  
The North Atlantic Squadron had checked out the conditions on Navassa before, when Rear Admiral 
Cooper detailed a ship to inspect labor concerns about the phosphate operations in 1882.   
  This short sentence reveals a telling 
difference between Admirals Gherardi and Walker, and their different conceptions of the 
identity of the units they commanded.  The historian would be hard pressed to find any 
communication from Rear Admiral Walker directing any of his ships to do anything 
without his direct involvement – especially reporting to higher-ups.  Indeed, when his 
ships are detached by the Department for one reason or another, there is typically an 
immediate complaint from him in the correspondence.  Gherardi, on the other hand, was 
used to dispatching units of his force on independent duty, and saw his role as 
commander-in-chief as one of administratively facilitating these deployments.  He was 
not threatened by having one of his captains correspond with the Secretary of the Navy. 
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105 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Elmer, 27 April 1891, 1891," orders, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
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Elmer departed Port-au-Prince on 28 April and arrived at Navassa Island the next 
day.  There he met with Fred Carter, as well as a very relieved Mr. Everett, the 
superintendent in charge of operations on the island.  He found that out of a total labor 
force of 189 workers, 140 refused to do any work whatsoever.  In consultation with Mr. 
Everett, it was decided that it was best that these disaffected workers be removed from 
the island as quickly as possible by a company steamer.  To facilitate this, Elmer 
transported one of the company officers to Jamaica where he would be able to book 
passage on a steamer back to the United States in order to make arrangements.  
Meanwhile, Elmer deployed his Marine guard to maintain order.  After a meeting 
with the strikers in which he heard their grievances, he appointed a board of officers to 
investigate and document the workers’ allegations, but he informed them in no uncertain 
terms that “if they attempted to carry out any of the threats they had made against the 
men who continued work…or in any way to disturb the peace and order of the Island, I 
would suppress them by force of arms.”106  Elmer asked for and received a request in 
writing from Superintendent Everett for the Marines, evidently wanting to be able to 
show the Navy Department that the use of armed force was not simply his idea but had 
been requested by an American citizen in fear for his life and property.107
The situation took a little over a month to resolve, with the arrival of Navassa 
Island Phosphate Company ships to bring fresh provisions and take the dissatisfied 
workers and those whose contracts had expired back to the mainland.  In his final report, 
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Commander Elmer praised the conduct of his Marine guard, noting that “the value of 
such a body of men on board ship is well illustrated by this case.”108  With that, 
Kearsarge weighed anchor and returned to New York, stopping through Key West for 
mail and resupply.109
Meanwhile, the collapse of talks with the Hyppolite government on 22 May 1891 
showed, not for the last time, the shortcomings of “gunboat diplomacy.”  The proud 
Haitian government in the end simply told Gherardi and Douglass that they were not 
interested in ceding any of their land to the United States and the Harrison Administration 
was left with the option of taking the Mole St. Nicholas by force or leaving.  Unwilling to 
attack Haiti, (and thereby risk alienating the African-American vote which had been 
instrumental in catapulting him into the presidency in 1888), the Republican Harrison 
was forced to take hat in hand and depart Port-au-Prince quietly.  Minister Douglass 
resigned over the incident, remaining loyal to Harrison and assigning most of the blame 
to Blaine.  The ham-handed attempts by Blaine, Tracy, and Gherardi to circumvent 




On his way back to the United States, Gherardi in Philadelphia stopped through 
Santo Domingo, where he met with President Heureaux and discussed the possibility of 
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leasing the Samana Bay property that President Grant had been interested in twenty years 
previously.111  Although President Heureaux was willing, his people were not, and 
nothing further came of the initiative.  The North Atlantic Squadron finally returned to 
New York on 16 May.  On the way home, Rear Admiral Gherardi’s flag lieutenant, 
Lieutenant Allen G. Paul died of what the papers called “brain fever,” brought on by the 
excessive heat of Haiti’s climate.112  It was one final disappointing note to end what had 
been a professionally unrewarding cruise.113
With both squadrons now temporarily back in the states, one of the sillier naval 
episodes of the 1890’s got into full swing: the wild machinations to ensure that the two 
admirals would not have to come in contact with each other.  Walker’s Squadron of 
Evolution was at Norfolk, refitting and having maintenance done.  Gherardi’s ships, with 
the exception of Kearsarge, which was finishing up its business at Navassa Island, and 
Vesuvius, which was at Norfolk, were at the Navy Yard at New York.  It was well-known 
that Walker wanted Gherardi’s job, and equally well-known that Gherardi had no 
intention of leaving his commander-in-chief billet until his prescribed tour was up.
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Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  
While newspapers and seapower enthusiasts stirred up excitement about the possibility of 
combined-squadron fleet operations, both admirals demurred.  Walker, who was in no 
 
112 Probably either meningitis or encephalitis –both viral and neither caused by the climate.  In any event, 
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hurry to subordinate his forces to Gherardi again, let the Army and Navy Journal know 
that he “[did] not think that there will be any joint maneuvers on the sound this 
summer.”115
What Walker was up to was summer maneuvers of his own.  Characteristically, 
he knew how to make a media event of it.  On the first of July, Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, 
Yorktown, and Newark got underway for Norfolk, headed to Boston for the Forth of July 
celebration.  Chicago had engine problems immediately upon getting underway, so 
Walker transferred his flag to Newark, as they were on a schedule to be in Boston in time 
for the Forth.
 
116  Newark was one of the Navy’s newest ships, having been completed 
earlier that year.  She was the first of the so-called “second generation cruisers” to be 
authorized by Congress, but the last to be completed due to complications during the 
design phase.117  Improvements over the “ABCD” cruisers included triple-expansion 
engines, an increased steel protective deck, and better auxiliary machinery.  She was 
well-armed for a cruiser, with a main battery of 12 6-inch breechloading rifles, all 
mounted on the gundeck.118
Arrival in Boston was a gala affair and, again, Walker knew exactly how to get 
the most from an event.  After the full-dress recognitions of the Forth of July holiday, 5 
July was designated as a general visiting day.  Thousands flocked to see the ships of the 
White Squadron.  On 6 July, official visits were exchanged with the governor of 
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Massachusetts.  One reporter noted that the state flag of Massachusetts flew from the 
foremast of Newark while honors were being rendered to the governor, testament to 
Walker’s attention to the details of public relations.119
Another ground-breaking event for the Squadron of Evolution was the 
embarkation of Massachusetts’ battalion of naval militia for training and joint maneuvers.  
The militia members were drilled at the great guns and secondary battery.  Subsequently, 
the Squadron got underway for live fire exercises which were witnessed by the Governor 
of Massachusetts, embarked with Rear Admiral Walker on board Newark.  That night, 
members of the militia in small boats armed with simulated spar/attachable torpedoes 
made attacks on Newark, Boston, and Atlanta, which were simulating enemy ships in 
Boston Harbor.  Newspapers credited the naval militia with successful attacks on two of 
the three ships. Walker in his official report brushed off these claims, simply saying that 
“the attack, in all cases, had failed.”  The culmination of the exercises came on Friday, 
with a landing exercise on Deer Island.  The sailors of the Squadron of Evolution formed 
one battalion, under the command of Commander French Endsor Chadwick, while the 
naval militiamen formed another.  Together, the two attacked a strongpoint on the island 
held by the Squadron’s Marines.  After a series of balls and dinners the following day, the 
Squadron sailed for New York.  Two weeks later, the Squadron repeated almost the exact 
same schedule of events with the naval militia of New York, conducting landing 
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exercises on Fisher’s Island off the coast of Connecticut.  Again there were combined 
landings and naval infantry exercises, boat races, dinners, and celebratory parades.120
In all, Rear Admiral Walker predictably claimed success.  “I regard the week 
spent in Boston as extremely interesting and valuable; instructive to the naval volunteers 
and encouraging to the officers and men of the regular service.”  In retrospect, the 
exercises probably did more to boost popular support for the New Steel Navy than make 
any actual preparations for a national emergency.  The idea of militiamen piloting small 
boats with spar torpedoes to attach to enemy battleships (swinging quietly at anchor, no 
less) was laughable.  However, the idea of having a trained core of civilians to man the 
ships the nation would have to produce in the event of a war had taken hold.  “If war 
were to break out,” remarked Rear Admiral Walker at a reception given for the Squadron 
in New London, Connecticut, “the great and pressing question at once arising would be 
as to the manning of our ships…The Naval Reserve is a great need…”
  
121
Spending only a couple of weeks in New York, the Squadron of Evolution got 
underway on 12 August to cruise along the coast of New England.  On board were 
several members of the Senate Naval Committee.  Since the Boston/Fisher Island 
exercises, new ships had been added to the Squadron.  Bennington and Concord were 
sister ships of Yorktown: 1700 ton gunboats mounted six 6-inch breechloading rifles and 
had hull openings for six torpedo tubes, although self-propelled torpedoes were not 
introduced into fleet use until 1894.  These gunboats were often criticized for not packing 
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enough firepower or protection to be effective fighters, but they proved to be the 
workhorses of the new steel navy – the “steam sloops” of the 1890’s.122  Thus enlarged, 
the Squadron made its way up the coast, stopping at Newport, Boston, Bar Harbor, and 
New London, Connecticut.  Everywhere along the way, the Squadron’s officers 
socialized with prominent citizens and were feted at dinners and balls.  These events, 
while undoubtedly good for public opinion of the Navy (not that the citizens of New 
England ever had any trouble supporting a navy), also added fuel to the intense dislike 
that many both in and out of the Navy felt for John Grimes Walker.  About this time, the 
New York Times began a series of articles exposing Walker’s “pull” within the Navy 
Department and lamenting his cruises up and down the east coast, entertaining and being 
entertained, while others did the daily work of overseas cruising.123
Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Gherardi’s North Atlantic Squadron, without dinner 
parties or senators aboard, slipped quietly from New York up to Bar Harbor, Maine, for 
exercises and target practice.  As the Squadron of Evolution had grown, the North 
Atlantic Squadron had dwindled down, now comprising three ships – Philadelphia, 
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quickly as Walker arrived with his Squadron of Evolution (and various senators).125  
Upon completion of their cruise to the north, the North Atlantic Squadron returned to 
New York, where Rear Admiral Gherardi busied himself making plans for winter 
operations in the Caribbean.126
This may explain why the Department turned to Rear Admiral Walker’s Squadron 
of Evolution for the next political crisis, which occurred later in the year with Chile.  
There, a civil war was underway pitting incumbent president J. M. Balmaceda and the 
Chilean Army against the Chilean Congress and Navy, headed by Captain Jorge Montt.  
The Congressional forces under Montt eventually prevailed and by October 1891 it 
appeared for a while that the situation was going to quiet down.  Things were calm 
enough for the commanding officer of Baltimore, the hapless Captain Winfield Scott 
Schley, to make what can only be referred to in the kindest possible terms as an ill-
considered decision to send his sailors into Valparaiso for liberty.
  Gherardi’s attention continued to focus on the Caribbean, 
and when his three warships sailed in November, they sailed separately and to different 
ports in the Caribbean.  For the North Atlantic Squadron, operations in company were 
something that was done at a particular time of year for training purposes.  The mission 
of the Squadron and its commander-in-chief continued to be traditional cruising duty. 
127
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  Predictably, 
violence broke out.  In the resulting brawl, the Chilean police stood idly by while two 
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sailors were killed and several others injured.  Eventually, the police dealt with the 
situation by arresting the Americans.   
Feelings ran hot in the United States, and when President Harrison went to 
Congress asking for a declaration of war, Tracy’s Navy Department made immediate 
preparations.128  In addition to forces in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Walker’s Squadron of 
Evolution was dispatched from Hampton Roads on the 3rd of December with orders to 
proceed to Montevideo.  As Walker stopped in the Caribbean for coal and fresh water, he 
reacted typically when encouraged by Navy Department telegram to hurry to 
Montevideo.  “The Department can reasonably believe that I have some knowledge of my 
profession, and as much interest in doing my duty efficiently as the Department can 
possibly have.”129  While he was at it, he made sure to mention that the Department had 
changed out many of his officers and men, and that his engineering department was green 
and “more or less inefficiency in the Engineers’ force and in waste of both coal and water 
for steaming purposes.”130
The plan was to gather the forces of both the North Atlantic Squadron and the 
Squadron of Evolution at Montevideo, where the Department had bought a large 
stockpile of coal, and launch the combined forces of the two squadrons, under the 
leadership of Rear Admiral Gherardi, to attack Valparaiso.
   
131
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Rear Admiral Walker would have responded to being placed in a subordinate position 
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under Rear Admiral Gherardi.  Fortunately for both U.S. foreign policy and the Navy’s 
relationships among their senior admirals, the fleet concentration never took place, as the 
Chilean government balked at the idea of war with the United States and capitulated to 
U.S. demands in January 1892. 
Conclusions 
 
          In the previous chapter, we followed the North Atlantic Squadron as its identity 
began to slowly transition from an administrative organization to a combat unit.  While 
exercises became more commonplace and the ships of the squadron quantitatively spent 
more time in company than they had in the previous decade, the focus of the North 
Atlantic Squadron continued to be traditional cruising, protection of U.S. commerce, and 
“showing the flag.”  This observation is confirmed by analyzing the operational 
movements of the North Atlantic Squadron and comparing them with those of a second 
squadron constituted in the home waters in 1889: the Squadron of Evolution.  The 
Squadron of Evolution embodied everything the North Atlantic Squadron was still in the 
process of transitioning towards.  Without ties to a specific geographic region and the 
political and diplomatic baggage such ties brought, the Squadron of Evolution was free to 
focus on what its commander repeatedly referred to in his correspondence as its primary 
duty: training together to operate as a combat unit.  This focus resulted in a unit with an 
organizational identity that had as yet not been seen in the United States Navy.  It was not 
the first time that the Navy had deployed its warships organized as a squadron; some of 
these had even developed a protean sense of organizational identity, such as “Preble’s 
Boys” in the Mediterranean during the Barbary Wars, but none had been as consistently 




          The North Atlantic Squadron, on the other hand, although it had made great strides 
in operating as a single unit since the 1870’s, still focused largely on solving foreign 
policy problems for the Secretary of State.  For all the evidence that Rear Admiral 
Gherardi took pains to exercise his squadron at naval tactics under steam, there is more 
that suggests that he was largely preoccupied with political matters, such as the fact that 
he was frequently called away from his squadron to Washington, D.C. for consultations.  
The alleged ineffectiveness of the U.S. Minister to Haiti, Fredrick Douglass meant that 
the State Department relied heavily on the admiral to carry out its policies on the island 
of Hispaniola. 
  When its commander wanted to report its presence somewhere in the 
world, he sent a telegram that said simply: “squadron.”  Everyone in the Navy 
Department knew what that meant – that all four ships of the Squadron of Evolution had 
arrived.  Those telegrams might be the best evidence of the development of the Squadron 
of Evolution’s organizational identity. 
Sadly, the relationship between the two squadron commanders precluded 
initiatives to exercise as a fleet.  Perhaps it was inevitable that the two would clash, as 
they were part of a Navy whose command structure was largely unchanged since the 
1840’s. The personal bickering and habitual comparing of lineal numbers and privileges 
that had plagued the officer corps since the War of 1812 was still very much alive in the 
1890’s.133
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of a modern fleet, and the friction between the two squadrons in the summer of 1891 was 
proof of this.  The Army and Navy Journal saw the need for better organization in 1891, 
writing in an editorial that:  “We should like to see some definite programme adopted for 
the use of the vessels of the American Navy which, in point of numbers, is growing daily, 
for its efficiency will continue to be seriously impaired until the officials cease working 
in the dark and adopt a definite naval policy.134
Naval strength has become at this day the right hand of diplomacy, and the most 
important element in large and critical foreign relations…I would propose, 
therefore, as one of the first steps towards such an international attitude as it 
seems to me our country should assume, and having assumed maintain, that a 
naval force should be created that should leave us nothing to fear from collision 
with any other naval power in the world.
  In his 1889 address to the Phi Beta 





Service in this new navy, which the nation increasingly intended to operate as an overt 
instrument of power, meant not traditional cruising activities, but the deployment of an 
instrument of national power – a squadron.  As Assistant Navy Secretary James Soley put 
it in 1891:   
The old theory of squadron-cruising, in accordance with which a large force was 
maintained upon each of several foreign stations, where it lay for a great part of 
the time in port, and during the remainder cruised aimlessly about, is a thing of 
the past.  Some force undoubtedly must continue to be maintained at certain 
points at all times, but the true place for a naval force in time of peace is in the 
waters that wash the shores of its own country.  It is here that it should gain the 
practice that will enable it successfully to defend those shores when they are 
attacked.136
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Whatever one thinks of the methods of Acting Rear Admiral John Grimes Walker, the 
Squadron of Evolution represented the future.  While many government officials and 
naval officers pressed for this change in identity, the day-to-day operations of the North 
Atlantic Squadron over the next few years would demonstrate the fact that this change 
was happening very gradually. 
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Chapter 4: The Limits of Ad-hoc Crisis Response, 1892 – 1894 
 
 
 The Navy Department wanted to develop the ability of its officers and ships to 
fight in formation.  Despite attempts throughout the 1880’s and early 1890’s to exercise 
the warships of the North Atlantic Squadron at fleet tactics under steam, the Squadron 
had not yet developed a coherent identity.  Contingency operations required the 
deployment of single warships from the Squadron to safeguard overseas U.S. business 
interests, interfering with the ability of the Squadron to develop a multi-ship fighting 
capability. 
With the introduction of the “ABCD” ships in 1889, the Squadron of Evolution 
was formed to give a trained nucleus of officers experience at operating as a squadron.  
There were not yet enough of the new steel warships to distribute them throughout the 
Navy, so a considered decision was made to keep them concentrated.  The North Atlantic 
Squadron, as has been seen, was largely left with cruising vessels to continue to carry out 
its mission during 1889-1891.  By 1892, new construction that had been authorized since 
1883 resulted in enough materiel assets that the capability existed to keep a substantial 
concentration of modern steel warships together, while deploying single vessels to handle 
diplomatic affairs and threats to business.  The process of developing a fleet mentality, 
however, was not complete.   
Rather than assign the new warships to the North Atlantic Squadron, giving it the 
ability to train tactically in the manner envisioned by Luce, and to a lesser extent, Walker, 
the new assets were put to use to further national objectives in foreign affairs and public 
relations.  In late 1892, Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi was sent to California to lead a 
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“Squadron for Special Service” around South America from the Pacific.  The Squadron’s 
purpose was to deliver a message of goodwill to the major nations of Latin America and 
invite them to participate in the New York Naval Review of 1893.  The Naval Review, 
which was held in conjunction with the Chicago 1893 Columbian Exposition, saw the 
creation of the “Naval Review Fleet”, comprised of two squadrons under two flag 
officers, with a fleet commander overseeing the formation.  A fleet of this size and 
organization had not been constituted since the Key West maneuvers of 1874.   
Jan Rüger has identified naval reviews as a “theatre of power and identity that 
unfolded…in the imperial age.”1 A powerful navy was a way to not only influence world 
events, but to build national identity – something that was critical to the post-Civil War 
United States.2
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  The movements of the Squadron for Special Service and the participation 
of the Naval Review Fleet in the 1893 International Naval Review supported the Navy’s 
public relations effort and afforded the Navy extended opportunities to exercise 
operational and logistical challenges associated with maintaining large concentrations of 
warships.  They did not, however, contribute to the development of the doctrine and 
tactics necessary for the North Atlantic Squadron to possess a multi-ship fighting 
capability.   Naval reviews, public relations, and tactical maneuvers were not necessarily 
comparable strategic activities.  The primary duty of the North Atlantic Squadron during 
1892-1894 continued to be the protection of commercial interests overseas, which the 
Squadron accomplished with the deployment of single warships to trouble spots across its 
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area of responsibility.  While the Navy’s new warships gained experience in multi-ship 
formations, those duties came at the expense of fleet tactical exercises.  The process of 
constructing a new identity for the North Atlantic Squadron as a combat unit remained 
unfinished. 
THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON - 18923 
 DISP(TONS) TYPE/CONST ARMOR SPEED ARMAMENT ERA BUILT 
(YEAR) 
PHILADELPHIA(FLAG) 4324 PROTECTED 
CRUISER 













CHICAGO 4500 PROTECTED 
CRUISER 
NO 15.3KTS 4X8”BLR 
8X6”BLR 
2X5”BLR 





KEARSARGE 1550 WOODEN SCREW 
SLOOP 
NO 11KTS 2X11” DAHLGRENS 
1X30LB PARROTT 
RIFLE 
4X32LB SMOOTH BORE 
CIVIL WAR 
(1861) 
MIANTONOMOH 3990 MONITOR 7.0”SIDE 
11.5” 
TURRETS 
10.5KTS 4X10” BLR 
2X6LB, 2X3LB, 2X1LB 
2X37MM 
NEW (1891) 
Table 7: The North Atlantic Squadron, 18924
 
   
War Scare with Chile and Concentration in Montevideo, 1892 
 
 The fallout from the Baltimore incident in October 1891 pushed the United States 
closer and closer to war with Chile.  The Navy Department began to consider its options 
for concentrating a force capable of contending with the Chilean Navy.  Unlike the 
                                                 
3 Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy1892. Vol. 1. 
 
4 Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the 
Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909; Canney. 
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confrontation with Spain over the Virginius incident in 1874, this was a fight the Navy 
Department felt ready to take on.  Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy was even 
accused of warmongering in an effort to show off his new warships.  At least one 
newspaper editor at the time put forward the idea that action for the New Steel Navy 
would make Tracy a dark horse candidate for the 1892 presidential election: 
A war with Chile would certainly develop one name as a compromise 
candidate between Blaine and Harrison.  And that dark horse might be the horse 
marine, the alert, active, and accomplished…Benjamin F. Tracy, who would have 




There is little evidence to support the editor’s contention.  When the Chilean 
revolution first broke out, Tracy went to great lengths to ensure that his commanders 
understood his wish to remain neutral and avoid trouble.6  The deaths of two American 
servicemen may have lessened that resolve somewhat; still, he vehemently denied any 
desire for a war.7
 The first unit to respond was, predictably, the remnant of Acting Rear Admiral 
John G. Walker’s Squadron of Evolution.  December 1891 found Walker’s ships in 
Hampton Roads, as Secretary Tracy was doing his best to keep Walker away from Rear 
  What is obvious are the immediate and aggressive steps Secretary 
Tracy took to place his New Steel Navy on a war footing.  In early December, coded 
telegrams began flying from the Navy Department, moving ships, supplies, and coal 
towards South America. 
                                                 
5 New York Advertiser, 19 January 1892, as quoted in B. F. Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father of 
the Modern American Fighting Navy (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 119. 
 
6 “Take no part in troubles further than to protect American interests…use every precaution to avoid if 
possible such measures.”, Benjamin F. Tracy, "Telegram, Tracy to Mccann, 4 March 1891, 1891," 
Telegram, RG 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1691 - 1945 
Washington, D.C. . 
 
7 Cooling, 121. 
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Admiral Gherardi of the North Atlantic Squadron, who was on the usual winter cruise in 
the West Indies at the time.  The relationship between the two admirals since the 
difficulties in Haiti in the summer of 1891 had not improved noticeably, and since 
nobody in the Department quite seemed to know what to do about the hostile 
relationship, the solution was simply to keep the two admirals as far apart as the East 
Coast would allow.  This arrangement was, however, unworkable in an international 
crisis. 
 A coded telegram sent to Hampton Roads on 8 December 1891 initiated the 
formation of an ad-hoc squadron to deal with the Chilean imbroglio.  Walker was sent to 
the Dutch West Indies with Chicago and Bennington.    The two ships were instructed to 
proceed to St. Thomas, where they arrived on 15 December to find a flurry of telegrams 
from the Navy Department concerning when and where to coal.8
                                                 
8 Benjamin F. Tracy, "Telegram, Tracy to Walker, 10 December 1891, 1891," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1691 - 1945 Washington, D.C; Admiral 
J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 15 December 1891, 1891," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 
Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  While the new Navy 
was enjoying materiel improvements in the form of new warships, getting them coaled 
and provisioned without a network of overseas bases was a chronic problem.  The United 
States at this point was simply not prepared logistically to deploy concentrated combat 
squadrons across great distances.  Secretary Tracy had been working non-stop since the 
crisis began to purchase and deliver coal to the U.S. warships headed south.  The ad-hoc 
nature of this process resulted in an unusually large number of telegrams issuing 
sometimes contradictory instructions to the fleet.  The hectoring telegrams annoyed the 
self-confident Walker, who responded predictably.  “I had no intention of coaling here 
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[St. Thomas],” he retorted at one point, “I had not intended coming to this port, but came 
in obedience to Department’s telegram of the 8th instant.”9
 The two ships were joined by Atlanta a day later, and all three got underway for 
Saint Lucia, where the Department had American coal waiting.  They arrived on 18 
December and immediately went about the grueling business of coaling ship.  Admiral 
Walker was worried about yellow fever, and for this reason did not want to stop in Brazil 
on his way to Montevideo.  He thus ordered all three ships’ bunkers filled to capacity.  
Additionally the much larger (and less fuel efficient) Chicago and Atlanta took deck 
loads of coal.
 
10 Fresh water was another matter.  Saint Lucia did not have the facilities to 
provide enough fresh water for the boilers of three modern warships in a timely fashion, 
so Walker made the decision to stop for a day at Barbados on the way south, where both 
the proper quantity of fresh water would be available as well as better facilities for 
pumping the water onto the warships.  About this time, Assistant Secretary Soley made 
the mistake of sending Walker a fairly innocuous cable reminding him to reach 
Montevideo as soon as practicable.11
                                                 
9 Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 15 December 1891. " 
  This perceived slight inspired a four-page missive 
in response, as an enraged Walker railed against anyone who could question his abilities 
as a squadron commander.  “…thus far, not an hour has been lost by this Squadron since 
leaving Hampton Roads,” fumed Walker.  He went on to find fault with the Department’s 
 
10 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 20 December 1891, 1891," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Admiral J.G. 
Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Tracy, 16 December 1891, 1891," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 
Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, 
Walker to Tracy, 18 December 1891, 1891," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
11 James R. Soley, "Telegram, Soley to Walker, 21 December 1891, 1891," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 




sailing instructions (“The call at that port was by order of the Department, and of the 
cause of the order I have no knowledge.”), the Bureau of Navigation and Detail (“The 
numerous changes of both officers and men, made at the last moment in the United 
States, have undoubtedly resulted in more or less inefficiency in the Engineers’ force...”), 
and finished by petulantly noting that “The Department can reasonably believe that I 
have some knowledge of my profession…If these ships do not reach Montevideo at the 
proper time it will be for reasons entirely beyond my control.”12  In the event, both 
Atlanta and Bennington had to stop through Bahia, Brazil for coal, while Walker and 
Chicago obeyed Department orders to press on to Montevideo, arriving on 10 January 
1892.13  He was joined by Bennington on 12 January and Atlanta on 15 January.14
 Meanwhile, the decision had been made to supplement Walker’s Squadron of 
Evolution with the rest of the modern warships available on the East coast.  On 24 
December, Rear Admiral Gherardi, who was back in Haiti to assist the U.S. minister with 
managing possible unrest there, received a coded telegram ordering him to take 




                                                 
12 Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 22 December 1891. " 
  Yantic, was already in Montevideo, having left Hampton 
 
13 Benjamin F. Tracy, "Telegram, Tracy to Walker, 24 December 1891, 1891," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1691 - 1945 Washington, D.C. . 
 
14 Francis Higginson, CAPT, "Letter, Higginson to Tracy, 6 January 1892, 1892," Letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Admiral J.G. 
Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 11 January 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File 
of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to 
Tracy, 12 January 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records 
Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Tracy, 15 January 
1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-
1910, Washington, D.C. 
15 Benjamin F. Tracy, "Telegram, Tracy to Gherardi, 24 December 1891, 1891," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 




Roads in October 1891 to be transferred to the South Atlantic Squadron by way of Porto 
Grande, Cape Verde.  She had arrived in Montevideo on 2 January 1892.  Not finding 
any other U.S. vessels present, Lieutenant Commander Belden decided to proceed to 
Buenos Aires, Argentina and report to Commander James M. Forsyth, the senior officer 
present in the area at the time.  Forsyth was busy preparing Tallapoosa, one of the last of 
the wooden steam cruisers, to be sold for scrap.16
 Once settled in Montevideo, Admiral Walker made the diplomatic rounds, calling 
on the senior officers of the various navies represented in the port, the U.S. legation and, 
on 22 January 1892, the President of Uruguay.
  In a somehow fitting commentary on 
the final demise of the old wooden cruising navy, Tallapoosa had literally rotted while 
assigned as a dispatch vessel on the South Atlantic Station, to the point that it was no 
longer safe to operate her.  Her crew had to be sent home by merchant steamers, her 
supplies were salvaged by Admiral Walker, (who ordered Essex to proceed from Buenos 
Aires to Montevideo with whatever useful objects from Tallapoosa she could carry), and 
the hulk was ordered sold to the highest bidder at the dock in Buenos Aires. 
17  Meanwhile, supplies and coal ordered 
by the Navy Department continued to accumulate.18
                                                 
16 CDR Belden, "Letter, Belden to Tracy, 2 January 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area 
File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
  The plan was for the assembled 
ships at Montevideo to proceed around Cape Horn, through the Strait of Magellan, to 
Callao, Peru where they would unite with the warships of the Pacific fleet.  To do this, 
 
17 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 28 January 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
18 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 2 February 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 




they would require the services of a collier, which Rear Admiral Walker was ordered to 
arrange.19
  Unfortunately, Walker was not able to get out of Montevideo with his three 
warships before Rear Admiral Gherardi arrived with his two.  Gherardi’s arrival 
automatically made him the senior officer present, and meant that Rear Admiral Walker 
would have to report to him.  Philadelphia arrived at Montevideo on 6 February, 
followed a day later by Concord.  Gherardi immediately went about making the formal 
calls on military and civilian officials that would be expected of the new U.S. senior 
officer present.  It can be safely assumed that Rear Admiral Walker, who took the 
integrity of his command so seriously, and had just made all these same calls not three 
weeks earlier, was annoyed that his primacy on station, not to mention overall command 
of “his” ships, had been taken over by Gherardi.  The New York Times reported that 
Walker stayed out of sight while Gherardi was in port, withdrawing to another anchorage 
to conduct target practice.
 
20  The Times notoriously disliked Walker, so its reporting 
must be accepted with caution.  Walker did report to Gherardi on the movements of his 
warships while the two occupied the same station.21  Throughout this period, in his 
official communications with Rear Admiral Walker, Rear Admiral Gherardi left 
absolutely no doubt about who was reporting to whom.22
                                                 
19 Benjamin F. Tracy, "Telegram, Tracy to Walker, 13 January 1892, 1892," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1691 - 1945 Washington, D.C. . 
   
 
20 "North Atlantic Squadron," New York Times (1857-1922), 22 May 1892. 
 
21 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Walker, 6 February 1892, 1892," Letter, RG313, 
Records of the Naval Operating Forces, Washington, D.C. . 
 
22 “You [Rear Admiral Walker] will be pleased to direct….”  Formal language very clearly and 
unquestionably denoting a senior/subordinate relationship.  Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to 
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On 25 January, President Harrison went before Congress to ask for a declaration 
of war.  Hours later, the news that Chile had accepted unconditionally all U.S. demands 
reached Washington D.C.  The crisis was over, and it was perhaps as well for the 
harmony of the senior officer corps of the U.S. Navy.  Within days of the President’s 
message to Congress, Commodore Ramsey of the Bureau of Navigation was in touch 
with Admiral Gherardi, asking him how he wanted to be detailed after his current job.23  
Admiral Gherardi was subsequently recalled to home waters, to take up his post as 
Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Squadron for a few more months, prior to his 
relief.24
Walker stayed behind in his new assignment as Commander-in-Chief, South 
Atlantic Station.  It did not take long for the new C-in-C to complain.  Before Gherardi 
had even departed the station, Walker had already fired a five-page missive to the 
Department.  South America, it seemed, was unhealthy.  There were not enough docking 
facilities available, and the bottoms of the steel warships had fouled rapidly.  Anyway, 
“The duties [on the South Atlantic Station] are inadequate to a Flag Officer’s rank and 
position, and the expense is unnecessary.”
 
25
                                                                                                                                                 
Walker, 13 February 1892, 1892," Letter, RG313, Records of the Naval Operating Forces, Washington, 
D.C. . 
  It was apparent that Walker’s real desire 
was Gherardi’s position as the C-in-C of the North Atlantic Squadron, and he was 
making sure the Department did not forget about him in the cruising backwaters of South 
 
23 CAPT Ramsey, "Telegram, Ramsey to Gherardi, 9 February 1892, 1892," Telegram, RG 45, Naval 
Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1691 - 1945 Washington, D.C. . 
 
24 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Telegram, Gherardi to Secnav, 16 February 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, 
U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; "Various 
Naval Items, 30 Jan 92," Army and Navy Journal, 30 January 1892 1892. 
25 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 15 February 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 




America.  Whatever his opinion of Latin America, he was still required to represent the 
U.S. flag there.  The three ships departed Montevideo on 8 March and arrived the next 
day at Ensenada, Argentina.  Walker and his personal staff boarded a train for Buenos 
Aires where he was presented to the President.26
As happy as Walker was to have attention paid to him, his opinion of the station 
only worsened when he was made aware of an article in the New York Herald of 2 
February 1892.  It accused the sailors of the “White Squadron” with “riotous conduct” 
while on liberty in Montevideo.  Walker fired off a three-page rebuttal to the Department, 
in which he denied that there had been any trouble, other than a couple of sailors who had 
been arrested for disorderly conduct.  Whether or not that was the case, what is 
significant about Walker’s letter is the closing, where he remarks that “it is due to the 
seamen of this Squadron and of the whole to give publicity to this authoritative denial of 
the false telegram enclosed.”
 
27  Walker’s salvation came not a moment too soon, in his 
eyes.  On 27 April, he was ordered back to northern waters.28  Chicago left immediately, 
Atlanta following on 3 May 1892.  Left on the South Atlantic Station were Bennington, 
Yantic, and Essex, under the command of Bennington’s captain, as Senior Officer Present 
– precisely the way Walker wanted it.  It seems that he still had some “pull” at the Navy 
Department after all.29
                                                 
26 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Letter, Walker to Tracy, 30 March 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
27 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Tracy, 17 March 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
28 Admiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Tracy, 27 April 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
29 R.B. Bradford, LT, "Letter, Bradford to Tracy, 5 May 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 
Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
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The Chilean incident and the ad-hoc formation of a squadron to respond to it 
exposed the Janus-faced thinking at the Navy Department during this era.  The standard 
operating practices of the Navy were still focused on cruising, showing the flag, and, 
most importantly, protecting property and commercial interests in foreign ports.  
However, at the first hint of conflict, the Department concentrated its forces, anticipating 
some sort of naval battle utilizing fleet tactics under steam.  These squadron 
concentrations were logistically and organizationally of an ad-hoc nature.  They did not 
contribute to the long-term construction of identity of the Navy’s squadrons as combat 
units, nor were they as effective at developing a multi-ship fighting capability as they 
could have been. The exigencies of whatever international crisis was underway typically 
prevented the temporary fleet for carrying out any training to refine doctrine or tactics.  
Additionally, getting enough fuel to the warships in the absence of an infrastructure 
designed to support multiple ships was always a limitation, and the personal conflicts that 
resulted from flag officers being forced to work together without a clearly-defined fleet 
organization hindered the Navy’s effectiveness.    
 
 
The North Atlantic Squadron – Operations 1892 
 
 Rear Admiral Gherardi, in his flagship, Philadelphia had departed Montevideo on 
18 February 1892 in company with Concord.   The two ships reached the Barbados on 8 
March, Gherardi remarking that Concord had spent most of the transit under sail to 
conserve coal, as the load of “Eureka” coal she had on board burned much less efficiently 
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than the “Cardiff” coal that fueled the Philadelphia.30  From Barbados, they touched at 
Havana and Matanzas, before arriving at Key West on 8 April.31  In Key West, the old 
North Atlantic problem of piecemeal assignment of squadron assets immediately 
presented itself.  On 9 April, Concord was ordered to proceed up the Mississippi River to 
Memphis, Tennessee, and to be there by 12 May 1892. She was to support the gala 
festivities marking the opening of the Memphis Bridge between West Memphis, 
Arkansas and Memphis, Tennessee.32
 Concord’s departure from Key West on 24 April for her trip up the Mississippi set 
off a wave of frantic telegrams from various civic associations along the way, begging 
the Secretary of the Navy to order Concord to stop at their municipality.  Local vendors 
greedily eyed the money that the hundreds, if not thousands, of spectators who would 
flock to see one of the new steel ships would spend at their establishments.
 
33
                                                 
30 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Tracy, 11 March 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C.  Cardiff was the 
main port for export of high-quality coal from Wales, Great Britain.  Eureka coal was from Pennsylvania. 
  While 
demonstrating the increased popularity of the Navy during the 1890’s, Concord’s 
goodwill trip up the Mississippi is evidence of the continued inability of the North 
Atlantic Squadron to build the kind of unit identity that Rear Admiral Luce had dreamed 
of for the Squadron in 1886-1887, and Rear Admiral Walker had made a reality for the 
Squadron of Evolution in 1889-1891.  In 1892, the North Atlantic Squadron still operated 
in a largely piecemeal fashion, with most of its warships away from the flag at any given 
 
31 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Telegram, Gherardi to Secnav, 8 April 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. 
Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
32 "Going to Memphis," The Atlanta Constitution (1881-2001), 7 May 1892. 
 
33 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Telegram, Gherardi to Secnav, 23 April 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. 




time, covering contingencies and public relations events throughout the area of 
operations. 
 Kearsarge, for example, remained behind in Haiti while Admiral Gherardi and 
the rest of the Squadron headed for Montevideo.  By the 1890’s, the venerable old 
warship had settled into a role of being the North Atlantic Squadron’s representative in 
Haitian waters.  It was a good use for a ship which otherwise could not operate in a 
formation with the vessels of the New Steel Navy.  Commander Elmer spent much of his 
time shuttling the U.S. minister to Haiti back and forth from Port-au-Prince to Santo 
Domingo.34  It was duty that Elmer did not really think was necessary, given the peaceful 
conditions in Port-au-Prince.  With his Commander-in-Chief away at Montevideo, Elmer 
corresponded directly with the Navy Department, informing them of the current political 
conditions in Haiti and requesting permission to take his ship to Key West, where he 
could perform quarterly target practice and give his men liberty.35
 Newark, meanwhile, which had been detached from the Squadron of Evolution in 
late 1891 and prepared for cruise in Hampton Roads, was assigned to the North Atlantic 
Squadron in March 1892 and immediately ordered to La Guayra, Venezuela.  Newark 
was Cruiser No. 1, the first ship of the 1885 authorization built and next in line after the 
“ABCD” ships.  She had been commissioned in 1891 and assigned to the Squadron of 
Evolution for training prior to her assignment to the North Atlantic Station.  At 4000 
  After another round of 
trips between Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, this permission was granted, and 
Kearsarge pulled into Key West on 17 March 1892.   
                                                 
34 Horace Elmer, CDR, "Letter, Elmer to Tracy, 16 January 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
35 Horace Elmer, CDR, "Letter, Elmer to Tracy, 22 February 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
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tons, she was just smaller than Chicago, but larger than Atlanta or Boston.  Her main 
armament consisted of 12 6-inch breech loading rifles, and her new triple-expansion 
engines could drive her at a top speed of 19 knots, 4 knots better than the best speed of 
the “ABCD” cruisers. 
 On 22 March 1892, Admiral Gherardi ordered Newark to leave St. Thomas and 
proceed to La Guayra, Venezuela to “protect American interests as may be required.”36  
Newark arrived two days later, on 24 March at La Guayra, a small port about twenty 
miles from the capital of Caracas.  Captain Silas Casey, Newark’s commanding officer, 
immediately contacted the U.S. consul at that port and two days later journeyed inland to 
Caracas to call upon the U.S. minister to Venezuela.  Casey found from his contacts with 
U.S. officials, as well as local informants, that a small insurrection was underway in 
Venezuela, but that violence was mostly taking place in the interior.  The coastal cities 
and the capital were quiet and Casey, in his report, remarked that although the 
insurrection was causing a general depression which might be bad for business, American 
lives and property were not in danger.37  After a stay of another five weeks, Captain 
Casey concluded that his presence was no longer necessary, and in accordance with his 
orders from Admiral Gherardi, departed for Key West.38
                                                 
36 Silas Casey, CAPT, "Letter, Casey to Tracy, 28 March 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 




38 Silas Casey, CAPT, "Letter, Casey to Tracy, 9 April 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department 
Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; Silas Casey, CAPT, "Letter, 
Casey to Tracy, 30 April 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records 




 Newark was able to spend just less than a week in Key West before getting 
underway for Savannah, Georgia.39  There, she joined Rear Admiral Gherardi in 
Philadelphia and Kearsarge, and Vesuvius, which had come down from New York.  This 
concentration of warships for a goodwill tour of the East coast represented the all of the 
cruising vessels of the North Atlantic Squadron in May 1892, besides Concord, which 
was on her cruise up the Mississippi.  As Philadelphia’s draft was too deep to allow her 
to enter the harbor, Rear Admiral Gherardi transferred his flag to Kearsarge, which 
allowed him to tie up at the city docks and entertain prominent citizens of the town.  
Vesuvius tied up at the dock as well, and Admiral Gherardi reported that the two ships 
were visited by “thousands.”  “The visit….cannot fail to be of benefit, by means of the 
increased interest in the Navy that has been created.”40   Especially popular with the 
visiting crowds was the former enemy Kearsarge, which had won fame by sinking the 
Confederate raider Alabama so many years earlier.  Philadelphia had to remain several 
miles out at sea, but even so, Admiral Gherardi reported that many steamers and tugs had 
brought visitors out to see her.41  Admiral Gherardi and his officers were feted at special 
dinners, and the Marine guards of the four ships marched in a parade through town.42
 Altogether, the Squadron spent eleven days in Savannah, departing on 18 May.  
Philadelphia, Newark, and Vesuvius proceeded to Charleston, South Carolina, where the 
 
                                                 
39 Commander Winn, Commandant of Naval Station Key West, "Telegram, Winn to Bureau of Navigation 
and Detail, 12 May 1892, 1892," telegram, RG45, U.S. Navy Department Area File of the Naval Records 
Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
40 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Tracy, 14 May 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
41 Ibid."". 
 
42 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Secnav, 21 May 1892, 1892," letter, RG45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C; "May Week in 




local chamber of commerce had invited the squadron to stop on their way north.  Rear 
Admiral Gherardi’s acceptance of this invitation again shows his mindfulness of the 
public image of both the Navy and his squadron in the port cities in his jurisdiction.43  
Kearsarge was sent to Port Royal for coal, with orders to rejoin the squadron when 
able.44  At Charleston, the Squadron was once again feted ashore, and visited by what 
Rear Admiral Gherardi referred to as “large numbers of the people.”45  They sailed for 
Annapolis on the evening of 21 May, arriving in time to take part in the Naval 
Academy’s “June Week” graduation celebrations.46  After the festivities at Annapolis, the 
squadron withdrew to Hampton Roads to await the arrival of Concord, fresh from her 
goodwill trip up the Mississippi to Memphis.  From there, Philadelphia, Concord, and 
Vesuvius returned to New York, while Newark stayed behind for work at the Norfolk 
Navy Yard and Kearsarge was tasked with towing the monitor Passaic to Boston.47
 Gherardi only spent three weeks in New York before getting underway for drills 
and target practice.  The destination was Gardiner’s Bay, Long Island, where the North 
Atlantic Squadron routinely held gunnery exercises.  Gherardi sent Minatonomoh ahead 
10 days early, as her slow speed would have held back the rest of the squadron had she 
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been in company.  After target practice, the Squadron reunited at New London, 
Connecticut, where the Naval Station had facilities for small arms practice.48   At New 
London there was some discussion of a trip up the St. Lawrence to the major port cities of 
Canada, but this did not materialize.49  The Squadron left New London instead for Bar 
Harbor, Maine on 6 August to take part in festivities there.50  The squadron was joined at 
Bar Harbor by Dolphin, which embarked the Secretary of the Navy to witness a naval 
review that concentrated the available warships on the east coast.51  Four hundred sailors 
were landed to march in a parade through town, while Secretary of the Navy Tracy 
entertained such luminaries as J.P. Morgan at a dinner given on board Dolphin.  From 
Bar Harbor, the Squadron proceeded to Gloucester, Massachusetts, where they were met 
by Miantonomoh.52  Again, the duty assigned them was to participate in a celebration of 
the 250th anniversary of the founding of Gloucester.53
 The warships of the North Atlantic Squadron spent a good deal of time together in 
the summer of 1892.  In this way, they continued to develop their unit identity.  What was 
missing was any mention – official or otherwise – of tactical exercises or formation work 
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during the months from June to September.  The concept of the Squadron as a tactical 
unit had not fully taken hold yet, and while the daily work of formation steaming was 
useful from developing a concept of multi-ship operations, it did not contribute to the 
doctrine and tactics necessary to possess a multi-ship fighting capability.  At least one 
contemporary observer was mystified by this.  Retired Captain Edward L. Beach, Sr. 
noted in his memoirs that “The Philadelphia was always active with drills, but seemed to 
me to steam about purposelessly.  Instead of following a carefully arranged program, as 
would be the case today [the 1930’s], we were able to attend flower shows and carnivals 
from Maine to Florida.  We seldom cruised in squadron formation.”54
 Rear Admiral Walker, on the other hand, made a point of keeping his squadron 
together.  His official communications and telegrams with the Navy Department often 
refer simply to the “Squadron” when reporting their movements, understanding that the 
Department will know which ships are his and will assume that they are together.
 
55
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  As 
previously noted, Walker departed from the South American station in April.  The station 
was without a C-in-C for a few months, until Rear Admiral A.E.K. Benham raised his 
flag aboard his new flagship, Newark on 25 June 1892.  Newark had returned to Norfolk 
and was fitting out for her cruise at the Norfolk Navy Yard at the time.  Benham and 
Newark left the yard in July, cruising across the Atlantic to Spain to represent the United 
States at the celebration of the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ departure for 
the new world.  Their duties in connection with the multi-nation commemoration took 
them next to France, then to Italy, before finally passing Gibraltar on the way to their new 
55 As an example, seeAdmiral J.G. Walker, "Telegram, Walker to Secnav, 23 July 1892, 1892," telegram, 




station in 1893.  Walker’s opinion that the presence of a flag officer on the South 
American Station was not necessary was at least partially validated, as there was no C-in-
C in the region for almost an entire year. 
Speculation ran rampant in New York City and Washington D.C. as to what the 
new flag officer assignments would be at this time.  Both Gherardi and Walker were 
completing sea tours, and were due to be rotated ashore, if not retired.56
John G. Walker as Commander-in-Chief 
  In a series of 
surprising moves, however, both senior officers managed to stay at sea.  Rear Admiral 
Walker took command of the North Atlantic Squadron on 10 September 1892.  Gherardi 
was given command of something to be called the “Squadron for Special Service.”  It is 
an interesting juxtaposition of duties, as Gherardi would now have a squadron formed for 
the express purpose of staying together and operating as a unit, while Walker –who had 
spent the last three years with just such a unit, whose identity and image he had carefully 
cultivated, would now command a unit which had not yet fully developed an identity, and 
whose members were constantly changing or being sent on individual missions by the 
Navy Department. 
 
It did not take the new Commander-in-Chief long to chafe at his situation.  The 
week before he took command, he was sent with Chicago to the Naval War College to 
participate in the maneuvers associated with the fall course.  Unfortunately, Chicago was 
the only ship assigned by the Department to carry out the maneuvers, which Walker 
found ridiculous.  In one of his characteristic four-page litanies of dissatisfaction, Walker 
complained that “I have absolutely no knowledge of what I am expected to do here with 
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my command.”  He went on to note that more ships were necessary to carry out the 
turning radius and speed trials the Naval War College class wished to study.  “If anything 
is done here, by my ships, while I am in command, I mean that it shall be well done; and 
therefore, write this to urge that the ships coming here may be sent at once…”57  It does 
not seem that he was upset about working with the Naval War College.  Indeed, much of 
his correspondence with Rear Admiral Luce five years earlier when he was the Chief of 
the Bureau of Navigation was positive about things he could do to help the War College 
project.58  Instead, it simply seems that Walker was annoyed because he did not have a 
formation of ships to direct.  He even signed himself the Commander-in-Chief of the 
“Squadron of Evolution”, although the squadron at that point consisted of Chicago.  After 
the change-of-command on 10 September, Rear Admiral Gherardi’s old flagship, 
Philadelphia, reported to Walker for duty, and the two ships (he was allowed to keep 
Chicago) prepared for sea.59
Gherardi and the Squadron for Special Service 
   
 
In the meanwhile, Rear Admiral Gherardi left New York for San Francisco in 
mid-September, accompanied by his flag secretary, Lieutenant William Potter and flag 
lieutenant, Lieutenant Ridgley Hunt.  The party stopped at Chicago on the way to inspect 
the construction underway for the World’s Fair to be held the next year.  Once in San 
Francisco, Gherardi was to raise his flag on the Baltimore.  Together with Charleston and 
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San Francisco, the three ships would begin a special diplomatic cruise down the west 
coast of Central and South America, stopping first at San Diego, California, to take part 
in the commemoration of the 350th anniversary of Cabrillo’s exploration of the coast of 
California.60
The “Squadron for Special Service” can be seen as an attempt by the U.S. 
government to strike a conciliatory tone in Latin America after the fiasco with Chile in 
1891-1892.  While traveling down the west coast of South America, the squadron was 
slated to stop at each of the major Latin American ports, where Rear Admiral Gherardi, 
himself no stranger to the diplomatic side of his job, would personally deliver an 
invitation from the President of the United States for the nation to send representatives to 
the Naval Review scheduled for spring 1893 in New York City.
 
61
Gherardi was insistent on having the latest and best equipment for his squadron, 
knowing not only that they were going to be spending a lot of time in formation, but that 
other navies around the world were going to be observing them.  One of his first acts 
upon assuming command of the Squadron for Special Service was to ask the Navy 
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which were hung from stays in the rigging and operated by a keyboard on the bridge.  By 
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with auxiliary electric power.  Fortunately, all the vessels in the Squadron for Special 
Service were so equipped.63
Baltimore and Charleston left Mare Island, San Francisco on 25 September 1892 
for the three-day voyage down the California coast to San Diego, where a celebration was 
underway to honor the 350th anniversary of the exploration of the California coast by the 
Spanish explorer Cabrillo.  The two ships arrived on 28 September.  Charleston’s sailors 
were put ashore to march in a parade and Gherardi received the Governor of California 
and other notables onboard Baltimore.  He also took the opportunity to pay an official 
visit to Charleston, which had recently joined his flag.  He pronounced himself “pleased 
with the neat and efficient appearance of both vessel and personnel.”  Thousands of 
civilians visited the two ships as they took part in the commemoration of the Spanish 
explorer Cabrillo.   
  Gherardi had not shown this level of interest in 
communications during his assignment as the North Atlantic Squadron commander-in-
chief.  An analysis of 282 Gherardi communications, covering all of his afloat flag 
assignments, reveals that this letter was the first time he addressed an issue of signal 
communication and fleet maneuvering.  His concern in this area was related to the public 
relations aspect of his mission and the appearance of power.  The fact that the Squadron 
for Special Service had not developed any substantive fighting capability through 
rigorous exercise was secondary to the appearance of such a capability. 
It was not all pleasure for the two ships’ companies, as Admiral Gherardi ordered 
first Charleston then the flagship Baltimore out into the bay to complete their quarterly 
target practice.  On 5 October, the Naval Reserve of San Diego reported onboard 
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Charleston for a day of drill.64  Then, it was off to Mazatlan, Mexico, arriving on 15 
October 1892.  On the way down from San Diego, Gherardi reported that the “ships of 
the Squadron were exercised at fleet tactics and signaling, especially night signaling (sic) 
by the Morse Code with the steam whistles.”  Gherardi’s report does not give any detail 
as to the tactics practiced, but the inference is that the drills involved the formations 
described in Parker’s “Fleet Tactics Under Steam.”  Gherardi also forwarded the 
Department a copy of the Routine and Instructions established by the flag for the 
Squadron.65  The squadron called next at Acapulco, Mexico and then continued to San 
Jose de Guatemala, where the Admiral traveled to the capital of Guatemala on a special 
train to call upon the Guatemalan president.66  This process was repeated in Peru a few 
weeks later.  A state dinner was given in the Peruvian capital of Lima for the officers of 
the Squadron.67
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  In Peru, Gherardi got down to some of the most important business of 
the voyage of the Squadron for Special Service.  On 3 December 1892, he and the U.S. 
minister to Peru made an official call on the Chilean minister.  One year out from the 
very real threat of war between the two countries, Gherardi was feeling out the reception 
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returned Gherardi’s call on board Baltimore the next day, and was received with honors 
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and a fifteen-gun salute.  The goodwill visit to Valparaiso would proceed as planned.68In 
Callo, Peru, Yorktown joined the Squadron.69
Rear Admiral Gherardi continued to be concerned about the unity of his command 
even as he was carrying out his diplomatic mission.  While in Peru, he wrote the 
Department to suggest that any ships which were going to be assigned to the upcoming 
Naval Review Fleet, of which he was going to be the commander-in-chief, be scheduled 
to meet his Squadron for Special Service in Barbados, so that they could practice 
formation steaming prior to arriving at Hampton Roads or New York.  “It is absolutely 
essential that the ships should be able to maintain position accurately in column, both on 
a straight course and when changing direction, and be able to act together in getting 
underway.”  He went on to note that these seemingly simple evolutions often were not 
simple at all: “my experience since leaving San Francisco is a fresh illustration of this 
fact.”
   
70
Gherardi exercised his four ships at fleet tactics on the way to Valparaiso.
  Gherardi’s major concern, both for the Squadron for Special Service and the 
upcoming Naval Review, was the smart appearance of his command.   
71
                                                 
68 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, Gherardi to Secnav, 6 December 1892, 1892," Letter, RG313, 
Records of Naval Operating Forces, 1849 - 1980, Washington, D.C. ; Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Letter, 
Gherardi to Secnav, 10 December 1892, 1892," Letter, RG313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, 1849 - 
1980, Washington, D.C. . 
  The 
Squadron anchored at Valparaiso on the 16th of December.  Salutes and official visits 
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were exchanged, with both sides eager to display the utmost civility to each other.  The 
Intendente of Valparaiso came aboard to express his hope that Gherardi would give the 
men of the Squadron liberty in his city and offered to help facilitate that.  Gherardi 
politely declined, pointing out that he was in a hurry to get home and begin his 
preparations for the Naval Review.  What he failed to point out was that he had received 
a frantic coded telegram from the Navy Department while in Peru: “Do not give your 
men liberty at Valparaiso.  Ramsey.”72  Gherardi was only too happy to oblige.  He went 
ashore, however, to make his official calls, and pronounced the civilian populace 
“peacefully inclined.”73
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  On 20 December, Gherardi and his staff boarded a special train 
that had been provided for them by the Chilean government for the trip to Santiago.  
Gherardi’s report describes the visit to the capital as proper, though not enthusiastic.  He 
noted that they were not welcomed at the train station by anyone other than the U.S. 
minister.  His audience with the Chilean Republic’s president, Admiral Monett, was 
largely perfunctory.  Gherardi informed Admiral Monett that the President of the United 
States had personally asked him to bring four of their newest warships to Valparaiso to 
deliver an invitation to take part in the Naval Review scheduled for the following year.  
Whether the Chilean president accepted this as anything other than a thinly veiled threat 
is hard to say, but he politely demurred, saying that it was too expensive for the young 
government to attempt to send one of its ships to New York.  An invitation to visit the 
squadron was similarly declined, and after both men expressed their satisfaction that the 
two nations would recover their previous good relations, Gherardi was dismissed.  “I was 




not encouraged to delay my departure” was the slightly more diplomatic way he 
described it in his report.74
Walker, The North Atlantic Squadron, and Unrest in Venezuela 
  There would be no state dinners in Chile.  The Squadron’s 
next stop was Montevideo, the scene of the fleet gathering eleven months earlier.   
 
Rear Admiral Walker, meanwhile, had to satisfy himself with the mundane duties 
of the North Atlantic Squadron, which included minor crisis management across the 
Caribbean region, safeguarding U.S. business interests.  The first exigency was unrest in 
Venezuela, where a faction of the Venezuelan Congress was fighting against an 
incumbent president who refused to cede power.  There were reports of violence against 
the U.S minister there, as well as molestations of U.S. citizens and property.  Concord 
was the first North Atlantic Squadron warship to respond, leaving from St. Thomas, 
Dutch West Indies and arriving at La Guyara on 14 September 1892.75  There, 
Commander White, Concord’s commanding officer made an initial assessment of the 
situation.76
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  Meanwhile, the Navy Department dispatched additional forces.  Kearsarge 
departed Port-au-Prince, Haiti on 9 September, and after leaving orders for Philadelphia 
to represent the Squadron at the Annual Encampment of the Naval Veterans of the United 
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States in Baltimore, Admiral Walker himself left New York aboard Chicago on 11 
September.77
When Admiral Walker arrived at La Guyara on September 19th, he found 
Kearsarge and the gunboat Concord in port.  After conferring with their commanding 
officers, Commanders Crowninshield and White, and meeting with U.S. consular 
officials ashore, he came to the conclusion that the situation in Venezuela as regarded 
U.S. citizens and property was largely stable.  Concord was dispatched to Puerto Caballo, 
a port city near the border with Colombia, about a day’s sail from La Guyara, with orders 
to prevent interference with the movements of the American Mail Steamers which called 
there and to report back anything of interest to Admiral Walker.
   
78  Kearsarge was sent to 
Coro, Venezuela, with similar orders.79  The Venezuelan Congressional forces under 
General Crespo enjoyed substantial support from the population at large, and were widely 
expected to prevail in the civil war.  When they did, it was assumed that the situation 
would quickly revert to peace.  Having said that, Walker, reporting to the Department on 
the situation, went on to complain about the length of time since Chicago had been in 
drydock and to note that the European naval forces had all assessed the situation as stable 
and withdrawn from La Guyara.  He then requested to be recalled to New York as soon 
as possible.80
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October, ordering a reluctant Admiral Walker to remain in Venezuelan waters until 
further notice.  
The fact that he was unhappy with his posting in Central America may account 
for his worse-than-usual temper during this time.  On 29 September, Commander 
Crowninshield of Kearsarge was the recipient of a scathing letter in which Walker 
upbraided him for the sloppy performance of his boat crews during a boat drill controlled 
by the flagship.  “You will require each line officer under your command to read the 
instructions for sail and spar drill and for boat drills, to make a copy of them and to report 
to you that he understands them.”81
This minor annoyance, though, paled in comparison with the venom with which 
Walker handled Chicago’s Marine complement following an incident on shore in La 
Guayara on 7 October.  A detachment of Marines had been sent ashore under the 
command of Marine Captain Meeker to secure the U.S. consulate against possible unrest.  
Once at the consulate, Captain Meeker handed the detachment over to a non-
commissioned officer and headed off for a local hotel to eat lunch.  This gave the enlisted 
Marines an opportunity to raid the consulate’s liquor stores, get drunk, and begin fighting 
among themselves.  Meeker returned, got the situation under control and consulted with 
his commanding officer, but the damage had been done.  From a military standpoint, 
anyone would have considered this a serious breach of discipline, but the always image-
conscious Walker was infuriated.  The next day, Chicago’s crew was drawn up at 
  Kearsarge, as an older wooden sloop, was 
accustomed to single-ship operations and not used to operating under the eyes of the 
flagship.   
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quarters to hear a general order from the commander-in-chief read.  “[The Marines] 
proving themselves as a body unreliable and worse than worthless, you [Captain 
McGlensey] will detail a detachment of Blue-jackets, under the command of a line officer 
of the Navy, for service…and will hereafter, never send a detachment of Marines out of 
this ship on duty without special instructions from me.”82 Everyone involved in the 
incident was subsequently court-martialed, Captain Meeker being convicted of 
inattention to duty.  Meeker attempted to plea in bar of trial that the public rebuke by 
Walker on board Chicago constituted a punishment, and therefore he could not be tried 
for the same offense again.  Walker ignored his defense and continued with the court-
martial proceedings, which were later overturned on appeal.  The context of this incident 
is important: the Marine Corps was in one of their perennial fights to justify their 
existence.  There was a large faction of naval officers who thought that their presence on 
the new navy’s steel warships was unnecessary and that properly-trained sailors, called 
upon to “away all boats, armed and equipped”, could do the job just as well.  Admiral 
Walker’s words and actions leave little doubt as to which faction he belonged. 83
Walker eventually was able to depart Venezuelan waters.  On 19 October, after 
spending the opening portion of his report of that date recounting the political news from 
Venezuela, including the news that the Congressional forces had taken the capital and the 
port town of La Guayara, Walker once again opined that there were too many U.S 
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warships present, and informed the Department that he was going to St. Thomas for coal 
and requested further orders from there.84  No more coded telegrams were forthcoming 
from the Department, and Walker did as he promised, arriving at St. Thomas, Dutch West 
Indies on 28 October 1892.. Before he left, he dispersed his warships to investigate 
various incidents which concerned U.S. businessmen, taking such action to safeguard 
U.S. lives and property as the situation(s) might warrant.  Concord had already left for 
Colón, Columbia (Aspinwall) to investigate unrest that might be hindering the business 
operations of the Panama Railroad Company, a U.S.-owned interest.85  Any disruption to 
the flow of goods and mail across the Panamanian isthmus was cause for immediate 
corrective action by the United States. This U.S. right was codified by the 1846 treaty 
with Colombia that guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus, but reserved to 
the United States the right to intervene to keep transit open.86  A week earlier, frantic 
telegrams from the Panama Railroad Company had begun arriving at the Navy 
Department, urging the dispatch of a U.S. warship so that transit across the isthmus might 
be kept open.  Concord arrived at Colón and found everything in good order.  
Commander White reported back to the Department that all was “tranquil” on the 
isthmus.87
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The New York newspapers reported that Concord would be sent next to Ciudad 
Bolivar, Venezuela, to investigate the treatment of a U.S. citizen there by the Venezuelan 
government.88  It is an interesting comment on the state of strategic communications at 
the time that Commander White of the Concord found out about orders for his warship 
from a clipping from the New York Herald which he received from the mail steamer 
while Concord was at Colón. This touched off a minor disagreement among the U.S. 
diplomatic representatives in Columbia, as the U.S. consul at Colón wanted Concord to 
remain there.  The U.S. consul-general of Panama felt that the situation was secure and 
saw no reason for detaining Concord.89  After reading the newspaper, White telegraphed 
the Department for clarification.  It was reminiscent of Concord’s trip up the Mississippi 
a few months earlier, each city along the way clamoring for the economic and civic pride 
advantages that would accompany the presence of a U.S. warship.  In the event, Rear 
Admiral Walker decided to send Kearsarge to Ciudad Bolivar, and Concord left for Key 
West, arriving there on 12 November.  She subsequently sailed for New York on 1 
December.90
Kearsarge touched at Trinidad, prior to proceeding up the Orinoco River.  There 
Commander Crowninshield met with the alleged wronged U.S. citizen, a Mr. George F. 
Underhill.  On the 200-mile plus voyage up the Orinoco, Crowninshield had an 
opportunity to interview Mr. Underhill.  Essentially, Underhill had chosen to work for the 
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losing side in a civil war, with the result that when the Crespo forces came to power, he 
was forced to sell his property at a loss and leave town.  Upon arrival at Ciudad Bolivar, 
Crowninshield met with and hand-delivered an official letter to rebel general Jose 
Hernandez, the rebel military and civil governor of the State of Bolivar.  After getting an 
official reply from General Hernandes, and thoroughly investigating the alleged incident 
among the populace, Commander Crowninshield wrote an extensive thirteen-page report 
which he mailed, not to the Navy Department, but to Rear Admiral Walker, to be 
forwarded.  In it, he seems to have very little sympathy for Underhill, appearing to 
believe that he should have been more careful with his business dealings.  By this time, 
Walker was safely in New York with Chicago, although it is noteworthy that he required 
his commanding officers to send their reports to the Navy Department through him even 
though he was not physically located with them.91
The International Naval Review, 1893 
  After completing his assignment at 
Ciudad Bolivar, Crowninshield steamed quickly down the Orinoco River, as the river was 
falling and Kearsarge’s displacement was such that he could barely make it as it was.   
 
Rear Admiral Gherardi reported the arrival of his Squadron for Special Service at 
Montevideo, Uruguay, on 9 January 1893.  The squadron had left Valparaiso, Chile on 24 
December 1892, passing through the Strait of Magellan on its trip to Uruguay.  After a 
stay of two weeks in Montevideo, during which time visits were exchanged with the 
President of Uruguay, the squadron got underway for the Barbados.92
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Montevideo gave Admiral Gherardi an opportunity to complain to the Navy Department 
about the practice of sending communications to his ships without first passing them 
through the flagship.  This was an issue that had vexed Admiral Walker and his Squadron 
of Evolution.  Gherardi had not dealt with issues of chain-of-command often, as the 
North Atlantic Squadron during his tenure was rarely together in one place for long 
enough for it to become a problem.93
The Squadron left Montevideo on 23 January and proceeded to the Barbados, 
where they arrived on the morning of 12 February.  Gherardi was forced to disperse his 
squadron throughout the West Indies, as there was not a port that had the facilities to coal 
all four ships expeditiously.  San Francisco and Yorktown went to St. Lucia, Charleston 
stayed at the Barbados, and Baltimore headed to St. Thomas.  Much like the fleet 
concentration in Montevideo the previous year, the fact that Gherardi had to break up the 
squadron in order to coal and replenish them shows that the logistical resources of the 
Navy had not yet matched the desire to deploy multi-ship squadrons on a regular basis.
 
94  
Coal consumption was a subject of constant concerns for the bureaus of the Navy 
Department, and soon after arriving back at New York, Gherardi was asked to submit a 
report showing by ship the amount of coal bought at each port and the price paid.95
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Gherardi also reported to the Navy Department on the feasibility of sending 
Morse Code or Myer Code signals using the ships’ steam whistles.96The Signal Office 
was constantly on the lookout for better ways for ships to communicate at night and in 
bad weather.  On the whole, Gherardi thought that the Modified Myer Code worked 
better with the steam whistles, although both methods were slow, requiring as much as 
twenty-seven seconds per word.97  While the Squadron for Special Service was not 
directly adding to the Navy’s ability to fight in multi-ship formations, it was continuing 
the process by providing a venue to test such fleet essentials as effective signaling.  The 
Squadron left Barbados on 18 February, bound for Hampton Roads, the home waters of 
the East coast, and their next assignment at the Columbian Exposition of 1893.98
The mid to late-nineteenth century witnessed an explosion in the popularity of 
large, international fairs and expositions.  A series of world’s fairs held in London and 
Paris from the 1850’s to the 1880’s proved immensely successful as celebrations of 
European progress and wealth.  By the 1890’s, the United States was ready to host a 
lavish debut onto the world stage.  The 400th anniversary of Columbus’ discovery of the 
New World proved to be a perfect opportunity.  The 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian 
Exposition which ran from 1 May to 30 October 1893 is most famous in popular memory 
for bringing us Cracker Jack and the Farris Wheel.  More serious historians have treated 
the underlying themes of race, gender, and class that underscored the opulent 
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The International Naval Review and Rendezvous was scheduled to be held in 
conjunction with the Columbian Exposition in Chicago.  Congress had appropriated 
$250,000.00 for this purpose, and expected that every available warship of the New Steel 
Navy would be represented.  On 1 March 1893, the Squadron for Special Service, the 
North Atlantic Squadron, and the South Atlantic Squadron were disestablished.  In their 
place, the Secretary of the Navy issued Special Order No. 2, creating the Naval Review 
Fleet.  Commanded by Rear Admiral Gherardi, the Naval Review Fleet consisted of the 
First Squadron under South Atlantic C-in-C Rear Admiral A.E.K. Benham in his flagship 
Newark, and the Second Squadron with Rear Admiral J.G. Walker as the commander in 
his flagship Chicago.  A Patrol Division was also established, with Captain Frederick 
Rodgers in command.  This fleet not only represented the largest concentration of U.S. 
naval power since the Key West maneuvers of 1874, it was also the first time since the 
Civil War that an attempt was made – although largely administrative and not tactical – 
to bring ships of various types and missions together under a single commander.   
  Rarely, though, does one run across mention of one of the major 
components of the celebration, because it took place some 1000 miles from the Fair itself, 
in the waters off New York City. 
Anxious to be back aboard “his” flagship after his trip with the Squadron for 
Special Service, Gherardi shifted his flag to Philadelphia on 20 March.  Although the two 
vessels were sister ships, built by the same shipyard, Philadelphia’s quarters and “certain 
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other arrangements” were preferred by Gherardi for use as his flagship.100  From the 
beginning, Gherardi made it clear that he expected the two squadrons and all of their 
assigned ships to act as a unified command while the Naval Review Fleet was in 
existence.  A “Routine and Instructions” was published in booklet form and copies were 
sent to every ship.  On 1 March, Rear Admiral Walker immediately and properly reported 
to Gherardi in New York.  This marked at least the fourth time in the last three years that 
Walker had been placed under the direct authority of Rear Admiral Gherardi.  For 
someone who was so concerned about the image of his squadron and had coveted the 
North Atlantic C-in-C position for so long, to have communications to and from the Navy 
Department now have to pass through Rear Admiral Gherardi, subject to his 
endorsement, must have exasperated Walker.  The obvious glee with which the New 
York newspapers speculated on Walker’s humiliation did not help matters.101  
Throughout the Naval Review Fleet correspondence, virtually every communication that 
had to do with Rear Admiral Walker had a slightly negative tone about it. On 24 March, 
Walker complained to the Navy Department that Rear Admiral Gherardi’s staff had not 
provided his ship with copies of the new “Wig-Wag” signal book.  Gherardi’s chief of 
staff put an exasperated-sounding endorsement on the complaint, noting that Chicago had 
been provided with 25 copies of the new signal book, but that the flagship would be 
happy to send over another 30 copies, addressed specifically to Rear Admiral Walker.102
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On 29 March, an annoyed Gherardi responded to a Navy Department query about landing 
facilities at Norfolk, stating that he had asked Walker that very question already and was 
still waiting for the reply.  “As soon as I reach Hampton Roads, the existing landing 
facilities will be carefully examined…”  It does not take much to read between the lines 
the fact that Walker had simply ignored Gherardi’s instructions to carry out the task at 
Norfolk.”103
Walker’s North Atlantic Squadron was, characteristically, not concentrated but 
spread throughout the area of operations.  Atlanta was at Key West, having recently 
returned from relieving Kearsarge in Haitian waters.  Concord was in Norfolk, just back 
from her mission to Colón, Colombia.  Miantonomoh was in New York, from whence she 
rarely ventured due to her slow speed and poor sea-keeping qualities.  The North Atlantic 
Squadron was rounded out by the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, which was on her way back 




                                                                                                                                                 
Gherardi to Secnav, 24 March 1893, 1893," Endorsement, RG313, Records of Naval Operating Forces, 
1849 - 1980, Washington, D.C. . 
  From the South Atlantic Squadron, Rear Admiral Benham was 
returning from his mission to Europe, where he had taken part in several 
commemorations of Christopher Columbus’ European connections before leaving Cadiz, 
Spain with Newark and Bennington.  The two ships were towing across the Atlantic two 
of the three replicas of Columbus’ caravels, Nina, Pinta, and Santa Maria, which the 
Spanish government had donated to the Exposition.   
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Bringing this diverse collection of vessels together as one unit was a problem that 
continued to occupy much of Rear Admiral Gherardi’s time.  One of the first things that 
he observed was that there was no standard paint scheme for the New Steel Navy.  
Gherardi ordered that the masts and stacks of all ships under his command be painted to 
match the flagship, for “uniformity in appearance.”  There is no evidence that Gherardi 
was concerned about this as C-in-C of the North Atlantic Squadron.  Probably, his ships 
were never together long enough for the issue to become apparent to him, but with twelve 
ships guaranteed to be together for the review, it had to be addressed.  Gherardi’s order 
caused objections from the bureaus who felt that they were responsible for the painting of 
ships, but he got his way and the ships were repainted.   
Rear Admiral Walker departed New York for Hampton Roads on 15 March in his 
flagship Chicago.  Already there, shuttling between the Navy Yard at Norfolk and 
anchorage in Hampton Roads were Newark, San Francisco, Charleston, Atlanta, 
Concord, and Dolphin.  Bennington, which had been engaged in towing the replica 
caravel Pinta across the Atlantic from Spain, arrived on 26 March.105  On 30 March, 
Admiral Gherardi left New York in Philadelphia, with Baltimore, Vesuvius, Yorktown, 
and Cushing in company.  The warships arrived at Hampton Roads the next day.106
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  Rear 
Admiral Gherardi immediately began shaping his command into a fleet.  The 
correspondence at this time shows a leader who was aware of rivalry among the flag 
officers and taking extra pains to establish a clear chain-of-command.  Within hours of 
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his arrival in Hampton Roads, he fired off a curt note to Rear Admiral Benham, who was 
already in Norfolk with Newark:  “I can only explain your failure to report to me since 
your arrival by the supposition that you have not received [General Order No. 1, 
establishing the Naval Review Fleet].107
His fleet’s chain-of-command and uniformity in appearance were two things on 
the Admiral’s mind, but signaling and cruising in formation were to be even more serious 
problems for the Naval Review Fleet.  A new signal system, which had been worked out 
in the North Atlantic Squadron, had been approved by the Bureau of Navigation and was 
to be used by the Naval Review Fleet to supplement the standard Navy code.
   
108
On 4 April, Gherardi ordered every ship currently at Hampton to sea for four days 
of exercises under the overall command of Rear Admiral Walker.  While at sea, Walker 
was ordered to “exercise [his] Squadron as per paragraphs eight and nine, of Section five, 
  
Difficulties in communication were compounded by the fact that the various different 
types of vessels required different rudder angles to describe the agreed-upon standard 
turning circle of 2730 feet.  Gherardi had two buoys placed in Lynhaven Roads exactly 
2840 feet apart, and ordered his ships to describe a perfect half circle between the two 
buoys (an extra 110 feet allowed so that the ships would not run the buoys over).  They 
were to note the rudder angle required to perform this maneuver, which would then be 
known as that ship’s “Standard Full Rudder.”  The fact that Gherardi had to devote time 
prior to the Naval Review to work on details such as this shows a navy that was still 
unaccustomed, even in 1893, to operating in formation. 
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“Programme for Naval Review”.  Specifically, they were to drill at getting underway 
together, keeping position when steaming in column, changing direction two and four 
points, and anchoring together.109  Squadron commanders were also to ascertain the 
number of revolutions necessary to maintain a set speed of eight knots, and the standard 
full helm, using the method described above.  Competence at each of these tasks by the 
officers and crews of each ship would be important if all twelve ships were to maneuver 
together without mishap during the Naval Review.110
Gherardi’s orders to Walker on this occasion make very interesting reading, more 
for what was not said than what was printed in the order.  They were detailed, explicit, 
and professionally correct to the letter.  Walker is specifically instructed to “signal for 
permission to get underway”, and later to “make the necessary anchoring signals, but 
signal for permission to anchor.”  These were both signals which would have been 
professionally expected without a prompt, but Gherardi was taking no chances, and was 
explicit about putting Walker in his place.  Rear Admiral Benham was sent out to do 
essentially the same thing with his 1st Squadron on 11 April.  Gherardi’s orders to 
Benham also spell out various things the Commander-in-Chief wanted done as far as 
getting underway and anchoring, but the phrase “signal for permission” is never used.  
Reading the two sets of orders side-by-side (Walker and Benham probably did not see 
each other’s orders), makes it clear that Gherardi wanted no repetition of the ugly 
business with Walker in Haiti in 1891, hence the specific language in Walker’s version.   
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Both squadrons were sent out on 11 April, drilling independently under the 
command of their respective squadron commanders.  Upon their return to Hampton 
Roads on 14 April, they anchored in their Rendezvous formation, each ship riding to a 
single anchor, two cables (about 480 yards) apart.  The “United States Fleet”, as Gherardi 
had taken to calling it in his correspondence, was ready for the Review.  That same day, 
the bulk of the foreign naval contingents began to arrive.  Two ships of the Russian 
squadron, the armored cruiser General Admiral and the corvette Kynda were already 
there, having arrived on 8 and 10 April, respectively.  They were followed by the Italian 
cruiser Giovanni Bausan and the French cruiser Jean Bart.  On 14 April, the entire 
British squadron arrived, consisting of the flagship of the North Atlantic and West Indies 
Squadron, the protected cruiser Blake, attended by the cruisers Australia, Magicienne, the 
torpedo cruiser Tartar, and the gunboat Partridge.  The last-named ship, Partridge, did 
not get to stay for the review, being called away on 19 April to deal with civil unrest in 
Nassau.111
The Dutch were next to arrive, on 17 April, with the cruiser Van Speijk.  Also 
arriving on 17 April was the French cruiser Hussard, which joined the Jean Bart.  On 18 
April, the German squadron, consisting of the protected cruiser Kaiserin Augusta and the 
small Colónial cruiser Seeadler, arrived, the latter under tow as she had run out of coal 
during the crossing.  The U.S. Navy apparently was not the only one that was learning to 
deal with the logistical side of power projection in the steam era.  On 19 April, the French 
flagship, the cruiser Arethuse, arrived and took her place at the head of the French 
squadron.  The next day, the Italian flagship, the cruiser Etna, arrived and took her place 
   
                                                 




at the head of the Italian squadron.  On 21 April the Spanish squadron, towing the three 
replicas of Columbus’ caravels, arrived.112
The Spanish squadron got underway two days later, as they would require extra 
time to tow the replica caravels to New York.  That same evening, the Brazilians arrived 
with three ships: the ironclad Aquidaban, the Tiradentes, and Republica.  These were the 
last vessels to join the Naval Review Fleet before they proceeded to New York.  The 
rendezvous at Hampton Roads was complete.  With all ships assembled, a round of 
entertainments began.  Admiral Gherardi gave a dinner for the flag and commanding 
officers of the visiting warships on board Dolphin, which had returned on 22 April from 
an errand to Annapolis to pick up the Secretary of the Navy.  Meanwhile, the wardroom 
officers of the U.S. ships entertained the foreign wardroom officers on two separate 
occasions.  There were dances ashore, in Norfolk, as well.  The social events culminated 
with a dinner for the flag officers on board Dolphin with the Secretary of the Navy.  The 
enlisted men had fewer opportunities for gala affairs, but a series of boat races were held, 
resulting in “handsome prizes” from the host city.
 
113  There were also baseball games – 
Chicago in particular was said to have an excellent “nine”, and a competition for ships’ 
bands, with a cash prize for the one judged to be the best.114
On 24 April, it was time for the international fleet to begin its journey to New 
York.  The United States Fleet got underway first, weighing anchor at 9:00 AM.  The 
twelve ships were reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy as they passed Dolphin, then 
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passed between the visiting squadrons, which were still at anchor, as they proceeded to 
sea.  There is no doubt that this was done with a purpose.  The Navy which, twenty years 
earlier was mortified that any foreigners would see the motley collection of wooden 
cruising vessels at Key West, now not only had four credentialed correspondents 
embarked, but were pointedly passing in review in front of an assembly of modern 
warships from major naval countries.115  In this display the United States was 
proclaiming its new international status.116  The assembled U.S. warships compared 
favorably in appearance to the various protected and unprotected cruisers of other 
countries.  This was a relatively new state of affairs.  Even five years earlier, the warships 
of the North Atlantic Squadron had consisted entirely of “Old Navy” wooden cruising 
vessels.  The Army and Navy Journal recognized this: “What an exhibition we should 
have made of ourselves had Columbus landed a few years earlier so as to bring the four 
hundredth anniversary of his landing within the eighties,” noted an editorial.117
The fleet steamed in two columns up the East coast, the American, Dutch, and 
German ships on the port side and British, Russian, French, Italian and Brazilian vessels 
on the starboard.  The two columns were 600 yards apart, with an interval of 300 yards 
between ships in column.
 
118
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  While this made an impressive sight during the day, it was 
not a safe formation for nighttime transit, so as evening approached, Philadelphia 
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signaled for the fleet to form columns of squadrons, each led by its own flagship, for the 
night.  The night passed uneventfully, and the review columns were formed again in the 
morning.  
As the fleet arrived in the waters of New York, they were met first by the 
Argentine flagship 9th of July and later by the Russian flagship, Dimitri Donskoi, which 
were already in New York.  Also waiting for Rear Admiral Gherardi’s arrival was the 
Patrol Division of the Naval Review Fleet, commanded by Captain Frederick Rodgers.  
Captain Rodgers had set up a headquarters at the Army Building on Whitehall Street in 
New York City, and commanded the movements of the torpedo boat Stilletto, and every 
Navy tug that could be spared on the East coast, as well as Revenue Marine (forerunner 
of today’s Coast Guard) steamers, Light House steamers, Naval Reserve and police tugs 
and other service craft.119
The question of a parade had been on the minds of the organizers of the event 
from the beginning.  The Committee of One Hundred was anxious to get the sailors, U.S. 
as well as foreign, off their ships and into the city.  Admiral Gherardi, perhaps more than 
a little familiar with the trouble that could be caused by 9000 sailors loose in New York 
City, was just as adamantly against the idea.  The Committee went ahead with the 
planning for an entertainment for the men at the 7th Regiment Armory Building, the idea 
being that the sailors would march from the landings to the Armory after the afloat 
portion of the Naval Review had been completed.  They continued to pressure Admiral 
Gherardi until he cabled the Navy Department from Hampton Roads on 18 April, asking 
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if he was going to be given the authority to invite the foreign squadrons to land armed 
forces for a parade.120
The fleet spent the night of 25 April at anchor in the Lower Bay, where they were 
joined by the Spanish squadron, which had completed delivery of the Nina, Pinta, and 
Santa Maria replicas.  At 9:00 AM on 26 April, Admiral Gherardi flew the preparatory 
signal for getting underway.  At 9:25, a gun was fired and the entire fleet began to move 
north, towards the Narrows at eight knots.  The ships were arranged in the same two 
columns they had traveled up from Hampton Roads in, with the U.S. squadron, led by 
Philadelphia at the head of one column and the British squadron, led by Blake at the head 
of the other, 600 yards apart.  The formation passed through the Narrows and stood up 
the Upper Bay into the North River, where they tightened their formation to a distance of 
400 yards between columns.  With the assistance of the Patrol Division, the Fleet came to 
its final anchorage positions, each marked by a buoy, at 11:45 AM.   
  Unlike the military disciplinarian Admiral Gherardi, the 
politically-savvy Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert was in favor of a parade, and on 
20 April, Gherardi notified Thomas F. Gilroy, the Mayor of New York, that he planned to 
land 1200 of his men and that it was possible that the visiting squadrons would as well. 
The next day, signal guns from Dolphin and Miantonomoh announced that 
President Cleveland had embarked.  The Naval Review was underway.  After the difficult 
formation maneuvering, the actual review was easier for the ships, as they were 
stationary, with all hands manning the rails.  Dolphin moved between the two columns of 
ships.  As her bow reached the stern of each ship, their guard presented arms; her band 
sounded ruffles and flourishes and played the “Star Spangled Banner”, then gave a 
                                                 
120 Bancroft Gherardi, RADM, "Telegram, Gherardi to Secnav, 18 April 1893, 1893," Telegram, RG 45, 
Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
244 
 
twenty-one gun salute.  Following close behind Dolphin was the U.S. Coast Survey 
steamer Blake with members of the diplomatic corps on board, the steamer Monmouth 
with members of Congress, governors of states, and mayors of cities, and the steamer 
General Meigs with the Duke de Varagus and his retinue on board.   
After a luncheon for dignitaries and the flag and commanding officers of the fleet 
on board Dolphin, the President boarded a launch and was landed near 48th Street.  With 
a final salute to the Chief Executive, the Naval Review was over.  At this point, the Patrol 
Division, which had been keeping civilian sightseeing boats away from the fleet, 
removed their cordon, and the civilian craft flocked around the warships.  That evening, 
the spotlights of each ship lit up the harbor in a fascinating display of electrical power 
and pyrotechnics.  This was followed on 28 April by the much-anticipated and 
unprecedented parade through New York of sailors from the international fleet.121
Rear Admiral A.E.K. Benham Takes Over 
   
 
As the celebration drew to a close, the Navy Department had decisions to make 
about the future assignments, not only of all the ships concentrated in New York, but of 
the various flag officers involved.  The disposition of the United States Fleet and the flag 
officer assignments after the Naval Review had been a subject of open speculation 
throughout the spring.  As the senior officer in the Navy, having been at sea for over four 
years with the North Atlantic Squadron, the Squadron for Special Service, and the Naval 
Review Fleet, it would have made sense that the successful completion of the 
International Naval Review would have signaled the end of his career.  It was reported, 
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however, that Gherardi wished to remain on active duty until his statutory retirement for 
age in 1894, and that the command he wanted was his old North Atlantic Squadron.  
This, of course, would place him directly in conflict with his old nemesis, Rear Admiral 
John Grimes Walker.122  Secretary Herbert, with barely three months on the job, had a 
political minefield to negotiate, and he settled the question by giving none of the flag 
officers exactly what they had requested.  Rear Admiral Gherardi became the 
Commandant of the New York Navy Yard, relieving Captain Erben, who was scheduled 
to take Chicago to European waters to become Commander-in-Chief, European Station.  
Rear Admiral Walker was sent on three months leave, to await orders, and Rear Admiral 
A.E.K. Benham, who had been C-in-C of the South Atlantic Station, was named the new 
C-in-C, North Atlantic Station.123
The disposition of the ships elicited almost as much interest as the flag officer 
assignments.  The Naval Review Fleet represented the best and newest ships the New 
Steel Navy had to offer, and where the Navy Department decided to station them would 
speak volumes about the Cleveland Administration’s priorities.
   
124  The decisions 
eventually arrived at created a situation which prompted the New York Times to remark: 
“At no time within recent years has the United States Government been so well 
represented in foreign waters by an armed naval force, nor so poorly provided for in ships 
at home.”125
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Immediately after the Naval Review, five of the twelve ships comprising the U.S. 
Fleet were sent to navy yards to be fitted out for deployment.  There was some concern 
that it might appear impolite for so many of the U.S. warships to depart the anchorage 
before the visitors had left, but Assistant Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo 
hastened to explain that the seven ships left could handle all of the entertaining that 
would be expected for the foreign visitors.126
By the end of 1893, all of these moves nominally left four ships for the Home 
Squadron: The flagship, San Francisco, Kearsarge, which was one of the last of the 
wooden cruisers, the double-ended monitor Miantonomoh, and Vesuvius, the 
experimental dynamite cruiser whose 15-inch pneumatic guns were of questionable value 
in actual combat.  In spite of the popularity of Mahan’s new theories of seapower, the 
decision had been made to scatter the New Steel Navy throughout the world, in support 
of U.S. trade interests.  “It is intended,” reported the New York Times,” to keep ships of 
war in the waters of countries where there is a chance of increasing American trade…The 
idea is based on the theory that American interests will be respected when an American 
  Eventually, Philadelphia was sent to 
Honolulu, Hawaii, where naval troops from Boston had just figured decisively in the 
overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy.  Yorktown and Charleston were sent to the Pacific 
Squadron as well.  Newark went back to the South American Squadron.  Chicago, as 
mentioned previously, went to Europe as the flagship of the European Station, taking 
Bennington with her.  Concord went to the Asiatic Squadron.  Bancroft was sent to the 
Naval Academy to be used as a training ship for the naval cadets.  Atlanta was put out of 
commission. 
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Before these movements could be completed, and before Gherardi had even had 
an opportunity to relinquish command of the Naval Review Fleet, a new crisis was 
underway in Central America.  A revolution had broken out in Nicaragua, and on 9 May 
telegraphic orders came from the Navy Department to Admiral Gherardi in New York to 
dispatch Atlanta to Greytown, Nicaragua, to protect American interests – specifically the 
men and equipment of the Nicaragua Canal Company, which was in the final stages of its 
failed attempt to build a trans-oceanic canal through Nicaragua.  The Nicaragua Canal 
Company was a large concern, which had powerful friends in Washington, and the 
protection of the sizable capital investment made by the Company was of the utmost 
importance, both from a foreign policy standpoint as well as political considerations at 
home. 
  In many ways, it was an unsatisfying end to the magnificent 
“coming-out” party of the United States Fleet. 
The Navy Department’s order touched off a series of events which culminated in 
the relief of Atlanta’s commanding officer.  On the heels of the massive festivities in 
New York, Captain Higginson of the Atlanta was apparently caught completely flat-
footed by the order to deploy overseas.  He offered excuses for his inaction.  Atlanta 
needed coal, which the Navy Department, through the New York Navy Yard, had to 
purchase and deliver.  A lighter of coal appeared, tied up to Atlanta, then disappeared 
during the night.  No one had any idea where it had gone or what had happened to the 
load of coal that had been purchased by the Department.  This necessitated the re-
ordering of the coal and the services of another lighter.  Meanwhile, Higginson was 
worried that he did not have enough officers on board, especially if he had to land the 
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naval battalion, and he began pestering the Bureau of Navigation for extra officers to be 
assigned.  On the mechanical side, two of her six boilers needed new tubes.  In spite of all 
this, it was the opinion of the Department that Atlanta could sail.  It was not considered a 
problem for her to rely on the other four of her six boilers to get to Nicaragua, but 
Captain Higginson was reluctant to attempt this.  Things came to a head when Higginson 
sent an ill-advised telegram direct to the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, Chief 
Engineer Melville, essentially begging him not to allow Atlanta to sail.  Secretary of the 
Navy Herbert was incensed by this direct communication to a bureau chief, viewing it as 
insubordination.128  Throughout all this it did not help matters that the New York papers, 
already heavily attuned to naval matters because of the Naval Review, reported daily on 
the failure of Atlanta to get underway to deal with the Nicaraguan crisis.129
Atlanta finally left New York on 12 May.  She proceeded to Jamaica, pulling in 
on 20 May for coal, and finally making Greytown, Nicaragua on 24 May 1893, 15 days 
after the Department’s telegram to Rear Admiral Gherardi.  Captain Higginson 
immediately sized up the situation on the ground.  After consulting with Mr. Frank Davis 
of the Nicaragua Canal Construction Company, he found that the insurgents had taken 
control of the city that North Americans referred to as “Greytown”; known locally as San 
Juan del Norte.  They had deposed the governor and placed someone loyal to the 
insurgency, Señor Manuel Pasos, in charge.  Davis was concerned about security for the 
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property of the Nicaragua Canal Construction Company, which he valued at over 
$1,000,000.130
 Higginson worked out the details of Atlanta’s assistance for the Company.  He 
agreed to land troops – 36 men and 4 officers.  The landing party contained both Marines 
and sailors, but notably was under the command of a navy lieutenant, Higginson almost 
certainly having in mind the debacle with Chicago’s Marine detachment earlier in the 
year.  The instructions to Lieutenant Cutler were detailed.  His command and operations 
were to be confined strictly to the limits of the Canal Company’s property.  He was not to 
discuss political questions with any representatives of either the recently deposed 
government or the insurgency, instead referring everything to Captain Higginson.  He 
was to “avoid in every way giving offence to the inhabitants.”  Furthermore, Higginson 
cautioned Cutler to “be very careful about the health of your command, keeping the men 
out of the sun and observing all sanitary precautions.”
 
131
                                                 
130 Frank R. Davis, "Letter, Davis to Higginson, 25 May 1893, 1893," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
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  The threat of yellow fever was 
never far from the mind of anyone who had to operate in the region.  Atlanta’s coal 
supply was an issue for Captain Higginson as well, affecting his ability to stay on station.  
Mr. Davis promised to have the Company deliver some coal to Greytown that could be 
given to Atlanta, otherwise, she would have to leave after 24 days and proceed to Colón 
for coaling.  Higginson also fired off an official letter to the insurgent provisional 
governor of Greytown, informing him of his actions and promising to remain clear of any 
131 Francis Higginson, CAPT, "Letter, Higginson to Herbert, 25 May 1893, 1893," Letter, p. Enclosure No. 
3, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. .  Higginson’s 
sanitary instructions to Custer are amusing, given our modern understanding of the causes of yellow fever, 
e.g.: “Drills and work in the sun to be suspended between 8:30AM and 4:30PM, and no one to be allowed 




internal Nicaraguan political issues, so long as the property of the Nicaragua Canal 
Construction Company was respected.132
Governor Pasos’ reply was not long in coming, arriving the next day.  He was 
understandably insulted by the U.S. intrusion onto Nicaraguan soil, and concerned about 
the image of the new government as it was affected by what appeared to be a foreign 
occupation.  More importantly to Captain Higginson, he appeared willing to work to 
ensure the security of the American company’s property.  Higginson replied promptly, 
setting the conditions under which he would remove his security force.  These conditions 
were met by the insurgent government.  After some haggling over the size of the security 
force Pasos was supposed to supply, and in consultation with the U.S. consul and Mr. 
Davis of the Canal Company, Higginson ordered his forces removed on 28 May.  It 
would be his last official act as the commanding officer of Atlanta.  On the evening of 28 
May, Captain John R. Bartlett reported to Captain Higginson as his relief.  After 
Atlanta’s failure to get underway in a timely fashion, and Higginson’s telegram to Chief 
Engineer Melville, Secretary of the Navy Herbert had ordered his replacement the day 
after Atlanta finally left New York.  The turnover between the two men was cordial and 
professional.  Captain Bartlett accompanied Captain Higginson ashore on 29 May to 
inspect the Canal Company’s property and its security, and pronounced himself satisfied.  
Visits were exchanged with representatives of the Revolutionary government.  These had 
to be done surreptitiously, as the new government had not been recognized by the United 
States, but the revolutionary dignitaries were welcomed to Atlanta as private citizens of 
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Nicaragua, and the series of meetings was entirely successful.133  Atlanta spent another 
month on station, as the Revolutionary government consolidated its hold on the country 
and peace returned.  Ironically, the operations of the Nicaragua Canal Company had 
dwindled to almost a complete standstill, and Captain Bartlett reported that much of the 
equipment he was there to protect was falling into disrepair.134  During this time, one of 
Captain Bartlett’s greatest worries was his coal supply, and he constantly had to come up 
with innovative ways to get it, such as contracting with the Panama Railroad Company at 
Colón, Columbia to receive whatever leftovers the company could spare, or asking the 
Navy Department to send him some on a steamer.  His constant preoccupation with this 
problem serves to demonstrate the limitations of the U.S. Navy’s power projection 
capabilities with large numbers of steam-powered warships at this point.135
Conclusions 
  Atlanta 
departed for Norfolk on 26 June, leaving behind a failed U.S. business investment and the 
dream of a canal across the isthmus that would have to wait another decade.  Upon her 
arrival in Norfolk, she was put out of commission 
 
On 31 May 1893, Rear Admiral Gherardi hauled down his flag as commander-in-
chief of the Naval Review Fleet and moved ashore to take over as Commandant of the 
Navy Yard and Station, New York.  Rear Admiral A.E.K Benham became the 
Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, aboard his flagship San Francisco.  
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The rest of the fall of ’93 remained relatively quiet.  San Francisco traveled to Newport, 
Rhode Island in August for the opening of that year’s Naval War College class.  She was 
joined there by Miantonomoh and Vesuvius, the former taking the Rhode Island Naval 
Militia on board for their yearly training. 
Less than two months after the Naval Review, an event occurred which shocked 
the naval community.  On 22 June 1893, HMS Victoria, the flagship of the British 
Mediterranean Fleet, collided with HMS Camperdown during a tactical maneuver.  She 
sank in minutes, taking most of her crew with her.  A Royal Navy inquiry placed the 
blame for the disaster squarely on Vice Admiral Sir George Tryon, who had ordered a 
complicated maneuver without enough space between ships to carry it out.  U.S. naval 
officers used the occasion to point out: “the necessity of constant practice…to prevent 
just such calamities in time of war and to familiarize our officers and men with the exact 
turning radius of each ship.”136
In spite of this lesson, the Squadron since the Naval Review was not much of a 
squadron.  By October of 1893, it consisted of Benham’s flagship, the protected cruiser 
San Francisco, which represented the only operational modern warship of the Squadron.  
The double-turreted monitor Miantonomoh, which never strayed far from her New York 
homeport.  The venerable wooden cruiser Kearsarge was a relic suitable only to show the 
flag in Caribbean ports.  The Navy Department was unsure what to make of the yacht-
like appearance and unconventional pneumatic guns of the experimental Vesuvius, 
consequently she spent much of her time doing utility work, finding and destroying 
hazards to navigation along the East coast.  The newly-commissioned Machias was in 
  
                                                 




Norfolk fitting out for an eventual cruise to the West Indies.137  No two of these ships 
were alike, had the same functions, or had been designed with any thought to their being 
used together.  When Benham left New York for the yearly cruise to the West Indies, his 
flagship went by itself.  In fact, in his monthly report to the Navy Department, Benham 
confessed that the report was only accurate up to 18 October.  “Since the latter date I 
have not been informed of their distribution or employment.”138
Admiral Benham’s plans for a peaceful winter cruise from port to port in the 
Caribbean were dashed when revolution broke out in Brazil.  San Francisco sailed on 21 
December 1893, for Rio de Janeiro.  Captain Philip, of the newly-commissioned New 
York received a telegram on 26 December, ordering her to sea immediately from New 
York.  The aftermath of the incident with Captain Higginson and Atlanta in May was 
obviously in Captain Philip’s mind, as he sent a frantic letter ashore from his anchorage 
in Gravesend Bay that evening, stating that the tide was too low for New York to pass 
through “the knuckle” and proceed to open ocean, and enclosing a copy of the pilot’s 
written opinion for good measure.
  His December report 
was worse.  “I have no knowledge of the distribution or employment of the other ships of 
the Squadron during the month.  The evidence is clear that by 1893, the North Atlantic 
Squadron was a fighting unit in name only. 
139
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incumbent, Rear Admiral O.F. Stanton, proceeded north to act as a caretaker for the 
eviscerated North Atlantic Squadron until his retirement in August.  Training for the 
various naval militias took place during the summer, but otherwise no tactical exercises 
were conducted during 1894.  For much of this time, most of the Navy’s modern assets 
were with Benham in the South Atlantic.   
The years 1892-1894 had seen many steps forward in the process of developing a 
concept of multi-ship operations for the U.S. Navy.  The Squadron for Special Service 
and the Naval Review Fleet gave an entire generation of officers of the New Steel Navy 
vital experience in operating warships in formation.  The Navy Department worked 
through complications with structural components of a fleet, such as a clear chain-of-
command and a reliable logistics network.  The international community, as well as the 
American public, had a new image of an ascendant United States, viewed through the 
pageantry of the International Naval Review.  The process, however was not complete.   
The development of processes critical to the formation of a multi-ship fighting 
capability, namely tactics and doctrine, stagnated during this time.  The Navy 
Department’s attention was drawn instead to the political and diplomatic requirements 
associated with the Squadron for Special Service’s many official visits during its trip 
around Cape Horn, and the International Naval Review.  These shortcomings, however, 
were about to be addressed. 
With enough vessels of the New Steel Navy now in commission to cover the 
various stations, Secretary of the Navy Herbert announced a new squadron policy in 
1894.  Noting that “heretofore an insufficiency of numbers has, in cases of sudden 
emergency abroad, necessitated sending vessels from one station to another”, Herbert 
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declared that, from then on, he would “keep a number of cruising vessels sufficient for 
the ordinary needs of naval policing on each of the six stations.”   
This policy will allow frequent fleet and squadron evolutions, which are 
absolutely necessary for the instruction of officers and men.  To the North 
Atlantic, or home squadron, a sufficient number of vessels will be assigned to 
permit of a number being employed in practical exercises connected with the 
course of instruction at the Naval War College.  Vessels fitting out on this coast 
will generally remain attached to the North Atlantic Squadron for the first six 
months of their cruise, for purposes of instruction and to enable officers and men 
to familiarize themselves with their ships.  The home squadron will thus become 
the feeder for all the other squadrons.140
 
 
 This was Stephen B. Luce’s vision.  He had been unable, during his uniformed 
career, to see it through to completion, but the stage was now set for his theories to 
become reality.  The process of constructing an identity as a fighting force could only 
occur through rigorous exercise at sea.  The conditions were now favorable for such an 
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Chapter 5:  Luce’s Vision Realized.  The North Atlantic 
Squadron Solidifies a New Identity, 1895-1897 
 
The advances in multi-ship operations under Rear Admiral Gherardi greatly 
increased the logistical and operational ability of the Navy to field a formation of 
warships, Gherardi’s work, however, had been largely concerned with appearance, not 
tactical skills.  It remained for the North Atlantic Squadron to develop a greater measure 
of the substance of a multi-ship fighting capability.  By 1895, the Caribbean, the North 
Atlantic Squadron’s traditional area of operations, was troubled by the renewal of armed 
resistance against the Spanish Colonial authorities in Cuba.  Elsewhere, both Great 
Britain and Germany threatened the Monroe Doctrine with unilateral actions against 
Caribbean governments.  As the warships which had been authorized in the late 1880’s 
began to arrive in the Squadron, the commander-in-chief, for the first time, possessed the 
ability to concentrate enough vessels to regularly hold productive tactical exercises 
Squadron Cruise to the West Indies, 1895 
 
The warships of the North Atlantic Squadron had cruised the West Indies 
regularly since the establishment of the station in 1865.  Political and military 
requirements in the West Indies had often created roadblocks to effective squadron 
training, as the presence of one or more vessels was often urgently requested by the U.S. 
consulate whenever unrest broke out.  The Navy Department, under pressure from the 
Department of State, typically had stripped warships from the Home Squadron to fulfill 
these requests.  The winter of 1895, however, would be different.  For the first time in the 
thirty years of the station’s existence, in the absence of a crisis requiring separate 
257 
 
deployments, the warships of the North Atlantic Squadron would visit the ports of the 
West Indies – “showing the flag” as a squadron, not as individual cruising vessels.1
From his flagship New York, berthed at the navy yard in her namesake city, Rear 
Admiral R.W. Meade made preparations for the cruise.  His squadron consisted of the 
flagship, the new protected cruisers Columbia and Montgomery, Atlanta, and the 
experimental dynamite cruiser Vesuvius.  Columbia was the namesake of a new class of 
lightly protected but speedy cruisers designed specifically for commerce raiding.  She 
and her sister ship, Minneapolis, both built by the Philadelphia yards of Cramp and Sons, 
were fast for the time at just under 23 knots, but the machinery necessary to drive the 
unique triple-screw engines made for a cramped and uncomfortable ship when at sea for 
extended periods.  They were unpopular with sailors and officers alike, including 
Admiral Meade. 
           
2
                                                 
1 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 4 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . "The North Atlantic Squadron," New York Times 
(1857-1922), 21 January 1895. 
  Cincinnati and Raliegh were smaller protected cruisers.  Authorized in 
1888 and commissioned in 1894, they displaced 3213 tons (about half the size of 
Columbia) and had a top speed of 19 knots.  Montgomery, launched in June 1894, was 
technically listed as an “unprotected cruiser”, but she was often referred to as a “peace 
cruiser”, the implication being that she was suited for peacetime patrolling duties but not 
engagement in combat with major warships.   With a top speed of 19 knots and a mixed 
armament of 6” and 5” guns, Montgomery was essentially a slightly-larger version of a 
gunboat.  The Squadron was rounded out by Atlanta, one of the original “ABCD” ships, 
and Vesuvius.  The latter was technically referred to as a “cruiser”, but at 929 tons she 
 
2 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 1 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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was really more of an unarmored experimental gun platform than a warship.  Taken 
together, the seven warships which made up the Noth Atlantic Squadron represented a 
national naval strategy which emphasized the traditional functions of cruising and attacks 
on commerce (see Table 7).  This was not, however, how the Department intended to 
utilize them in 1895.   
Secretary Herbert and Rear Admiral Meade’s objectives for this deployment were 
to be unlike what the annual Secretary of the Navy report had come to call the “usual 
winter’s cruise”.  As he told a newspaper reporter: “Everything regarding the capabilities 
and weaknesses of the new navy is as yet experimental…a fleet hastily assembled and 
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THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON – 1895 



















19KTS 1X6” RAPID FIRE 
10X5” RAPID FIRE 
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15.6KTS 2X8” BLR 
6X6” BLR 




VESUVIUS 929 DYNAMITE 
CRUISER 





Table 8: The North Atlantic Squadron, 18954
 
 
In order to have a squadron that could perform tactical maneuvers together, it was 
first necessary to get rid of warships that would be unable to keep up with the most 
modern vessels.5
                                                 
4 Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the 
Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909. 
  A request from the city of New Orleans to have a representative of the 
New Steel Navy at their Mardi Gras celebration provided the perfect excuse to detach 
 
5 Timothy Wolters makes this point in Wolters, "Recapitalizing the Fleet: A Material Analysis of Late-
Nineteenth-Century U.S. Naval Power." 
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Atlanta, which was already at Hampton Roads.6  Now nine years old, her horizontal 
compound engines were a generation behind the vertical triple expansion engines of the 
newer cruisers, and her top speed of fifteen knots was four to eight knots slower than the 
other ships in the squadron.  In addition, Rear Admiral Meade apparently did not like her 
commanding officer.7
New York departed Navy Yard New York for Hampton Roads on 10 January.  She 
traveled alone down the coast to Norfolk, arriving on 13 January.  In the meantime, the 
other ships of the squadron were finishing their post-commissioning fitting out and 
preparation for deployment.    Raleigh was to be sent to Newport to have her torpedo 
outfit installed, while Cincinnati was still in the New York Navy Yard and Columbia had 
work to be performed on her at the Norfolk Navy Yard.
  Vesuvius was detached from the North Atlantic Squadron on 2 
January 1895, and detailed by the Navy Department to search for and destroy partially 
submerged wrecks and other hazards to navigation along the East coast.   
8  Montgomery was in Mobile, 
Alabama, performing coal tests for the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting.9
                                                 
6 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Cromwell, 17 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of 
the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. ; R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to 
Herbert, 17 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, 
Washington, D.C. . 
  Concerned 
about an outbreak of measles and convinced that a warmer climate would “destroy or 
drive out the disease germs”, Rear Admiral Meade departed Hampton Roads as soon as 
 
7 “I regret to say that I did not expect very much from Captain Cromwell when I heard he had been 
appointed to the ATLANTA…”  Meade, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 17 January 1895. " 
 
8 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 13 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of 
the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. .  The Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode 
Island, installed all torpedo equipment on ships. 
 
9 Equipment and Recruiting was responsible for procuring and delivering coal to the fleet.  The quality and 
grade of coal used in a ship’s fireroom was crucial to the performance of its engines. 
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he was able to collect Cincinnati and Raleigh.  The three ships left on 30 January 1895.10
Rear Admiral Meade found much to satisfy him on his squadron’s first underway 
evolution together.  On the way to St. Thomas, the ships exercised at maneuvers and held 
signal drills.
  
Minneapolis and Columbia were to follow when their yard work was completed.  The 
Squadron made for St. Thomas, Dutch West Indies, stopping at Samana Bay along the 
way to check for the rumored presence of the French fleet.   
11  Meade had observations to make about both.  On the whole, he was 
pleased with the performance of his flagship, New York, although he felt that she had too 
much woodwork and other flammable materials that needed to be removed after her 
current commission was up.12  He was, however, less impressed with the protected 
cruisers.  These he criticized as difficult to steer handily and inefficient in the burning of 
coal.  His problems as a commander-in-chief also included the inability to send signals 
efficiently, both night and day.  “On this trip I made twelve pages of fools-cap [scratch 
paper],” lamented Meade, “of signals important at this day that are absolutely ignored in 
the General Signal Book, each of which should be made in one hoist of flags.”13
                                                 
10 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 30 January 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of 
the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
  The 
more time his warships spent in company with the flagship, the more the inadequacy of 
the Navy’s signaling system was exposed. 
 
11 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 1 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
12 The Battle of the Yalu in 1894 yielded several important lessons learned, among them the danger of 
flying splinters from interior woodwork shattered by enemy shells impacting on the armored exterior 
surface of a ship.  Admiral Meade obviously had this in mind when he criticized the internal arrangements 
of New York.  
 
13 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 6 February 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of 
the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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From St. Thomas, the three ships went to St. Croix, then St. Lucia before stopping 
at St. Pierre, Martinique, then St. Lucia, and finally Bridgetown, Barbados.  Here, the 
Squadron paused to celebrate Washington’s Birthday.  The holiday provided another 
opportunity for the Squadron to grow together as a team.  A series of boat races was 
organized, including a printed program outlining the rules and the different classes of 
boats for each race.  There was nothing new about marking holidays with boat races 
between ships that happened to be in port together, but this particular event, with its 
printed program advertising the races of the “United States Squadron”, provides another 
small piece of evidence pointing to the solidification of a permanent identity for the 
North Atlantic Squadron.14
Meanwhile, Captain Cromwell of the Atlanta was keeping a wary eye on the 
revolution underway in Colombia.  On 25 February, he reported to the Department that 
since Atlanta had been dispatched to Colón, there had been three attempts to start fires in 
the city with incendiary devices.  Fortunately, none had been successful.  Cromwell 
continued to guard U.S. interests in the isthmus, particularly the property and operations 
of the Panama Railroad Company.
   
15
The Squadron left for Port-au-Spain, Trinidad on 28 February, arriving on 1 
March.  Although Rear Admiral Meade was irritated that the local authorities had not 
acknowledged Washington’s Birthday, but otherwise the visit at Barbados had been a 
success.  The U.S. consul noted that the local officials had arranged a ball for the officers 
of the squadron – the first time he was aware of that “any public entertainment has been 
 
                                                 
14 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 23 February 1895, 1895," Letter, p. Enclosure #2, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
15 Cromwell, "Letter, Cromwell to Herbert, 25 Feburary 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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given in honor of the visit of foreign warships.”  Meade sent a proper letter of thanks to 
the committee in charge of the dance, which was reprinted in the local paper.  If he was 
unhappy with the authorities, he at least kept it to himself while he was there.   
In his 1 March situation report, Meade praised the idea of having the three ships 
cruise together, boasting that: “I am informed by officers who served in the White 
Squadron that the NEW YORK, RALEIGH, and CINCIN11NATI keep better line and 
column, and maneuver better than the White Squadron did after six months practice…”16  
He went on to properly give some of the credit for this to his ships’ twin screw designs, 
but his delight in the Squadron’s prowess was unmistakable.17  He was also proud of their 
signaling ability, which he exercised daily, but was of the opinion that the current system 
of signaling would have to be improved upon if a number of vessels were going to 
operate together and maneuver rapidly.18  Meade’s chief-of-staff, New York’s 
commanding officer, Captain Robley Evans, noted that “Admiral Meade…gave us 
admirable and systematic drill.  Modern methods and appliances were used in a modern 
way – torpedoes were run under service conditions and searchlights used to their utmost 
capacity as a means of communicating…”19
The Squadron’s stay in Port-au-Spain took a dramatic turn on 4 March when a 
large fire was spotted downtown.  Rear Admiral Meade immediately gave orders for all 
three of his ships to prepare fire parties to go ashore, and dispatched an officer to the U.S. 
consulate with an offer of assistance.  Meade was concerned about landing troops on 
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17 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 3 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
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foreign territory without a formal request for assistance from the local authorities.  This 
led to some delay in sending the boats ashore.  As the fire grew in intensity, Chief-of-
Staff Evans took the initiative to order about 225 men from all three ships to land in the 
city and provide assistance.20  After about four hours ashore, the tide had turned and the 
rest of the city was saved.  The next day, a letter from the governor arrived on board New 
York, profusely thanking the men of the North Atlantic Squadron for their timely 
assistance.  Meade promptly had the letter copied into a circular order and ordered it read 
to all hands at quarters.  It was a great example of squadron teamwork, and what Capt. 
Evans referred to as “the most important work of Admiral Meade’s squadron during the 
West India cruise.”21
While the city of Port-au-Spain was still smoking, Minneapolis arrived from the 
U.S., fresh from having her torpedo outfit installed at Newport.  Rear Admiral Meade, 
whose criticism of the unarmored protected cruisers has already been discussed, was 
unimpressed.  He ridiculed the “much vaunted ocean racer ‘Minneapolis’” in a report to 
the Department, pointing out that she had arrived in Trinidad, six days from Newport 
with only 740 tons of coal remaining on board.
 
22
                                                 
20 A formal request from the governor arrived about 10 minutes after the boats cast off.  Robley notes in his 
autobiography that the delay caused “much property to be lost”.  In Meade’s defense, the North Atlantic 
Squadron had not had great luck with putting landing parties ashore over the previous couple of years – 
Chicago’s 1894 debacle with drunken Marines and Atlanta’s strained relationship with the new 
revolutionary government of Nicaragua after putting troops ashore being two examples.  See Chapter 4.  
Meade probably had these things in mind when hesitating to land assistance. 
  In contrast, Meade’s beloved New York 
had been at sea for 34 days and was not short on coal, while being capable of 21 knots 
and having armament and armor far superior to that of Minneapolis.  The cost of 
construction of the two ship classes was about the same.  Meade did not see the value of 
 
21 Evans, 365. 
 
22 Roughly three days’ supply at average consumption. 
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the unprotected commerce raider design, and was of the opinion that an armored cruiser 
such as New York offered substantially more warfighting capability with a top speed 
almost as high and increased coal burning efficiency.23
The Navy Department detached a member of the Squadron on 6 March, when it 
cabled orders for Meade to send Raleigh to Colón to reinforce Atlanta.  The Nicaraguan 
rebels had attacked Bocas del Toro, about one hundred miles north of Colón.  Atlanta 
was ordered to Bocas del Toro to protect the considerable U.S. commercial interests 
there, while Raleigh was ordered to secure the Atlantic end of the Panama Railorad at 
Colón.
 
24  Like other commanders-in-chief before him, Meade took it personally that one 
of “his” ships was being sent on detached duty, and in his usual outspoken manner 
expressed his views to the Department.  “I regret very much to lose her at this time,” he 
wrote as he acknowledged his orders, “…the sister ships were beginning to show the 
effects of drill together in squadron…I trust the reports received by the Department from 
Colón were accurate enough to justify the orders.”25
The reports from Colón did indicate a lot of unrest, which in turn, threatened U.S 
commercial interests.  “While everything is comparatively quiet here now,” reported the 
U.S. consul at Colón, “there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, which may result in 
incendiarism or an outbreak.”
   
26
                                                 
23 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 6 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
  The consul went on to express his hope that Atlanta 
would stay around in case of any further trouble.  Atlanta, meanwhile, was busy at Bocas 
 
24 "Colombia's Stubborn Rebels," New York Times (1857-1922), 6 March 1895. 
 
25 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 7 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
26 Josiah L. Pearcy, "Letter, Pearcy to Uhl, 8 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval 
Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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del Toro.  Although the rebel attack was repelled, the U.S. consul at Bocas del Toro was 
nervous, as there were a large number of rebel sympathizers known to be in the area.  He 
requested that Captain Cromwell land troops to “protect American interests”, including 
the property of American merchants doing business there.27  By 8:30 PM, his executive 
officer, Lieutenant Commander Taussig was ashore with a detachment of 66 men, a 
surgeon and apothecary.  While Taussig secured the U.S. consulate and the property of 
American and German merchants nearby, Assistant Surgeon Moore treated the men 
wounded in the engagement earlier in the day.  The night passed uneventfully, and the 
detachment was back on board Atlanta the next morning, having received the thanks of 
both the U.S. consular agent as well as the town’s mayor.28
Raleigh arrived on 11 March and reported to Captain Cromwell as the senior 
officer present.  Between the two warships, a continuous presence was maintained at the 
isthmus for another month, Atlanta finally departing for Key West in April.  The North 
Atlantic Squadron, meanwhile, left Trinidad on 13 March for LaGuayra, Venezuela, 
arriving the next day.
 
29
                                                 
27 D. R. Hand, "Letter, Hand to Cromwell, 8 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval 
Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
  Meade, along with the CO of Cincinnati and the members of his 
staff, boarded a train for Caracas.  There he and the U.S. minister to Venezuela called on 
General Crespo, the President of Venezuela, as well as various members of his cabinet.  
 
28 Cromwell, "Letter, Cromwell to Herbert, 8 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval 
Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. ; J. Miller Moore, Assistant Surgeon, "Letter, Moore to 
Cromwell, 11 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, 
Washington, D.C. ; E.D. Taussig, LCDR, "Letter, Taussig to Cromwell, 10 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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The U.S. party returned to LaGuayra on 17 March and made preparations to depart for 
San Domingo. 
Coal continued to be an issue for the squadron, demonstrating once again 
evidence that, logistically, the United States did not have the resources in place to support 
a large concentration of warships.  On 15 March, Captain Cromwell of Atlanta sent 
Raleigh from Colón to Cartagena to take on coal.  It had to be purchased from a civilian 
company, the Cartagena Terminal and Improvement Company.  Captain Miller reported 
to the Navy Department that the Company had about 1000 tons of coal “to spare,” and 
that he could purchase it at $5.45 per ton.30
While Raleigh was busy refueling, the rest of the squadron departed LaGuarya, 
Venezuela on 18 March.  Cincinnati was detached and sent to Curacao for mail and 
dispatches.  She rendezvoused with the rest of the squadron off Little Curacao Island 
Light on the morning of 19 March, and the three ships continued on to the Dominican 
Republic.  Along the way, Admiral Meade exercised the squadron in distant signaling 
with searchlights and Very signals.  The Squadron arrived at Santo Domingo City on 20 
March 1895.   
  The Navy Department’s reliance on private 
suppliers and the good graces of local businesses to fuel their warships was a major 
hindrance to having more than one ship in any port at a given time. 
On 22 March, Admiral Meade was presented to the president of the Dominican 
Republic by the American consul.  President Heureaux was concerned about the French 
squadron patrolling the Caribbean, and more than a little grateful for the presence of U.S. 
warships and for the good offices of the U.S. government in the ongoing trouble between 
                                                 
30 Merrill Miller, CAPT, "Letter, Miller to Herbert, 19 March 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 




France and the Dominican Republic.31
The Squadron departed for Kingston, Jamaica, bypassing a planned port visit at 
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, much to the chagrin of the U.S minister there, who complained to 
the Secretary of State about all the disappointed U.S. businessmen in Haiti who would 
have benefited from the visit of the North Atlantic Squadron.   The Squadron arrived at 
Kingston on 24 March, having exercised at fleet maneuvers and signaling on the way.  
After exchanging the usual visits and salutes, the Squadron was met on 27 March by 
Columbia, carrying Assistant Secretary of the Navy McAdoo.  Much of the Squadron’s 
time over the next week was spent coaling.  The Navy Department had hired colliers to 
bring U.S. coal to the Squadron at Jamaica.  This was an improvement over trying to get 
coal either from local firms at inflated prices or from U.S.-owned firms who might have 
some coal to spare.  It was still a headache, however, as the Department had sent too 
much coal.
  Meade replied that he and his Squadron were “in 
these waters for the protection of American interests…and that I could assure him it was 
my intention to fully protect the interests of all citizens of the United States.”  Whether or 
not Meade offered President Heureaux direct protection against the French fleet, his 
presence was still reassuring. 
32
The Squadron left Jamaica on 8 April, proceeding to Port-au-Prince.  Once again, 




                                                 
31 Heureaux’ government was heavily in debt to several European countries, France included. 
  The delay of 3 hours, fifteen minutes earned the U.S. minister 
resident a letter from Meade asking for an explanation.  The small hints at Meade’s 
 
32 "To See the St. Paul Launched," New York Times (1857-1922), 24 March 1895. 
 
33 Port clearance 
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temper in his official correspondence help the reader understand the Navy Department’s 
reluctance to allow him much interaction with foreign officials.  In Port-au-Prince, Meade 
got word that the French flagship Duquesne was possibly headed towards Santo Domingo 
City to investigate the murder of a French citizen at Samana Bay, in the Dominican 
Republic, and press the French government’s demands for payment of debt.  Meade 
ordered Captain Wadleigh and the Minneapolis to Santo Domingo City to keep watch on 
the French admiral’s actions and report back.  Meanwhile, the Department seemed 
reluctant to allow Meade to become involved – even as an observer.  Meade was cabled, 
countermanding  his orders.  He was told to leave the French alone and proceed to Colón, 
Colombia.34
Meade’s temper was about to get him in worse trouble.  Before he left Port-au-
Prince, he answered Secretary Herbert’s letter of 9 March which had reprimanded him for 
some earlier remarks he had made about the British Colonial officials at Barbados failing 
to observe Washington’s Birthday.  Meade’s reply to the secretary’s disapproving letter 
was a single sentence:  “The information contained therein is very interesting.”  He 
seemed unable to acknowledge an error in judgment and move on, and his snide reply of 
10 April infuriated Secretary Herbert.  Herbert, in turn, dictated a letter to Meade dated 
19 April demanding an explanation in writing of what Meade meant by the remark “the 
information contained therein is very interesting.”
 
35
                                                 
34 R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 10 April 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. ; R.W. Meade, RADM, "Letter, Meade to 
Herbert, 11 April 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, 
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  Meade’s reply of 24 April from Key 
 
35 Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Herbert to Meade, April 19 1895, 1895," Letter, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. ; Meade, "Letter, Meade to 
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West was no better than his first answer, challenging the Secretary that “If I had stated 
that I found the information furnished by the Department not interesting, the Department 
might, with justice, have taken me to task.”36
In the meantime, the Squadron left Port-au-Prince for Colón, Colombia on 11 
April, arriving on 14 April.  Meade again exercised his squadron at fleet maneuvers 
during the run from Haiti to Colón.  The correspondence does not specify exactly what 
maneuvers the warships were performing, but according to Captain Robley Evans, New 
York’s CO at the time, they were realistic and worthwhile.  “During our winter’s cruise 
with the squadron [Admiral Meade] gave us admirable and systematic drill.  Modern 
methods and appliances were used in a modern way – torpedoes were run under service 
conditions and searchlights used to their utmost capacity…the tone of the squadron was 
excellent.”
   
37
At Colón, the Squadron met Atlanta and Raleigh.  Captain Cromwell reported all 
quiet since his arrival.  Meade not only thought that things were quiet, he questioned just 
how much business interest U.S. citizens even had in Colón.  He pointed out that most of 
the property of the Panama Rail Road was owned by the French, and went on to say that 
the guarantee of the integrity of the transit across the isthmus mainly benefited the 
French.  “These men and their employees are the people who constantly raise the cry that 
because there is a revolt…800 miles off and up the country, than an American ship of 
war must be kept at Colón to protect American interests.”  He went on to say that: “if the 
Navy Department could only realize what an extraordinary amount of humbug and self 
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interest of the foreigners enters into this business, it might save much money for work 
more useful.”  Meade was referring to tactical formation work.  He was still annoyed that 
Raleigh had been ordered away from the squadron while he was trying to exercise his 
warships back in March.38  Meade saw the time spent on what he considered to be a 
“humbug” as a distraction from his ability to exercise his squadron in tactical work.39
Minneapolis was sent out on 20 April for her final speed trial, Captain Evans of 
New York again acting as the president of a board appointed by Meade to oversee the 
trials.  That same day, New York and Columbia sailed for Key West.  Minneapolis headed 
for Kingston, Jamaica to take the rest of the coal from the schooner which the Navy 
Department had sent there for the Squadron.  Atlanta and Raleigh were ordered to Key 
West as well, although those two were ordered to proceed separately, as Atlanta’s slow 




The deployment of the North Atlantic Squadron to the West Indies ended with the 
arrival of the flagship New York off Key West on 24 April, 1895.  It had been a historic 
cruise.  While individual ships had been ordered off on Navy Department tasking, on the 
whole the Squadron operated as a unit.  Meade had emphasized training, formation work 
whenever possible, and night and day signaling.  In fact, on the run in to Key West, 
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Meade reported on exchanging search light signals with Cincinnati at ranges up to thirty 
miles.41
Admiral Meade Retires 
   
 
Rear Admiral Meade arrived back in New York aboard his flagship on 28 April.  
He reported his arrival and went on to express his “great disappointment at the virtual 
breaking up of this Squadron just at a time when it was getting into promising condition 
and especially do I regret that I could not have had the drills in Florida Bay that I 
projected three months since.”42
The loss of his flagship frustrated Meade even more than having other warships 
under his command ordered away for Navy Department errands.  He sent a petulant 
letter, complaining among other things that his band instruments and typewriter were 
going to be damaged while moving from ship to ship and requesting, if he absolutely had 
to move, to be allowed to shift his flag to Cincinnati.
  The Navy Department had other concerns, however.  In 
Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II was preparing to celebrate the opening of the Kiel Canal.  
This strategically-important waterway linked the North Sea with the Baltic Sea, allowing 
ships to save about 250 miles by not having to transit around Denmark when moving to 
or from the Baltic Sea.  To represent the United States at the naval celebration, the Navy 
Department decided to send New York and Columbia.   
43
                                                 
41 Meade, "Letter, Meade to Herbert, 24 April 1895. " 
  Meade thought particularly 
highly of Captain Glass, Cincinnati’s CO, and it was probably not a surprise at the Navy 
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Department that he wanted to shift his flag to her, but she had been ordered by the Bureau 
of Construction to Norfolk for repairs and refitting.  Work at the shipyards was slow.  
Consequently, the Bureau was trying to distribute the Navy’s needed repair work evenly.  
The New York Navy Yard already had several ships of the Squadron in hand. 
None of this mattered to Meade, who essentially demanded Cincinnati.  
Amazingly, the Department relented, going so far as to have a pilot boat intercept 
Cincinnati off Hampton Roads and tell Captain Glass to steam directly to New York.44  It 
was, however, too late.  While those orders were being given, but before they could be 
carried out, Meade asked to be relieved of command.  In nine and a half months of 
command, Meade had never been able to find his stride.  From the controversy over his 
assignment to the Cincinnati board of inquiry, to his exchange of disrespectful letters 
with the Secretary of the Navy, to his constant complaints over the employment of his 
warships, Meade was unable to function effectively as a commander-in-chief in the new 
Navy.45
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.  But, having resigned his command, Meade could not resist public 
declarations.  When a reporter for the New York Tribune cornered him, he vented his 
frustration.  “My ideas are not in accordance with those of this Administration.  I am just 
as much disgusted with it as the prople at large in the country are, and I preferred to quit 
rather than continue my association with it…I am an American and a Union man.  Those 
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are two things that this Administration cannot stand.”47  It was outright insubordination – 
not only to Secretary Herbert (an ex-Confederate) but to President Cleveland himself.  
For a while, it appeared that Meade would not be allowed to retire quietly, but would face 
court-martial.  Eventually, the president allowed him to retire quietly to New York.48
Rear Admiral Bunce and Squadron Exercises, 1895  
  
Command of the Squadron devolved to Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce.  Bunce 
was a native of Hartford, Connecticut.  He was appointed to the Naval Academy in 1852, 
at the age of 16, graduating in 1857.  As a lieutenant during the Civil War, he served in a 
variety of positions that gave him experience both in small boat and disembarked 
operations, as well as the more traditionally squadron-orientated blockading duty.  His 
Civil War service culminated in command of the monitor Monadnock, which he took 
around Cape Horn, from Philadelphia to San Francisco after the war ended.  It was the 
first extended sea voyage ever made by a monitor.  Prior to taking command of the North 
Atlantic Squadron, he commanded the Naval Training Station and the training ship 
Richmond at Newport, Rhode Island. 
Within weeks of taking command, Bunce had proposed a training schedule for the 
Squadron.  The Department had requested the Squadron’s presence at Portland, Maine 
not later than 26 August 1995.  Bunce proposed leaving New York on 1 August and 
sailing to Gardiner’s Bay for target practice.  They would then proceed to Newport, 
Rhode Island for exercises in support of the Naval War College class graduating that 
term.  After a call at Bar Harbor, Maine, they were to arrive at Portland, Maine, by 25 
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August.  Bunce was anxious to exercise his new command at fleet tactics, and stipulated 
that fleet tactics at sea would be exercised en route between ports.49
Fleet tactics would share top billing in the summer and fall of 1895 with the 
exercise of the various naval militia units up and down the east coast.  Bunce detailed the 
monitor Amphitrite to carry out most of this tasking.  This slow and unseaworthy vessel 
was not very useful for fleet tactical work, but her big guns made her an excellent 
training platform for the militia crews.  Amphitrite was ordered to proceed to Brunswick, 
Georgia, where Captain Wise was to report to the adjutant general of Georgia and 
provide the Georgia naval militia with two days of drill.  Amphitrite was then to proceed 
to Charleston, South Carolina, where the naval militia of South Carolina would be 




While the rest of the squadron was preparing for the summer maneuvers along the 
East coast, Atlanta was at Key West, Florida, enforcing President Cleveland’s 
proclamation of strict U.S. neutrality in the ongoing revolution in Cuba.
 
51  There were 
various rumors of groups of “filibusters” organizing to send arms and men to the Cuban 
rebels, but Atlanta had not thus far uncovered any activity.52
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  On 23 July the Department 
cabled orders for her to proceed to Havana, Cuba and report to the U.S. minister there.  
She was to observe and assess on the unrest in Havana, returning to Key West when her 
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captain felt that the lives of U.S. citizens and their property were adequately safeguarded.  
Upon arrival in Cuba, Atlanta reported that there had indeed been some unrest in Havana, 
but Captain Cromwell felt that it was under control, and that U.S. citizens were secure.  
Yellow fever was rampant, so Cromwell elected to return to Key West as soon as 
possible.53  The squadron trend here seemed to be to use ships which were unsuited to 
fleet duty to take care of ancillary duties (naval militia, diplomatic missions), leaving the 
modern vessels free to concentrate and practice tactical drills together.54  Bunce avoided, 
unless absolutely necessary, sending his first class vessels to do single-ship work.  In 
August, however, he was forced to relieve Atlanta.  Cincinnati was detailed for this 
duty.55  New York and Columbia, meanwhile, returned from their mission to the Kiel 
Canal opening.  Columbia set a new Atlantic crossing record for a warship with a time of 
six days twenty-three hours and forty-nine minutes from Great Britain to the Sandy Hook 
Lightship.56  Bunce immediately made arrangements to transfer his flag from Cincinnati 
to the larger New York.57
New York moved to the Navy Yard for repairs.  Once those repairs were complete, 
the Squadron, now consisting of New York, Cincinnati, and Montgomery, left New York 
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for Newport and the Naval War College.58  Minneapolis was coaling at Hampton Roads, 
under orders to join the Squadron in Newport as soon as she was able.  Raleigh, which 
was in dock at the New York Navy Yard, had the same orders.59  The newspapers called 
the planned summer maneuvers “a series of naval evolutions and strategic manoeuvres 
(sic) on a larger scale than has ever been attempted before by a United States fleet in time 
of peace.”60  On the way to Newport, the three ships practiced basic fleet maneuvers.61
The Squadron anchored together in Newport Harbor on 8 August 1895.  They 
were met by Secretary Herbert, who had traveled to Newport in Dolphin for the 
commencement of the summer maneuvers.
 
62  Their presence in Newport marked the 
height of the Newport social season.63  A gala reception awaited the officers of the 
Squadron the Tuesday night after their arrival.  On 13 August, Governor Lippitt of Rhode 
Island was hosted on board the New York, as were many other visitors.64
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  It was not all 
festivities.  While in Newport, the ships exercised boats, landing parties, and torpedoes, 
and planned for the follow-on maneuvers which would take place at sites up and down 
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the East coast.65  The idea was to “conduct a campaign such as would prevail during a 
war with foreign vessels endeavoring to capture cities along the Atlantic coast.”66
After conferring with the War College and completing their business in Newport, 
the Squadron, now joined by Raleigh, got underway on 15 August for the resort town of 
Bar Harbor, Maine.
 
67  The Secretary of the Navy quietly took passage to Bar Harbor on 
New York, not raising his flag to be officially recognized on that vessel, but simply 
observing.  Along the way, the warships practiced every maneuver in the fleet drill book.  
Some of the more important ones were performed several times.  In all, Admiral Bunce 
reported that “The good results have begun to appear, already, in increasing uniformity in 
speed, in keeping distance, and in time of making turns and circles.”68
At Bar Harbor, Secretary Herbert disembarked from New York and went back 
aboard Dolphin.  The arrival of the North Atlantic Squadron had been eagerly awaited by 
the society luminaries who summered in Bar Harbor.  Among the notables who waited to 
  After exhaustive 
trial and error, the Squadron concluded that their squadron tactical diameter should be 
750 yards, based on the turning capability of Minneapolis at 9 knots.  In all, it was a 
successful trip, not only from the point of view of the tactical work they were able to 
accomplish, but of the social calls they were able to make in the various cities in the 
northeast that they visited, as well as the time the officers of the squadron were able to 
spend together at social functions.   
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greet the Squadron were John Jacob Astor, the retired secretary of state and sometime 
presidential candidate James G. Blane, and the Rockefellers.69  Again, the Squadron 
officers were entertained at numerous society events, the highlight of which was the 
grand ball and reception given in honor of the Secretary of the Navy on 20 August.70  The 
officers were able not only to socialize with the citizens of Bar Harbor, but to spend time 
with each other.  The officers of the various ships would had the opportunity to discuss 
the previous week’s tactical exercises, exchanging information and observations about 
the drills.  This socialization of the officer corps was a crucial component of the 
development of an identity as a fighting organization.  Critics, however, felt that the 
North Atlantic Squadron was not doing enough.  They complained that the warships of 
the South Atlantic and European stations had not been called to New York to assemble a 
United States Fleet for massive exercises, simulating attacks on New York or Boston.  
The Navy Department largely shrugged off these complaints, in keeping with Secretary 
Herbert’s stated 1894 policy of keeping squadrons together as much as possible on their 
respective stations.  The old days of responding to every contingency with ad hoc 
concentrations of all available warships were being traded for the cohesion and 
professionalism to be found in the repeated, rigorous exercise of a single combat unit.71
The North Atlantic Squadron left Bar Harbor on 22 August, arriving at Portland, 
Maine after another four days of intensive tactical drills.  They were now routinely 
performing intricate maneuvers at nine knots during the daytime and six knots at night.  
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While at Portland, the officers of the Squadron had yet another opportunity to be 
entertained by the city notables.72  After three days in Portland, the warships departed for 
Boston on 29 August.73  By now, newspaper articles were showing confusion over the 
new image and identity of the North Atlantic Squadron.  Reporters were so used to 
squadron-sized operations being the result of an ad hoc concentration of warships for a 
specific contingency or purpose, that they were frankly unsure of what to do with the fact 
that the summer maneuvers were simply the normal operations of the North Atlantic 
Squadron.  Various reporters in the New York Times began to refer to the “White 
Squadron,” or the “Squadron of Evolution,” as if there had to be some purpose for all 
these warships to be concentrated on the East coast.  Finally, the editors of the New York 
Times put an end to the confusion by promising in an editorial to stop referring to the 
North Atlantic Squadron as the “White Squadron,” as they pointed out that the rest of the 
ships in the Navy were white as well.74
The Squadron departed Portland for Boston on 29 August, arriving the next day.  
The wharves were lined with hundreds of people anxious for a look at, or perhaps even a 
visit to, the white warships.
 
75
                                                 
72 Bunce, "Letter, Bunce to Herbert, 29 August 1895. " 
  Eventually, the four ships hosted over 30,000 of these 
citizens, enabling them to get a closer look at the warships their government had 
purchased.  The Squadron took on coal at Boston and stayed five days, enjoying the usual 
dinners and celebrations.  New York, Minneapolis, and Raleigh got underway on 5 
September.  Montgomery had a casualty which forced her to spend an extra day in port, 
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but she was able to rejoin the other three ships by 7 September.  The Squadron took up 
positions in Block Island Sound, off Fisher’s Island.  A farm on Fisher’s Island owned by 
brothers William and E.M. Ferguson had been used successfully for landing exercises 
four years earlier, in 1891, by Walker’s Squadron of Evolution.  Bunce’s staff officers 
had secured the use of the farm again.  The owners of Fisher’s Island Farm were happy to 
give permission for the Squadron to land its naval brigade, asking only that they stay off 
of any fields that had been freshly seeded.76  The Squadron spent a week off Fisher’s 
Island, organizing their boats and landing forces.  Each day from 8:30 AM until 5:00 PM 
the sailors practiced embarking and debarking from the boats, marching, and forming 
skirmish lines.  Overall, Bunce pronounced himself satisfied, and proclaimed that “There 
is no question but that the landing force of the four ships – NEW YORK, 
MINNEAPOLIS, RALEIGH AND MONTGOMERY can be landed at short notice, fully 
equipped and thoroughly organized in all details, for active service as infantry.”77  
Bunce’s after-action report to the Navy Department went on to stress the defensive nature 
of the exercises.  “The instruction was thoroughly practical, the exercises being confined 
exclusively to such preparations and drills as active operations on the Island, if held by an 
enemy, would necessitate.”78
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  The landing exercises did highlight a couple of 
weaknesses.  Bunce noted that none of his ships had been provided with mobile artillery 
to be landed with a naval brigade, and he called the Department’s attention to this 
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discrepancy in a letter to the Secretary prior to the exercises.79  Bunce also argued that 
the North Atlantic Squadron needed a tender, supply, and dispatch vessel; small enough 
to enter any harbor but large enough to keep up with the Squadron and stay in formation 
in bad weather.80
The landing exercises complete, the Squadron weighed anchor from Fisher’s 
Island Sound on 15 September, and arrived at Tompkinsville, Staten Island, New York 
the next day, where they took on coal.  Bunce intended for the squadron to spend about 
five days in Tompkinsville, replenishing supplies and coaling, before departing for 
Virginia.  They were joined there by Columbia, which had finished her repair period in 
the Navy Yard and was ready to rejoin the Squadron.  The arrival of the battleships Texas 
and Maine was also eagerly anticipated.  These two second-class battleships had been 
authorized by Congress in 1886, before the armored cruiser New York, but construction 
delays had slowed their commissioning.  Texas was the product of a design completion 
sponsored by the Navy Department, and won by the Naval Construction and Armaments 
Company of Barrow-in-Furness, England.  Construction took place at the Norfolk Navy 
Yard.  At 6,315 tons displacement, she was smaller than most European battleships.  Her 
main armament consisted of two 12-inch rifles in single turrets fore and aft, with a 
secondary battery of six 6-inch guns.   
 
Maine was designed by the Navy Department, and built at the New York Navy 
Yard.  She was slightly larger than Texas, at 6,682 tons, with a main battery of four 10-
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inch guns mounted in two double turrets, and a secondary battery of six 6-inch guns.81  
Maine was commissioned on 17 September, the day after the Squadron’s arrival back in 
New York.  Her new commanding officer was Captain Crowninshield, who had 
previously served in the North Atlantic Squadron as the CO of Kearsarge.  
Crowninshield immediately reported by letter to Admrial Bunce, placing himself and the 
ship under his command at the Admiral’s orders82
New York, Raleigh, Minneapolis, Columbia, and Montgomery got underway from 
Tompkinsville on 23 September for target practice and Squadron drill, “repeating all 
former evolutions and performing such others in the Fleet Drill Book as are thought to be 
valuable for exercise or for use in action.”
  It would take another four or five 
weeks for her to be ready to cruise.  After provisioning, she had to take on ammunition, 
then sail to Newport for her torpedo outfit.  Admiral Bunce’s plans for the summer 
exercises had envisioned three phases.  The first was complete, including the basic 
formation work and the landing exercises.  With the addition of Columbia, Texas, and 
Maine, the second phase of maneuvers in the exercise grounds off of Hampton Roads 
could start.   
83  On each of the first two days out of New 
York, the five ships spent about two hours shifting between the basic formations of 
echelon, line abreast, and column.84
                                                 
81 Ship descriptions from Alden, The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from 
the Introduction of the Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909, 31-32. 
  The work got significantly more difficult as the 
Squadron made its way south.  On the third day the ships worked for four hours, 
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incorporating simultaneous turns and more intricate formation shifts.  By the fourth day, 
they were breaking up into sections (two and three ships, respectively), forming into 
columns of sections, manipulating the distance between ships from close to open order, 
and turning the entire formation.  The Squadron worked for about 4.5 hours on the fourth 
day and another 4.5 on the fifth.  With the exception of Gharardi’s Naval Review Fleet, 
which was executing maneuvers strictly for appearance, formations this complicated with 
more than four ships had not been attempted since the Key West exercises in 1874.  
Then, the formation could barely maintain a top speed of four knots.  The ordered speed 
for most of Bunce’s maneuvers was nine knots, which his warships had little trouble 
sustaining.  After five days, the squadron came to anchor in Hampton Roads.  The 
weather precluded the target practice that Admiral Bunce had hoped to hold in the 
Virginia Capes, but the work the Squadron had done was impressive, nonetheless.  
Bunce’s official report of the maneuvers practiced ran to six single-space printed pages.  
“There is no evolution in the Fleet Drill Book,” he wrote to the Bureau of Navigation, 
“that has not been tried by at least four of the ships now in company.”85
Although the Squadron did not hold target practice after arriving at Hampton 
Roads, Bunce had issued the orders for the exercise which was to have taken place on 30 
September.  The orders give a glimpse of what stationary target practice entailed in 1895.  
The ships were to be anchored at 1000 yard intervals.  Officers from each ship were to be 
sent to adjoining ships, in order to observe the fall of shots from their ship’s guns.  Two 
broadsides were to have been fired from the main battery, and four from the secondary 
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battery on the starboard side.86  After the tide shifted and the ships swung around, the 
process would be repeated on the port side.87
The Squadron remained at anchor off Hampton Roads for the next two weeks, 
with the exception of 18 October, when all the ships got underway and proceeded to 
Newport News Shipyard to be present at the launching of the new gunboats Nashville and 
Wilmington.
   
88   On 21 October, the Squadron weighed anchor and proceeded to the 
Southern Drill grounds, where they were finally able to hold the long-postponed target 
practice.  Targets were anchored and the ships were detailed to observe for each other.  
This evolution was carried out underway, the ships of the Squadron proceeding at a base 
speed of nine knots, between 1000 and 1300 yards from the targets.  Each ship made four 
runs by the targets, firing their main and secondary batteries separately.89  Admiral Bunce 
pronounced himself pleased with the results.  Five targets were hit, “under the conditions 
that would obtain in action.”  This may have been an optimistic comment, as the 
Squadron’s opponents in this “action” were anchored in place.90
After more tactical work, raising the formation speeds to twelve knots, the 
Squadron ended its training exercises and broke up.  New York returned to the Navy 
Yard, New York, arriving on 9 November.  Columbia, Raleigh, and Montgomery stayed 
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at Hampton Roads, the latter two undergoing repairs at Navy Yard, Norfolk.  
Minneapolis was detached from the North Atlantic Squadron and ordered to the European 
Station on 21 November.91  Amphitrite was ordered to Key West, to relieve Cincinnati, 
which had been there since August.92
Rear Admiral Bunce wasted little time preparing for his next endeavor.  The year 
of training complete, he was now contemplating an operational deployment of his 
squadron to the West Indies.  In comparison with squadron plans that had been submitted 
in past years, Bunce’s submission of his proposed itinerary for the winter cruise did not 
list individual ships and the ports they might be sent to, but simply assumed that the 
Squadron would be operating as a unit.  The Navy Department was apparently also 
anxious to exercise this capability, asking Bunce for a list of repairs to his ships that were 
absolutely necessary to make the deployment happen as soon as possible.
 
93
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  Coaling so 
many ships at the same time was still a problem for deployment, as Bunce assumed that 
he would have to break the ships up between St. Lucia and St. Thomas for refueling.  The 
plan was to buy from local vendors on this cruise, rather than sending the coal down from 
the U.S.  Apparently, the sending of colliers during the previous deployment had 
convinced local merchants to lower their prices acceptably.  Bunce proposed being gone 
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from about 21 December 1895 to 12 May 1896, touching at virtually every port in the 
Caribbean where there was a significant U.S. business interest.94
New York and Columbia got underway from New York for Hampton Roads on 16 
December, arriving off Norfolk the next day.
   
95  There, they were joined by Montgomery 
and Raleigh.  Maine arrived on Christmas Day.  On 29 December 1895, Rear Admiral 
Bunce reported the five warships ready for deployment.96  1 January 1896 found the 
squadron at anchor off Hampton Roads.  Celebrations began at 11:50PM the night before, 
when the steam whistles of the ships joined in a cacophony leading up to midnight.  
Sailors and junior officers alike serenaded the flag quarters before turning in.  The next 
morning after quarters, a “rope yarn” day was declared, and the sailors enjoyed rare time 
off on board ship.  The junior officers traveled between ships in boats, wishing members 
of the other wardrooms a happy new year.  It was evidence that the officers of the 
Squadron had developed close ties over the previous six months of exhaustive maneuvers 
together.97
Naval Militia Drills, 1896 
 
 
The Squadron was not able to deploy as Rear Admiral Bunce had planned.  
Contingencies arose which superseded his carefully-prepared peacetime itinerary.  The 
renewed revolutionary unrest in Cuba made the Navy Department reluctant to dispatch 
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warships to the Caribbean, lest the Spanish become uncomfortable.98  Additionally, the 
long-running dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela over the border of British 
Guiana threatened to provoke British intervention, which was increasingly perceived as a 
threat to the Monroe Doctrine.  In the summer of 1895, the Cleveland Administration 
decided to act.  Recent U.S. naval advances, including the North Atlantic Squadron’s 
successful 1895 squadron deployment to the West Indies under Rear Admiral Meade, the 
anticipated summer and fall maneuvers, and the imminent additions of the battleships 
Maine and Texas almost certainly affected the decision.  In July 1895, Secretary of State 
Olney sent a note to the British government reiterating the Monroe Doctrine, demanding 
that the British submit the boundary issue to arbitration, and containing the famous line 
that became emblematic of the age: “Today the United States is practically sovereign on 
this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”99  
That sentence would have been unthinkable a decade earlier.  The perceived effectiveness 
of the North Atlantic Squadron was the only reason it could be uttered in 1895.  The 
British prime minister, Lord Salisbury, waited four months before replying to Olney’s 
note, which gave newspapers plenty of time to discuss the merits of the Royal Navy 
versus the new U.S. Navy, and critique U.S. shore defenses.100
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  It was decided to await the arrival of Maine and possibly Texas as well 
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before the Squadron would proceed.  While the Department was deciding on the best 
employment for the North Atlantic Squadron, another foreign relations crisis arose.  The 
U.S. Minister to Turkey made demands upon the Ottoman authorities in Constantinople 
for compensation for destruction of property belonging to U.S. missionaries working in 
Turkey.  The strong words from the minister led to a round of newspaper speculation, 
again involving the North Atlantic Squadron.  Stories ranged from the entire squadron 
being sent to the European Station (whose commander-in-chief, Rear Admiral Selfridge, 
was senior to Rear Admiral Bunce), to a few of Bunce’s ships being sent to augment the 
European Squadron.102 In the end, nothing came of the trouble with Turkey, but it still 
served to delay the departure of the Squadron on a cruise to the West Indies as 
planned.103
Maine arrived on 6 January 1896, and was immediately ordered to sea with one of the 
seasoned ships of the Squadron, Raleigh, for two days of section drill.  While the various 
political issues were playing out, it was up to Rear Admiral Bunce to keep his squadron, 
which was marking time off the coast of Norfolk, occupied.  By February, it became clear 
that the Squadron was not going to be deployed immeidately.  One by one, Bunce began 
to send his ships north for liberty.  Columbia was the first to go, leaving on 4 February.
 
104
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In April, with still no definite orders in sight, Bunce detached several of his ships to give 
the men some rest.  Columbia went back to Staten Island.  Montgomery and Cincinnati 
went to the Norfolk Navy Yard.  The flagship followed Columbia back to Tompkinsville 
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a few days later, Admiral Bunce leaving explicit instructions for the senior officer present 
(SOPA) to govern the Squadron in his absence.105  Upon New York’s return to Hampton 
Roads, Newark reported to the Squadron, having been previously assigned to the South 
Atlantic Station.106  Bunce sent her north to New York Navy Yard to be docked, have her 
bottom painted, and discharge sailors whose term of enlistment had expired while they 
were in South America.107
The attention of the Navy Department turned to other matters.  The entire North 
Atlantic Squadron eventually relocated from Hampton Roads back to the squadron 
anchorage in Tompkinsville, Staten Island, a sure indication that the Department was 
actively trying to keep the Squadron away from the Caribbean.  During the summer of 
1896, the Squadron was dispatched on several goodwill visits to cities up and down the 
east coast.  This exposed the public to the New Steel Navy in two important ways:  ship 
visits and parades, and drills of the state naval militias.  Cincinnati and Montgomery were 
detailed on 1 May to leave Hampton Roads and sail to New London, Connecticut to 
participate in a celebration marking the anniversary of the city’s founding.  Admiral 
Bunce was concerned that his warships maintain their fighting edge while involved in 
these goodwill tours, and his orders to the individual ships were careful to spell out that 
the two ships were to be “kept together and manoeuvred as a Section while under way, 
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and exercised in movements and in signaling.”108  In June, Cincinnati was used again to 
support a reunion of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery at Bridgeport, Connecticut.109  
Also in June, Columbia was sent to Castine, Maine, to help that city’s inhabitants 
celebrate the centennial of their founding.110
Interest in a naval militia – that is, volunteer units organized and administered by 
the states – had started in the early 1890’s.  The practice of keeping harbor defense 
monitors in ordinary, to be rapidly commissioned in time of war, required a source of 
readily-available manpower that did not have to be paid for with the Department’s 
limited budget.  State militias fit the bill nicely.  Rear Admiral J.G. Walker’s Squadron of 
Evolution, it will be recalled, embarked some militia units for underway training five 
years previously, in 1891.  By 1896, there were naval militias in 14 states.  Coordinating 
their training was a full-time job for a junior officer in the Navy Department, overseen 
personally by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and commanding 34 pages in the 
Secretary of the Navy’s annual report.  It was not a simple coincidence that this rapid 
growth in the naval militia movement, both in its popularity with civilians, as well as its 
support from the Navy Department, coincided almost exactly with the development of the 
  As we have seen in previous chapters, 
chambers of commerce vied desperately for the economic fortune that a visit from one of 
the new steel warships would bring their city.  The fact that Rear Admiral Bunce was 
originally from Connecticut probably helped Bridgeport and New London secure visits, 
among several other cities.   
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North Atlantic Squadron’s unit identity as a combat force, and its increased operations as 
a squadron.  The New Steel Navy wanted out of the business of guarding harbors, so that 
it could concentrate on its blue-water mission, which was fighting a fleet action against a 
peer naval competitor.  The easiest way to accomplish this for the least money was to 
turn more of the defensive mission over to the various naval militias.    It was universally 
assumed that the naval militias would focus on harbor defense.111
It cannot, however, nor was it at the time of the Spanish-American War expected that 
they could go upon our modern men-of-war, with their many mechanical devices and the 
elaborate system required to maintain order and discipline, and render service satisfactory 
to themselves and to their commanding officers. Their training had not been such as 
would prepare them for this duty. As primarily designed the organizations were intended 
for the defense of the coast, and their drills and knowledge of local conditions brought 
them into the service better fitted to carry forward the work assigned to the Auxiliary 
Naval Force and the Coast Signal Service, than for assignment to vessels of the regular 
Navy, which would have been their preference.
  As one author, 




For this reason, the Navy Department was happy to lend whatever support it could 
to the various naval militia units.  In May, Captain Ramsay in the Bureau of Navigation 
received a memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy, asking him to instruct the 
Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron to support the naval militias of 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisina with two ships, one to be a 
monitor, for a period of two weeks between 15 and 30 June 1896.113
                                                 
111 Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 1894. 
  Ultimately, six 
North Atlantic Squadron ships would perform some sort of duty with the naval militia 
during the summer.  In the north, the battleship Indiana was detailed to drill the 
 
112 Wheeler Howell, "The Naval Militia in the Spanish-American War," The United Service: A Monthly 
Review of Military and Naval Affairs 1, no. 4 (April 1902) (1902): 341. 
 
113 Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, "Letter, Herbert to Ramsey, 13 May 1896, 1896," Letter, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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Pennsylvania militia.  Newark went to New Jersey, Montgomery went to New York, 
Columbia to Massachusetts, Cincinnati to Massachusetts.114  Bunce detailed Amphitrite 
and Raleigh for the drills with the southern militias.115
 
   
Squadron Tactical Exercises, 1896 
 
While the Navy Department was busy with the summer training of the militia 
units, Admiral Bunce had not lost sight of the training of his own forces.  A series of 
exercises planned for the late summer was approved by the Department in June.  Bunce 
was given permission to “make trials of such formations and movements as may 
seem…desirable.”116  On 1 August, Bunce reported New York, Indiana, Cincinnati, 
Amphitrite, Newark and Fern ready for sea.  Columbia and Raleigh had some repairs to 
complete, but were expected to join the Squadron shortly.117  Fern had been attached to 
Bunce’s command officially in May, giving the North Atlantic Squadron an organic 
tender and dispatch ship.118
The Navy Department made a special effort not to interfere with the movements 
of the squadron during the exercises.  This meant declining many requests received by 
Secretary Herbert for ships to take part in various celebrations and commemorations, as 
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they had done earlier in the year.  Newspapers billed the summer exercises as the “largest 
fleet ever assembled by the Navy Department for instruction in fleet tactics.”119  The 
Squadron arrived in Hampton Roads on 9 August.  Amphitrite and Fern had to be 
detached on the way down from New York, as they were unable to keep up with the rest 
of the warships.  Columbia arrived on station, overtaking the Squadron on the morning of 
9 August, prior to their arrival at Hampton Roads.  Admiral Bunce reported satisfactory 
progress with tactical exercises and signal drills to ascertain the range of visibility of day 
signals and audibility of fog signals at night.120  Sub-caliber target practice was carried 
out with artillery and with small arms.121  New York practiced torpedo firing.  She had 
three torpedo tubes, one in the bow and two amidships.  Aiming the torpedoes by eye 
took some practice.  A typical torpedo drill involved a target being placed out and the 
ship steaming by the target at 6, 9, and 11 knots, launching a torpedo as it passed.  The 
speed increased with each pass.122
On 11 August, Admiral Bunce was informed that Massachusetts had been placed 
in commission and ordered to join his command.  Massachusetts was one of three “sea-
going coast-line battleships” authorized by Congress in 1890.  Her main battery of four 
13-inch rifles in two turrets, plus the turret-mounted secondary battery of eight 8-inch 
rifles and four 6-inch rifles made her the heaviest-armed U.S. ship built to date.  At 
   
                                                 
119 "Admiral Bunce at Sea," New York Times (1857-1922), 2 August 1896; "The North Atlantic Squadron," 
New York Times (1857-1922), 17 June 1896. 
 
120 F.M. RADM Bunce, "Letter, Bunce to Ramsay, 9 August 1896, 1896," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the 
Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
121 Sub-caliber target practice:  A method of installing what was essentially a rifle along the barrel of a 
cannon. The gun crew would go through all the correct motions to simulate loading the cannon, then fire 
the rifle to check proper sighting and alignment of the gun.  This saved expenditure on powder and shells.   
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10,288 tons, she and her sister ships Indiana and Oregon were smaller than the largest 
battleships being built by European powers, but their heavy armament made them 
nominally the most powerful battleships on the ocean at the time.123  Bunce immediately 
sent Captain Rodgers orders to take on his ammunition load and 1000 lbs of coal, and 
join the squadron, either in Hampton Roads, or at the squadron anchorage at 
Tompkinsville, Staten Island, where he expected to be by 25 August.124  The rest of the 
Squadron left Hampton Roads on 15 August to proceed back north.  Before leaving the 
southern drill grounds, the Squadron spent three days “exercising at tactical maneuvers 
and signals,” and devoted the entire day on 19 August to target practice.  This was 
another underway practice, with the Squadron warships firing on anchored targets as they 
steamed past.  Torpedo practice was carried out on 21 August, the ships steaming by a 
fixed target and launching torpedoes from their amidships tubes as they came to bear.  
Upon completion of these drills, the Squadron turned north.125
                                                 
123 N. Friedman, U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History (Naval Institute Press, 1985), 25-29. 
  It arrived back at 
Tompkinsville on 23 August, steaming into the squadron anchorage in double columns.  
The outer column consisted of Columbia, Indiana, New York, and Massachusetts, while 
the column closer to Staten Island was Cincinnati, Amphitrite, Raleigh, and Newark.  It 
was an impressive display of naval power, and it had a purpose.  The Chinese 
Ambassador, Earl Li Hung Chang, was in New York, and the Squadron was scheduled to 
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be inspected as part of his reception.126  New York had been the site of impressive naval 
displays before.  The 1893 International Naval Review, under Rear Admiral Gherardi, 
had served notice of the U.S. arrival as a naval power.  But that fleet had been assembled 
under Gherardi’s command specifically to execute the programme of the Naval Review.  
While the Naval Review Fleet had done much formation and signaling work, it was not a 
combat unit, and was never handled as such.  The Squadron that steamed up from the 
Lower Bay in double column formation to anchor off Staten Island, and which was going 
to be reviewed by the Chinese Ambassador, was not fashioned especially for the purpose 
– it was simply the North Atlantic Squadron.  The next day, Texas reported for duty with 
the North Atlantic Squadron by telegram.  Bunce responded with orders to join the 
Squadron at Tompkinsville as soon as ready for sea.127
The one contingency that caused Admiral Bunce to have to detach ships was the 
enforcement of U.S. neutrality in the Cuban Revolution.  Bunce was trying to keep the 
time spent in Key West, away from the Squadron, to about 7-8 weeks.  Montgomery had 
been on station since 30 July, and so needed relief before the Squadron left on their next 
series of maneuvers.  Newark was designated to take Montgomery’s place, and Captain 
Stirling was ordered to have her in Key West on or about 1 September.
 
128
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  Meanwhile, 
with the Chinese Ambassador’s reception complete, Admiral Bunce made preparations to 
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return to sea.  Landing exercises were on the docket for this underway period, with 
Fisher’s Island again the destination.  Along the way, Massachusetts would be detached 
to pull in to Newport for her torpedo outfit.129  The Squadron got underway on 1 
September.  Bunce made a point of having the four battleships, Massachusetts, Indiana, 
Maine and Texas steam together in line and column.  This was a watershed moment: it 
marks the first time a division of U.S. battleships had operated together as a body.  The 
North Atlantic Squadron had a true battle line, and Admiral Bunce reported “no difficulty 
found whatever in their steering or handling in evolutions.”130
The weather did not cooperate fully off Fisher’s Island, and Admiral Bunce had to 
cancel a couple of days’ operations ashore and postpone his departure for Tompkinsville 
an extra day, but valuable training was had nonetheless.
 
131  The Squadron got underway 
from Fisher’s Island on 16 September.  Massachusetts had finished the installation of her 
torpedo outfit at Newport, and was waiting off Block Island to join the Squadron as it 
steamed past.  The continued poor weather hampered squadron evolutions, but one clear 
day did give Admiral Bunce the opportunity to exercise his squadron in tactical 
formation, breaking the six ships up into two divisions of three ships each.  They arrived 
at the squadron anchorage off Tompkinsville on 19 September.132
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  This time, they were 
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home for ten days before getting underway for the southern drill grounds on 1 October.133  
From Hampton Roads, Bunce detached Raleigh to proceed to Southport, N.C. to receive 
the testimonial the citizens of North Carolina had asked to present earlier in the summer.  
Bunce noted that: “The Squadron exercises have reached a point where the Raleigh, an 
exceedingly well drilled ship, can be spared at any time…”134
The rest of the ships worked off Hampton Roads for two weeks, returning to 
Tompkinsville on 14 October.  It was on this voyage, while driving through a heavy gale, 
that Indiana, under the command of Captain Robley Evans, had the locking devices on all 
her turrets fail, allowing the massive armored structures and the guns inside them to 
swing freely in the storm.  In his memoirs, Rear Admiral Evans described the scene as 
officers and men worked frantically to secure the 13-inch guns: “I stood by the wheel on 
the upper bridge and frequently the whole forward end of her would go under water, men 
and all…At such times, I held my breath as the water rolled off and the black heads of the 
officers and men, one after another, came in sight.  I fully expected to see them swept 
overboard by the dozen.”
   
135
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  Amazingly, no one died in the episode, although a junior 
officer did lose his leg when an armored watertight door broke loose from its fittings and 
slammed on it.  By 11:10 the next morning, after a sleepless night, everything was secure.  
Admrial Bunce’s report somewhat matter-of-factly noted that “She [Indiana] rejoined 
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Squadron formation and full speed was resumed.”136  Besides the unfortunate episode 
with Indiana, which necessitated the redesign of her turret locking mechanisms, the 
Squadron had an opportunity to exercise the new “Squadron Tactics” manual.  Rear 
Admiral Bunce and his staff had compiled this volume specifically for the North Atlantic 
Squadron, building on Commodore Parker’s by-now dated tactical manual, “Squadron 
Tactics Under Steam.”137  After testing it with the Squadron during underway exercises, 
Bunce reported to the Navy Department that the new manual was of “great help in the 
discharge of my duty and if desired they can be readily perfected and issued.”138
The Blockade of Charleston 
  As 
1896 drew to a close with the ships of the Squadron at Tompkinsville, it marked a year of 
the most vigorous operational exercises of U.S. warships that had ever been undertaken 
in peacetime.   
 
The end of 1896 found most of the North Atlantic Squadron’s warships in the 
New York or Norfolk Navy Yards, undergoing upkeep and repairs.139
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  While his ships 
were otherwise engaged, Rear Admiral Bunce was busy with the planning for the 
Squadron’s next major exercise.  The series of maneuvers the Squadron had carried out in 
1896 had originally been conceived to proceed down the length of the east coast.  In 
keeping with that concept, the next exercise was set to take place in the South, off 
 
137 Note the difference in the titles.  By 1896, it is assumed that all squadron tactics will take place “under 
steam,” rendering the phrase superfluous.   
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Charleston, South Carolina.  This gave the added benefit of allowing citizens other than 
those in New England and the Mid-Atlantic region to see the warships of the North 
Atlantic Squadron.  On 8 December, Bunce received authorization to move his Squadron 
from New York to Hampton Roads.140  Bunce cooperated closely with the Bureau of 
Navigation – something his predecessors often resented, or did not care to do.  Major 
movements of his warships were always prefaced with communications with the Navy 
Department, and the receipt of their blessing before he made a move.  No sooner than 
Bunce had received the Department’s approval to began deploying his forces, than he 
received a communication from Rear Admiral Ramsay at the Bureau of Navigation.  In 
attempting to manage the anti-filibustering efforts off the Florida coast, the Navy 
Department had changed the orders of three of Bunce’s ships, and Ramsey had 
communicated those changes directly to the ships without consulting Bunce.141
The same day he received the “green light” from the Bureau of Navigation, Bunce 
ordered Captain Evans and the Indiana to Hampton Roads, as the advance party.  Evans 
was given careful instructions about how and where to anchor, leaving space so that the 
  Bunce 
took this in stride, showing his comfort with the consensus-building, managerial style of 
leadership demanded by the new navy.  This can be contrasted with his predecessor, who 
tended to display more “heroic” qualities (to use Janowitz’ terminology.)  Bunce enjoyed 
a longer tour as commander-in-chief because of his ability to work within a modern 
command structure increasingly tied to the telegraph and the latest news.   
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entire squadron could be easily constituted at Hampton Roads.  Bunce himself relocated 
his flag on 21 December, taking New York and Maine to arrive off Norfolk just in time 
for Christmas.142
Rear Admiral Bunce and the representatives of the Navy Department and the War 
College decided during their meeting that the Squadron was to arrange itself in the best 
possible position to blockade the entrance, while smaller vessels, such as Vesuvius, would 
be detailed to attempt to run the blockade under various conditions.  The naval station at 
Port Royal, South Carolina would be used to stockpile coal and supplies for the smaller 
vessels of the Squadron, while the battleships and other vessels of larger displacement 
  On 8 January 1897, Rear Admiral Bunce traveled from Norfolk to 
Washington, D.C., where he conferred with Secretary of the Navy Herbert and others 
within the Navy Department about the upcoming exercises.  After this meeting, it was 
announced that the maneuvers would consist of a mock blockade of the port at 
Charleston, South Carolina.  The U.S. Navy was not unfamiliar with blockading 
Charleston, having done so during the Civil War.  Admiral DuPont, victor of the 
successful action to take Port Royal, attempted to capture the port in 1863, but failed to 
subdue the famous Fort Sumter (which was held by the Confederates at the time).  The 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was never able to close the port of Charleston 
completely the entire war.  This was a matter of some pride to the locals, and a lively 
debate took place concerning the ability of the Blockading Squadron’s modern 
descendents to do any better.  
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would have to coal and provision at Hampton Roads.143
The North Atlantic Squadron, for the first time, was exercising an offensive 
capability.  It was couched in terms that suggested that they were experimenting to assess 
the capability of Spain to blockade a major port on the east coast, but there is little 
evidence to suggest that this explanation was any more believable in 1897 than it is 
today.  The North Atlantic Squadron was perfecting the techniques to enable them to 
carry the fight to an enemy’s waters, not practice coastal defense.
  Once the particulars had been 
worked out and approved, Bunce returned to New York to carry out the preparations. 
144  Admiral Bunce’s 
staff had to tackle several problems associated with deploying a large, disparate force 
away from its home waters.  The battleships could not move in close to the coast to chase 
blockade runners, so smaller vessels would be have to be used in conjunction with the 
capital warships.  Nor could the large ships utilize Port Royal as a depot because of their 
draft, so other ways would have to be found to supply and refuel them.145
Admiral Bunce ordered the Squadron to have steam up and be prepared to depart 
Hampton Roads on the morning of 3 February 1897.  In issuing his orders, he broke the 
Squadron into three sections.  The first was New York and Maine.  The second was 
  In other words, 
this was a protean combined arms “fleet”, that required more staff work and planning 
than a force composed of a few ships of roughly the same size, such as Rear Admiral 
Walker’s Squadron of Evolution, six or seven years earlier. 
                                                 
143 "Will Blockade Charleston," New York Times (1857-1922), 9 January 1897. 
 
144 At the risk of engaging in teleology, the fact that the Squadron’s major contribution to the Spanish-
American-Cuban War the following year was a blockade action in foreign waters speaks for itself. 
 
145 Robley Evans, in his memoirs, devotes an entire chapter to complaining about how difficult it was to get 
Indiana into Port Royal to utilize the drydock the Navy had built there.  That episode signaled the 
beginning of the end of Port Royal as a major naval station. 
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Indiana and Marblehead.  The third was Amphitrite and Columbia.146  The short trip 
down was marred by a violent storm, which resulted in the injury of six of Marblehead’s 
men.  They had to be landed at Charleston and taken to the hospital.147  The remainder of 
the Squadron anchored outside the harbor.  On 9 February, the Squadron took up 
blockading positions, anchoring with 1500 yards between the ships on a line of bearing 
northeast through southwest.  The line was initially set with Marblehead, Maine, New 
York, Amphitrite, and Columbia.  On 10 February, the mayor of Charleston and a 
Committee of Reception and Entertainment officially welcomed the North Atlantic 
Squadron to Charleston, and offered them the freedom of the city.148  Citizens flooded 
into the area, taking extra trains run by the railroads for the express purpose of bringing 
people in from the countryside to see the warships (and spend money in Charleston).  “15 
Men-of-War.  Most imposing Naval Exhibition for two weeks,” advertised one railroad, 
“The Atlantic Coast Line via Richmond is the only line to Florida passing through 
Charleston.”149
With the official courtesies dispensed with, the ships immediately got down to 
work, practicing light discipline on the first night.  The Squadron’s tender, Fern, was sent 
out to inspect each vessel and report to the admiral on any light which remained visible.  
Each commanding officer received a report on the results the next morning.  They also 
extended the blockade line to the efficient range of the ships’ searchlights, to ascertain 
 
                                                 
146 F.M. RADM Bunce, "Letter, Bunce to Na Squadron, 2 February 1897, 1897," Order, RG 45, U.S. Navy 
Department Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. 
 
147 "The Marblehead's Injured," New York Times (1857-1922), 10 February 1897. 
 
148 "Welcomed to Charleston," New York Times (1857-1922), 11 February 1897. 
 
149 "Front Page 1 -- No Title," New York Times (1857-1922), 5 February 1897. 
304 
 
the maximum distance apart ships could be and still maintain an effective blockade in the 
dark.  This was determined to be an interval of about 3000 yards. 
The Squadron closed up to 400 yards between ships on the morning of 10 
February, debriefed the previous night’s work, and spent the day conducting torpedo 
practice.150  That evening, night target practice utilizing searchlights was carried out.  
Heavy weather beset the Squadron on 11 February, preventing much in the way of 
meaningful drills.  That evening, the ships were joined by Indiana, which took her place 
in line, and Vesuvius, which was to be used as the “blockade runner.”  The weather was 
also bad on 12 February, postponing the official beginning of the exercises.  Marblehead 
and Amphitrite went in for coal, the former preparing to depart and proceed to Florida to 
relieve Dolphin on the anti-filibuster enforcement detail.  The newspapers, which 
reported daily on the Squadron’s progress, were disappointed that bad weather had 
delayed things, and eagerly awaited the commencement of Vesuvius’ attempts to run the 
blockade.151
That evening, after sundown, Vesuvius got underway and headed out to sea.  The 
line was set with four ships at 3000 yards interval.  Unfortunately, the fog that rolled in 
soon afterward led to an inauspicious start for the blockade.  “The VESUVIUS had no 
difficulty in getting in,” remarked Admiral Bunce somewhat dourly in his report.
 
152
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  His 
brevity was more than compensated for by the newspapers the following morning.  “THE 
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BLOCKADE IS BROKEN,” exclaimed the New York Times.  The subheading read: “It 
is Demonstrated that a Blockade Runner Can Safely Pass Lines of Battleships in a Fog, 
Despite the Searchlights.”153
The following day, things went a little smoother for the Squadron.  Amphitrite 
returned from coaling, and at noon, Massachusetts reported her arrival on station to the 
flag.  After a day spent in target practice, Admiral Bunce was ready to try again with six 
warships.  The weather on the evening of 13 February was clear and moonlight, with only 
a slight haze.  This time, things went more according to plan.  Vesuvius made four runs, 
and was spotted and “captured” each time, before passing the blockade line.   
  Bunce’s officers complained, off the record, of course, that 
the fog and the fact that they only had four ships on station were all factors that 
contributed to an “unfair” test, but the fact remained that Vesuvius, with her lights 
doused, had steamed right in between two of the warships and reached her objective 
without being challenged.   
After a day off for Sunday, 14 February, the ships were exercised at great gun 
target practice on Monday.  Marblehead completed her coaling and stood out for Florida 
to relieve Dolphin.  The poor weather continued to frustrate the Squadron’s attempts to 
practice their blockade techniques.  An attempt to blockade with the Squadron ships 
underway instead of anchored, and their lights doused, was finally declared unsafe at 
8PM, and the exercise halted for the night.  More target practice, with both the great guns 
and the secondary battery, was had the following day.  On 17 February, the Squadron 
cleaned their ships in anticipation of a visit from Secretary of the Navy Herbert.  A 
member of a lame-duck cabinet, now that William McKinley had won the 1896 election, 
Herbert was days from turning his portfolio over to incoming Republican John D. Long.  
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On 18 February, Secretary Herbert embarked in Dolphin and passed the Squadron in 
review.  Later that evening, the Chamber of Commerce of Charleston honored him at a 
banquet to which all the officers of the Squadron were invited.  This visit to the Squadron 
was his final review of the organization he had worked so hard to put together, and to 
develop as a fighting unit.154
After a farewell ball given the next evening for the officers by the citizens of 
Charleston, it was time for the Squadron to return to New York.  Rear Admiral Bunce 
offered has assessment of the exercise as follows:  “I think it has been established that, in 
blockading, a belt of light two miles in width, and whose length is limited only by the 
number of ships available, can be stretched around any harbor by the use of search 
lights.”  Bunce’s remarks in his after-action report dispel any notion that this exercise 
was performed to try to evaluate the ability of “the Spanish” to blockade a U.S. port city.  
There is no mention of an enemy force anywhere in the report, Bunce’s only interest 
being the efficiency of the North Atlantic Squadron’s blockading capabilities.
 
155
Rear Admiral Sicard Takes Over 
  
 
Having concluded one of the largest naval exercises undertaken since the Civil 
War, Rear Admiral Bunce’s attention returned to domestic matters.  The approaching 
mild weather of spring brought a season of celebrations and commemorations.  The 
presence of the Navy was highly sought after at each of these, and the Navy Department 
had a political minefield to negotiate in granting or denying requests.  Meanwhile, a new 
administration took office in March.  As of 6 March 1897, Bunce had a new superior.  
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President McKinley’s selection of John D. Long as his Secretary of the Navy was a 
fortunate choice for the New Steel Navy.  A previous governor of Massachusetts as well 
as a member of Congress for six years, Long’s contacts on Capitol Hill as well as his ties 
to an important maritime state made him an effective secretary.  But, it was McKinley’s 
selection a month later of a young New Yorker, Theodore Roosevelt, as the assistant 
secretary of the Navy that would have an even more historic impact.  While Roosevelt 
rightly gets much of the credit for preparing the U.S. Navy to prosecute the War of 1898, 
this study has demonstrated that the North Atlantic Squadron, under Rear Admiral 
Bunce’s energetic leadership, spent much of the year prior to Roosevelt’s appointment as 
assistant secretary busily engaged in developing its skills. 
The Squadron (except the monitors) left Charleston on 21 February.  New York, 
Indiana, and Columbia proceeded back to Hampton Roads, where Raleigh awaited them.  
Massachusetts went on to New York to enter the Navy Yard and test the new dock that 
had just finished construction.  From there, she was to go to Boston where the citizens of 
her namesake state were to present her with a memorial.156  Newark was in dock at Port 
Royal.  Texas and Maine were detailed to New Orleans, with orders to arrive in time to 
participate in the Mardi Gras celebration.  Montgomery left her station in Key West to be 
present at Mobile, Alabama’s Mardi Gras festivities.  Marblehead and Vesuvius both 
remained in Florida to reinforce the expanded anti-filibustering mission.157
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The fact that the Caribbean was relatively quiet in the winter of 1897 helped the 
Squadron have enough ships available to carry out multi-ship exercises.  The absence of 
urgent threats to U.S. lives and property allowed the Navy Department to use the 
Apprentice Training Squadron ship Essex to pay port visits to many of the usual stops of 
Squadron warships in the West Indies.  Essex’s spring cruise in 1897 included stops in 
Barbados, LaGuayra, Venezuela, and Kingston, Jamaica.  This not only provided 
valuable training for the apprentices in Essex, it was a low-cost alternative to issuing 
individual orders to Squadron warships, thereby allowing Admiral Bunce to keep his unit 
concentrated, and was much less threatening to the Spanish than sending the entire 
squadron.158
On 6 March 1897, the Squadron got underway for Tompkinsville, Staten Island.  
New York was to perform a full speed trial on the way home, so Bunce arranged for the 
Squadron to break up and proceed independently after clearing the Virginia Capes.
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  It 
was one of the rare times during Bunce’s command that the flagship moved without 
having tactical control of at least one other member of the Squadron – a far cry from the 
year 1873, when no squadron ships sailed in company at any time during the year.  
Bunce, in fact, was constantly concerned with operating his warships at least in pairs 
whenever possible, the better to exercise their station-keeping abilities.  His instructions 
to Texas and Maine, returning to New York from their Mardi Gras duty in New Orleans 
were explicit that the two ships would be exercised during the transit.  “Your attention is 
called to the Programme of Exercise for Section, issued by me June 15th 1896, a copy 
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enclosed,” he wrote to Captain Glass.160  Likewise, even the monitors – although they did 
not exercise with the Squadron – were sent out in section whenever possible.161
Back in New York, preparations were underway for the dedication of the General 
Grant National Memorial, better known as “Grant’s Tomb.”  The month of April found 
the Squadron in Hampton Roads.  It got underway on 19 April, arriving back at the 
squadron anchorage at Tompkinsville, Staten Island, the next day.
   
162  On 25 April, the 
Squadron weighed anchor and steamed up the Hudson River, anchoring directly off the 
new mausoleum.  After the flagship, New York, was Maine, Indiana, Texas, Columbia, 
Raleigh, Amphitrite, and Terror.  The U.S. warships were joined by foreign vessels:  
from Great Britain, the Talbot; from Italy, the Dogali, from France, the Fulton, and from 
Spain, Infanta Maria Teresa and Infanta Isabel.163
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  The morning of 27 April was cold 
and cloudy, which kept away a lot of casual observers.  Still, the parade route was lined 
by the time the naval brigade, which had been landed earlier that morning, marched 
alongside hundreds of other civic and military participants through New York to the 
tomb.  As the head of the column drew near the reviewing stand, a signal was given to the 
flagship, and the guns of the Squadron and their foreign guests erupted in the 21-gun 
salute prescribed for a head of state. 
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Anchored north of the Squadron, just off 133rd Street, was Dolphin, which was 
tasked with transporting President McKinley.  Just after 4PM, the president embarked in 
Dolphin, and proceeded to review the assembled squadron.  Each ship’s guns boomed 
with another 21-gun salute as Dolphin passed.  After honors were rendered, the president 
returned to the wharf to be whisked away to another engagement.  In all, as Admiral 
Bunce reported, “the ceremonies for which the fleet was gathered here…were carried 
out…in all respects according to the plans prepared.”164  The success of the naval review 
was a fitting close to the admiral’s tenure as commander-in-chief.  On 1 May, he 
detached from command of the North Atlantic Squadron and reported as the 
Commandant, New York Navy Yard and Station.  Although he never took the Squadron 
on an operational deployment, Admiral Bunce can be credited with coming the closest 
yet to realizing the transformation that Rear Admiral Luce had envisioned for the 
Squadron a decade earlier.  During Bunce’s tenure, single-ship deployments were kept to 
a minimum, while the entire squadron, now reinforced by the arrival of battleships, 
conducted two major and several lesser exercises.  In Admiral Robley Evans’ words: “we 
had mastered it [handling battleships] in the only way possible to seamen – by constant 
work and practice out on the blue water.  We all owe much to Admiral Bunce.”165
Admiral Bunce was relieved by Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, whose 
previous assignment had been commandant of the New York Navy Yard.
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admirals of his generation, Sicard had a distinguished Civil War record, having been 
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present at the capture of New Orleans in 1862, run the batteries at Vicksburg in 1863, and 
commanded the gunboat Seneca during the assaults on Fort Fisher in 1864-1863.  Post-
war duty included tours at the Naval Academy, various sea commands, and nine years as 
chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.167
The longer the civil war in Cuba dragged on, the more desperate the Spanish Empire 
became to suppress the insurrection.  By 1896, the Spanish forces had burned entire 
villages and planted fields, seized livestock, and rounded up Cuban civilians to be placed 
in the infamous “reconcentration” camps.
  Sicard inherited a squadron focused, at least in the 
short term, on domestic matters.  However, greater problems were brewing in the North 
Atlantic Squadron’s area of operations. 
168  All of this, of course, was bad for U.S. 
business interests on the island, which amounted to $50 million in direct investments and 
another $100 million in trade.169
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  This, coupled with the vibrant ex-patriot “Cuba Libre” 
movement, contributed to a constant interest by various combinations of U.S. citizens and 
Cubans to become involved in helping the rebels eject the Spanish from the island.  As 
has already been shown, throughout 1896 and 1897, attempts to maintain U.S. neutrality 
were leading to an increasing workload for the squadron.  What had begun as an 
assignment of one vessel to duty off Florida had become a constant deployment of three 
North Atlantic Squadron warships by the time Sicard took over.  The trouble brewing in 
Cuba pushed Sicard to continue drilling his Squadron, preparing for whatever crisis 
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might develop.170  The Department took a renewed interest in training and preparedness 
as well, detaching Amphitrite from the Squadron on 7 May to serve as a training ship for 
gun captains.171
Spring began the season for celebrations and commemorations.  One of the first 
orders Sicard gave as commander-in-chief was to send Terror and Texas to Philadelphia 
to participate in the dedication of a statue erected to George Washington by the Order of 
Cincinnati.
 
172  Sicard himself, in the flagship New York, was off to Boston for the 
unveiling of a statue dedicated to Colónel Robert G. Shaw, the famous commanding 
officer of the 54th Massachusetts “Colored” infantry regiment.  Texas joined the flagship 
in Boston after finishing her duties in Philadelphia.  Massachusetts then joined the other 
two ships on 17 June for the anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill.173  From Boston, 
Massachusetts headed north to St. John’s, Newfoundland to take part in the celebration of 
the 400th anniversary of the discovery of Newfoundland, while Texas headed the other 
direction – to Hampton Roads, where she was made available for inspection by the 
members of an engineering society that was holding an annual meeting there.174
                                                 
170 RAMD Robley Evans credits him with drilling hard to prepare for war.  See: Evans. 
  While 
these various port visits were being scheduled, representatives of the U.S. mackerel 
fishing fleet, which fished in the waters opened to them by treaty with Great Britain, were 
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clamoring for a warship to make a cruise in those waters to discourage Canadian 
interference with their fishing rights.175  Marblehead was eventually designated for this 
duty, after a port visit to her namesake city of Marblehead, Massachusetts in June.176
In the midst of servicing all these requests from citizens that wanted to either see 
their warships, or have them actually protect them, Sicard became concerned that the 
cohesion of his squadron, and her new mission to maintain the ability to fight a fleet 
action, might suffer.  In June, he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, expressing 
emphatically the importance of keeping “together as many of the vessels of this squadron 
as the demands of the service will allow.”  Sicard went on to note:  
 
Being ‘in squadron’ is of great advantage to the discipline and order of ships, as 
it promotes emulation between their officers and crews, and the frequent signaling made 
necessary by the presence of numerous vessels, keeps the personnel watchful, alert, and 
attentive, and accustoms them to constant use of the different kinds of signals – in other 
words the squadron is an excellent school of practical, every day duty.177
 
 
Sicard, like Bunce and Luce before him, envisioned the North Atlantic Squadron as a 
fighting organization constantly devoted to training, not an administrative grouping of 
ships.   
 Rear Admiral Sicard’s concerns were answered by Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Theodore Roosevelt.  In a letter sent just two days after Sicard mailed his from 
Hampton Roads, Roosevelt reassured the admiral, stating that: “The Department desires 
to keep the squadron intact after August 1st, and from that date you will have ample 
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opportunity for squadron drills.”178  At the time of his correspondence with Sicard, 
Roosevelt had just returned from Newport, Rhode Island, where on 2 June 1897 he had 
given one of the pivotal speeches of his career to the Naval War College class of 1897.  
“We must therefore make up our minds once for all to the fact that it is too late to make 
ready for war when the fight has once begun,” he had said then.179  Sicard had a true ally 
in Roosevelt, who was eagerly in favor of keeping the Squadron together as much as 
possible, and understood that preparedness required constant training and learning.  Two 
weeks later, Sicard traveled from Norfolk to Washington, D.C., where he met with 
personally with Roosevelt as well as Captain Goodrich of the Naval War College.  
Together with Captain Crowninshield, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the three men 
planned the Squadron’s August maneuvers.180
Naval Militia Drills, 1897 
 
 
 Before the Squadron could drill themselves, however, they had to provide training 
for the naval militia.  The success of 1896 led the state organizations to expect even 
better things for 1897.  That year’s exercises promised to be the most extensive yet.  
After careful planning, Sicard issued a flurry of orders to his warships on 24 June.  
Wilmington was ordered from her current station at Key West, Florida to Brunswick, 
Georgia, to arrive by 13 July.  There she was to cooperate with the drills of the Georgia 
Militia.  New York, Maine, and Texas were to depart Hampton Roads on 29 June.  The 
three ships would proceed to the southern drill ground, exercise until 3 July 1897, then 
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head north. Maine would leave the flag off the Capes of Delaware, proceeding to meet 
the Pennsylvania Naval Militia.  Texas would proceed to Fisher’s Island, where the naval 
militias of Connecticut and East New Jersey were to emcamp.  Massachusetts was 
ordered to Boston, to work with the naval militia of her namesake state alongside the 
torpedo boat Ericsson from 12 – 16 July.  She was then to return to New York, where she 
would join Maine in cooperating with the Naval Militia of New York from 24 – 31 
July.181
 The summer militia exercises themselves were fairly unremarkable.  What was 
new was Assistant Secretary Roosevelt’s personal involvement.  Characteristically, 
Roosevelt threw himself into advocacy for the growing naval militia movement.  During 
the summer, he visited the encampments of the Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and New York 
organizations, while overseeing the assignment of North Atlantic Squadron resources to 
as many units as could be reasonably accommodated.  While Roosevelt was generally 
very supportive of the militia movement, he was uncomfortable with the naval militia’s 
subordination to the state governors, and only thought that so much could be done as long 
as each militia organization depended on its own state government for orders and 
funding.  He called for a national naval reserve, which could harness expertise resident in 
the “seafaring classes” in time of war.  Until then, Roosevelt made it clear that he thought 
the main contribution of the naval militia would come in harbor defense – specifically 
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laying defensive minefields, and manning coastal signal stations to warn of the arrival of 
hostile fleets.182
 The summer work with the naval militia complete, the Squadron prepared to 
resume their own training.  On 2 August, New York, Massachusetts, Indiana, Puritan, 
Maine, and Fern left the Squadron anchorage at Tompkinsville for Newport, Rhode 
Island.
 
183  It was the largest gathering of the new navy ever seen in Newport, and the city 
turned out in force for a series of celebrations.  The morning of 4 August was taken up 
with boat races.  Racing the oar-driven cutters which served as ships’ boats was a 
traditional favorite pastime for sailors.  Commanding officers were often passionate about 
their cutter crews, and bragging rights throughout the Squadron often depended on a good 
race from a ship’s handpicked crew.184  At the 4 August races, the second crew from New 
York took first place, followed by the crews from Iowa, Indiana, New York’s first boat, 
and Massachusetts.185
Later in the afternoon of 4 August, a parade wound through the narrow downtown 
streets of Newport.  Representatives from the Army troops stationed at Fort Adams, the 
Rhode Island militia and naval militia, the Marine detachments and sailors from each of 
  Athletics regularly organized at the squadron level provide yet 
another piece of evidence that the North Atlantic Squadron had developed a discrete 
organizational identity.  The members of the Squadron sailed together, drilled together, 
and engaged in recreational activities together so regularly by 1897 that there standing 
boat crews for their frequent cutter races. 
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the warships marched past the stand as Rear Admiral Sicard, Retired Rear Admiral 
Stephen B. Luce, Governor Elisha Dyer of Rhode Island, and Secretary of the Navy John 
D. Long reviewed them.186  In the evening, the officers of the Squadron were honored at 
a reception.187
From Newport, the Squadron sailed for Portsmouth, New Hampshire on 11 
August.  Puritan left the day before, as her speed of advance was considerably less than 
the rest of the Squadron’s.  Off Cape Cod, the battleship Iowa and armored cruiser 
Brooklyn were detached to proceed to Provincetown, MA, where they were to determine 
their tactical measurements, which the Squadron did not have yet due to the fact that they 
were the two newest ships.  After completely gathering all the tactical data they could, 
they were to join the flag at Portland, Maine.
 
188
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  The remaining ships stayed in 
Portsmouth from 11 – 16 August, at which time they departed for Portland, Maine.  They 
were joined in Portland by Iowa and Brooklyn, who had finished their data collection.  
Together, the seven ships participated in “Squadron Day” at the New England Fair on 18 
August.  1250 officers and men were landed to march in a parade.  The ships of the 
Squadron were illuminated in the evening, and the Governor of Maine was hosted on 
board New York the next day.  A lengthy editorial in the New York Times pointed out 
that, only five or six years previously, the American public had taken pride in the North 
Atlantic Squadron led by Rear Admiral Walker, the nucleus of which was his Squadron 
of Evolution.  Four years previously, the world had acknowledged the United States as an 
 
187 "War Ships Arrive at Newport," New York Times (1857-1922), 4 August 1897. 
 
188 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Bartlett, 9 August 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area 
Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. ; Montgomery Sicard, RADM, 
"Letter, Sicard to Ramsay, 12 August 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval Records 
Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
318 
 
emerging naval power at the 1893 International Naval Review.  The Times marveled at 
the four battleships and three cruisers on display in New England.  “This formidable 
squadron is presently to proceed to sea for exercise in battle evolutions.  Its movements 
will be watched with the greatest interest…they [naval officers] cannot have too much 
familiarity with such undertakings.”189
After a week in Bar Harbor, Maine, where the commander-in-chief and his 
officers partook of the usual festivities, the Squadron got underway on 30 August for the 
southern drill grounds, off Hampton Roads, and Admiral Sicard’s long-awaited summer 
maneuvers.
   
190  These maneuvers were closely observed by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, 
who joined the Squadron in Dolphin on 7 September.  Roosevelt spent two full days with 
the Squadron, inspecting Iowa and Brooklyn, observing target practice – both service and 
sub-caliber, searchlight drills, and squadron evolutions, departing on 9 September.  The 
maneuvers continued for another three days, finishing on 12 September.  Sicard 
pronounced the results “generally…satisfactory.”191
After spending a couple of weeks coaling the ships and performing routine 
maintenance, Sicard wrote to the Department with his plans for the next month.  He 
envisioned a series of maneuvers, taking the Squadron first to the southern drill grounds 
from 27 September to 1 or 2 October, then to the Yorktown area where the naval brigade 
could be landed for drills and target practice.  After re-coaling, the Squadron would be 
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ready for whatever other duties the Department might have in mind.192
Roosevelt’s leadership within the Navy Department during Secretary Long’s 
lengthy illnesses and visits to his home is a well-known and accepted fact.  The story of 
Roosevelt’s telegram to Dewey in Hong Kong, telling him to coal his ships and attack the 
Philippines in the event of war with Spain is legend among even the most casual students 
of the war.  What is less known is the extent to which the hyperactive Roosevelt was 
deeply involved in the operations of the Home Squadron during this time.  On 21 
September, Sicard received this letter from Roosevelt, acting as secretary in Long’s 
absence: 
  What followed 
was a bizarre exchange of letters with Assistant Secretary Roosevelt that speaks volumes 
about the change in the character of fleet command in the 1890’s. 
The Department suggests that advantage be taken of all the passages of the 
Squadron under your command from one port to another to engage in fleet maneuvers, 




One can only imagine how Rear Admiral Walker, or Rear Admiral Meade would have 
received this letter.  Previous chapters have documented Walker’s multiple-page missives 
fired off for much less provocation than this.  Sicard, however, remained calm.  In a 
respectful reply, he gently instructed Roosevelt in how units of multiple ships move 
together and what sort of environmental factors govern their movements, then went on to 
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say sympathetically, “I am fully alive to the importance of practicing evolutions 
whenever opportunity in afforded….and shall do so.”194
 The Squadron anchored off Yorktown, Virginia on 27 September, Sicard having 
decided to do the landing drills and ashore work prior to taking on coal.  The planned 
rifle target practice for the sailors had to be postponed until the Squadron could find 
another location for a makeshift range.  The Yorktown area had become so settled that 
Sicard was concerned that the rounds from the Navy’s new 6mm rifle would endanger 
civilian lives or property, so he decided to await another opportunity elsewhere.  The 
Squadron made up for the lack of rifle target practice with a week of “exercising landing 
brigades on shore, in extended movements by companies, and in target practice with 
pistols and revolvers.”  On 1 October, sailors from New York, Maine, and Puritan set up 
defensive positions on Gloucester Point.  They were then attacked by the battalions from 
Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Indiana.  After a day of fighting, the offense was 
judged to have won the skirmish.  Upon completion of the landing exercises, Fern left for 
Norfolk, Virginia, with a draft of handpicked men to be trained as gun captains on board 
Amphitrite, which had been stationed at Norfolk since being detached from the Squadron 
in May.
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one of her main steam pipes began leaking and required repairs.  Puritan was detached to 
proceed to the New York Navy Yard for scheduled repairs.  The remaining ships: New 
York, Iowa, Massachusetts, Indiana and Maine conducted tactical maneuvers from 5 – 9 
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October.196  Indiana and Maine were detached by the Navy Department to proceed on 
other business.  The three remaining ships then proceeded to Cape Cod Bay, where they 
met up with Texas and conducted another set of tactical maneuvers on 13 October, before 
departing the area for Boston, where the Squadron participated in ceremonies marking 
the 100th anniversary of the launching of the USS Constitution, on 21 October.197
 The Squadron arrived back at Tompkinsville, Staten Island, New York on the 24th 
of October.  New York went into dock immediately, for a scheduled upkeep period.
 
198  
Although not underway, Admiral Sicard never lost sight of the vital importance of 
continuing with training and preparedness.  He dispatched Texas, which had been in the 
New York Navy Yard for much of the previous underway period, to the northern drill 
grounds for four days of target practice on all guns, following a set of instructions very 
carefully written and issued by him.  Captain Wise was admonished to “express [his] 
opinion of the practice, using for that purpose, the Naval Academy scale of merit.”199
                                                 
196 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Ramsay, 14 October 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area 
Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
  It 
is a myth that accuracy with the great guns was ignored until after the War of 1898.  
Although there were charges of “gun-decking” target practice scores, and the real-world 
post-battle analysis of the accuracy at the Battle of Santiago de Cuba showed an abysmal 




198 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Ramsay, 24 October 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area 
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199 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Wise, 10 November 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area 




on the part of the Squadron or her commanders-in-chief to practice with the guns.200  
During this time, Sicard also issued a number of orders to Squadron warships concerning 
the ongoing efforts to patrol the Florida coastline.  Montgomery and Vesuvius were 
ordered to Pensacola and Jacksonville, respectively, to join Detroit which was under the 
Navy Department’s direct jurisdiction, patrolling the Key West district.201
 The Squadron now regularly not only went to sea together, but spent time not at 
sea in the same port, usually Tompkinsville, Staten Island.  Time in port together 
inevitably meant that the crews of the warships would spend their leisure time together.  
The time-honored tradition of racing the ships’ cutters has already been mentioned.  




                                                 
200 Herrick, 165-166. 
  The 1890’s craze for sporting and other leisure activities carried over to 
the Navy, with other sports soon joining rowing and baseball.  Importantly, these sports 
were organized and enjoyed on a Squadron level, not by ship.  Bicycling was becoming 
popular during this time, and two of the Squadron’s commanding officers, Captain Silas 
Casey of New York, and Captain Francis Higginson of Massachusetts were avid cyclists.  
A cycling club started on New York, but that was insufficient to serve the numbers of 
officers who were interested.  Soon, a circular was sent to the wardroom of every ship in 
the Squadron, and the North Atlantic Squadron Bicycle Club was born, complete with 
elected officers and representatives from each warship.  At this point the officers not only 
were comfortable with each other when handling their ships in formation and mingled 
 
201 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Telegram, Sicard to Bradford, 7 November 1987, 1897," Telegram, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
202 Chicago, while John G. Walker’s flagship, was said to have an excellent baseball team.  See Ch. 3 
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with each other at official functions and receptions, they now formed relationships and 
shared interests to the point where they were participating in non-official recreational 
organizations on a squadron level. 
Conclusions 
 
 Through 1897, the trouble in Cuba escalated to the point that the Navy 
Department eventually wanted the entire North Atlantic Squadron in Florida.  Sicard was 
alerted on 3 December that the Department desired the Squadron’s winter cruise and 
exercises to take place off Key West and the Dry Tortugas.  He was directed to 
concentrate his Squadron at Hampton Roads prior to moving south.203  In compliance 
with this plan, Sicard began to issue orders to his warships.  Throughout 1897, Sicard had 
worked to successfully prepare his squadron for the deployment which they were now 
undertaking.204  The flagship moved to Hampton Roads in December.  In his instructions 
to the other warships which would be joining the squadron when their repairs were 
complete, Sicard was emphatic that all line officers be afforded an opportunity to practice 
the tactical maneuvers they would be expected to be familiar with.  He even enclosed a 
copy of a table which had been created on New York, containing each junior officer’s 
name, the various evolutions practiced, and the date that officer acted as the Officer of 
the Deck during one of the evolutions.  He strongly suggested that his other warships take 
up this practice of systematic training.205
                                                 
203 John D. Long, "Letter, Long to Sicard, 3 December 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area Files of the Naval 
Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
 
204 Athough they would deploy without him.  Sicard was condemmed by medical survey in late 1897 and 
had to be replaced by W.T. Sampson right before the outbreak of hostilities.   
 
205 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Co of Brooklyn, 28 December 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 
45, Area Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
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On 8 December, Bunce ordered Captain Sigsbee of the Maine to “proceed with 
the MAINE under your command to Key West, Florida, and there await further 
orders.”206  These were fateful instructions.  In his memoirs, Rear Admiral Robley Evans 
described those last few weeks of Maine’s short existence.  “At Key West, Florida, I 
found the North Atlantic Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Sicard, and it was 
clear to me that that able officer expected war with Spain and was doing all he could to 
be ready for it when it came.”207
The previous chapter ended with a commander-in-chief who was unsure of the 
locations or assignments of any of his warships, other than the flagship.  That was in 
1894.  Three years later, the Squadron not only traveled in formation, they trained 
together, using standardized training guides promulgated by Rear Admiral Sicard.  They 
socialized together after hours, engaging in activities like the North Atlantic Squadron 
Bicycle Club.  In the three years prior to the War of 1898, the commander-in-chief of the 
North Atlantic Squadron was in direct tactical control of at least one of his ships for 536 
of 1095 days, or 49% of the time.  Ten major squadron exercises took place.  These facts 
represent a major change both in mission and identity.  The Squadron’s primary mission 
shifted from single-ship “showing-the-flag” and presence operations to being prepared to 
confront an enemy fleet.  With that change in function came an identity as a tactical unit 
which had not existed fifteen, or even three, years earlier.   
    
Significant advances were made in multi-ship operations.  Under the leadership of 
Rear Admiral Meade, the “usual winter’s cruise” in 1895 was accomplished not by 
                                                 
206 Montgomery Sicard, RADM, "Letter, Sicard to Sigsbee, 8 December 1897, 1897," Letter, RG 45, Area 
Files of the Naval Records Collection, 1775-1910, Washington, D.C. . 
 
207 Evans, 404. 
325 
 
sending the warships out piecemeal to various ports in the Caribbean, but by moving as a 
squadron throughout the operating area.  Although Meade’s attitude and leadership style 
were incompatible with the demands placed upon a modern commander-in-chief, he was 
effective in keeping the Squadron concentrated and developing its unit identity.  Under 
Rear Admiral Bunce, the Squadron reached new heights in the development of doctrine 
and tactics through a series of meticulously-planned exercises.  The support and 
development of a naval militia enabled the Squadron to restrict its involvement in harbor 
protection.  With the monitors in ordinary manned by willing naval militia volunteers, the 
North Atlantic Squadron could focus on the tasks required of a sea-going battle fleet.  
There were still challenges to be met before the true power projection capabilities 
of the organization could be realized.  The purchase and delivery of high-quality coal for 
so many warships concentrated in one place continued to consume an inordinate amount 
of time for both the Squadron and the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting.  The steel 
ships had to be docked more often, and the lack of availability of enough suitable 
drydocks – especially for the larger ships – was a limiting factor.  Target practice was 
unrealistic, and the concept of conducting exercises against opposing forces had not yet 
been perfected.  Still, at 1897’s end the North Atlantic Squadron was a changed 
organization.  Consisting of entirely new materiel and better-trained, it entered 1898 as a 










 It is appropriate that this study end in the same geographic location where it 
began, 23 years earlier: the waters off the coast of Key West, Florida.  There, at the 
anchorage off the island of Dry Tortugas, the North Atlantic Squadron, with Rear 
Admiral Montgomery Sicard in command, was resting after a day of exercises.  Late in 
the evening of 15 February 1898, a torpedo boat from the naval station came alongside 
the flagship New York with the shocking news of the explosion of the battleship Maine in 
Havana, Cuba.  The much-anticipated war with Spain was now almost a certainty.  The 
North Atlantic Squadron was ready; not simply because it possessed modern steel 
warships, but because it had spent the last two decades engaged in an ongoing process of 
transformation from an administrative unit to a group of warships constituting a battle 
fleet.  The process was not complete in 1898, but enough progress had been made to test 
the North Atlantic Squadron’s ability to engage another naval power in a multi-ship 
action, should the need arise. 
A full scholarly treatment of the North Atlantic Squadron’s actions during the 
War of 1898 is beyond the scope of this study.  However, a brief review of the 
Squadron’s accomplishments between February and July of 1898 will serve as a 
background upon which to consider the arguments of this dissertation.1
                                                 
1The following account draws from: William G. Cassard, Chaplain, USN, ed. Battleship Indiana and Her 
Part in the Spanish-American War (New York, NY: Everett B. Mero, 1898); A. B.  Feuer, The Spanish-
American War at Sea: Naval Action in the Atlantic (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995); W. A. M. Goode, ed. 
With Sampson through the War: Being an Account of the Naval Operations of the North Atlantic Squadron 
During the Spanish-American War of 1898 (New York, NY: Doubleday and McClure Co., 1899); Jim 
Leeke, Manila and Santiago: The New Steel Navy in the Spanish-American War (Annapolis, MD: U.S. 
Naval Institute Press, 2009); John D. Long, The New American Navy, 2 vols., vol. 1 and 2 (New York, NY: 
    This study has 
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offered evidence that the creation of fleet practices crucial for the sound deployment of 
the modern warships of the “New Steel Navy” began in the 1870’s, grew in the 1880’s, 
and matured in the 1890’s.  The result of this ongoing process was the construction of an 
organizational identity as a combat unit.   
Swinging at anchor with Sicard’s flagship, the armored cruiser New York, were 
the battleships Iowa, Texas, Massachusetts, and Indiana.  During the 1874 crisis, the 
order for a concentration of the fleet in Key West was made during a meeting of 
President Grant’s cabinet on 14 November 1873, and that it was not until the end of 
January, 1874, after the threat of hostilities had already passed, that enough of a “fleet” 
could be mustered to hold tactical exercises.  By late 1897, enough new ships existed that 
the North Atlantic Squadron could remain concentrated as the norm, rather than an 
exception. 
After the war, Rear Admiral Sicard was criticized for his first actions after finding 
out Maine had been destroyed.  Some felt that Sicard should have weighed anchor and 
got underway with the battleships for Havana instantly.  Perhaps the show of force of his 
battleships in Havana harbor would have caused the Spanish to capitulate, and might 
have averted hostilities.  Rear Admirals John G. Walker or Richard W. Meade might 
have done just that.  As has been shown the concept of squadron command of these 
officers took an expansive view of the powers of the commander-in-chief to do as he 
thought best and seek permission later.  Sicard reacted as the modern institution would 
have expected him to.  He moved New York closer to Key West that evening, to stay in 
closer telegraphic communication with Washington, D.C, and awaited orders from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Outlook Company, 1903); Craig L. Symonds, The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). 
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Navy Department concerning the disposition of his squadron.  Sicard’s actions are 
evidence that the mode of leadership of the commander-in-chief was undergoing a 
process of change as well, from what Morris Janowitz has called a “heroic” leader to a 
“managerial” one.  Sicard regarded his command not as his personal fiefdom but as an 
instrument of power to be directed by Washington, D.C.2
Rear Admiral Sicard was replaced in command of the North Atlantic Squadron by 
Captain W.T. Sampson, Iowa’s commanding officer, on 28 March 1898.  Like Sicard, 
Sampson had been assigned previously as the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, prior to 
assuming command of Iowa.  Much has been made of Sicard’s relief by Sampson.  The 
accusations are twofold: that Sicard had somehow been found lacking by Secretary of the 
Navy Long, and that Sampson was advanced over the heads of several officers senior to 
him due to some kind of favoritism.  Both charges are vehemently denied by Secretary 
Long in his memoirs.
  
3
                                                 
2 Janowitz. 
  The facts are simply that a shooting war was coming, and Sicard 
was demonstrably unwell.  Secretary of the Navy Long (not exactly healthy himself) 
prudently had to get someone into the commander-in-chief’s position who was physically 
capable of the demanding duties associated with leading a squadron of warships in a fleet 
combat action.  Sampson, although only a captain at the time, was the next senior officer 
in the North Atlantic Squadron, and it was his rightful place to take the squadron in the 
event of his senior’s incapacity.  Sampson had the added advantage of having worked 
with the Squadron while captain of Iowa.  It was hardly the right time to attempt to break 
in a flag officer who might have been senior to Sampson, but was serving ashore when 
the crisis erupted. 
 
3 Long, The New American Navy, 209-213. 
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The organization of Sampson’s fleet soon became an issue for the Navy 
Department.  Faced with the threat of an actual war, the idea of a concentrated fleet broke 
down in the face of popular clamor for coast defense.  The extensive public relations 
work done by the Squadron, documented in this study, produced an unexpected side 
effect.  Immediately upon the threat of hostilities, cities up and down the east coast 
demanded protection from the threat of the unlocated Spanish squadron.  The Navy 
Department’s first response was to mobilize thirteen Civil War-era monitors and man 
them with personnel drawn from the ranks of the naval militia.  However, even civilians 
understood that the ancient monitors and their ridiculous smooth-bore artillery were no 
protection against the capabilities the Spanish armored cruisers possessed. 
Eventually, the decision was taken to constitute two combat squadrons and one 
patrol squadron with all the assets available.  In addition to Sampson’s North Atlantic 
Squadron, the so-called “Flying Squadron” was formed at Hampton Roads, which was 
believed to be close enough to Key West to reinforce the North Atlantic Squadron if 
necessary, yet close enough to New York to protect it if occasion arose.  Texas, 
Massachusetts, and Iowa formed its nucleus, with Brooklyn as the flagship of Rear 
Admiral Schley.  Further north, The Northern Patrol Squadron, commanded by Rear 
Admiral J. A. Howell, was built around a core of four converted Morgan Line 
steamships, renamed Yankee, Dixie, Prarie, and Yosemite.  These ships were scattered up 
and down the east coast, ostensibly to provide early warning of the approach of the 
unlocated Spanish squadron.  The real purpose of the vessels was to assuage the fears of 
the public, which were greatly magnified by the constant alarmist reporting of 
newspapers.  The Northern Patrol Squadron served its purpose.  If not for the naval 
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militia, the assets available to the combatant squadrons would probably have been drawn 
down even further.   
 Upon the declaration of war by Congress on 21 April, the Squadron was 
immediately ordered to get underway and establish a blockade of major Cuban ports.  
Early on the morning of 22 April, New York departed Key West, followed by Indiana, 
Cincinnati, Wilmington, Helena, Machias, Nashville, Castine, seven torpedo boats and 
three monitors.   The challenge facing Sampson was to mount an effective and 
maintainable blockade that would deprive Spanish troops of the supplies necessary to 
continue fighting, while keeping in mind that the whereabouts of a Spanish squadron that 
was said to have left Spain under the command of Admiral Cervera were not known.   
This latter complication was the reason that the Navy Department would not 
allow Sampson to close on Havana and shell it into submission with his battleships, as he 
had requested permission to do.  The plan might have worked, but the Navy Department 
objected that there were no infantry forces available to occupy the city, even if it did 
surrender.  Moreover, after the shocking loss of Maine, public opinion would not stand 
the loss or serious damage of another capital warship.  Sampson was required to preserve 
his armored ships for an anticipated battle with a Spanish fleet. 
 After receiving word that Cervera had left the Cape Verde Islands on 29 April, 
Sampson left a few cruisers off Cuba and took the rest of the Squadron to San Juan, 
Puerto Rico.  His arrival was delayed by the fact that he had to have the two monitors 
assigned to the squadron towed.  It did not matter, however, because Cervera was not at 
San Juan.  The Squadron bombarded the city fortifications for about an hour, with little 
effect, then returned to Key West to refuel.  Upon arrival there, he was met with the news 
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that the Spanish had been sighted at Martinique.  With proof that Cervera did not, 
therefore, pose a threat to the east coast, Schley’s Flying Squadron was detached from 
Hampton Roads and ordered to report to Sampson at Key West.  Both squadrons met at 
the Naval Station on 18 May.  While they were deciding their next move, Cervera was 
able to refuel at Curacao, then steam quickly across the Caribbean to the safety of 
Santiago de Cuba. 
 While Sampson was busy hunting for Cervera, the Asiatic Squadron, under 
Commodore George Dewey, delivered a crushing defeat to the Spanish squadron 
guarding the Philippines at the Battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898.  The Asiatic 
Squadron’s experience is not directly concerned with this study.  However, a couple of 
observations are in order.  Dewey’s squadron consisted of the cruisers Olymipa (flag), 
Baltimore, Boston, and Raleigh, gunboats Petrel and Concord, and the revenue cutter 
McCulloch.  Of these seven warships, Baltimore, Raleigh, and Petrel had served with the 
North Atlantic Squadron, and Boston and Concord with Walker’s Squadron of Evolution, 
prior to their assignment to a foreign cruising station.  Only the flagship Olympia had not 
had the opportunity to be immersed in daily, multi-ship operations.  In this can be seen 
evidence of the fruition of Luce’s vision of using the North Atlantic Squadron as a school 
of practical application for the fleet.   
 Unlike the Battle of Santiago, which will be discussed shortly, the Battle of 
Manila Bay was actually fought in formation.  Prior to the engagement, Dewey formed 
his squadron into a column.  He then directed the movements of the column as it 
attacked, withdrew, and then re-attacked the Spanish line.  The simple column was not a 
complicated formation, nor did it have to be maneuvered in a complex manner, mostly 
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due to the fact that the Spanish squadron was stationary.  Nonetheless, it can be argued 
that at least some of the credit for the success enjoyed by the Asiatic Squadron belongs to 
the rigorous exercise at sea that six of its seven members received while with the Home 
Squadron/Squadron of Evolution in the 1890’s. 
 Meanwhile, not knowing that Cervera had steamed for Santiago, Sampson 
assumed that he would be headed either for Havana or Cienfuegos, a harbor on the 
southern coast of Cuba that was connected by railway with the capital.  Accordingly, 
Sampson augmented the Flying Squadron with Iowa, and sent Schley to blockade the 
harbor of Cienfuegos.   Meanwhile, he took the remainder of the North Atlantic Squadron 
and blockaded Havana.  It was at this point that Schley committed the first of several 
missteps which contributed to the acrimony between the two men after the war.  Taking 
an inordinate amount of time to reach Cienfuegos, Schley did not arrive off the harbor 
until 22 May, and then was unable to ascertain definitively whether the Spanish were 
there or not.  Sampson, meanwhile, had received intelligence that Cervera was at 
Santiago, and frantically sent a dispatch vessel to Schley with orders to proceed to 
Santiago at once and find the Spanish.   
 Schley kept his own counsel, however, and delayed two days in leaving 
Cienfuegos.  When he finally got within about 30 miles of Santiago, he decided that his 
squadron was low on coal.  Unable to refuel at sea due to bad weather, he turned the 
Flying Squadron around and steamed for Key West.  While headed West, the Squadron 
was met by another dispatch vessel with orders from the Navy Department to return to 
Santiago and find out whether or not Cervera’s squadron was actually there, and to “take 
appropriate action” if it was.  Schley’s response was: “Much to be regretted, cannot obey 
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orders,” and he continued for Key West.  Secretary of the Navy Long later remarked that 
the Department could be justly criticized for not relieving Schley on the spot.”  
Fortunately for Schley’s career, as well as the U.S. war effort, there was a break in the 
weather and Schley was finally able to refuel his ships lowest on coal.  On the evening of 
28 May, he returned to Santiago and found the Spanish squadron in the harbor.   
 Sampson brought the North Atlantic Squadron to Santiago immediately.  With the 
two forces unified, he established a close blockade of Santiago de Cuba.  On 10 June, he 
ordered a battalion of Marines ashore at nearby Guantanamo Bay to establish a coaling 
and resupply station.  The successful operation validated the many landing exercises the 
North Atlantic Squadron had carried out in over the previous years.  Sampson then called 
upon the Army to land and capture Santiago’s fortifications, so that he could approach 
the harbor without exposing his capital ships to fire from the Spanish guns.  In response, 
16,000 men led by General William R. Shafter embarked in transports at Tampa, Florida, 
and sailed to the southeastern coast of Cuba.  The 32 transport ships were convoyed by 
Navy warships, in an escort formation reminiscent of one that had been practiced by Rear 
Admiral Case in 1874. 
 General Shafter’s forces landed twenty miles east of Santiago.  Sampson met with 
Shafter on 20 June.  On 1 July, the U.S. forces attacked Santiago’s outer defenses at El 
Caney and San Juan Hill.  The Americans carried the defenses, but at a cost of over 1500 
men killed or wounded.  Shafter was concerned that he would have to withdraw, and he 




 This, of course, was impossible, due to the mines and the guns of the still-
uncaptured Spanish fortifications.  On the morning of 3 July, Sampson set out in New 
York to meet with Shafter and tell him so.  Schley was left in charge of the blockade.  At 
9:30AM, the Spanish squadron sortied from Santiago.  Every U.S. ship that could get up 
enough steam took off in pursuit of the Spanish ships, firing wildly.  New York, with 
Sampson aboard, turned around and frantically raced toward the scene of the battle, only 
to find the action largely over by the time she could get within the range of her guns.   
During these initial moments, Schley’s actions again came into question.  
Concerned either about being within range of Spanish torpedoes or that Cervera’s 
flagship, Infanta Maria Theresa, was trying to ram him, or some combination of both, 
Schley ordered Brooklyn’s captain to turn her to starboard4, in a circle which nearly 
caused a collision with Texas and Oregon.  Texas was required to back her engines hard, 
bringing the battleship almost to a complete halt.  She was forced to stop firing as 
Brooklyn masked her guns.  Oregon managed to evade both Texas and Brooklyn and 
continue past to the east.  This episode would later be referred to as “The Loop.”  The 
final outcome of the engagement, never really in question, took a little over three hours 
and just less than 10,000 shells to effect.  In the end, “a materially superior U.S. fleet had 
virtually destroyed its Spanish opponent while suffering almost no damage to itself.”5
 In the battle’s aftermath, controversy erupted over which admiral deserved credit 
for the victory.  Rear Admiral Sampson, although he had left the area for his meeting 
with General Shafter, remained in overall command of the victorious fleet, and left no 
 
                                                 
4 i.e. in the opposite direction from the heading of the escaping Spanish ships. 
 




doubt in his initial telegrams to Washington D.C. that he considered himself the victor.  
Rear Admiral Schley, as the acting C-in-C in Sampson’s absence, was in command 
during the battle itself.  However as previously noted, his actions as officer-in-tactical-
command largely consisted of flying a signal ordering the fleet to chase down the Spanish 
ships.  The uneasy relationship between the two admirals was at least cordial in the 
beginning.  Schley’s after-action report to Sampson congratulated him “most sincerely 
upon this great victory to the squadron under your command (my italics)…and I am glad 
that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for 
all of us.”6
 
  After the war, tension between the two continued to grow until certain 
remarks, attributed to naval officers, were made public which cast aspersions on Schley’s 
conduct in the early days of the campaign and the inept way in which Brooklyn was 
handled during the Santiago action.  Schley demanded, and received a court of inquiry 
into his conduct in 1901.  Alerted in advance that the board’s findings were largely 








                                                 






“It was not the ‘sprint’ at the end, the feverish purchase of new ships or the 
repair of old ones, that enabled the United States Navy to meet all emergencies 
without hitch.  No; it was the ‘hammer, hammer’ on the hard road of routine; 
the result of the gradual building up, by recent administrations, of a new navy 






We have no way of knowing how the North Atlantic Squadron’s transformation 
would have been judged if it had been fully tested in 1898.  Fortunately, the Squadron did 
not face a peer competitor in close order fleet combat.  The fact that the hapless Spanish 
ships were destroyed by a superior North Atlantic Squadron has dominated the historical 
narrative of the 3 July 1898 engagement, but the Battle of Santiago was not a fleet action.  
After Rear Admiral Schley’s flagship hoisted the signals to “Follow the flag,” and “Close 
up,” the subsequent engagement resembled nothing so much as a target practice with the 
targets in motion.  Theodore Roosevelt later referred to it as a “captain’s fight,” the 
implication being that further coordination and leadership from the flag was not 
required.8
Viewed properly, the Battle of Santiago represents not a conclusion or a finalized 
outcome, but a waypoint in the process of the development of an American battle fleet. 
The endpoint of this transformation requires further study.  It can be argued that the first 
true test of American ability to fight in close order was the deployment of Battleship 
Division Nine to join the Royal Navy Grand Fleet during the First World War.  British 
   
                                                 
7 Goode, ed., 4. 
 




officers were underwhelmed with the tactical abilities of the U.S. battleships, particularly 
with respect to gunnery.9  Having been thus exposed directly to the best practices of a 
mature fleet, however, the U.S. Navy was able to develop its own battle fleet in the 
interwar period.  The proper endpoint of a full study of the development of a U.S. battle 
fleet would thus include the fleet problems of the 1920’s and 1930’s, and end with the 
outbreak of the Second World War.10
This is not to denigrate the significance of the process the Squadron went through 
to develop the ability to carry out the 1898 operations.  It was a process that deserves 
careful study.  This dissertation has argued that, beginning in 1874, the North Atlantic 
Squadron underwent a slow transformation from a largely administrative organization to 
a coherent combat unit.  It was not a linear process, but one in which progress in critical 
areas was modulated by conflicting demands that caused distraction.  From 1874 to 1897, 
the Squadron was constantly required to balance the missions of cruising, domestic 
security, and public relations with the Navy Department’s desire to train for fleet combat.  
   
The operational record narrated in this study, over a period of 23 years, suggests 
three distinct periods of ongoing development of the identity of the North Atlantic 
Squadron as a combat unit.  This development was not continuously progressive, but was 
interspersed with setbacks.  The conduct of foreign policy and limitations of materiel 
interfered with the ability of the Squadron to concentrate its forces in a manner conducive 
to conducting fleet tactical exercises and building unit identity.  The Squadron began 
conducting tactical exercises with the wooden cruising assets available.  A protean 
                                                 
9 Jerry W. Jones, U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1998). 
 
10 For instance, C.C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940 
(Texas A&M University Press, 2006). 
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concept of multi-ship operations was developed, yet the Squadron did not possess a fleet 
warfighting capability, a fact widely acknowledged by naval officers.11
The U.S. Navy, circa 1874 has been criticized as ineffectual.  In fact, as historian 
Lance Buhl has argued, the U.S. possessed an adequate navy given the nation’s priorities 
in the 1870’s.
  An interim 
period began when the last of the wooden cruising vessels was replaced by steel 
warships.  The Navy accelerated the development of multi-ship capabilities with the 
deployments of the Squadron of Evolution, the Squadron for Special Service, and the 
Naval Review Fleet.  The latter two units were concerned mainly with appearance, rather 
than warfighting capability.  While largely for public relations purposes, their 
deployments forced the Navy Department to deal with a range of logistical issues and 
provided valuable experience for junior officers in the art of close order, multi-ship 
operations.   A mature – I do not say complete – capability arrived when the Squadron 
was able to exercise its modern assets under simulated combat conditions, such as the 
mock blockade of Charleston, South Carolina.  These exercises proved valuable when the 
Squadron was called upon to carry out similar tasks during the War of 1898. 
12
                                                 
11 Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in the Bay of Florida, and the Navy of the Future." 
  It was highly professionalized, with entry into the officer corps 
controlled by the U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval Institute as a forum for 
professional discourse and development.  From a materiel standpoint, the wooden 
cruising vessels in use possessed the requisite amount of firepower to successfully 
intimidate small Caribbean nations, while their sails allowed them to cruise on station for 
long periods of time economically.  This study has favorably compared the North 
 
12 Lance Buhl, “Maintaining an American Navy,” in Kenneth J. Hagen, ed. In Peace and War: 




Atlantic Squadron in 1874 with the Royal Navy’s Pacific Northwest Squadron at the 
same time, showing that the warships utilized to carry out the cruising mission were 
similar in the two navies.  The difference was that the Royal Navy possessed enough 
resources to execute the cruising mission while retaining enough armored warships to 
field another squadron with a primary mission of fleet combat against a peer European 
naval power.  The U.S. Navy had no such luxury.  Fleet tactical training prior to 1874 
was largely theoretical.  Visionary officers such as Commodore Foxhall Parker wrote 
textbooks and developed signaling capabilities.  Naval cadets were examined on the 
theory of tactical formations at Annapolis.  No operational capability existed, however, 
and none was thought necessary until national strategic priorities changed.  The Virginius 
incident in late 1873 highlighted the fact that the U.S. government could no longer pursue 
its strategic priorities in the Caribbean region with the Navy as it was then constituted, 
and pressed for change.13
From 1874, the Navy Department made a conscious decision to train its personnel 
in the mechanics of fleet tactics under steam.  This was to be practical training to 
complement the instruction naval cadets received at the Academy.  The 1874 exercises 
were conducted at a speed of four knots, useless for an actual engagement against an 
enemy fleet.  By 1882, the speed of the maneuvers had been raised to six knots.  Tactical 
exercises with wooden cruising vessels had limits, though.  By 1882, Rear Admiral 
Cooper let the Navy Department know in several of his reports that he felt his squadron 
had accomplished what it could in terms of practicing tactical formations.  The strategic 
purpose for multi-ship operations was still unclear, as contingencies regularly interfered 
  A new strategic purpose for the Navy required not only new 
materiel, but a new concept of operations and a new identity for the Home Squadron. 




with the ability to concentrate enough warships to conduct fleet tactical training.  As an 
example, Rear Admiral Cooper’s relief, Rear Admiral Jouett, spent a large portion of his 
commander-in-chief tour responding to the revolution in Colombia and the threats to the 
passage of the Panamanian isthmus.   
Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce wanted more.  After establishing the Naval War 
College in 1884, he attempted to marry the theoretical work of the War College staff and 
students with practical application by the North Atlantic Squadron warships during 
summer exercises.  During his tour as commander-in-chief, the Navy Department’s 
strategic priorities had not yet developed to this point where enough assets could be made 
available to carry out Luce’s vision.  The requirement to provide presence throughout the 
Caribbean and the Canadian fisheries consistently interfered with, and eventually 
precluded his ability to carry out tactical exercises, much to Luce’s frustration. 
This limitation was addressed during 1889-1891 by providing a venue for multi-
ship operations which would not be subject to the requirements of station cruising.  As 
the first four steel warships authorized in 1883 were commissioned and joined the fleet, 
the Navy Department made a conscious decision to concentrate them, rather than assign 
them piecemeal to the various cruising stations.  The establishment of the Squadron of 
Evolution in 1889, under the leadership of Rear Admiral John G. Walker, not only 
provided intensive experience in daily multi-ship operations, it required the Navy 
Department to address logistical issues associated with the overseas deployment of 
concentrated forces of warships.  Rear Admiral Walker’s correspondence made it clear 
that he viewed his primary duty as a commander-in-chief to be the preparation of his 
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squadron for combat.  This marked a clear departure from the concept of command and 
the command experience of previous squadron commanders-in-chief.   
The absence of an operational chain-of-command hindered developments during 
this time.  The Admiral of the Navy was an advisor to the Secretary of the Navy without 
executive functions.  Thus, individual squadron commanders did not report to a superior 
naval officer, but directly to the appointed secretary of the navy or his civilian assistant.  
This led to conflicts of personality among squadron commanders, most notably the tense 
relationship between Rear Admiral Gherardi of the North Atlantic Squadron and Rear 
Admiral (acting) Walker of the Squadron of Evolution.  No structure was in place to 
mitigate these difficulties.  Walker was an advocate of Stephen B. Luce’s ideas, having 
used his influential position as chief of the Bureau of Navigation to support Luce’s efforts 
to establish the Naval War College.  However, his personal behavior and his conflict with 
Gherardi precluded what could otherwise have been an opportunity for meaningful multi-
squadron tactical exercises in 1891-1892.  Indeed, the evidence shows that the Navy 
Department went out of its way to keep the warships of the two squadrons apart during 
this time.  The Sampson-Schley controversy following the Battle of Santiago indicates 
that issues of hierarchy of command remained to be corrected in the years following the 
period under study. 
Further refinement of multi-ship operations came with the cruise of the Squadron 
for Special Service in 1892-1893, and the Naval Review Fleet in 1893.  Both of these 
organizations provided extensive formation work and experience in the administrative 
and logistical problems associated with the deployment of large numbers of ships.  
However, while live-fire practice and drills were carried out on each ship, multi-ship 
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formation work and maneuvers in both of these units were largely about appearance, not 
fighting skill.  Appearance was important in this age.  The participation of the U.S. Navy 
on the stage of international naval pageantry made important contributions both to the 
image of the United States in its people’s eyes and abroad, as well as to the squadron-
based identity of U.S. Navy warships. 
From 1895, squadron maneuvers were focused more on combat.  Maneuvers not 
only exercised the warships at various formations, they began to have a specific strategic 
purpose, such as the blockade of Charleston, South Carolina in 1896.  Target practice, 
however, continued to be at stationary targets.  There is no evidence during this time that 
practice took place which married the ability to maneuver warships in close order 
formation with accurate naval gunnery.  The limitations of stationary target practice 
would be displayed at Santiago de Cuba.  The outcome of that engagement would lead to 
gunnery reforms, most notably the work of Admiral William A. Sims, in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. 
As the North Atlantic Squadron focused more on its mission to develop the 
capability to engage an enemy squadron at sea, it devoted more time and resources to the 
naval militia movement.  Assigning the mission of the protection of strategically 
important harbors and cities to ironclad monitors crewed by militia volunteers served two 
important purposes.  Supporting local and state naval militias gave key local leaders, 
congressmen, and senators throughout the east coast a stake in the continued 
modernization of the Navy.  It also freed the North Atlantic Squadron to carry out its 
primary mission, which was training for the engagement and destruction of an enemy 
fleet at sea.  During the War of 1898, the presence of naval militia, although not as 
343 
 
calming to the populace as the presence of a steel warship, enabled the formation of the 
Northern Patrol Squadron, which allowed the North Atlantic and Flying Squadrons to 
focus on taking the offense. 
The unpacking of this process of organizational change in the North Atlantic 
Squadron has implications for the debate over the nature of U.S. imperial aspirations in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century.  The results of this study reinforce and extend the 
work done by Stephen Roberts to claim that a “pattern of informal empire” existed in the 
years prior to the War of 1898.14  This study concludes that not only did the Navy 
regularly call at ports considered vital to U. S. business interests, as Roberts showed, but 
that the Navy Department made a conscious decision as early as 1874 to develop the 
capability to fight fleet-level engagements.  That process was not completed during the 
period of this study.  However, the process of change provides evidence that the 
“imperial moment” of 1898 was not an accident.  It was the result of a deliberate course 
of action and the development of a specific naval capability tied to the imposition of U.S. 
will beyond its borders.  In this way, this study confirms the work of historians who have 
maintained that the events of 1898 can only be understood through the lens of the 
developments of the previous decades.15
Before either materiel or structural changes had taken place within the Navy 
Department, the North Atlantic Squadron was undergoing a process by which not only its 
function, but its very identity was changing.  This was happening before it was evident to 
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15 Plesur, America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890; Plesur, Creating an 
American Empire, 1865-1914; Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the 




outsiders in the form of new ships.  Today’s U.S. Navy is in the midst of a period of 
profound change.16
  
  With the end of the Cold War and the rise of global terrorism, a 
Navy which was structurally and materially designed to fight the Soviet Union has been 
called upon instead to fight the War on Terror.  What this means for the Navy of 
tomorrow remains to be seen.  Within today’s military, function and identity have been 
forced to change in response to new missions.  These new missions have often been 
carried out using materiel designed for functions in keeping with an outdated strategic 
purpose.  This study highlights the importance of considered strategic direction and 
allocation of resources.  It shows that the process of organizational change can be well 
underway in advance of new materiel, and cautions against the resulting conflict between 
actual and desired missions and functions.  Above all, it demonstrates that any new 
capability not developed through rigorous exercise at sea may, in fact, not be a capability 
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*Data taken from Secretary of the Navy Annual Reports and C-in-C after-action reports.  
Credit is given for an entire underway period if the Squadron remained together and at 
least one exercise in “fleet tactics under steam” was held.  Only squadron exercise under 
the control of the C-in-C as Officer in Tactical Command is considered.  Credit is not 
given for moving from port to port in company, for two-ship detached section work, or 
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